La scène contemporaine des arts visuels et de la danse contemporaine en Afrique, semble proposer une illustration réussie du mot de Theodor Adorno selon lequel « l’art a perdu son caractère d’évidence.» Et nombreux sont les artistes qui acceptent de ne pas être compris des publics locaux. En fait, on remarque que les productions artistiques de type patrimonial ou de type moderne et contemporain, apparaissent dans des occurrences inégales. Parfois, l’offre et la demande se raccordent avec bonheur. Parfois, l’offre attend en vain la demande et il apparaît qu’en art comme ailleurs sur d’autres marchés, la valeur n’est pas tant un attribut intrinsèque de l’objet, qu’une valeur ajoutée par l’artiste et les opérateurs culturels.

Plato both created the Western aesthetic tradition and rejected the artistic claim to truth. I suggest that Plato’s rejection of the view that non-philosophical art is true gave rise to a debate later traversing the entire Western aesthetic tradition. I further suggest that the post-Platonic Western aesthetic tradition can be reconstructed as an effort by many hands to come to grips with and if possible overturn the Platonic judgment. I finally suggest that Hegel, in disagreeing with both Kant and Plato, presents an interesting anti-Platonic argument for “reforging” as it were the ancient link between art and truth. For in the final analysis, art, or at least some kinds of art, is not only beautiful but also in a deep sense true.

This paper offers a new look at Whitehead’s criticism of Leibniz’s metaphysics and at the role this criticism plays in the broader context of Whitehead’s philosophy. A re-evaluation of Whitehead’s reading is called for since he takes his own system as an elaboration of the Leibnizian one, and as an effort to overcome what he deemed its major difficulties. Whitehead’s alternative, which is formulated in terms of real connectivity among basic constituents, is aimed at solving what he takes to be the most problematic issue within Leibniz’s system, namely, the analysis of phenomenal continuity. However, I claim that Whitehead’s criticism obscures the fact that he is much closer to Leibniz than he is willing to admit.

Are all cultural products to be understood in cultural terms alone? The paper tries to open up our awareness beyond current culturalistic constrictions towards protocultural as well as transcultural factors involved in the production and understanding of art and other cultural phenomena.

This paper explores the relationship between technology and the environment. Although technological intervention can help humanity to address some of the most pressing environmental challenges, technological advances alone cannot solve all environmental ills. In some cases, the attempt to manipulate the environment through technology can lead to different types of environmental destruction. This paper thus suggests that the introduction and use of technology requires a critical assessment of its ethical and environmental benefits.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which occurred on the occasion of the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, caused enormous damage to the political, social, cultural and natural environments in Japan and still continues to create problems.What can we learn from the case of Fukushima from the viewpoint of the philosophy of technology?First, I emphasize that technology is not considered a closed system constituted only of a technological factor in the narrow sense of the term, but must be considered an open system related to and constituted of various factors, including social, cultural, and natural environmental factors. In this sense, technology is inherently multidimensional.Second, as there is no guarantee that multiple factors maintain a harmonious and stable unity under various circumstances, technology inevitably brings about unintended consequences. We must always consider the unmanageable and unpredictable character of technology, which can be characterized as the “otherness” character of technology and is to be considered a central problem of the philosophy and ethics of technology.

The management of radioactive waste, particularly of High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW) containing isotopes, whose half-life exceeds one million years, is a wicked and aporetic problem. The amount of waste increases continuously, while the question of management remains technologically and politically unsolved. Not only do the technological challenges involved exceed the horizon of scientists, but the ethical problems raised by the use of nuclear power have been neglected from the beginning. The history of nuclear power is as well a history of neglecting its consequences. No country is able to provide a suitable concept of storage for HLW. Instead, we have failing approaches: for example, decaying barrels in the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, and in Germany two salt mines stuffed with unregistered amounts of waste on the edge of collapse.After the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi in March 2011, the German Federal Government decided for the second time to stop using nuclear power as an energy source, and on July 5th 2013, it passed a law mandating a new search for a storage site. In the beginning of 2013, an interdisciplinary project—ENTRIA—was launched to investigate options for radioactive waste management from the perspectives of the technical sciences and the humanities. ENTRIA is evaluating three possible options for storage: deep geological disposal, retrievable deep geological repository with monitoring, and permanent dry cask storage above ground. Each of the three options bears particular technological and ethical challenges.

Noel Hendrickson argues that the coarse-grained account of action individuation is unwittingly committed to the metaphysical thesis that all causation is deterministic. I show that the argument does not succeed. On one of the interpretations, all the argument shows is that the minimalists are committed to deterministic causation in a manner of speaking, which is quite compatible with sui generis indeterministic causation. On another, the problem is that minimalism is taken to be committed to a necessary identity claim where the view is only committed to a contingent identity claim. I explore other strategies of saving the argument. In particular, I consider whether the argument will succeed if the designators in question are rigid. I argue that there are principled reasons for thinking that such a strategy must fail.

This paper describes life-philosophical lecturing, as developed by the author, as a form of performing art and as a positive, oral and non-directive philosophical practice that revitalizes the Socratic ideal of philosophy. Life-philosophical lecturing is explicated as a systems-intelligent technology of the self.

Although we are likely unaware of it, in one troubling respect nearly all of us today wear the ring of Gyges. Because we are “invisible,” we use the ring to harm others with impunity. What is our ring of Gyges? It is our use/release of epigenetically toxic environmental pollutants (ETEP), such as endocrine disruptors, metals, and some pesticides. For developmentally/pre- and-postnatally-exposed children, ETEP often cause heritable gene-expression changes, developmental toxicity (DT) that increases later-life disease/dysfunction/death, including asthma/allergy, cancer, cardiovascular disease, depression, diabetes, hypertension, immune/precocious autoimmune diseases, infertility, neuro-developmental/neuro-degenerative diseases, obesity, osteoporosis, puberty, and schizophrenia.Yet, like Gyges, we offenders are “invisible” in at least two senses: (i) invisible before the law, because current regulations do not prohibit ETEP exposures able to cause DT; (ii) invisible as perpetrators, because most child-DT harms appear later in life. This paper (1) uses ETEP and DT to explain how we cause severe, hidden, pollution harms to children and future generations, (2) argues that no major ethical theory can justify allowing avoidable ETEP, and (3) shows that we have justice-based duties to help stop avoidable ETEP exposures, because, to varying degrees, we help cause ETEP and profit from them. Finally, the paper (4) answers objections to (3).

There was once a lively debate concerning the individuation of events (specifically events that are actions) and whether, for example, “Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar” was the same action as “Brutus’s killing of Caesar.” More recently, I attempted to reinvigorate this debate by suggesting a new reason for distinguishing these two as separate actions: the inherent indeterminacy of Caesar’s death in “Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar” but not in “Brutus’s killing of Caesar” and further proposed that the debate was significant because (if my argument held) it has intimate connections to theories of causation (Hendrickson 2003). Katarzyna Paprzycka has carefully and thoughtfully shown that my original argument fails to cogently demonstrate the fine-grained theory of events because one cannot compellingly show that the determinacy with respect to Caesar’s death in “Brutus’s killing of Caesar” would transfer to “Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar.” However, the intuition behind the original argument may still survive as it is perhaps possible to argue directly that the best explanation for how there is an indeterminacy in “Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar” but not in “Brutus’s killing of Caesar” is that they are distinct events (and actions). In that case, there is still a “new” argument for a fine-grained theory of action individuation.

Analytic epistemology is thriving. Many people, however, think that it has gone wrong. They judge that it has become a new scholastics, narrow-minded, obsessed by a small set of problems, most of them examined through repetitive examples, thought experiments and paradoxes, such as the Gettier cases, stories about fake barns, bank cases, brains in vats and evil demons, or the lottery paradox. Philip Kitcher is one of these critics. In an article called “Epistemology without history is blind” published in Erkenntnis in 2011, he takes his stand from William James, “There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere” and judges severely the production of contemporary epistemologists. I disagree. Kitcher’s judgment is hasty, and analytic epistemology is not guilty of the sins that he denounces

In reply to my criticism of his argument for the fine-grained theory of action individuation, Hendrickson proposes a new argument. He notes that there is a kind of indeterminacy with respect to Caesar’s death in the case of Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar that is missing in the case of Brutus’s killing of Caesar. He argues that the best explanation for the indeterminacy is given by the fine-grained view. I show that the argument fails for similar reasons. Minimalists have good reasons not to accept a crucial premise, viz., that the indeterminacy is metaphysical rather than merely linguistic.

In “Doing Without Morality” Richard Kraut argues that Aristotle does not work with moral concepts such as moral rightness and duty. One of his arguments is that Aristotle treats wit as a virtue of character but not a moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics IV.8 and that this treatment should be extended to all the virtues of character. Though sympathetic to his conclusion, I offer three reasons for thinking that wit is ill-suited to play the role in which Kraut casts it: first, what Aristotle says about wit elsewhere in the NE calls its status as a character virtue into question; second, the taxonomy of virtue and vice implicit in NE IV suggests that wit is not a full-fledged character virtue; and third, in Eudemian Ethics III.7 Aristotle holds that wit is not a virtue of character. Along the way I discuss some intriguing complexities in Aristotle’s taxonomy of virtues and vices and suggest that Aristotle has the resources to make a principled distinction between personality and character traits.

I argue in this essay that practices of epistemological injustice by European scholars and researchers are neither a thing of the past nor a confine of philosophical debates driven by bad social science. Recent dimensions can be termed experimentations in science and ethics. Taking Africa as a place for scientific experimentation with hypotheses that have been classified as unethical is rife today, with the potential for far more serious and life threatening consequences. There are two phenomena that raise ethical questions and concerns: they are carried out by scientists and agencies who know well both short-term and long-term effects of the materials or products; moreover, the exportation of both the knowledge and materials for these experimentations is licensed by agencies of the governments of origin. The first concerns the exportation to and dumping in Africa of obsolete technological materials with high levels of toxity and radiation. The second concerns the mass exportation to Africa of scientific experimentations with genetically modified crops and foods when these are known in the countries of origin in Europe and America to bear pathogens harmful to both humans and ecological systems. The potential harm associated with these practices is comparable with, and puts them at the same level with, weapons of mass destruction, and their use ought to be questioned at the same level of concern as the use of sarin gas or cyanide in warfare.

What follows offers a solution for the problem of causal deviance in its three varieties. We consider Davidson on action, Grice on perception, and the account of knowledge as apt belief, as belief that gets it right through competence rather than luck. We take up the opposition between such traditional accounts and “disjunctivist” alternatives. And we explore how our take on the point and substance of metaphysical analysis bears on the problem and on competing reactions to it.

Deploying distinctions between ignorance of a proposition and ignorance that it is true, and between knowledge of a proposition and knowledge that it is true, I distinguish between propositional privacy and factive privacy. While the latter is limited to personal facts, the former encompasses personal falsehoods as well. I argue that propositional privacy is both broader and deeper than factive privacy, and accordingly that conceiving of the nature of privacy in terms of propositional privacy has important advantages over conceiving of it solely in terms of factive privacy. I draw similar lessons with regard to secrecy.

According to Pierre Bourdieu, practices and habits are out the realm of rationality; this claim about their nature explains their peculiar resistance to rational revision. I argue that one can explain the fact that practices and habits are difficult to revise, without abandoning the view that they are within the space of reasons.

‘Neokantianism and Platonism’ indicates an important issue of Neo-Hellenic Philosophy during the 1920s and the 1930s. The protagonist was Johannes Theodorakopoulos. His Heidelberg dissertation Platons Dialektik des Seins (1927) follows the Neokantian theories of judgement (of Emil Lask and Heinrich Rickert) and explores Plato’s theory of judgement with emphasis on Philebos’ categories of peras and apeiron. Theodorakopoulos’ prolegomena to the Greek translation (1929) of Paul Natorp’s Platos Ideenlehre are relevant here. Nevertheless, Theodorakopoulos developed a personal interpretation of Plato’s philosophy and almost demoted the Neokantian interpretation, as is clear in his Introduction to Plato (1941, in Greek) as also in his Heidelberg Vorlesungen 1969 entitled Die Hauptprobleme der Platonischen Philosophie. Besides, other interpretations of Plato came forward. Evangelos Papanoutsos wrote his Tübingen dissertation Das religiöse Erlebnis bei Platon (1926) under the supervision of Adickes. Konstantinos Georgoules, an earlier student of Husserl and Heidegger, published a translation of Plato’s Politeia (1939, in Greek) with a rather philological introduction.The Marxist Demetres Glenos, an opponent of Neokantianism, proposed a realistic interpretation of Plato’s Sophistes (1939, in Greek). Basileios Tatakes (an adherent of Henri Bergson) presented Plato’s philosophy as a reconciliation of reason and mysticism.

I argue that, despite similarities between them, Hayden White has fundamentally misunderstood Nietzsche’s philosophy of history. White, like many postmodern historical theorists, attributes to Nietzsche a truth-relativism with respect to historical facts and a value-relativism with respect to the worth of competing interpretations. I show that both of these attributions take insufficient account of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Nietzsche rejects relativism and endorses interpretations that further the interests of particular types of life. When Nietzsche’s position is properly distinguished from the kind of relativism ascribed by White, it will appear a coherent middle-ground between the positivist construal of historical truth and post-modern truth relativism.