論 著 / articles |
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 44
Jih-Ching Ho
何志 青
The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason
實踐理由之動機結構
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A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason. Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly, he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups, “the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches, primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell, and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the two approaches.
有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連,內在論主張行動 理由與動機事實有必要之聯結,外在論則否認。1980 年,威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”,提出反對外在論的強力論證,引發了倫理 學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後,他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”(2001),精進他的休謨 理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢;更重要的是,他將過去二十多 年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路:「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」,並 且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發 展,其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述,以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最 新論點不足以反駁此二進路。
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82.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 44
林志 欽
Chih-Chin Lin
天台宗圓教法門形成之依據及其類別
The Reasoning and the Classification of Ways of Practice in Perfect-teaching in T’ien-t’ai Buddhism
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本文是筆者有關天台宗圓教法門的系列論文之一。圓教是天台宗最高超 玄妙的法門,在實踐上是否適合於一般人之修行,學界有不同看法之爭論。此外,筆者研究發現,圓教法門有許多種,而各種的圓教法門其實並非同具 相同的特質,而有不同的定位、適合的根機與可達致的成就。要真正解決天台宗圓教法門的相關論題,就必須先完整地了解天台宗 所有的圓教法門究竟有哪些?其是否有不同的類別?各類法門所以成為 圓教法門的依據又為何?而此等議題學界仍未有相關著作成果。本文研究 之目的即在廣納所有的圓教法門,分析其所以成為圓教法門的理由,進而 加以分類,最終歸納出天台宗成立圓教法門之各種依據。透過此了解,將 有助於對圓教法門之全盤與正確地掌握,並開啟圓教法門爭論問題的解決 之端。經本文之研究所得,從智者大師著作釐析出之30 種圓教法門,其所以 成為圓教法門之根據有七類1.因持誦或由於是《法華經》所說而成為圓教 法門。2.以該法屬最高佛位故為圓教法門。3.與圓教之理相應故成為圓教法 門。4.以圓教之理論述之而使之成為圓教法門。5.本身為圓教法門之獨特代 表行法。6.作為圓教一心三觀之前行方便法門。7.作為圓教一心三觀之輔助 行法。
This paper is one of a series of my articles researching practice ways of “Perfect-teaching” (圓教) in T’ien-t’ai Buddhism. Practicing different ways of Perfect-teaching is the most unsurpassable and wonderful one among all dharma-gates. However, it has been an issue of debate among the academia whether these are suitable for average people to practice or not. Moreover, I realize that in fact, there are several ways to practice Perfect-teaching showing different characteristics. As a result, they have their different positions, are suitable for different people, and can reach different obtainments.In order to fully comprehend the related issues in ways of practice in Perfect-teaching, it is imperative to fully clarify aspects that are not well defined in academia. For example, different ways of practice, possibilities in classification of different ways, and justifications of different ways in Perfect-teaching should all be studied. Main objectives of this research are as follows: all ways of practice in Perfect-teaching will be collected, reasons of different ways of practice as such will be analyzed and classified, and then foundations of various ways in practicing Perfect-teaching will be concluded. Only after these works have been done can one gain a correct whole picture of the practices in Perfect-teaching which is the foundation to sort out different viewpoints of the Perfect-teaching.After analyzing thirty ways of practice in Perfect-teaching taught by Master Zhi-yi (智顗), seven characteristics or circumstances can be identified that make a certain practice under the Perfect-teaching:a. when recitation of the Saddharmapundarika Sutra (妙法蓮華經) is involved or it has been stated clearly in the scripture;b. when it belongs to the unsurpassed Buddha of Perfect-teaching;c. when it corresponds to the principles of the Perfect-teaching;d. when it is defined by the principle of Perfect-teaching;e. practices which are unique to the Perfect-teaching;f. those that are the prerequisites of “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind” (一心三觀,) which is the representative way of practice in Perfect-teaching; andg. those that are auxiliary to the “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind.”
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83.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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胡 勇
Yong Hu
有無、本末與體用:王弼經典詮釋中的哲學創造
Being and Non-Being, Root and Branch, Substance and Function: The Philosophical Innovation in Wang Pi’s Interpretation of the Classics
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魏晉玄學在中國哲學發展史上的重要性,很大程度上要歸功於其在大量 的經典詮釋活動中所展現出來的強大的哲學創造性,正是這種創造性為後來 印度佛教中國化以及宋明理學的產生提供了十分重要的思想資源和理論範 型。有無、本末和體用是王弼在經典詮釋中最重要的三組概念,也正是這三 個範疇充分體現了王弼哲學詮釋的創造性。這種創造性主要表現為三種形 式:一種為保持原概念的語言形式,卻改變其概念的內在涵義或邏輯,「有 無」是其代表;一種為原概念的形式和內涵保持不變,獲得改變的是其在文 本脈絡或意義結構中的地位,例如從邊緣到中心、從平等到支配,「本末」 是其代表;一種為創造或採用新的概念範疇作為理解框架或詮釋邏輯,從而獲得和先前完全不同的文本意義,甚至創造出新的文本結構,「體用」是最 好的說明。筆者本文擬從有無、本末和體用及其相互關係等四個方面來呈現 王弼哲學中的創造性所在。
The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.
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84.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 43
黃文 宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論早期西田哲學中「自覺」的基本構造 ─以〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉 為線索
On The Basic Structure of Self-awareness in Early Nishida -In View of His Discussion of "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding"
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「自覺」是西田對「純粹經驗」的發展的一個邏輯性說明。本論文的 目的在依據西田〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉(1912)來思考西田早期的 「自覺」構造。在這裏有著西田對齊格瓦特與李克特的邏輯思想以及對羅 伊斯與戴德金的無限觀念的改造,我們將重點置於李克特的部分,看看西 田如何從自身的立場轉化了李克特對邏輯與數理的想法,將「邏輯」與「數 理」視為連續性的關係,乃至有所謂「由邏輯往數理」的說法,這形成了 後來西田《自覺中的直觀與反省》中自覺的第一個階段。筆者的論點在於,自覺的體系除了無限自我表象的系統之外,還必須包含著一個對「有+非 有」的全體的直覺,這個全體的直覺或體驗才是自覺體系的中心。在行文 上,我們先沿著〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉的思路,重構西田對「邏輯 的理解」(第二節)與「數理的理解」(第三節)的思考,在最後一節(第 四節),筆者試著透過《自覺中的直觀與反省》西田對「絕對自由意志」 的討論來補充之。在這裏,筆者將西田這種「全體的直覺」連結到海德格 對康德的「先驗想像力」的闡釋,西田與海德格都將重點置於經驗中的「無 而生有」的領域。西田所謂的「理解之前的理解」或「純粹經驗」指的就 是這種全體直覺。筆者個人的觀點也表達在這裏。
In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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黃麗 綺
Li-Chi Huang
從「虛無」到「笑」 ─論尼采「永恆回歸」之概念
From “Nihilism” to “Laughing” -on Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
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在尼采「上帝已死」的思想中,人失去其價值根源的有效性,在強力意 志所建構的生成世界中,人不再具有不變與永恆的意義與真理,而是由其 相對、暫時的效用與價值來理解存有的意義。本文即嘗試研究在尼采永恆回 歸學說中,是否提供了一種在「上帝已死」、傳統形上學之外對生命的理解 與評價的可能,並且由這個新的理解方式創造出在生成世界之內的新價值。 對此,本文所提出的假說為:永恆回歸的學說是人自我評價的方式,它的特 殊性在於透過此評價方式,一方面保住了生成世界的意義,另一方面在虛無 與生成中創造了存在的價值;而此方式在尼采哲學中呈顯為由從「虛無」到 「笑」的動態發展;在一切言說與理性之外,「笑」創造了一個由身體出發的新視角,它是人作為超人的意義。
In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.
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86.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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陳 平坤
Chen Ping-Kun
幻有假名觀下的「物不遷」論辯
Dialectic of “Things Do Not Shift” under the View of “Naming of Illusory Existence”
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本文旨在論究僧肇依據幻有假名的佛教觀點,如何洞徹一切諸法的存 在底蘊,去開顯其中稱得上是究竟真實的內涵,以簡別於非真實的存在體 和認識構作物,從而為世人打通一條得以趣入「諸法實相」或「物性」的 思維道路。本文論述的主要典據是〈物不遷論〉和《注維摩詰經》的僧肇注解;而 所採取的進路,則為重視反省思維和闡釋義理的哲學研究進路。本文研究成果的主要重點如下:(1)涉及「物性」課題的「物不遷」論點只是一種假名言說。(2)「不遷」假說建立在取相分別之認知活動架構上。(3)「物不遷」雖不意謂就是諸法實相,但可當作趣入實相的一道 法門。(4)有關「物不遷」論據的探討,必須清楚辨明認識論問題思維脈絡 中的「[事]物」與存有論問題思維脈絡中的「[事]物」二者間的不同意 義分界,如此才能不管反對僧肇、還是贊同僧肇,在論據上都有比較圓滿的 說服力。
This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.
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洪巳 軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
論《管子》政治權威之形式與基礎 ─以〈權修〉為核心之探討
On The Forms and Bases of Political Authority in Guanzi ─A Research on “Quanxiu”
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本文將政治權威視為一種「命令─服從」的權力關係,並以呈現此種 關係之不同的性質為其「形式」,又以支撐起各種形式之原因為其「基礎」, 進而以此種角度探究《管子•權修》對於政治權威相關主張。結果本文發現, 〈權修〉篇中已然將道德與法律視為政治權威的形式,而且在法律形式中又 可以進一步區分出合法性、引誘性以及強制性等三種權威形式。再者,道德 形式的政治權威其基礎則是心理的,法律形式的政治權威則是以經濟與武力 為其基礎。
The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.
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丁 福寧
Ting, Paschal Fu-Ning
亞理斯多德的靈魂不朽概念
Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul
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亞理斯多德的《論靈魂》一書探討所有有機體;植物、動物和人之所以 有生命的事實,以及它們分別可以有的活動。他將靈魂定義為生命的原理,靈魂是潛能中可以有生命的自然身體之所以活著的現實原理。有關靈魂不朽的問題是亞理斯多德思想中最不清楚的問題。唯可以明確 的即靈魂不朽的概念是他早期已遺失的著作中的核心問題。在早期著作中,他基本上受柏拉圖的影響,肯定靈魂不朽。在他的成熟期著作中,亞理斯多 德以物理學中的形質論,類比的用到靈魂與身體之間的是形式與質料之間關 係。人是一完整的人,靈魂不能分開、自立地存在,靈魂當與身體組合成一 完整的人。在形質論的框架下如何解釋在身體死亡後,靈魂仍有繼續存在的 可能,就成為哲學家不斷地探討的問題。在本文的探討中,我們指出亞理斯多德雖從沒有一系列有關靈魂不朽的 論證,但從他肯定理性才是人的靈魂,它是形上的簡單,是非物質的,它的 固有活動是非物質的活動,他肯定靈魂的本性是不朽的。理性非身體的形 式,它是在自身分開的實體,形質論不能用到理性與身體的關係。不同於植 物和動物的靈魂當與身體組合在一起,理性是不同類的靈魂。從理性是分開 的實體,它的活動與身體無關,它是非物質的,它因而是永恆和不朽的。亞 理斯多德的這種有關理性的靈魂的獨特本性和活動的特性有著濃厚的柏拉 圖色彩。本文旨在論證靈魂不朽的概念是亞理斯多德早期思想中的主要概 念,也是他一生所未曾放棄的。
Aristotle’s De anima is the first book which deals with all sorts of organism: the living facts of all the plants, animals and human beings, and their proper activities or functions respectively. Soul is defined as the vital principle which enables the natural bodies from having life in potency to be a living body in act.The problem regarding the immortality of the soul is altogether unclear in Aristotle’s writings. However, what is definite is that the concept of immortality of the soul is one of the central ideas in his early lost writings. At his early age, Aristotle was influenced by Plato and accepted the idea of the immortality of the soul. In his mature writings, Aristotle develops his own philosophy. When he speaks about psychology, he speaks in terms of the hylomorphism in the Physics. According to which, all the material substances are composed of form and matter, so is a man composed of soul and body. For Aristotle, as a man is a whole man, the soul cannot subsist separately in itself. In such a case, the possibility of the survival of the soul, after the death of body, becomes the repeated question on which philosophers have been trying to investigate.Aristotle never makes any demonstration of the immortality of the soul, as Plato does before him. Nevertheless, he affirms that the intellect is the very soul of human beings, being metaphysically simple and immaterial, and its activity is immaterial in nature. Intellect is not the form of body; it is a separable substance in its own right. In fact, hylomorphism cannot be referred to the relationship between intellect and body. Intellect is different from the vegetative and animal souls which are bound to be united with bodily organs, whereas intellect can be a separable substance in its own right. It is a different genos of soul. Since intellect is immaterial, its activities are independent from body. It is therefore eternal and immortal. The Aristotelian idea of the intellect is platonic in essence. Aristotle has never given up his early idea of the immortality of the soul throughout his whole life.
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陳瑞 麟
Ruey-Lin Chen
牟宗三「科學開出論」的形上學困難 ─以儒家思想為本的中國文化 可以開出現代科學嗎?
Metaphysical Predicaments in Mao Zhongsan’s “Science Kei-Chu-Lun”: Could Modern Science Be Developed Out of Chinese Culture Based on Confucianism?
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「以儒家思想為本的中國文化可以接受西方現代科學嗎?」是二十世紀 新儒家企圖解決的一個核心問題。他們的解決方案是牟宗三著名的「科學開 出論」,亦即主張科學必須從中國文化內部、即儒家思想本身發展出來(開 出)。這套科學開出論預設了一個道德形上學的學說,包含一個「先驗道德 界」與「經驗現象界」的二分架構。本文爭論這套形上學不相容於現代科學 發展的形上學條件,因此無法支持科學開出論,進而我們可由此申論儒學與 中國傳統文化無能力發展出現代科學,雖然它已經產生中國傳統科學。最後 本文想指出,當代台灣哲學家要面對的問題不再是「中國文化與科學的關 係」,而是「在現代科技的衝擊下,什麼是中國文化」的新問題。
The key question which new Confucians in the twentieth century attempted to solve is “Can Confucianism-based Chinese culture adopt Western modernscience?” Their program is Mou Zhongsan’s distinguished “Kei-Chu-Lun,” which claims that modern science must be dialectically developed out of, but not be transplanted to, Confucianism-based Chinese culture. The theory presupposes a doctrine of moral metaphysics, which implies a dichotomy between “the kingdom of a priori morality” and “the kingdom of a posteriori phenomena”. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical doctrine is incompatible to ontologicalconditions by which modern science could be produced. Therefore, it fails in supporting “Kei-Chu-Lun.” I also argue that Confucianism-based Chinese culturehas no capability to develop Western modern science, although it has produced Chinese traditional science. Finally, I want to point out that the key problemwith which contemporary philosophers in Taiwan should deal is rather “what is Chinese culture when it has been transformed by modern science and technology” than “what is the relationship between modern science and Chinese culture.”
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90.
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徐 學庸
Hsu, Hsei-Yung
四個角色的理論 ─西塞羅《論義務》I, 105-125
The Theory of Four Personae -Cicero’s De Officiis I, 105-125
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根據羅馬哲學家西塞羅《論義務》(De Officiis)的記載,西元前二世紀 的斯多葛學派的哲學家帕奈提烏斯(Panaetius),在論述合宜行為時提出四 個角色(personae)的理論(I, 105-125)。合宜行為的判定,根據帕奈提烏 斯的思想,必須依據一個人是否將其具有的四個角色扮演好,即理性,個人 特質,環境與運氣及選擇。這篇文章的論述主要有兩個目的:首先試探究帕 奈提烏斯的四個角色理論的內涵;其次是藉此理論的討論為當代一空洞的口 號「做自己」,提供一可能的內容充實。本文主要由三部分組成:第一部分 針對四個角色分別進行討論,並論及帕奈提烏斯的思想是受哪些哲學家或學 派的影響;第二部分主要處理的問題是:這四個角色如何能和諧運作?最後,能使四個角色和諧運作者會有什麼樣的生活,會是第三部分關注的焦點。
According to Cicero’s De Officiis, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius discusses the notion of proper conduct in terms of the theory of four personae, i.e. rationality,personal characteristics, circumstance and chance, and choice. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, the content and connotation of the theory will beexplored; secondly, by virtue of the discussion of the theory, the contemporary content-free slogan ‘Be Yourself’ could hopefully be provided with substance.This paper therefore consists mainly of three parts: The first part of this paper explores the four personae respectively, and discusses the problem: WhetherPanaetius’s theory is his own creation or influenced by some other philosophers? The second part deals with the issue: How can the four personae harmoniouslywork together? The third part focuses on the problem: What kind of life will one have, when he can make his four personae harmoniously work together?
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91.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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孫效 智
Johannes Hsiao-chih Sun
論儒家現實擁有判準理論 與等差之愛原則的人類胚胎觀點
Confucian Accounts of Personhood and the Moral Status of Human Embryos
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本文旨在探討當代儒家在位格理論上所提出的「儒家現實擁有判準」 理論及「等差之愛」原則,以及它們對於人類胚胎的觀點。「儒家現實擁有 判準」(Confucian actual-possession criteria)是區別位格(person)與非位格 (non-person)的一種理論,該理論及由之衍伸出來的「儒家位格漸進論」 (Confucian gradualism)、「儒家社會性位格論」(Confucian social personhood) 是本文首先要加以探討的幾個儒家位格理論,這些理論對於人該如何看待人 類胚胎乃至如何看待人提出了非常具爭議性而值得探討的看法。其次,本文 進一步要探討訴諸儒家「等差之愛」原則以證立「為了醫學進步及人類福祉 的理由而許可傷害人類胚胎」的主張。本文主張,無論「儒家現實擁有判準」、「儒家位格漸進論」或「儒家 社會性位格論」等概念,都無法從儒家思想中推導出來,而且也與儒家思 想互不相容。至於以儒家「等差之愛」原則來證立犧牲胚胎的作法,不僅 證據薄弱,從「不傷害」(first, do no harm)原則的角度來看,更是站不住 腳的。
The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind.I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.
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書 評 / book reviews |
92.
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王文 方
Wen-fang Wang
N.J. Smith 之《含混性與真之程度》
Nicholas J. J. Smith, Vagueness and Degrees of Truth
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論 著 / articles |
93.
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彭孟 堯
Eric Peng
蒼涼蘊涵與天擇論證 ─人類是不理性的嗎?
The Bleak Implication and the Selection Argument -Are Humans Irrational?
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本文主旨在於探討並拒斥在1980 年代一群認知科學家依其研究結果而 主張的「蒼涼蘊涵」:人類是不理性的。本文首先解析這些認知科學家建立 此結論時所依據的前提,再逐一反駁。另一方面,Stich 檢討了文獻上訴諸 天擇演化以辯護人類理性的主張,並重新建構了「天擇論證」,然後提出三 件反駁。本文檢視Stich 這三件反駁,並藉由指出其思考不足之處,來修改 天擇演化論證,以試圖說明理性與心理推想系統之間的關聯,並重新開啟以 演化理論辯護人類理性之路。
This essay is to reject the so-called “bleak implication”—human beings are irrational in nature, which was said to follow from experiments on human reasoning in the eighties. The rejection is advocated by way of re-constructing for the cognitive scientists their argument for the bleak implication. Meanwhile, Stich constructs what he calls the “Selection argument” for human rationality, and then rejects it. This essay examines his arguments and argues that his objections are defective. This essay then revises the selection argument to show how human rationality is connected to the design and performance of human reasoning mechanism with the hope that we may re-open the possibility of defending human rationality from an evolutionary point of view.
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94.
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王志 輝
Zhi-Hue Wang
亞理斯多德論「善」 及「存有」之同名異義
Aristotle on the Homonymy of “Goodness” and “Being”
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亞理斯多德對柏拉圖哲學最常提出的控訴,便是它過於簡化。在他看 來,柏拉圖也分享了蘇格拉底關於字詞與定義的假定。蘇格拉底認為,當問 及「何謂F?」(正義、勇敢等)的問題時,總是可以找到某個關於「F」的 單一定義。然而,亞理斯多德卻宣稱,某些哲學上關鍵的字詞與概念,例如 「存有」、「善」、「正義」、「友情」等等,乃是同名異義或者以各種方式來述 說的。因此,在他眼中,柏拉圖正犯了過度簡化的問題:柏拉圖錯誤地忽略 了同名異義,並誤以為相同的字詞總是以相同方式而述說的。因而我們必須 放棄柏拉圖對於「存有」、「善」以及「正義」的說明。然而Ch. Shields 卻認為,亞理斯多德哲學中的兩個關鍵概念─「存 有」以及「善」─是無法被證明為同名異義的;雖然亞理斯多德經常提出 對於「存有」以及「善」之同名異義的警示,對於兩者同名異義的論證卻是 失敗的。Shields 宣稱,根本沒有一套可用以辯護亞理斯多德有關「存有」 之同名異義的學說,因為這個學說根本是錯誤的;他也認為,「善」之同名 異義同樣也無法被建立,因為它是從可疑的「存有」之同名異義學說推導而 來。本文將展示,Shields 對於亞理斯多德有關「存有」與「善」同名異義 論證之批判並不成功。本文將藉這種方式重構亞理斯多德嘗試建立「存有」 與「善」之同名異義的基本架構。
The criticism of Plato most often leveled by Aristotle against Plato is that his philosophy is oversimplified. On his view, Plato shares the Socratic assumption about words and definitions. When asked “What is F?” (justice, courage, etc.), Socrates thinks that a single definition can always be found. However, Aristotle claims that some of the crucial words and concepts in his philosophy, such as “being,” “goodness,” “justice,” and “friendship,” are homonymous or multivocal (said in many ways). In his eyes, therefore, Plato oversimplifies the issue: Plato mistakenly ignores homonymy and simply supposes that the same word is always said in the same way. Put briefly, the Platonic accounts of “being, ” “goodness, ” and “justice” should be rejected because homonymy and multivocity are ignored.However, Ch. Shields holds that two of the crucial concepts of the Aristotelian philosophy – “being” and “goodness” – cannot be shown to be homonymous; although Aristotle often issues special warnings against the homonymy of “being” and “goodness, ” all of his arguments fail. Shields claims that there is no defensible Aristotelian doctrine about the homonymy of “being” because this doctrine is false; he also thinks that the homonymy of “goodness” cannot be established because it is inferred from the problematical doctrine of the homonymy of “being”. In this article, I shall show that Shields’ critiques of Aristotle’s arguments for the homonymy of “being” and “goodness” do not succeed. In this way, I shall reconstruct the basic framework of Aristotle’s attempt to establish the homonymy of “being” and “goodness”.
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95.
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蔡龍 九
Lung-Chiu Tsai
王陽明「理」的內容 與「心即理」的適用範圍
The Content of Wang Yangming’s “Li” and the Proper Application Range of “Xin Ji Li”
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陽明的「理」概念在他的立教宗旨中明顯偏向「德性方面」,然而他論 述「理」的內容時對「非德性方面」亦曾提及,並且欲亦以「心」說之;筆 者於本文中除考察他對此兩種方向之「理」的論述內容之外,在個人的分類 中,談論出他的「心即理」教法可適用於「德性意義之理」,並且指出陽明 若勉強地以「心」談論「非德性意義之理」時所遭受的困難以及不通暢之處。 於本文中,筆者除了對陽明的「理」概念內容作出分類及釐清之外,並論述 其「心即理」的適用範圍。
In Wang Yangming’s theoretical premises, the concept of “Li” tends to relate to “the moral domain,” though its affinity with “the amoral domain” is also suggested. He furthermore expounds this concept of “Li” by the notion of “Xin.” In this paper I investigate Wang’s twin-track approach upon “Li,” and propose that his tenet of “Xin Ji Li” suits a moral conception of “Li.” I also point out the predicaments Wang encounters when carring out a forced application of the notion of “Xin” in expounding an amoral conception of “Li.” In addition to my attempts to categorize and elucidate Wang’s concept of “Li,” the proper application range of “Xin Ji Li” will also be explored.
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96.
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蘇慶 輝
Ching-Hui Su
論瑣碎性結果與對條件化的限制
On the Triviality Results and the Restriction on Conditionalization
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路易士的「瑣碎性結果」論證被視為能有力地拒斥對於條件句採行的真 值條件語意論,因為如果接受古典的機率理論、條件化,以及史東內克對條 件句的論點,我們可以推導出一個荒謬的結果─對任意的命題A 與C 而 言,p(C/A) = p(C)。本文試圖回應他的「瑣碎性結果」論證,並指出:無論 我們以條件機率如何定義自然語言的任何二位連接詞,瑣碎性結果仍會出 現。因此,放棄史東內克對條件句的論點不是避開瑣碎性結果的唯一方式; 相反的,我們可以對「條件化」做適當的限制來避免瑣碎性結果。
Lewis’s arguments for the triviality results are considered as a powerful rejection of the truth-conditional accounts of conditionals: the absurd consequencethat for any propositions A and C, p(C/A) = p(C) is derived from the classical probability calculus, conditionalization, and Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals.In this paper, it is argued that the triviality results need not be a threat to Stalnaker’s semantics, for we can derive a generalized triviality result from the classicalprobability theory and any thesis about conditional probability. The lesson, I suggest, is that we should reconsider the classical probability theory or set a restriction on the rule of conditionalization such that the triviality results may be avoided.
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97.
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陳清 春
Qing-Chun Chen
牟宗三「智的直覺」理論的內在矛盾與出路
On the Internal Contradictions and Solution to Mou Zong-san’s “Intellectual Intuition”
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由於牟宗三的直覺理論繼承了康德(Immanuel Kant)直觀理論的感性 (Sinnlichkeit)與智性(Intellektuell)二分的理論前設以及康德智性直觀 (intellektuelle Anschauung)的非感性和創造性這兩個性質,使得其“智的 直覺"理論產生兩個內在矛盾:其一,道德感情和道德興趣的感性與智性的 矛盾;其二,本體的存在與創造的矛盾。於是,他在用直覺理論解釋中國傳 統儒釋道哲學時就陷入難以克服的困境。根據胡塞爾(Edmund Husserl)的 現象學直觀理論,感知(Wahrnehumung)的意向性(Intentionalität)事實上 已經取消了康德感性與智性的截然二分,而他關於感覺(Empfindung)與感 知的區分又為解決牟宗三“智的直覺"的內在矛盾提供了現象學的理論基 礎,即,感覺是與“智的直覺"意義相當的本體直觀方式,但由於感覺是 感性的和非創造性的,就避免了牟宗三的兩個理論矛盾,而感覺正是直觀 的本義。
Mou Zong-san’s “intellectual intuition” contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’sdichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s “intellectual intuition”: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.
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98.
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彭孟 堯
Eric Peng
心智構造模組性的爭議
The Debate Over the Modularity of Cognitive Structure
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本文探討人類心智構造的模組程度問題,著重在如何掌握最小模組論與 演化心理學的大量模組假設之間的爭議。最小模組論的「模組」概念與演化 心理學的「模組」概念有非常大的差異,這不僅是由於前者將「資訊膠封性」 視為模組的要件,而演化心理學並不接受,甚至就連雙方關於「論域特定性」 的理解也不同。但本文不將雙方的歧異視為表面的文字或概念之爭。本文論 述,一方面從最小模組論的立場來說,由於中央系統的機制大都具有整體論 的性質以及等方位的性質,它們是資訊不膠封的,這一點是演化心理學無法 否認的;另一方面,本文對大量模組假設提出六點批駁,並結論:即使在大 量模組假設下,不以「資訊膠封」作為模組的標準,而以「功能分殊」以及「適應難題」取而代之,中央系統的心理機制仍未必是大量模組的。
This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular.
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李淳 玲
Esther C. Su
康德的後學:是「善紹」?還是「別子」?—從萊因赫德到牟宗三
Kant’s Successors: Legitimate Heirs? Or Not? -From Reinhold to Mou Zongsan
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牟宗三先生曾說康德在西方無「善紹」,而當代西方康德學家安默瑞克 斯(Karl Ameriks)也說:「那位本來無後的教授,形上學家康德:留下一窩 非法的子嗣。」如果用牟先生的詞語說,這「一窩非法的子嗣」都是「別子」,間接也就是無「善紹」的意思。牟先生認為康德太客氣,把「智的直覺」只歸屬上帝,上達的路徑太虛 歉,所以他從中國哲學「實踐」的立場,把「智的直覺」歸給人類,消彌「現 象與物自身」的二分,還出一個以「價值」為皈依的「絕對實在論」。而安 默瑞克斯則以為康德哲學原是一個比較樸素的系統(modest system),卻因 萊因赫德(K. L. Reinhold)鼓吹「實踐理性的優先」,而使原來樸素的哲學 轉為黑格爾的絕對理念論,不但轉化了康德,也侵蝕了康德。但是英語系的 發展,卻因萊因赫德的《書信》(Letters on the Kantian Philosophy)不曾被 譯成英文,而沒有發展出德國理念論的型態,反之,英美系循《第一批判》 的另一條線索,追究嚴格的科學(exact science),發展出邏輯實證論、科學 實在論及實用主義等說,這其中被流失的,正是康德哲學樸素的原味,這個 原味由耶拿一批名不見經傳的早期浪漫派學者所繼承(early Romantics),可 惜他們完全被後期浪漫派的光芒所掩蓋,這是康德哲學的不幸。本文有意藉安默瑞克斯對康德哲學樸素的詮釋,對比牟先生對康德哲學 的轉化,指出牟先生與西方康德後學之同異,並勾繪康德後學是「別子」還 是「善紹」的輪廓。
Professor Mou Zongsan once proclaimed: “Kant has no great successors in the West.” Recently, Professor Karl Ameriks also uttered: “A supposed childless professor, Kant the metaphysician left behind a fertile family of illegitimate heirs.” By contrasting Mou’s and Ameriks’ perspectives employed to express a somehow shared sentiment, this paper intends to extract the philosophical imports from this seemingly mere sentiment taking place in the history of philosophy.Mou believes that Kant is often too polite to attribute “intellectual intuition” exclusively to God. Instead, Mou, by taking the stand of Chinese practical philosophy, attributes “intellectual intuition” to humans, thus dissolves the gap between “phenomena and thing-in-itself” and further establishes an “absolute realism” based on values. Ameriks, on the other hand, thinks that Kant’s philosophy is apologetic and modest in comparison to its direct successors in German Idealism. The transformation of Kant into the German Idealism through advocating “the primacy of practical reason” by K. L. Reinhold, however, also misunderstands Kant's very basic discourse of critical philosophy. On the other hand, in the absence of English translation of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, theAnglo-American Kantians, get Kant’s philosophy expressed in a completely different direction. By following the thread of exact science, they convert the Kantian philosophy to logical positivism, scientific realism and pragmatism, and thus miss the critical flavor of Kant's original insights. Only the early Romantics, in Ameriks’ view, have inherited Kant's critical philosophical thinking.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 40
王 禕
Yi Wang
《禮記•樂記》中的「理」範疇根源與內涵
On the Origin and Meaning of the Category of “Li” in the Liji Yueji
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《禮記•樂記》中的「理」範疇頗具討論意義。一方面在理範疇的發展 史上,它首先提出了「倫理」一詞。另一方面,它繼莊子之後,較早地使用 了「天理」的概念,並增之為「天理人欲」。在先秦所有理字的涵義中,〈樂 記〉繼承了其中「萬事萬物內在屬性和運行規律」、「天命人性之理」、「倫理」 幾個義項。從學派來看,它雜糅了儒家、道家、墨家等多家思想,而又以儒 家思想為主。形成了以理為「體」,以禮樂為「相」,以移風易俗之施為「用」 的「體─相─用」三層融通契合結構。〈樂記〉之理亦與其他哲學範疇產生密切聯繫,再現了先秦理範疇的思想脈絡。
The category of “li” as it appears in the Yueji (Record of Music) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites) is of considerable significance. On the one hand, the Liji Yueji contains the first instance of the word ‘lunli’ in the history of the category of “li.” On the other hand, following Zhuangzi, it contains an early use of the concept of “tianli” (principle of nature) and broadens this to “tianli renyu” (principle of nature and human desires). From all meanings of the character ‘li’ in the pre-Qin period, the Yueji inherited its aspects of “internal property and operational pattern of all things and events,” “consciousness of destiny and life,” and “ethics” (lunli). From a school perspective, the Yueji blends the thought of the Confucian, Daoist and Mohist schools, yet with Confucianism as its main framework. It moreoverbuilds a three-level tacit structure with li as body (ti), etiquette and music as performance (xiang), and the practice of social traditions and customs as function (yong). Moreover, the Yueji also generates close connections between “li” and other philosophical categories, thereby revealing the intellectual context of the category of “li” in the pre-Qin period.
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