E-Collection
LOGIN
PRODUCTS
All Products
Online Resources
Journals & Series
Digital Media
Books & Reference Works
E-Collection
About
Alphabetically
By Category
By Type
Price Lists
Terms and Conditions
MEMBERSHIPS
Societies & Associations
Conference Registrations
SERVICES
Conference Exhibits
Conference Registrations
Electronic Publishing
Journal Advertising
Mailing Lists
Marketing Services
Membership Services
Production Typesetting
Subscription Fulfillment
ABOUT
About us
Contact
FAQs
Order Info
Privacy
Support
This Title
All Titles
Browse
>
Volume
>
10
>> Go to Current Issue
Logos & Episteme
Volume 10
Already a subscriber? -
Login here
Not yet a subscriber? -
Subscribe here
Browse by:
Volume
Year
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Issue: 4
Issue: 3
Issue: 2
Issue: 1
Overview
Editorial Team
RSS Feeds
E-mail Updates
Special Issues
About the Institute
Indexing / Abstracting
Submission Guidelines
Rights & Permissions
Results per page:
20
50
100
Sort by:
Page Number - ascending
Page Number - descending
Date - recent first
Date - oldest first
Title
Author
<< additional functions
Displaying: 41-44 of 44 documents
<
1
2
3
41.
Logos & Episteme:
Volume
>
10
>
Issue: 1
Andrew Cling
Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem
abstract
|
view
|
rights & permissions
|
cited by
I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is . (1) and (2) jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.
42.
Logos & Episteme:
Volume
>
10
>
Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
view
|
rights & permissions
|
cited by
43.
Logos & Episteme:
Volume
>
10
>
Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
view
|
rights & permissions
|
cited by
44.
Logos & Episteme:
Volume
>
10
>
Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
view
|
rights & permissions
|
cited by
<
1
2
3