Considered as will, ‘way of life’ consists of two unresolvable issues. (1) The will is never known in itself; yet, this fact does not negate the possibility of experiencing it. (2) The will can never be fully denied, yet we can create the illusion of a brief hour of rest from the will. I posit that philosophy exists as a ‘way of life’ in the form of this unresolvable will. The world consists of one thing. Arthur Schopenhauer’s project attempts to name this thing, bringing it beyond the vague placeholders of other systems of philosophy: the Dao of Daoism, God in Spinoza, what is unified and one in Parmenides. In calling out this placeholder, Schopenhauer achieves his greatness; and simultaneously, Schopenhauer calls out Kant’s wholly unknown x, the thing-in-itself. In calling out the monistic substance and Kant’s wholly unknown x, Schopenhauer points us towards a ‘way of life’. This text explores this ‘way of life’ as an aspect of the epistemological denial of the will.

Marx’s concept of ideology (Ideologie) first appeared in the Chinese context (in 1919) as the term “ideal (form)”; and Marx’s “form of consciousness” (Bewuβtseinformen) was expressed as “ideology” in Chinese. All this come from the initial use of the term in the Japanese version and later the Chinese version of ‘1859 Preface to the Critique of Political Economics’. But interestingly, though Cheng Fangwu was the first to make the German Ideologie correspond directly to the Chinese “ideology” in 1927, during the first half of the 20th century, the main theorists in China theoretical circles as a whole seemed to have a natural tendency to use Marx’s concept of ideology in the name of “ideal form”, and still persisted in understanding Marx’s concept of ideology as form of social consciousness in general instead of as its specific form.

Le mot induction a deux sens différents. L’induction est: a) une méthode d’acquisition de nouvelles connaissances; et b) une espèce de raisonnement/syllogisme (raisonnement/syllogisme inductif). En tant que méthode de connaissance, l’induction se fonde sur le recours à l’observation et l’expérimentation. Cette propriété érige l’induction en la méthode par excellence de la découverte scientifique et de la vérité. En effet, c’est grâce à l’observation ou l’expérimentation, que nous acquérons De nouvelles connaissances et nous pouvons soumettre ces connaissances au contrôle de la vérité. Comme espèce de raisonnement/syllogisme, l’induction peut être définie ainsi: la marche de la pensée (logos), qui va du singulier/particulier au général/universel. De fait, grâce à l’observation nous formons nos premières propositions singulières et nous construisons les concepts. Le syllogisme inductif consiste à poser comme principe une proposition singulière, puis, à subsumer le sujet de cette proposition sous un concept et, enfin, à généraliser, c’est-à-dire à tirer une proposition générale/universelle et probable comme conclusion. Ces propriétés rendent l’induction une méthode capable d’être appliquée tant dans le champ des sciences de la nature (philosophie théorique) que dans celui des sciences de l’homme (philosophie pratique).

Répondant au besoin pour la philosophie et les sciences sociales de proposer à l’homme une image concordante de la vérité susceptible d’impacter sur l’existence humaine, Tarski a souhaité construire une théorie sémantique de la vérité. La célébrité de cette théorie dont les enjeux méthodologique et épistémologique sont révélés dans la volonté de proposer une image autre de la vérité que celle en vigueur dans les conceptions courantes sont pourtant aussi à l’image des interprétations qui en ont suivies, notamment celles de Field et de Popper. La définition tarskienne de la vérité est donnée par l’instance (T): «La phrase «la neige est blanche» est vraie ssi, la neige est blanche». Cette formulation définit la vérité comme correspondance entre un énoncé et les données extralinguistiques. En dépit de cette formulation orientée vers la saisie des intuitions aristotéliciennes, la théorie sémantique a subi des interprétations réductionnistes qui semblent incompréhensibles. Si on ne peut nier que l’aventure tarskienne est celle d’une correspondance; on ne peut s’accorder avec les interprétations réductionnistes de la théorie tarskienne. Nous voulons montrer que la théorie tarskienne ne répond pas au réductionnisme de Popper et de Field. Le point de résistance de la théorie tarskienne étant donné par la formulation d’une sémantique formelle suivant l’approche modèle-théorétique. Tarski reste convaincu de l’existence des structures d’interprétation – qui deviennent objectives dès lors qu’on les a adoptées. Il y a peut-être lieu de parler de réalisme, mais il s’agit d’un réalisme intra-théorique ou intra-structurel.

L'article vise à montrer la démarcation entre René Descartes et Karl Raimund Popper sur le statut épistémologique de la métaphysique dans l'«arbre de la connaissance». En effet, pendant que l'arbre cartésien du développement de la connaissance part d'une «métaphysique constituée» au sein de laquelle il enfonce ses racines, pour culminer sur les «3 M» (médecine, mécanique et morale), l'arbre poppérien du progrès de la connaissance procède à l'inverse en enfonçant ses racines dans une «métaphysique à construire» comme ouverture à la science et à l'épistémologie par la considération d'une première situation problématique dont le corollaire est une situation théorique, pour culminer sur un nouvel ensemble de situations problématiques/théoriques.

La necesidad propuesta por Kant de encontrar la unidad necesaria de la razón será el tema que tomo como punto de partida para desarrollar un estudio de la ‘Doctrina del Método’ de la KrV; la razón que se ha quebrado desde la primera página crítica de los textos kantianos, y desde la primera página se lucha por remediar esta disgregación. Con el título de ‘libre unidad de la razón’ quiero apostar por una solución que pasa por la consideración de la libertad como tarea relevante, dando así primacía al uso práctico de la razón. Dos son las razones principales por las que me he centrado en el texto de la ’Doctrina del método’: es el momento en que se introduce de forma clara el papel que ha de jugar la razón práctica más allá de los límites del uso puro especulativo de la razón y, en segundo lugar, es un texto que apenas ha sido modificado en la segunda edición de la Crítica, cuando sin embargo Kant ya ha desarrollado cambios en sus propuestas en otros escritos. Me detendré en concreto en las páginas de la ‘Disciplina’ y el ‘Canon’ y para entender el sentido de que estos textos se incluyan en esta primera Crítica.

Diverse epistemologists have proposed this Discriminability Postulate (DP): If S knows that p, then S can discriminate between the case that p and other relevant alternatives. I propose that DP derives from other, more basic postulate, that sees knowledge as providing some Warrant Against the Risk of Error (WARE): If S knows that p, then this knowledge confers on S’s belief that p a (reliable but typically fallible) warrant against the risk of error. The kind of error mentioned in WARE is the error consisting in mistaking the case that p for some of its relevant alternatives. But the possibility of mistaking in that sense entails that the subject has appropriate representational access to the two items that have to be distinguished. The fact that DP derives from WARE provides grounds to think that if DP is true, then the discriminative capacities than it involves are not jeopardized when the subject cannot have representational access to one of the corresponding items. A corollary of this idea is a weakening of DP and a subsequent reduction of its potential to raise sceptical doubts against claims of knowledge.

Las ciencias naturales han sido llamadas, con razón, ciencias inductivas, y por eso el estudio del problema de la inducción es central a nuestro conocimiento de la naturaleza. En el presente trabajo queremos determinar las complementariedades e influencias de las ideas de David Hume en la filosofía de Jean Nicod, filósofo que podría haber dejado muchas ideas interesantes y originales respecto al problema de la inducción, pero su corta estadía en este mundo impidió esta tarea. Así lo afirma Bertrand Russell en el prefacio de su libro Problema lógico de la inducción. Dado que Jean Nicod no es un autor muy conocido, recordemos que es un lógico y filósofo francés que vivió sólo 31 años, entre 1893 y 1924, y que Bertrand Russell fue uno de sus maestros durante su paso por Inglaterra. Hume no necesita presentación, pero recordemos simplemente, en este encuentro de filosofía de la naturaleza, que es uno de los naturalistas más completos de la historia del pensamiento. En este trabajo veremos algunas relaciones y cruces de ideas entre Hume y Nicod respecto a la inducción y a sus procedimientos.

Как из идеального мира (Ин) рождает Бытие (Ян)? Идеальный мир это единый мир пространств идей, программы – смыслы которых есть проекты событий, создаваемых ноосферой, происходящих в материальный мир. Человек воспринимает, осознаёт и определяет материю, изменяющуюся во времени и пространстве, как существующий трёхмерный материальный мир. Единицами измерения сущего мира являются: объём для пространства, время для энергии и вещество для материи. В упанишадах сказано «Идее, чтобы обнаружить себя, требуется форма». Информация это проекция новой формы идеи. Такое определение слова «информация» вытекает при сложении смыслов нескольких слов. Идея есть ограниченный объём пространства, притягивающий энергию (дух), структурированный программой – смыслом, дающей направление энергии. Потенциальная энергия это движение в замкнутом идеей напряженном объёме пространства. По Платону «хоре». «Хора» - это вечный «третий вид», «не поддающийся разрушению», дающий место или пристанище всему, что рождается на свет; сам он недоступен восприятию…». Материя есть движение «законсервированное» напряжённым пространством идеи вещи. По Ньютону m = F/a. Человек наполняет ноосферу Земли энергией слов и действий, чем в идеальном мире создаёт программы - смыслы будущих событий.

New interpretations of the truth as an attempt to achieve a more efficient test of true knowledge constantly emerge in the philosophy. But postmodernism, is giving up this trend; it does not recognize even the very notion of “truth”, considering it an attribute of the dominant ideology. Truth in postmodernism is, if it exists at all, completely situational. It derives from the given particular conditions and creates man as a reaction to these conditions, whereas the reaction is not necessarily appropriate to them, and is generated by the free play of the imagination, as well. In the post-modern concept of truth, the truth cannot be reduced x. there are no centers and mechanisms and it is in the initial set of meanings and interpretations. Today we are experiencing the need to overcome dogmatic truth and feel the need for flexible quick forms, not dividing, but uniting people.

We examine Plato’s arguments about the essence of two types of mathematics – mathematics of natural science and mathematics of philosophy –, about the subject-matter of two types of mathematics, the laws of their rise and development during the Modern Times. We also consider the question of essence of the mathematical method of philosophy, its objectives, problems, research tools – Plato’s ideal numbers and the objects of sacral geometry. Further, it is also considered the mathematical method of Pythagorean philosophy and its implementation in Aristotle’s Organon. We then pass over the objectives and problems of the methods of theologians and Holy Fathers of the Church – the method of “septenary” as development of the most ancient concepts about the existence of seven notes-principles and seven whirls of thinking. We proceed with an overview of the history of European philosophy and of the reasons for the attempts to create new mathematical methods of philosophy by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and others. We treat the mathematical methods of philosophy of our contemporaries – J. G. Bennett and Drunvalo Melchizedek and the reasons for their appearance, discoveries in physics and psychology. Finally, we suggest our own mathematical method of philosophy as a system of seven equations of identity of cognition and mode of life, as a ladder of ascension from ignorance to the awareness of the Unity. This method combines the approaches of the Pythagorean method and the ideas in Plato’s Timaeus with the method of the “septenary” of the classics of theology and ideas of contemporary science and philosophy. It is a key to the Seven Sacra-ments of the Christian Church.

Η ανακοίνωση είναι μία απόπειρα αποσαφήνισης των συνθηκών κατανοησιμότητος των αξιακών μας όρων δια της σύζευξης των διακρινομένων καταστάσεων, δηλαδή του είναι και του δέοντος (του γεγονότος και της αξίας), στη βάση του πλατωνικού προτύπου που σχηματικά περιγράφεται στον Τίμαιο του Πλάτωνα. Πρόκειται για ένα διαχρονικό, μαθηματικό πρότυπο για την ανθρώπινη πραγματικότητα, την μόνη μέχρι στιγμής τουλάχιστον γνωστή στην οποία συγκλίνουν, συνυπάρχουν και συλλειτουργούν και δη ταυτοχρόνως, οι τρεις κόσμοι, ήτοι ο μικρόκοσμος, ο μακρόκοσμος και το «οπτικά» γνωστό μας ευκλείδειο σύμπαν. Η ανακοίνωση επιδιώκει να συγκροτήσει και να δικαιολογήσει τη διαχρονικότητα του Πλατωνικού προτύπου ως τρόπον τινά «χάρτα» της ανθρώπινης προσωπικότητας. Ήτοι θέλει να δείξει σχηματικά ότι όχι μόνον η συνείδηση και το γεγονός (που είναι μη συμβατές καταστάσεις) είναι συμπληρωματικές όψεις της ίδιας πραγματικότητας, αλλά να επισημάνει και την παραπληρωματικότητα της υφής των δύο περιεχομένων της συνειδήσεως του ανθρώπου, ήτοι του περιεχομένου της εμπειρικής και της ηθικής. Διότι ο άνθρωπος, μέσω ενός άλλου είδους αρχής, που είναι η κριτική της κριτικής του δύναμης, «λαμβάνει» από τις εμπειρίες της ζωής του το άριστον και το κάλλιστον (άρα ενεργεί με βάση την μεσότητα) και δημιουργεί την ηθική πραγματικότητα του ανθρωπίνου βασιλείου πάνω στην οποία εδραιώνεται και λειτουργεί η επιστήμη της ηθικής.

Αναπτύσσεται η διδασκαλία του είναι , το πρώτο μέρος της εγελιανής λογικής. Οντολογικά η βασική διαφοροποίηση σε ‘Κάτι και σε Άλλο’ οδηγεί στην ανάπτυξη σύμφυτων τάσεων εντός του αντικειμένου (an ihm), στην αναδίπλωση και αυτοαναφορά του, με αποτέλεσμα το αντικείμενο να μην είναι όπως φαίνεται έξωθεν (an sich), αλλά να αναπτύσσει δυναμική για τον εαυτό του (fuer sich). Έτσι διενεργείται η μετάβαση από την ποσότητα στην ποιότητα αλλά και αντιστρόφως. Επιστημολογικά, επειδή δεν μπορεί να γίνει διείσδυση στο αντικείμενο και η ποιότητα, καθώς και η ποσότητα, φαίνεται κάτι το εξωτερικό, απαιτείται το στάδιο της ουσίας, δηλαδή η αφηρημένη θεώρηση να αντικατασταθεί από συγκεκριμένη και να γίνεται η περιγραφή με βάση καθορισμούς που επισημαίνουν σχέσεις του αντικειμένου με το περιβάλλον. Αν οι καθορισμοί είναι κατάλληλοι, το αντικείμενο συμφωνεί με αυτούς και τους επιβεβαιώνει, οπότε παράγεται η έννοια ως ταυτότητα Είναι και ουσίας, το αυτόνομο ον, που γεφυρώνει υποκείμενο και αντικείμενο.

A narrative approach to the teaching of philosophy at the introductory level offers to traditional aged college students, eighteen to twenty one years old, an accessible entrée to philosophical ideas. For many students in the introductory course, this single philosophy course will be their only exposure to philosophy. Through specific reference to three Platonic dialogs and Descartes Meditations it is argued that the presentation of philosophical discipline by way of personal narrative allows an approach that is true to the spirit of the ideas as well as attractive to students at this stage of life. Reference to the settings of these philosophical works and a detailed analysis of the horse trainer analogies in the Platonic dialogs demonstrates the usefulness of this approach. It is further argued that any complete philosophical system will be similarly approachable in this way.

The frame of reference of this paper is, university teaching in prisons and the question of this paper is what teaching philosophy there really means. In my experience, it consists of transmitting philosophy as an exercise of thought between the participants of which –teacher and student- occurs an experience of freedom. It is about the paradoxical encounter between these two subjects, who are polarized by unavoidable tensions: political, epistemological, esthetic, existential. If this paradoxical dimension of philosophy is not perceived and we take for granted that it can and must be taught, we run the risk of abandoning it. Added to these tensions, there are others which are inherent to contexts of imprisonment, where the public University has been building an inclusive space- concrete end symbolic-within the marginalization of prison confinement. The students “deprived of their freedom” are the ones who declare they feel free when they approach philosophy, while inhabiting prison environment. This paradox confirms the above mentioned: tension is a condition for the possibility of philosophy, because, far from limiting it, it is its own life. The transmission of philosophy always needs an emancipating teacher; but if they teach in prisons, they should be free both from intellectual and moral superiority feelings or attitudes. This requirement – maybe the most difficult- is sine qua non, if we want philosophy to have an emancipating effect within prison confinement.

We are currently developing a short, online ethics course that attempts to teach students why (otherwise) well-intentioned people act unethically and what students can do to decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in the middle of an ethical crisis in the future. Most of the well-known case studies in professional ethics textbooks concern ethical failures that do not involve difficult ethical choices. When our students read these case studies (e.g., Enron and Challenger), it is not difficult for them to determine what went wrong or what the players in the cases ought to have done. And students don’t need to read Kant or Mill to make these determinations. Importantly, the agents who acted wrongly usually seem to be ethical people. Rarely do cases involve moral monsters. In a similar vein, most cases of research misconduct (fabrication, falsification and plagiarism) are cut-and-dry, and most of our students who plagiarize did not enroll in the course intending to plagiarize. Rather, something went wrong. Professional ethics classes neglect to address an important practical question: Why do (otherwise) well-intentioned people find themselves in the middle of ethical crises and how can our students decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in an ethical crisis in the future? We are developing a course that answers this question. Our course is built around the findings of John Dorris and other situationists. After teaching our students about situationism, we teach them a two-level theory of cognition that may help them avoid acting unethically.

This paper describes and discusses the philosophical underpinnings of teaching business philosophy. Management textbooks and curricula are dominated by a “managerialistic” logic or ideology according to which rational planning, prediction and control is the basis of managerial power and legitimacy. Critics have made clear that this conception of rationality is reductionist. But the critique often dismisses rationality altogether as the failed project of the Enlightenment. My paper will argue that rationality should be seriously engaged with in management education, but that such a serious engagement will illuminate business rationality as a multi-faceted concept. Thus, teachers of Business Philosophy should not be in the “trade” of promoting managerialism, neither in the “trade” of diminishing it. Rather, illuminating business rationality as a multi-faceted concept, allows us to teach Business Philosophy in a theoretical fruitful and ethically engaged manner that challenges us to see rationality as a form of activity or labor.

Inasmuch as the mind of modern man is affected by a lot of factors which in their own turn are connected with new tendencies of the world development, the system of factors could be used to impersonate some constructs of modern way of thinking of growing generation. The transitions to new ideals of man is contemporaneous with the formation of new paradigms of thinking, so the development of contemporary life, respectively, is followed by man’s changing identity. It seems that education of multi-dimensional man is one of the most important perspectives for the 21st century. On the other hand, the changing process of cultural education and globalization as well as iincreasing climate changes and the intense development of digital technologies cause new challenges for teaching content. The creatively oriented curriculum appears to meet the needs of 21st century learners, offering opportunities for education of multi-dimensional man. The author is convinced that the education of understanding a multi-dimensional man should be able to foster good traditions of cultural continuity, cultural dialogue with the past, cultural awareness as well as be able to increase the senses of responsibility, respect and other associated features.

John Stuart Mill argued that we should treat every person’s happiness as of equal importance, being strictly impartial. My students react negatively to this, understandable insisting that they rightly love their own family and friends more than others. It is one reason they resist Mill’s utilitarianism. In this paper I explore how to teach the idea of loving your neighbor as yourself as a continually transcending ideal, citing sacred texts from world religions as well as Mill and Kant.

Beginning with Plato’s cave and Aristotle’s tower thought experiments represent a very old and often intriguing genre of philosophical writing. On the other side, neurophysiologic research on brain learning theories shows clearly that learning processes are more intense and more sustainable, if they engage the individual in autonomous activities. In this contribution the author who was member of a commission to plan, introduce and organize a school subject called “Practical Philosophy” in all types of secondary schools in NRW (Germany), suggests thought experiments as a method of stimulating critical and autonomous philosophical thinking. This is not only meant as a preparation of earnest philosophical studies, but can help to develop an attitude in order to enrich philosophical cultures of thinking and arguing as well.