Cover of Logos & Episteme
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Displaying: 41-44 of 44 documents


41. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Andrew Cling Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem
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I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is . (1) and (2) jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.
42. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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43. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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44. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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