This article begins with an examination of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of emanation and its origin within the Greek and Islamic philosophical traditions. Secondly, I present his view of the multiplicity of the universe from a single unitary First Cause, followed by a discussion of the function of the Active Intellect in giving rise to the existence of the sublunary world and its contents. In the second part of the article, I consider Cartesian cosmology, without, however, going into detail about what Descartes calls the ‘imaginary new world,’ the problems arising from the mechanical worldview. Note is made of the conflict between Descartes and the Scholastic and Orthodox Christian concept of cosmos. This article provides an account and comparison of Ibn Sīnā’s and Descartes’ portrayal of the origins and structure of the universe of both philosophers.

This article examines ḥikma as it was practiced by Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, or Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), in explaining the connection between the divine names and the attributes of God. This is done via a translation of the fourth part of his al-Maẓāhir al-ilāhiyya fī asrār al-ʿulūm al-kamāliyya [The loci of divine manifestations in the secrets of the knowledge of perfection]. Ḥikma, philosophy, as it is defined here, is the combination of rational demonstrations and spiritual unveiling. Shīrāzī’s philosophy is a synthesis of Ibn ʿArabī’s school of metaphysical unveiling, the Ishrāqī school led by Suhrawardī, and the rational school of the Peripatetics. The text is translated here for the first time, and includes annotations.

This article offers a comparative study of three thinkers from almost as many intellectual and cultural traditions: Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides, and discusses the extent of the knowledge of particulars which each one ascribed to God. Avicenna de-reified Aristotle’s abstract and isolated Prime Mover and argued that God can know particulars but limited these to universals. Maimonides disanalogized divine from human knowledge, arguing that the epistemic mode predicated of mankind cannot be equally predicated of God, and that God knows particulars qua particulars even as his Knowing encompasses all of eternity in a single act of knowledge. Attempting an intermediate path between the former’s highly discursive reasoning and the latter’s more scriptural approach, Gersonides postulated that God can know particulars qua particulars—as is befitting a Perfect Being—but this He does ‘mediately’ as it were, via the emanative ordering comprising the separate intelligences and culminating in the Active Intellect.

In this review essay we focus on what we call a philosopher’s toolkit: a number of books that will help those studying Islamic philosophy texts. These books are both primers on Islamic philosophy, as well as texts that are essential to keep on one’s desk or in close reach.

This paper examines the trait of submissiveness within the framework of virtue ethics. Submissiveness is generally regarded as a vice, particularly when evaluated in reference to patriarchal systems. This paper argues that there is something valuable about the trait of submissiveness—when it functions as a virtue—that is lacking in secular contexts, and this lack detracts from the possibilities of a good life.

For Averroes, celestial circulation is evidence of a divinely mandated rational universe. This paper follows Averroes’ account on cosmic contact between the eternal and the temporal, in Tahafūt al-tahafūt contra al-Ghazālī. It argues that the polemical perspective of the Tahafūt al-tahafūt frames Averroes’ appeal to Aristotle’s account of cosmic motion. Consequently, Averroes’ exceptional account of the universe contrasts Aristotle’s exemplary account of the mutual participation of intellect and nature. Their accounts of celestial circulation implicate the status of human nature conditioned by cosmic nature. As such, the possibility of human freedom rests on the nature of causality between divine intellect and cosmic manifestation. The convergence and divergence of Aristotle and Averroes regarding celestial circulation reveals Averroes’ politics that guide a rational argument for a strong cosmic causal connection between the unmoved mover and the universe, against al-Ghazālī’s rationally inaccessible divine will.

Aristotle claimed that man is by nature social. Later philosophers challenged this assertion, questioning whether man is necessarily social or simply socialized. Ibn Bājja, a twelfth-century philosopher from Muslim Spain, and Martin Heidegger, a twentieth-century German philosopher, approached this question in paradoxical terms, claiming in their respective works that despite having been born into social origins (a necessary framework of existential and social conditions), human beings are able—and even mandated—to escape these origins, and thus society, to some degree. Through Ibn Bājja’s book, The Governance of the Solitary, and a portion of Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time, I present what each of these thinkers posit to be a person’s social origins, and the respective epistemological justifications they provide to suggest that man should work to depart from them. To conclude, I appropriate the claims of Ibn Bājja and Heidegger to address the “real world” plausibility and potential benefits—both to society and to man himself—of man’s departure from society.