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panel discussion
61. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Kirill A. Rodin Кирилл Александрович Родин
Wittgenstein in the Camp of Logical Positivists. Reply to Critics
Витгенштейн в лагере логических позитивистов. Ответ оппонентам

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epistemology & cognition
62. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Domingos Faria Домингос Фариа
Group Belief: Defending a Minimal Version of Summativism
Групповые верования

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Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.
language & mind
63. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Dmitry V. Zaitsev Дмитрий Владимирович Зайцев
Towards Protolanguage: Bodily Reactions Represent Emotional Type
К протоязыку

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In this paper, I attempt to offer a general outline of my views on the origin and evolution of language. I do not pretend in any way to a completely new conception of language evolution. It seems to me that all the most important and productive hypotheses about the origin of language have already been made before, and it is only a matter of putting the pieces of the puzzle together correctly. As far as I can see it, the evolution of language is directly related to the embedded and embodied emotional types, which served as the basis for the subsequent categorization of perceived objects, and thus laid the ground for the formation of first an internal language (of thought), and then an external verbal language. Consistent with this, the paper is organized as follows. In the Introduction I briefly describe the problem I am facing in this article and outline a plan for solving it. Next section comprises a survey of relevant empirical findings related primarily to the processing and understanding of abstract terms and concepts. In my view, it supports the idea of the close connection of abstract terms proceeding, and thus language comprehension, with emotional states. The third section provides relevant theoretical considerations of the relationship between emotions, cognition, and language. Consistently considering various theories of emotions and concepts of language formation, I pay attention to the connection between affective states and language as a sign system. In the fourth section, my views are presented directly. In so doing, I illustrate my approach with a telling example that shows how, in the course of evolution, embedded and embodied emotional responses and reactions could become the building blocks first for the internal language of thought, and then for the external natural language.
64. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Danil N. Razeev Данил Николаевич Разеев
Generative and Perceptive Models of Volition
Генеративная и перцептивная модели волевых актов

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In recent decades, scientists and philosophers have developed several naturalistic theories of consciousness, in which they try to work out some theoretical foundations for a satisfactory solution to the problem of voluntary acts, in particular the genesis of voluntary bodily movements. From the author’s point of view, depending on which concept of consciousness scientists rely on in their empirical studies of voluntary movements, volition can be understood either as a generative act or as a perceptual act. The first part of the article shows that nowadays there are two competing philosophical and scientific models of volition: the generative model (dualistic and casualistic types) and the perceptual model (strong and weak types). The second part of the article deals with some experimental data from cognitive psychology and neuroscience related to the study of voluntary movements and concludes that they are in favor of the perceptive model of volition.
vista
65. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Olga V. Popova Ольга Владимировна Попова
Body As an Object of Experimentation and the Emergence of Biomedicine Ethos: The Nuremberg Lessons
Тело как объект экспериментирования и становление этоса биомедицины

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The purpose of the article is to study the influence of Nazi experiments on the formation of ideas about the ethos of science in the field of biomedicine. It is shown that the idea of discrediting a value-neutral science was often confronted with the resistance of the scientists themselves, who, in different contexts of condemning Nazi crimes, appealed to the fact that they acted for the good of science, and even of all mankind. The article discusses the strategy of American lawyers adopted at the Nuremberg Trials aimed at demonstrating the perversity of Nazi crimes in the field of biomedicine both ethically and scientifically. In addition, an analysis of individual materials of the Nuremberg process was carried out, which made it possible to give an idea of the scientific and linguistic design of the human body (name correction strategy) as a “correct” scientific object with desired properties. The article considers the influence of the data obtained on Nazi crimes on the formation of the content of the Nuremberg Code and the design of the principle of informed consent in biomedicine. Ethical aspects related to the further use of Nazi scientific data are also considered. In conclusion, the problem of the formation of scientific knowledge in non-violence mode is articulated.
case-studies – science studies
66. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Lev D. Lamberov Лев Дмитриевич Ламберов
Benacerraf and Set-Theoretic Reductionist Realism
Бенацерраф и теоретико-множественный редукционистский реализм

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The paper is devoted to analysis of P. Benacerraf’s argument against set-theoretic reductionist realism which is a fragment of a broader argument, know as the “identification problem”. The analyzed fragment of P. Benacerraf’s argument concerns the possibility of reducing of mathematical notions to set-theoretic notions. The paper presents a reconstruction of P. Benacerraf’s original argumentation, its analysis and also several possible objections proposed by P. Benacerraf himself about 30 years later after the original publication. Namely, he claimed (1) that a set-theoretic definition of natural numbers in G. Frege’s fashion can serve as a proper and unique set-theoretic definition, (2) that his argument doesn’t undermine eliminative reductionsts’ position, (3) that even if there are no argument possible in favor of some particular set-theoretic definition of natural numbers one may take set-theoretic realism for granted. An analysis of the mentioned possible objections shows their dependence on a number of additional premises. The paper demonstrates that P. Benacerraf’s objections on his own argument against set-theoretic realism either have a pragmatic character themselves or essentially rely on additional arguments that are justified pragmatically or require additional argumentation. For example, his possible objections require that set theory is considered as the only true foundational theory in mathematics, and that it has several important pragmatic virtues, like convenience of use to formalize other mathematical theories. In some cases, P. Benacerraf’s objections on their own, or the indicated additional principles may well be called into question, which demonstrates the insufficiency of P. Benacerraf’s objections against his original argument. Without the mentioned pragmatic arguments P. Benacerraf’s objections become a kind of belief in mysticism. Accordingly, his doubts about his own argument against set-theoretical realism seem insufficient to reject the problem of identification and save the position of set-theoretical realism from collapse.
67. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Sergei Yu. Shevchenko Сергей Юрьевич Шевченко
Ethics of Uncertainty As an Extension of Virtue Epistemology: The ·ase of Genetic Risks
Этика неопределенности как продолжение эпистемологии добродетелей

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Uncertainty can’t be understood without taking into account both properties of the problem situation and agent’s knowledge about it. The correspondence of knowledge and situation of decision-making is crucial for understanding the onto-epistemological nature of uncertainty. At the same time, this correspondence is the key topic in virtue epistemology, especially in its ‘non-classical’, regulatory, branch, related to works of R. Roberts and W.J. Wood. In this article, genetic consultation is chosen as an example of such a problematic situation since a doctor and a patient explicitly deal with the uncertainty of genetic risks. The problems of communication and joint decision-making in the context of medical-genetic consultation are comprehensively described in bioethics. At the same time, its social dimension is limited to the direct interaction of two individual agents, that allows us to use it as a model for constructing the ethics of uncertainty. In this article, four forms of uncertainty are identified: descriptive, normative and radical uncertainties, and translation uncertainty. Referring to the approaches of virtue epistemology, the author brings each of these forms into conformity with the proposed regulatory principle. The regulations assume that generating or disseminating knowledge under conditions of uncertainty require taking into account the incompleteness of the presented model of reality in its four aspects. A modelled fragment of reality could change in a predictable (descriptive uncertainty) or unexpected (radical uncertainty) way. The goals and values of a model’s user can not be hierarchically ordered, and may also change in the future (normative uncertainty). User’s interpretations of the model may be diverse, and can never be strictly defined by the intentions of the model’s author (indeterminancy of translation, or uncertainty whether success of co-reference is achieved).
interdisciplinary studies
68. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Olga A. Lavrenova Ольга Александровна Лавренова
Games With Space
Игры с пространством

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The culture beeing in the geographical space is one of the important problem fields of ontology. The process of understanding the environment has many levels and characteristics. Culture is an universal object of semiotics, in this case it is considered as a subject of the semioticization of geographical space, the formation of the image of the world. Culture inherits and constantly renews the main discourses associated with this ongoing process, the origins of which lie in the deep archaic. As a result, stable representations of geographical objects and/or permanent culturally significant symbols with different degrees of spatial connotations are formed. Much more interesting than the already formed images and symbols is the process of their creation and the patterns and frames that can be traced in it. The meanings created by culture are involved in the process of secondary interpretation. The most common are several areas of interpretation that play an active role in structuring our ideas about the geocultural space. They can be conventionally referred to as “games with space”, because they have a certain amount of arbitrariness, but also have established rules. This article discusses a few of them – games of range, games of geographical modeling, games of structures, of time, of significations, of emotions and institutionalization.
69. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Nick Overduin Ник Овердуин
The Inherent Logic in the Idea of the Multiverse
Внутренняя логика в идее мультивселенной

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The idea of the multiverse, likely difficult to prove in traditional scientific ways, may be bolstered by two arguments from the field of logic. This article, contextualized by the metaphorical, non-logical approaches to the multiverse and situating itself within the history of astronomy, explicates these two arguments from logic. The first argument relates to the implicit illogical vanity in the assumption that our presently-known universe is special. In other words, it may be somewhat logical to embrace the history of deanthropomorphism more fully in the light of the Big Bang and the theory of cosmic inflation. The second argument suggests resolution to the long-standing philosophical and logical mysteries associated with the anthropic principle, as well as the attendant use of Ockham’s razor as a logical tool. The problem of evidence and falsifiability is briefly implicated, as well as some consequences for apologetics.
archive
70. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Vladimir V. Seliverstov Владимир Валерьевич Селивёрстов
Alexius Meinong's Extraontology: Beyond Being and Non-being
Сверхонтология Алексиуса Майнонга

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The notion of Ausersein/outbeing, proposed by Alexius Meinong, was for a long time in the shadow of the principle of the Ausersein of a pure object, which made it possible to make non-existent objects part of a judgment. This principle was adopted by many followers of Meinong within the framework of analytical philosophy, but the very concept of Ausersein was almost totally ignored. When it’s become an object of research, there appeared several interpretations of it. It was interpreted either as a way of describing the ontological status of non-existent objects, or as a basic property of all objects without exception. Dale Jacquette suggests interpreting Ausersein as extraontology, i.e. a metasemantic category that includes all items. In this article, we will analyse the arguments of modern interpreters of this notion and try to find out which interpretation is most correct.
new trends
71. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Vitaly V. Dolgorukov, Vera A. Shumilina Виталий Владимирович Долгоруков
What Is Formal Philosophy?
Что такое формальная философия?

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The paper focuses on the review of current literature on formal philosophy. Special attention is paid to the review of the book «Introduction to Formal Philosophy» [Hansson, Hendricks, 2018]. The book is a consistent introduction to the problems of formal philosophy, a research tradition that relies on the precise mathematical tools in order to study traditional philosophical problems. The methods of formal philosophy are successfully applied not only to the problems of ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language but also relevant for the problems of ethics, axiology and social philosophy. The book demonstrates that it is not correct to identify formal philosophy with another area of study – philosophical logic, since formal philosophy uses not only logical methods of analysis, but also uses the tools of game theory, decision theory, probability theory, Bayesian statistics, and other theories. Although the book has a propaedeutic character, it also contains some open problems. These problems include the aggregation of the opinions of the group under the condition of a conflicting base of premises in the theory of public choice, there are still open problems in the interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and others. Certainly, formalization in itself is not a general solution to the particular philosophical problem, but only a tool that allows to formulate a problem in a more rigorous and precise way, which sometimes allows to reveal some unexpected consequences, some implicit contradictions and new solutions. Despite the importance of the concept of coherence in ethics, decision theory, philosophy of law, Bayesian epistemology, philosophy of science, the existing formalizations of the concept of coherence are highly specialized for epistemology, researchers recognize the lack of the relevant explanatory models. Overall, the book is an excellent introduction in to the field of formal philosophy, which provides a general overview of different aspects of formal philosophy and the opportunity to study particular research topics by means of an extensive bibliography accompanying each of the chapters.
in memoriam
72. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Lyudmila A. Markova (12.12.1932–26.12.2020)
Памяти Людмилы Артемьевны Марковой (12.12.1932–26.12.2020)

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