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Displaying: 41-60 of 611 documents


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41. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Eric Raidl Neutralization, Lewis‘ Doctored Conditional, or Another Note on "A Connexive Conditional"
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Günther recently suggested a 'new‘ conditional. This conditional is not new, as already remarked by Wansing and Omori. It is just David Lewis‘ forgotten alternative 'doctored‘ conditional and part of a larger class termed neutral conditionals. In this paper, I answer some questions raised by Wansing and Omori, concerning the motivation, the logic, the connexive flavor and contra-classicality of such neutralized conditionals. The main message being: Neutralizing a vacuist conditional avoids (some) paradoxes of strict implication, changes the logic essentially only by Aristotle‘s Thesis, makes strong connexivity impossible, and remains in the realm of non-contra-classical logics.
42. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Erratum Notice
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43. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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44. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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45. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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research articles
46. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Ryan Miller Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures
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David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents‘ conformity to ideal rationality. I review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so there is no principled basis for claiming that only avoidance of true Dutch Books characterizes ideally rational agents. Agents without Byzantine Failures can be ideally rational in a very strong sense, but are not normative for humans.
47. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Rogelio Miranda Vilchis Improving Conceptual Engineering by Differentiating the Functions of Concepts
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The leading assumption of this paper is that we can improve the methodology of conceptual engineering if we differentiate between the different functions of our concepts. There is a growing body of research that emphasizes the revisionist virtues of conceptual engineering against the descriptive task of conceptual analysis. Yet, it also has faced severe critiques. Among the difficulties raised are the problems of conceptual identification and continuity. That is why several philosophers are trying to resolve these problems and improve the methodology by calling attention, for example, to the functions that concepts can play. I follow this line of argument and argue that we can increase the chances of success if we also clarify and differentiate them. Identifying and assessing the relationship between functions will help us avoid confusion, inconsistencies, and possible verbal disputes. Doing this not only serves our theoretical and practical purposes but helps us reconsider the potentialities and limits of the conceptual engineering program.
48. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Ragnar Van der Merwe Rational Decision-Making in a Complex World: Towards an Instrumental, Yet Embodied, Account
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Prima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than via any determinant or criterion such as rationality. I call this view radical voluntarism (RV). Proponents of RV include those who subscribe to a view they call Critical Complexity (CC). In this paper, I argue that CC presents a false dichotomy when it conceives of rationality in Cartesian – i.e. ideal and transcendental – terms, and then concludes that RV is the proper alternative. I then outline a pragmatist rationality informed by recent work in psychology on bounded rationality, ecological rationality, and specifically embodied rationality. Such a pragmatist rationality seems to be compatible with the tenets of post-structuralism, and can therefore replace RV in CC.
discussion notes/debate
49. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Timothy Kirschenheiter Objecting to the 'Doesn‘t Justify the Denial of a Defeater‘ Theory of Knowledge: A Reply to Feit and Cullison
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In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison‘s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate 'Doesn‘t Justify the Denial of a Defeater‘ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison‘s motivation for jointly offering their theories and recount counterexamples that others have offered against various theories that assert that knowledge is justified, true belief plus some condition concerning essential reliance.
50. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Gustavo Picazo On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics
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Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social groups. In this note, I introduce a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics, and argue that there are no 'fundamental metaphysical truths‘ (as Greenwood conceives of them) at all. If there is one thing that should not persist here, it is absolute metaphysics.
51. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Lukas Schwengerer Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Group Belief Against the Challenge from Group Lies
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Joint acceptance accounts of group belief hold that groups can form a belief in virtue of the group members jointly accepting a proposition. Recently, Jennifer Lackey (2020, 2021) proposed a challenge to these accounts. If group beliefs can be based on joint acceptance, then it seems difficult to account for all instances of a group telling a lie. Given that groups can and do lie, our accounts of group belief better not result in us misidentifying some group lies as normal assertions. I argue that Lackey‘s argument is not decisive. The cases she proposes as challenges for joint acceptance accounts can be dealt with in the joint acceptance framework. I present two different readings of Lackey‘s central case, showing that in both readings Lackey‘s example of a problematic group lie should not be identified as a lie, but rather as an epistemic mistake by the group. What kind of mistake the group makes depends on the exact reading of Lackey‘s case, but either way the group is not telling a lie.
52. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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53. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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54. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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research articles
55. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Youssef Aguisoul Group Belief: Summativism in Non-summativist Cases
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The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary objections to non-summativism tend to be rejectionists , i.e., showing that non-summativist cases involve group acceptance rather than group belief, my objection is newfangled in that it grants non-summativist cases group belief but shows that group belief in such cases is majority belief.
56. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Elliott R. Crozat Education and Knowledge
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In this paper, I challenge a traditional assumption concerning the nature and aims of education. According to epistemic infallibilism, propositional knowledge requires epistemic certainty. Though some philosophers accept infallibilism, others consider it implausible because it does not recognize ordinary cases of supposed knowledge. On this objection, we possess many items of propositional knowledge, notwithstanding the fallibleness of these items. Infallibilism is inconsistent with such items and thus considered unwarranted. I articulate this kind of objection to infallibilism as it concerns education. I then offer a cumulative case defense of infallibilism and evaluate that defense. This examination suggests that much of what we commonly consider as education does not provide knowledge, and therefore that the traditional assumption is incorrect. My paper has interdisciplinary interests with respect to epistemology, philosophy of education, philosophy of science, and pedagogical practice.
57. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Jumbly Grindrod Epistemic Standards and Value: A Puzzle
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In this paper, I present a puzzle that arises if we accept i) that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and ii) that whether a person counts as knowing is dependent upon a context-sensitive epistemic standard. Roughly, the puzzle is that if both claims are true, then we should always seek to keep the epistemic standard as low as possible, contrary to what seems like appropriate epistemic behaviour. I consider and reject a number of different ways of avoiding this consequence before presenting my own solution to the puzzle: that any view that posits a context-sensitive epistemic standard must relativize epistemic value as well.
58. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
M. Hosein M.A. Khalaj Gettier Cases, Mimicking, and Virtue Reliabilism
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It has been argued that virtue reliabilism faces difficulties in explaining why the “because-of” relation between true belief and the relevant competence is absent in Gettier cases. However, prominent proponents of this view such as Sosa and Turri suggest that these difficulties can be overcome by invoking the manifestation relation. In his Judgment and Agency, Sosa supports this claim based on an analogy between Gettier cases and what in the literature on dispositions is called mimic cases. While there are initial motivations for the alleged analogy, I claim there are at least two arguments against it: 1. there is an asymmetry in the nature of context-sensitivity between the problem of mimicking and the Gettier problem; 2. while causal deviance and double luck can be found in both the mimic case and the Gettier case, their causal processes are different in important respects, making it challenging to see them as both falling under the same category. If these arguments are on the right track, the upshot is that virtue reliablists such as Sosa and Turri who describe the “because-of” relation in terms of the manifestation relation still owe us an account of why the manifestation relation is absent in Gettier cases.
59. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Basil Müller Epistemic Dependence, Cognitive Irrationality, and Epistemic Conflicts of Interests: Why There Is a Need for Social Epistemic Norms
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When an agent A depends on an agent B to promote one of A's epistemic goals, this will often involve B's forming and sharing of true beliefs. However, as is well documented in research on cognitive irrationality, agents are disposed to form and share false-but-useful beliefs in a lot of circumstances. The dependence relation is thus at risk of becoming negative: A might adopt false beliefs from B and thus be unable to promote their epistemic goal. I propose that we can employ the notion of an epistemic conflict of interest [ECOI] to capture the kinds of problems that epistemically interdependent agents face. Much like familiar cases of conflict of interests—e.g., related to government officials—in ECOI an agent is subject to a normatively primary interest—roughly to form and share true beliefs—that stands in conflict with normatively secondary interests. I focus on secondary interests documented in the aforementioned research on cognitive irrationality. The resulting framework addresses an explanatory gap in the literature on social epistemic norms by making explicit why there’s a need for these norms to regulate our epistemic lives. Lastly, I show how the ECOI-framework furthermore allows us to make sense of and amend norm regulation failures.
discussion notes/debate
60. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
John C. Duff Gettier Unscathed for Now
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Moti Mizrahi (2016) argues that Gettier cases are unsuccessful counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge (TAK) because such cases inadequately reveal epistemic failures of justified true belief (JTB); and because Gettier cases merely demonstrate semantic inadequacy, the apparent epistemic force of Gettier cases is misleading. Although Mizrahi claims to have deflated the epistemic force of Gettier cases, I will argue that the presence of semantic deficiency in Gettier cases neither requires nor indicates the denial of the epistemic force of those cases. I will provide an extracted version of Mizrahi’s argument, which I believe to be most charitable to his motivation. Then I will offer a counterexample to a pivotal premise in Mizrahi’s argument, ultimately rendering the argument unsound. Finally, upon the examination of a plausible objection, I conclude that Gettier cases are epistemically sustained.