Examples of “nameless” virtues are discussed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. They are also found in the Confucian Analects. This paper explores what makes a virtue nameless in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Analects, and then argues that restrained speech is best understood as a nameless virtue in the Analects. It further argues that the virtue of restrained speech merits careful study because it contributes to our understanding of nameless virtues generally, while also deepening our understanding of Kongzi’s ethics by showing why he thought it was important to cultivate certain virtues. Indeed, many of the things that make restrained speech valuable hold in a contemporary setting as well, making restrained speech a virtue that is important for us today.

This article explores the relevance of the thought of Ignatius of Loyola regarding moral discernment of the magis for adjudicating the debate between traditionalists and proportionalists in contemporary Catholic ethical theory. The Ignatian criteria for discerning the magis have ceteris paribus qualifiers attached. The relevance of this type of qualifier for ethical theory in general is assessed by examining contemporary analytic philosophy’s quest to interpret what W. D. Ross means by prima facie obligations. The similarity between his thought and that of Ignatius is explored, as well as the resulting paradoxical implications for resolving the debate between traditionalists and proportionalists.

Two persons have been proposed as the author of the Summa Lamberti, a thireenth-century treatise on logic. Franco Alessio takes him to be the Auxerre Dominican Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel, and he basis his claim on Dominican sources from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Recently, Alain de Libera has presented a counter-proposal: the author was Lambert of Lagny, a secular cleric at the time of the composition, who afterwards became a Dominican. This claim is based on the acta of the counts of Champagne and a document of Pope Urban IV. I conclude that, given the present evidence, de Libera’s case rests on more historically sound data, but that to arrive at this conclusion one must impeach the Dominican sources (not done by de Libera) and take into consideration additional data from the research of Michèle Mulchahey on the introduction of logic into the Dominican curriculum.