Nietzsche’s conception of knowledge, usually known as perspectivism, bears such a resemblance to and has so many points of convergence with the skeptical doctrines that some of his commentators take Nietzsche’s “skepticism” for granted. But Nietzsche was frequently critical to skepticism and aimed to demarcate his own uniqueness towards the skeptical position. We propose to investigate here the similarities as well as the radical differences that separate both doctrines. We sustain that perspectivism is not a reflection on the limits of reason, but a reflection on the incognizable nature of the world itself. Nietzsche’s attitude towards knowledge is not a skeptical doubt, but a suspicion. Unlike doubt, suspicion itself is likely to be included in the set of things under suspicion and he who suspects admits remaining in uncertainty.

We know that Hans. George Gadamer, in his book Truth and Method substitutes the word ‘Bildung’ (education, self-formation) for ‘knowledge’. Our attempt to edify ourselves or to edify other persons may refer to the hermeneutic activity or to the inverse of hermeneutic activity, or, it may refer to activity of self-formation (Bildung). The basic formulation of the question may be expressed in this way: whether there is one way or many ways in which we might be edified. Broadly speaking, different approaches to this basic issue have been formulated differently. But there is an attempt to re-orient the notion of truth as a property of the propositional content to an event or phenomenon with ‘temporal specificity’ which is the result of accepting truth as that which occurs when the interaction between knower and the known object creates a fusion (Gadamer). Hence there is a possibility to reorient the conception of truth as that which occurs when the interaction between knower and the known object creates a fusion two of the achievement of mental pacification. (Buddhism) Buddhists tend to see truths (ultimate) as nirvāna. Hence from the perspective of the Pudgalavadin the status of emptiness as a prajnapti would not have hindered it from the category of an ultimate truth.

Epistemological problem has been one of the central in philosophy in the post-Soviet area for the last forty years. This sphere of philosophy (as well as logics, philosophy of science, some sections of the history of philosophy) had less ideological pressure and there were opportunities for a research work. Here, interesting philosophers appeared with their original conceptions (including O.V. Il’enkov, T. P. Shedrovitsky, M. K. Mamardashvili, G.S. Batishev, M.K. Petrov and others) who created their own schools. Live discussions were conducted and fruitful links were established with some special sciences such as psychology, history of science, and linguistics. The situation has changed at present. New disciplines have appeared the existence of which in philosophy was impossible, such as political philosophy and philosophy of religion. In essence, the history of Central Asian philosophy has been studied anew. For the irst time it has become possible to discuss seriously those problems related to social philosophy or ethics. In this new situation epistemological problem has become less important. It seems that the main approaches to its solution are known and developed in detail while one cannot say that about the other sections of philosophy.

The subject matter of the paper is supposed to be the challenge to the transcendentalist theory of knowledge from the background of the “epistemology naturalized” (or the so-called “eliminative epistemology”). The heuristic power and cognitive limits of the naturalistically oriented theory of knowledge will be thoroughly scrutinized. A “strong” and more reasonable “moderate” attitude to eliminative epistemology will be considered. It is argued that the non-intentional re-description of the basic concepts of traditional epistemology in terms of impersonal and non-intentional “information”, “prediction”, “control” (which lead to “adaptation”, “effectiveness” and so on) paves the way not only to the elimination of the philosophical theory of knowledge, but also to the depreciation of philosophy as such. It will be substantiated that philosophical theory of knowledge cannot be reduced to general theoretical divisions of cognitive sciences. The significance of E. Husserl’s phenomenology as one of the most sophisticated approaches to the study of human reason in maintenance of the basic principles of the philosophical theory of knowledge will be shown.

This theory is revealed in terms of existential materialism finding its source in Aristotle’s maxim that philosophy is a study of essential unity of the grounds of being and consciousness. Let me coin a word for this remarkable situation from which the process of cognition starts: “Dabewuβtsein”. New theory still makes use of the old principle of reflection postulating the subject/object dyad. Its metamessage is anti-new-Kantianism, indifferent to the unity mentioned, splitting essence and phenomenon, be it epistemology or its postmodern background. Despite of the recognition of subject/object coincidence turning into their mutual interference in “Dabewuβtsein”, new theory points out that there is not really a dyad, but a triad of cognitive relationship: subject – language – object. To cope with the main gnoseological problem of truth, we offer that not only paradigmatic, but also syntagmatic axis has to be considered. The basic syntagma of gnoseology is contemplation on absolute and relative in true knowledge (but not in Hegelian way, deriving it from Absolutische Idee).

In Quine’s eyes, naturalism can be characterized negatively as the abandonment of a first philosophy prior to natural science. But what are Quine’s reasons for rejecting first philosophy? Prima facie, Quine’s argument against first philosophy seems to be pretty straightforward: in his “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine famously argues that we ought to abandon traditional epistemology because all attempts to ground our beliefs on sense experience have failed. That is, he argues that we ought to despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena. Let me call this the standard conception of Quine’s rejection of first philosophy. The standard conception is widespread among both Quine scholars and critics. In this presentation, I will argue that the standard conception is mistaken. I will show that Quine’s argument against the first philosopher is considerably stronger than the standard conception suggests. Quine does not abandon traditional epistemology out of despair but because the project does not make sense to begin with. Not only is the idea of an external validation of science incoherent, the scientific enterprise also does not require any additional justification in the first place. What I will try to offer, then, is a reconstruction of Quine’s actual argument against first philosophy and a reinterpretation of “epistemology naturalized”.

The tradition of philosophy relies on the hard rationality, which has the standard logic as and its application as its fundamental model. Knowledge and reason are relegated to only two options: hard rationality or irrationality. By attentively studying the history of science and its debates, Dascal comes out with his types of polemics theory. There are two types of polemics that are related to that dichotomized view of rationality: The discussion, guided by hard rationality, and the dispute, the “pathological” debate guided by no rationality. Dascal brings out an alternative via, the controversy. The controversy is able to deal with a range of inquiries from science that remains unsolved, such as those that are inaccurate and uncertain. To be up with this open frame of questions for the debate and to accomplish persuasion, the controversy employs what Dascal calls soft rationality that is about what is reasonable. Aristotle, as it is well-known, presents the hard rationality of science on the Analytics. My aim here is to show that we can find a philosophical support for soft rationality even in the traditional Aristotelian view.

In this paper I explore the conflict of philosophical intuitions that makes it hard to get a grip on the nature and scope of first-person knowledge. First, I shall sketch the shape of this disagreement, applying it to a debate between philosophical accounts of self-knowledge and psychological ones. Secondly, I shall argue that philosopher’s current work on self-knowledge opens up an entirely new way of thinking about many of our first-person claims. But while, this new way of thinking is inspired by philosophical considerations, it is driven by psychologist’s empirical findings. I suggest that the philosophical and psychological accounts of self-knowledge can be reconciled; it may simply be a matter of calibrating this debate in terms of the kinds of mental states and processes under consideration, or the kinds of situations in which first-person judgments are made, or the kind of self-judging subject in question (that is child or adult). I suggest an emphasis on the claim that more work needs to be done on methodological direction of acquiring self-knowledge that can subsume this psychological work on fist-person error while leaving the inalienable, intentional authority of agents intact.

This paper is a contribution to the comparison of – on the one hand – the understanding of knowledge and belief by Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904-1984), whose philosophy is a version of transcendental philosophy (interpreted as a form of transcendental Thomism, intentionality analysis, or phenomenology), with – on the other hand – notions of knowledge and belief held by contemporary analytical philosophers (such as P. K. Moser, W. P. Alston, K. Lehrer, A. Plantinga, among others). A crucial problem of contemporary analytical epistemology (the theory of knowledge) is the question: what is knowledge? Although in epistemology we find different conceptions of knowledge, the basic conception to which discussions (be they positive or polemical) appeal is the classical conception of knowledge. This limits knowledge to propositional knowledge, which is defined as justified true belief. The task of the paper is, first, to reconstruct the notion of belief used by B. Lonergan; second, to show how Lonergan’s notion of belief differs from that of analytical philosophers; and third, to show that the Lonerganian notion of belief is not the basic category involved in understanding propositional knowledge as it is understood by analytical philosophers.

Any description must take some corresponding stipulation as its premise. All stipulations are formed in the tension between objective basis and subjective needs. This means that description has clear anthropological characteristics and therefore the nature of standard. Description will reach its edge and lose its meaning while it describes the stipulation as the premise of itself. But it will turn into the basic way of development of human description when the description is made on the foundation of a higher level stipulation and goes beyond the original one. Some stipulations are clear and definite, and some others may be implied. It’s the origin of paradoxes that the description conflicts with the implied stipulation as the premise of itself. The basic origin of paradox is the conflict involves stipulation in the description. As for the concrete origins of paradoxes, there are three kinds of mechanisms that descriptions causes the conflicts between stipulations: (a) Description causes the conflicts between the description as a special stipulation itself and the stipulation(s) as the premise of the description itself; (b) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by interrelating stipulation(s) involve(s) paradox; (c) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by the adhesion of stipulation(s);(d) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by the confusion of stipulation(s).

Considered as will, ‘way of life’ consists of two unresolvable issues. (1) The will is never known in itself; yet, this fact does not negate the possibility of experiencing it. (2) The will can never be fully denied, yet we can create the illusion of a brief hour of rest from the will. I posit that philosophy exists as a ‘way of life’ in the form of this unresolvable will. The world consists of one thing. Arthur Schopenhauer’s project attempts to name this thing, bringing it beyond the vague placeholders of other systems of philosophy: the Dao of Daoism, God in Spinoza, what is unified and one in Parmenides. In calling out this placeholder, Schopenhauer achieves his greatness; and simultaneously, Schopenhauer calls out Kant’s wholly unknown x, the thing-in-itself. In calling out the monistic substance and Kant’s wholly unknown x, Schopenhauer points us towards a ‘way of life’. This text explores this ‘way of life’ as an aspect of the epistemological denial of the will.

Marx’s concept of ideology (Ideologie) first appeared in the Chinese context (in 1919) as the term “ideal (form)”; and Marx’s “form of consciousness” (Bewuβtseinformen) was expressed as “ideology” in Chinese. All this come from the initial use of the term in the Japanese version and later the Chinese version of ‘1859 Preface to the Critique of Political Economics’. But interestingly, though Cheng Fangwu was the first to make the German Ideologie correspond directly to the Chinese “ideology” in 1927, during the first half of the 20th century, the main theorists in China theoretical circles as a whole seemed to have a natural tendency to use Marx’s concept of ideology in the name of “ideal form”, and still persisted in understanding Marx’s concept of ideology as form of social consciousness in general instead of as its specific form.

Le mot induction a deux sens différents. L’induction est: a) une méthode d’acquisition de nouvelles connaissances; et b) une espèce de raisonnement/syllogisme (raisonnement/syllogisme inductif). En tant que méthode de connaissance, l’induction se fonde sur le recours à l’observation et l’expérimentation. Cette propriété érige l’induction en la méthode par excellence de la découverte scientifique et de la vérité. En effet, c’est grâce à l’observation ou l’expérimentation, que nous acquérons De nouvelles connaissances et nous pouvons soumettre ces connaissances au contrôle de la vérité. Comme espèce de raisonnement/syllogisme, l’induction peut être définie ainsi: la marche de la pensée (logos), qui va du singulier/particulier au général/universel. De fait, grâce à l’observation nous formons nos premières propositions singulières et nous construisons les concepts. Le syllogisme inductif consiste à poser comme principe une proposition singulière, puis, à subsumer le sujet de cette proposition sous un concept et, enfin, à généraliser, c’est-à-dire à tirer une proposition générale/universelle et probable comme conclusion. Ces propriétés rendent l’induction une méthode capable d’être appliquée tant dans le champ des sciences de la nature (philosophie théorique) que dans celui des sciences de l’homme (philosophie pratique).

Répondant au besoin pour la philosophie et les sciences sociales de proposer à l’homme une image concordante de la vérité susceptible d’impacter sur l’existence humaine, Tarski a souhaité construire une théorie sémantique de la vérité. La célébrité de cette théorie dont les enjeux méthodologique et épistémologique sont révélés dans la volonté de proposer une image autre de la vérité que celle en vigueur dans les conceptions courantes sont pourtant aussi à l’image des interprétations qui en ont suivies, notamment celles de Field et de Popper. La définition tarskienne de la vérité est donnée par l’instance (T): «La phrase «la neige est blanche» est vraie ssi, la neige est blanche». Cette formulation définit la vérité comme correspondance entre un énoncé et les données extralinguistiques. En dépit de cette formulation orientée vers la saisie des intuitions aristotéliciennes, la théorie sémantique a subi des interprétations réductionnistes qui semblent incompréhensibles. Si on ne peut nier que l’aventure tarskienne est celle d’une correspondance; on ne peut s’accorder avec les interprétations réductionnistes de la théorie tarskienne. Nous voulons montrer que la théorie tarskienne ne répond pas au réductionnisme de Popper et de Field. Le point de résistance de la théorie tarskienne étant donné par la formulation d’une sémantique formelle suivant l’approche modèle-théorétique. Tarski reste convaincu de l’existence des structures d’interprétation – qui deviennent objectives dès lors qu’on les a adoptées. Il y a peut-être lieu de parler de réalisme, mais il s’agit d’un réalisme intra-théorique ou intra-structurel.

L'article vise à montrer la démarcation entre René Descartes et Karl Raimund Popper sur le statut épistémologique de la métaphysique dans l'«arbre de la connaissance». En effet, pendant que l'arbre cartésien du développement de la connaissance part d'une «métaphysique constituée» au sein de laquelle il enfonce ses racines, pour culminer sur les «3 M» (médecine, mécanique et morale), l'arbre poppérien du progrès de la connaissance procède à l'inverse en enfonçant ses racines dans une «métaphysique à construire» comme ouverture à la science et à l'épistémologie par la considération d'une première situation problématique dont le corollaire est une situation théorique, pour culminer sur un nouvel ensemble de situations problématiques/théoriques.

La necesidad propuesta por Kant de encontrar la unidad necesaria de la razón será el tema que tomo como punto de partida para desarrollar un estudio de la ‘Doctrina del Método’ de la KrV; la razón que se ha quebrado desde la primera página crítica de los textos kantianos, y desde la primera página se lucha por remediar esta disgregación. Con el título de ‘libre unidad de la razón’ quiero apostar por una solución que pasa por la consideración de la libertad como tarea relevante, dando así primacía al uso práctico de la razón. Dos son las razones principales por las que me he centrado en el texto de la ’Doctrina del método’: es el momento en que se introduce de forma clara el papel que ha de jugar la razón práctica más allá de los límites del uso puro especulativo de la razón y, en segundo lugar, es un texto que apenas ha sido modificado en la segunda edición de la Crítica, cuando sin embargo Kant ya ha desarrollado cambios en sus propuestas en otros escritos. Me detendré en concreto en las páginas de la ‘Disciplina’ y el ‘Canon’ y para entender el sentido de que estos textos se incluyan en esta primera Crítica.

Diverse epistemologists have proposed this Discriminability Postulate (DP): If S knows that p, then S can discriminate between the case that p and other relevant alternatives. I propose that DP derives from other, more basic postulate, that sees knowledge as providing some Warrant Against the Risk of Error (WARE): If S knows that p, then this knowledge confers on S’s belief that p a (reliable but typically fallible) warrant against the risk of error. The kind of error mentioned in WARE is the error consisting in mistaking the case that p for some of its relevant alternatives. But the possibility of mistaking in that sense entails that the subject has appropriate representational access to the two items that have to be distinguished. The fact that DP derives from WARE provides grounds to think that if DP is true, then the discriminative capacities than it involves are not jeopardized when the subject cannot have representational access to one of the corresponding items. A corollary of this idea is a weakening of DP and a subsequent reduction of its potential to raise sceptical doubts against claims of knowledge.

Las ciencias naturales han sido llamadas, con razón, ciencias inductivas, y por eso el estudio del problema de la inducción es central a nuestro conocimiento de la naturaleza. En el presente trabajo queremos determinar las complementariedades e influencias de las ideas de David Hume en la filosofía de Jean Nicod, filósofo que podría haber dejado muchas ideas interesantes y originales respecto al problema de la inducción, pero su corta estadía en este mundo impidió esta tarea. Así lo afirma Bertrand Russell en el prefacio de su libro Problema lógico de la inducción. Dado que Jean Nicod no es un autor muy conocido, recordemos que es un lógico y filósofo francés que vivió sólo 31 años, entre 1893 y 1924, y que Bertrand Russell fue uno de sus maestros durante su paso por Inglaterra. Hume no necesita presentación, pero recordemos simplemente, en este encuentro de filosofía de la naturaleza, que es uno de los naturalistas más completos de la historia del pensamiento. En este trabajo veremos algunas relaciones y cruces de ideas entre Hume y Nicod respecto a la inducción y a sus procedimientos.

Как из идеального мира (Ин) рождает Бытие (Ян)? Идеальный мир это единый мир пространств идей, программы – смыслы которых есть проекты событий, создаваемых ноосферой, происходящих в материальный мир. Человек воспринимает, осознаёт и определяет материю, изменяющуюся во времени и пространстве, как существующий трёхмерный материальный мир. Единицами измерения сущего мира являются: объём для пространства, время для энергии и вещество для материи. В упанишадах сказано «Идее, чтобы обнаружить себя, требуется форма». Информация это проекция новой формы идеи. Такое определение слова «информация» вытекает при сложении смыслов нескольких слов. Идея есть ограниченный объём пространства, притягивающий энергию (дух), структурированный программой – смыслом, дающей направление энергии. Потенциальная энергия это движение в замкнутом идеей напряженном объёме пространства. По Платону «хоре». «Хора» - это вечный «третий вид», «не поддающийся разрушению», дающий место или пристанище всему, что рождается на свет; сам он недоступен восприятию…». Материя есть движение «законсервированное» напряжённым пространством идеи вещи. По Ньютону m = F/a. Человек наполняет ноосферу Земли энергией слов и действий, чем в идеальном мире создаёт программы - смыслы будущих событий.

New interpretations of the truth as an attempt to achieve a more efficient test of true knowledge constantly emerge in the philosophy. But postmodernism, is giving up this trend; it does not recognize even the very notion of “truth”, considering it an attribute of the dominant ideology. Truth in postmodernism is, if it exists at all, completely situational. It derives from the given particular conditions and creates man as a reaction to these conditions, whereas the reaction is not necessarily appropriate to them, and is generated by the free play of the imagination, as well. In the post-modern concept of truth, the truth cannot be reduced x. there are no centers and mechanisms and it is in the initial set of meanings and interpretations. Today we are experiencing the need to overcome dogmatic truth and feel the need for flexible quick forms, not dividing, but uniting people.