In Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus contended that death is nothing to us since it is the deprivation of all sensations. I find that his argument implies at least three assumptions, which are hedonism, physicalism and existence requirement. At first glance, Epicurus’ argument seemed to be acceptable due to one is deprived all his sensations and unable to estimate whether death is good or bad for him when death comes. So, it is concluded that death is nothing to us. However, the question follows: is something really not bad for a person if one has no capacity to acquire the unpleasant experiences? I must say that the answer is ‘No’. In this essay, I will argue that something is bad for the people even they don’t have any unpleasant experience and most of us will agree that he is indeed harmed by the lack of pleasant experiences. Thus, Epicurus’ argument is implausible because the strong version of existence requirement is not justified.

Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought has its intrinsic development clue. During the period of his ‘early doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi dealt with the stirring and not stirring problems by thinking of entity and function; he considered that not stirring was entity and nature, while stirring was function and mind. Corresponding to the theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means ‘first identifying the source of consciousness then cultivating with Heart.’ During the period of his ‘later doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through chronological arrangement and motion and still in space in empirical phenomena, through which not stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking no sprout and things without realizing,’ while stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking sprout and things realized.’ He also considered that ‘nature’ was the entity of mind, and Qing was the function of mind, man's spiritual mentality consists of sense and sensibility. Corresponding to such theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means that ‘self-restrain when not stirring, self-examinate when stirring, and respectfulness exists through stirring and not stirring.’ In his later years, Zhu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through minds responding thing following Li or not, and thus made possible the interaction between the stirring and not stirring. He did not insist on figuring out the boundary of chronological arrangement and motion and still in space between stirring and not stirring. Therefore, Zhu Hsi tried to unite respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li as a whole and emphasized that respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li should be interpenetrative, which makes his Gong-fu Thought be more harmonious.

This paper uses The Platform Sutra as the theoretical background for probing the ethics on which Chan Buddhism built its foundations. First of all, I analyze the type of ethics that the content of the The Platform Sutra can be said to display from the perspective of the view on precepts and mind-nature and subsequently offer my opinion on the similarities between virtue ethics and the type of ethics displayed in The Platform Sutra. Next, I give consideration to whether The Platform Sutra can be classified as a type of consequentialism when viewed in terms of the Chan Buddhist notion of instant revelation, along with the ultimate Buddhist aim of liberation from suffering and the attainment of Buddhahood. The outcome of this paper suggests that, The Platform Sutra offers a transcendental cognition aiming at Nirvāna and that its central theme of “non-abiding,” derived from the ethical perspective of this text which in turn is based upon both the theoretical journey of returning to mind-nature and a world view constructed around Dependent Origination and Impermanence. The theoretical journey that starts with “cognition” and culminates in “liberation” prompts an ethical pattern of autonomy, whereas the moral subject spontaneously perfects all virtues through the practical wisdom of proper conduct. When considering the ethics of The Platform Sutra it would be prudent to conclude only the following: when seen purely from the aspect of theoretical similarity, the ethical pattern of The Platform Sutra can be said to be roughly analogous to virtue ethics and consequentialism, and perhaps even to deontology. However, when the intrinsic theory of The Platform Sutra is taken into account, it is evident that apart from theoretical similarity, the view of differentiation still needs to be incorporated into the ethical equation of this text.

This paper argues that the concept of reason in Hegel’s philosophy is the rationalization of the commandment of love in Christianity. The commandment of love is the greatest one in the New Testament of the Bible. Love surpasses but also fulfils the law of the Old Testament. There is contradiction in the commandment, which is most evident in the command ‘love for enemies.’ Nevertheless, only by love is the mortal raised to the divine and the infinite. Hegel’s reason has all of these characteristics: it sublates the law; it appears as something contradictory to human understanding; and it is comprehended as belonging to the infinite.

In De Anima III 9, Aristotle raises a series of criticisms against the Platonic division of the soul. He firstly indicates that the parts of the soul seem to be infinite, and not confined to the calculative, spirited, and the appetitive part, as Plato describes. Secondly, Plato’s tripartition of the soul almost neglects the nutritive part as an independent capacity of the soul. Moreover, although the Platonists simplifies Plato’s tripartition and transformed it into a bipartition, it is not easy to assign the perceptive part either to therational or the irrational part. Finally, Aristotle thinks that it is totally unreasonable for the Platonic soul-division to split the desiderative part up, which should be one and single capacity of the soul; for then there would be wish in the calculative, appetite and spirit in the irrational part, such that in each part of the soul there would be desire.In this article I shall explain these criticisms respectively. However, I will not treat them as though they were isolated, but will show that they belong to Aristotle’s overall criticism against Platonism. J. Annas and G. Fine have suggested that in criticizing Plato’s theory of forms, Aristotle usually finds fault with this theory in an uncharitable and even arrow way. Sometimes he takes an inexact and vague Platonic claim, and provides one literal and natural reading of it on which he then proceeds to attack. Sometimes he reads a Platonic claim not in a way Plato would accept, but in a way which derives from the assumptions of his own metaphysics or from his own understandings about Platonism. Sometimes he criticizes a Platonic argument even in isolation from the original context in Plato’s dialogues. In so doing, however, Aristotle does not intend to misinterpret Plato; his aim is not to record Plato’s arguments straightforwardly, but rather to reconstruct them in a way that will provide philosophical illumination, so that we can learnsomething important about Platonism and the plausibility of Aristotle’s alternative. This article will show that in principle, Aristotle’s criticisms of the Platonic soul-division are compatible with his general mode of criticism against Platonism.

面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象，這篇論文試圖論述：對柏 拉圖而言，「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性 的關係，文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話，作為比較的對象。 厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」（τέχνη），即，希波克拉底派的醫學，符合柏拉 圖早期對知識的要求，也就是：知識必須要能提出合理的說明；此外，當時 的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡，而使人內在各成分達致健康與 和諧。然而，這裡提出的解釋是：柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知 識範本；在對慾望的處理上，他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分，他的和諧概 念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量，慾望雖然可能變成非理性，卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。

Chuanshan presents lots of philosophical questions and theories via his interpretation on Zhuangzi, and the one about the concept of “Helping Heaven” especially deserves our attention. There are at least two reasons for this. First, in Chuanshan’s mind, the Inner Chapters is the representative of Zhuangzi’s thought, and the core in it is the concept, “Helping Heaven”. Second, Chuanshan regards “Helping Heaven” not only as the core theory in Zhuangzi but also as the standard to evaluate different theories in ancient Chinese philosophy.The discussion of this paper is divided into three parts. First, in Chuanshan’s interptretation, Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven” tells us why living is more valuable than death. From this viewpoint, we can ask further why not all personalities or behaviors have the same value. In the second part, we according to Chuanshan’s interpretation, figure out the answer to the question above from the metaphysical meaning of Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven”. In the end, the paper discusses the ethical meaning of “Helping Heaven” in Chuanshan’s interpretation.

Zhu Xi’s criticisms of Cheng-Shi-Yi-Zhuan seem to be diverse and inconsistent. Further analyses, however, show the contrary. To put it very briefly, Zhu Xi’s complaints were mainly due to Cheng Yi’s failure to bring about a coherent theory that can integrate xiang-shu, yi-li, and shi-fa, as well as his lack of awareness of the significance of such an integration. The reason why Cheng Yi failed in both regards was in turn due to his ignorance of the theoretical roles Shao Yong’s xian-tien-yi-xue can play. By demonstratingwhat those theoretical roles are and why they are so important to Zhu Xi, this paper explicates Zhu Xi’s own understanding of the Book of Changes.

During the Middle Ages, the two problems which philosophers concern the most are the holistic unity of man and the immortality of soul. In order to explain these basic Christian beliefs, philosophers adopt the dualism and universal hylomorphism. The reason to take such a stance is to ensure the immortality of soul.For Aquinas, the human rational soul is both the substantial form of body and the substance in its own right, and the holistic unity of man requires the unity of the substantial form. Since the rational soul is created by God, its esse (being) participates in Ipsum Esse. Rational soul is the essence of humans, but not its complete species. It needs to be united with a body. It is spiritual by nature. Once the rational soul is created, it has being, it is a subsistent substance, but not exists separately by itself. The being of therational soul then unites the composit man’s soul and body. Being is the unifying principle. It has absolute priority. There are double composition of potency and act in man’s ontological structure. On metaphysical level, the composition of being-act (or actus essendi) and essence-potency. On physical level, the soul (act-form) and body (potency-matter), yet the rational soul is essentially independent from body. The being of the rational soul is its metaphysical foundation of immortality.

In his writing, “Xiaoyaoyou” (逍遙遊), Zhuangzi uses parables to express his profound and innermost spiritual world. His artistic conception and approach inspire ongoing research by subsequent generations. Fang Yizhi analyzes numerous ancient and modern interpretations of Zhuangzi’s piece, applies Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist thinking, and uses his unique writing method to interpret the rich content in Zhuangzi’s writing.In the present article, important concepts of Fang Yizhi’s interpretation are analyzed from three different angles. First, regarding Zhuangzi’s argument of “the distinction between micro and macro” (小大之辨), Fang Yizhi intends to eliminate this persistent polarized view by emphasizing that micro and macro are indistinguishable. Second, Fang Yizhi uses the conflict between the concepts of “existence” (有) and “nonexistence” (無) to illustrate the relationship between mutual negation and mutual confirmation. He also advocates that if we “are not biased by or do not insist on either existence or nonexistence” and “do not break away from the confronting phenomena of existence andnonexistence”, then we shall be at ease in our real life. Third, Fang Yizhi applies Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism to illustrate the approach and structure of Xiaoyaoyou. This is precisely the reflection of his own life experiences. Through the analysis of the present article, one can understand the interpretation methods and theoretical basis Fang Yizhi advocates to remove any polarized view in order to obtain freedom of the soul.

According to Zhuangzi, the meaning of Yang-Sheng is all about life-cultivation. This can be seen from the fact that it is one of Yang-Sheng’s requirements to keep good company with one’s parents. The story of Cook Ding, as presented in the book by Zhuangzi, is meant to provide an insight into the importance of technê in life. To put it briefly, technê is important not because it can bring about flow experience, but because it can reveal the world as one in which one can wander about and be playful with valuable things in multiple dimensions. Thus, it is a necessary condition for anyone who wants to cultivate the meaning of life to be able to master at least some skills, especially the ones involved in keeping good company with one’s parents. As a consequence, Zhuangzi is quite successful at giving a daoist twist to filial obedience, though he confineshimself not to pursue further ethical and/or political theorizations.

本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評，而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則：其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念，其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容，並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎，則可及原則是恰當的。

「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念，來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題，從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的，在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面，酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面，要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件：一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件，而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之，酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此，酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。

In order to understand the content and significance of Zhan Zai’ thought, commentarial works on the Zhengmeng during the Ming and Qing period areindispensable because these works present detailed explications on every conceptual terms. Compared to those commentarial works on the Zhang Zai’s thought by Gao Panlong and Wang Fuzhi who have been regarded as rather creative thinkers, other commentarial works during the Qing period have not drawn sufficient scholarly attention. Bearing this in mind, this article aims to explore the two topics: Firstly, it analyzes Li Guangdi’s interpretation on Zhang Zai’s idea of “deification” through Li’s Commentary of the Zhengmeng. And secondly, it also traces Wang Zhi’s elucidation of the concept of “Ultimate Voidness” (Taixu) in his commentarial work, the Basic Meanings of the Zhengmeng, as well as Wang’s correction of initial mistakes in aforementioned Li Guangdi’s commentary.The discussion of this article consists of the following four sub-topics: (1) Wang Zhi’s exposition of three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness”; (2) Li Guangdi’s interpretation of the term “Ultimate Voidness” and Wang Zhi’s repudiation against it; (3) Li’s argument that the ontological significance of the concept of “Ulitmate Voidness” should be dissolved, and that Zhang Zai’s idea of deification of continuity between vital breath and voidness should be understood by the dualistic framework between principle and vital breath; and (4) Highlighting of Wang’s insight and Li’s limitation of his conception of deification by means of our analysis of the three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness.”

人是如何獲得「理解」？德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中，作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱，並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視，作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。

This paper aims to dissolve Rott’s counterexamples in terms of default logic proposed by Reiter in 1980. In his counterexample, Rott pointed out that some fundamental principles in AGM theory which meet the property of monotonicity are implausible because it seems unable to handle the processes of nonmonotonic reasoning which are common in our ordinary reasoning. In contrast to classical logic, AGM theory indeed developed a prominent way to deal with belief change, whereas many philosophers still casted doubts on the fundamental principles in AGM theory. For example, there might be some sentences in one’s belief set which are of the same form but different in information value and AGM theory does not commit it. Nevertheless, Rott failed to suggest a plausible way to fix the defect of AGM theory, so I aim to propose a suitable way to dissolve the problem of the processes of nonmontonic reasoning in virtue of the association of AGM theory with default logic.

本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質，並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」（perceptual anti-individualism）為研究對象。根據這一理論，知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張：視覺科學（vision science）預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點，並 企圖從三方面來論證：「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先，我討論「體內恆定」（homeostasis）的概念，並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」（perceptual norms）產生質疑。第二，我以論證指出：許多視覺科學所研究的現象，可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」（veridicality）和「單一表徵」（singular representation）也能得到解釋。第三，我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證：許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是：「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。

The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. Thecosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divinelogos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes.Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one’s own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals,including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as theway animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage ofoikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because allmen possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take intoaccount of his fellow’s well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself.This paper tries to argue why the Stoics’ oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics’ oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied.

Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main “problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find “the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers’ “intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.