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Displaying: 21-40 of 1823 documents


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21. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Joshua R. Sijuwade Grounding Eternal Generation
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This article aims to provide an explication of the Christian doctrine of eternal generation. A model of the doctrine is formulated within the ground-theoretic framework of Jonathan Schaffer and E. Jonathan Lowe, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the doctrine can be successfully answered.
22. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Blake Hereth Heavenly Procreation
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Kenneth Einar Himma (2009, 2016) argues that the existence of Hell renders procreation impermissible. Jason Marsh (2015) contends that problems of evil motivate anti-natalism. Anti-natalism is principally rejected for its perceived conflict with reproductive rights. I propose a theistic solution to the latter problem. Universalism says that all persons will, postmortem, eventually be eternally housed in Heaven, a superbly good place wherein harm is fully absent. The acceptance of universalism is now widespread, but I offer further reason to embrace one variant of it. If universalism is true and there are opportunities to procreate in Heaven, then reproductive autonomy is largely preserved for everyone. Assuming Heaven is a harm-free place, there are no risks to children born in Heaven, unlike Earth or Hell. While this requires human persons to accept temporary restrictions on procreation during our premortem lives, the bulk of reproductive autonomy is preserved since one will have infinite opportunities to reproduce in Heaven.
23. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Christopher Hauser Aquinas on Persons, Psychological Subjects, and the Coherence of the Incarnation
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The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas’s answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas’s position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas’s response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.
book reviews
24. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Andrew M. Bailey, Kenny Boyce Thomas M. Ward: Divine Ideas
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25. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Chan, Travis Darnold Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler, eds.: Becoming Someone New: Essays On Transformative Experience, Choice, And Change
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26. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Kris McDaniel Luis R.G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran: Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays In Honor Of Lynne Rudder Baker
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27. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Robert C. Roberts John Lippitt: Love’s Forgiveness: Kierkegaard, Resentment, Humility, And Hope
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28. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Zita V. Toth Tobias Hoffmann: Free Will And The Rebel Angels In Medieval Philosophy
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29. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Terry Godlove Allen W. Wood: Kant And Religion
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30. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
T. Parker Haratine Jordan Wessling: Love Divine: A Systematic Account Of God’s Love For Humanity
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articles
31. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Meghan D. Page, Allison Krile Thornton Have We No Shame?: A Moral Exemplar Account of Atonement
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Although Christ’s atoning work on the cross is perhaps the most central tenet of Christianity, understanding precisely how the cross saves remains a theological mystery. We follow the Abelardian tradition and argue that Christ’s death on the cross acts as an example of God’s love for humanity and a means of drawing us back into communion with the triune God. However, our view avoids the standard objection to exemplar views—that they are Pelagian—by introducing an alternative conception of the problem of sin, according to which Christ’s example of God’s love is in fact required for salvation and sanctification.
32. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Gregory R. P. Stacey Simply the Best?: Ontological Arguments, Meinongianism, and Classical Theism
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Some critics claim that ontological arguments are dialectically ineffective against sceptics, whatever the sceptics’ broader metaphysical commitments. In this paper, I examine and contest arguments for this conclusion. I suggest that such critics overlook important claims about God’s nature (viz. divine simplicity and divine inimitability) typically advanced by proponents of ontological arguments who endorse classical theism. I reformulate two representative ontological arguments in light of this characterization of God, arguing that for philosophers prepared to endorse Meinongianism or modal Platonism, alongside divine simplicity and inimitability, such arguments are not invalid, question-begging, or obviously liable to parody. Accordingly, two species of ontological argument may possess some persuasive force, albeit for a select audience.
33. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Guy Kahane Should Atheists Wish That There Were No Gratuitous Evils?
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Many atheists argue that because gratuitous evil exists, God (probably) doesn’t. But doesn’t this commit atheists to wishing that God did exist, and to the pro-theist view that the world would have been better had God existed? This doesn’t follow. I argue that if all that evil still remains but is just no longer gratuitous, then, from an atheist perspective, that wouldn’t have been better. And while a counterfactual from which that evil is literally absent would have been impersonally better, it wouldn’t have been better for anyone, not even for those who suffered such evils.
34. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Timothy D. Miller On Three Varieties of Concurrentism and the Virtues of the Moderate Version
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Concurrentist views concerning Divine and secondary causes seek to establish both that secondary causes are fundamentally dependent upon God (contra deism) and that they make genuine, non-superfluous causal contributions (contra occasionalism). However, traditional (or strong) concurrentism struggles to establish a genuine, non-superfluous role for secondary causes, while weak concurrentism (aka, mere conservationism) has been accused of amounting to a sort of “weak deism” that grants too much independence to created beings. This essay introduces a moderate concurrentist alternative and argues that it preserves the most important benefits of the strong and weak varieties, while avoiding their most familiar difficulties.
35. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
William Hasker Is the Latin Social Trinity Defensible?: A Rejoinder to Scott M. Williams
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Scott Williams has provided a careful and detailed response to my critique of his Latin Social model of the Trinity. I reply to his defense, and I argue that this model is, in fact, indefensible.
36. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Scott M. Williams Gregory of Nyssa, Conciliar Trinitarianism, and the Latin (or Conciliar) Social Trinity: Response to William gHasker
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WilliamsThe disagreement between William Hasker and myself includes discussion of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theology, the relevance of Conciliar Trinitarianism for evaluating models of the Trinity, and the defensibility of my Latin Social model of the Trinity. I respond to Hasker’s recent objections regarding all three areas. I contest Hasker’s interpretation of Gregory and argue that Gregory is indeed a “one-power” theorist. I make historical connections between Gregory’s Trinitarian theology and Pope Agatho’s “one-power” statements that were endorsed by the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680-681ce); and I make explicit the Sixth Ecumenical Council’s interest in the general issue of how “ousia” and “hypostasis” pertain to the Trinity and the Incarnation. Lastly, I defend and develop the Latin Social model in response to Hasker’s five objections. In light of my findings in the Sixth Council, I retire the name “Latin Social Trinity” for my model and replace it with a name more apt for my model, that is, the “Conciliar Social Trinity.”
37. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
William Hasker “Latin” or “Conciliar,” but Still Incoherent: A Rejoinder to Scott M. Williams
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HaskerI argue that Scott M. Williams’s “Latin/Conciliar Social Trinity” is unable to give a coherent account of some undisputed divine actions. The reason for this lies in Williams’s failure to recognize the different senses in which the trinitarian Persons can be said to have “powers.”
book reviews
38. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
John Y. Lee Mark R. Wynn: Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living Between Heaven and Earth
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39. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Elizabeth Li William Wood: Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion
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40. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 4
Justin Matchulat Michael P. Krom: Justice and Charity: An Introduction to Aquinas’s Moral, Economic, and Political Thought
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