This article tries to explain the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and psychology, particularly phenomenological psychology, in the work of Aron Gurwitsch. Following Husserl, Gurwitsch shows the paradoxes of phenomenological psychology and the necessity to perform the transcendental reduction in order to overcome them. This technical issue will help us to see in a very clear way why Gurwitsch is a transcendental phenomenologist and why, from a Husserlian and Gurwitschean point of view, every philosophy that remains in the natural attitude—and for the author of The Field of Consciousness this is the case of the philosophy of existence (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty)—is not philosophy in the more radical sense of the word.

Painting paints the conditions of visibility in accordance with their historical modalities and not the conditions of the reproduction of the real. That is why the whole Phenomenology, speaking about Painting, speaks of “phenomenon,” i.e. of “appearing” of that which appears.

Th is paper proposes a phenomenological approach to the constitution of biological objects of inquiry. It argues that such an approach can be built upon an extended version of Heidegger’s existential conception of science. Five main thematizing projects of constituting biological objects of inquiry are under examination. Finally, the paper suggests the view that despite the disunity of biology on the level of the main thematizing projects, there is a dynamic and mosaic unity of interrelated practices of scientific research.

In this paper we intend to lay the grounds for a Phenomenology of money. We start from the pre-theoretical comprehension of money as an “entity for”, that is to say, as a tool. Within this pre-theoretical comprehension, money is always understood according to its teleology (money is always “something to buy with”). Also, in this pre-theoretical framework money is hardly ever defined as “something to sell with”, or as “something being the result of my work”. Thus, in our daily experience the being of money becomes undistinguishable with the act of purchasing, which in turn underlines the deeply projective nature of money’s essence. In order to grasp this projective quality, we will have to develop a phenomenlogy of the purchasing act. “To purchase” is “to get something by means of money”. But, what is this thing that we get anyway? Whatever it is, it has a distinctive character: it is a merchandise. Through the appropiate phenomenologial descriptions, we will try to show how the description of the spatiality of the merchandise is essential to understand the effects of money upon the spatiality of the surrounding world.

The essay explores the thought of Alfred Schutz with regard to his position on Husserlian transcendentalism. Comparing the “paradox of communication” formulated by Schutz in 1945 with Husserl’s treatment of the life-world in §34 of the Crisis, it arrives at the question of practicing the phenomenological method (the reduction) in the field of the social sciences. As this problem pushes the phenomenological paradigm to its limits, Schutz is seen as a borderline figure between the paradigm of perception and the paradigm of action. Th e transition is illustrated in the example of his idea of “stock of knowledge.”

In this essay the author will try to show that the transition from Otherwise than Being to The Essence of Manifestation has necessarily been done under the influence of Henry’s philosophy of immanence, which is highly appreciated by Levinas.

On the route towards a philosophy of translation inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics, my working hypothesis is that thinking about translation is fertile for a deeper understanding of the meaning of interpretation and of phenomenology. Language, languages, and translation enter into the very heart of the constitution of sense. The free gift of language and of languages permits us to have access to the world and to meet the other. In this way a phenomenological hermeneutics of translation can help us to realize that humanity, just like language, exists only in the plural mode.

This essay suggests that it is possible to develop a phenomenology of moral action modeled upon Aristotelian ethics. Focusing on the debt owed by phenomenology to Heidegger and his hermeneutics of Aristotelian ethics, we will argue for the two following theses: a) One of the main contributions of Aristotelian ethics is that it provides an account of moral action in terms of perception; b) Heidegger pointed out this contribution, but to the extent that he concealed its perceptual character, he did not prove faithful to the project of a phenomenology of moral action.

It is sometimes claimed that Husserl’s writings provide an inspiration for considering art today. More specifically we ask here whether Husserl’s description of the aesthetic attitude is rich and original. The comparisons he draws between the aesthetic attitude and the phenomenological attitude always aim to clarify the phenomenological attitude and thus take it for granted that the typical features of the aesthetic attitude are well known. In this way Husserl presupposes and retrieves the teaching of Kant, although in certain working notes he clarifies and intensifies the formal characteristics of Kant’s description of the aesthetic judgment.

Th e aim of this contribution is to think about contemporary phenomenology in comparison to its vanguard between 1910 and 1935. This encounter would have been fruitful and possibly transgressive for Husserl’s Phenomenology and that of others. Husserl and Heidegger provided an immense “openness of phenomenality,” the consequences of which were not noticed by themselves with enough lucidity. For this reason, today it would be interesting to think that this encounter, which in fact never took place, between contemporary phenomenology and its vanguard, that is, between phenomena and manifestos, is an attempt to pay an historical debt.

Th e aim of this contribution is to think about contemporary phenomenology in comparison to its vanguard between 1910 and 1935. This encounter would have been fruitful and possibly transgressive for Husserl’s Phenomenology and that of others. Husserl and Heidegger provided an immense “openness of phenomenality,” the consequences of which were not noticed by themselves with enough lucidity. For this reason, today it would be interesting to think that this encounter, which in fact never took place, between contemporary phenomenology and its vanguard, that is, between phenomena and manifestos, is an attempt to pay an historical debt.

The purpose of this paper will be the elucidation of the basic structure of socialization. Socialization is temporarily constituted by a first original moment, which as such is also generative; this offers the possibility of a systematic analysis of the different degrees of the pure form of social phenomena. This work will actually focus on the exegesis of time as the basic structure of socialization, beginning at the pure We-relation in order to found the possibility of creating ontology of social phenomena, which we think has always been present in Alfred Schutz’s work.

The paper seeks to revisit Levinas’s conception of à-Dieu as a plausible account of a new way of saying (dire) the name of God (Dieu) without reducing its radical alterity to a mere dictum (dit). The Portuguese word adeus is perhaps the most felicitous way of doing justice to Levinas’s radical subversion of onto-theology, as the hyphenated term (a-deus) also allows for an important ambiguity, beyond its own polysemy and plays on words, that not only one may think of the equivalent function of addressing the Other (à Dieu) and its negation by way of a privative alpha (a-Dieu) but also a tacit il y a.

Th e paper seeks to establish a dialogue between two 20th century philosophers for whom language, or more specifically dialogue, is the founding element of their understanding of human beings and the human world. As they both refer their work back to the phenomenological tradition and anchor many of their proposals in the Aristotelian practical philosophy, the lack of dialogue between them is somewhat surprising. Th e purpose of this brief communication is to set the grounds for what the author hopes will be a fruitful exchange. Th e paper will examine it on the basis of the concepts of plurality, language and the importance of judgment, the latter understood in the Kantian sense.

After almost forty years of debate, the question is asked again: Why the Noema? We will try to advance an answer on the basis of: 1) Th e historical background of Husserl’s attempt to overcome Cartesianism; 2) The structure of the noema’s transcendence and ideality, which in turn leads to focus anew on the controversy between “traditional” and “analytic” interpretations; 3) Noematic constitution understood not as yielding “entities” but as a “network” of levels and strata, which include the role of the living body and the genetic dimension, both concerning primary passivity in the living present and secondary passivity or habituality.

The present contribution examines the notion of sublime within the reconstruction of the phenomenological interpretation of the alive nature and animal organisms in the book “The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics” (Heidegger, 1929/30). It is intended to show that the appropriate ontology for the proper behavior with the alive nature implies the recognition of a sublimity predicated of the nature itself. Having presented the ontological identity of the organisms with the two concepts of captivation (Bennomenheit) and interpenetration of the disinhibiting rings, Heidegger identifies in the adaptative dynamics of the organisms a movement of construction and overcoming of the nature by the nature itself. In these terms, the sublime is not only the proportionate feeling for the meeting with the nature. It does not give place to the game between the finitude human being and the autonomy of the reason, but it is characteristic of the nature qua nature. The sublimity of nature is relative to a dynamics that is not internal to the subjectivity, but points out the dimension of manifestation of ontological structures. In face of this dynamics it appears a attunement that Heidegger calls restraint (Verhaltenheit). In fact, the restraint is asserted as the condition for any kind of relation with living creatures that observes the adequate ontological categorization of nature.

Unlike the absolutification of the mode of thinking that reduces man to a mind, which represents, and the world to a physical-mathematical structure available just through objectification, Heidegger requests philosophy to return to the question of the being making it a task of the thinking. During the course of this task he constructs the possibility of a thinking about man unbending to the objectifying discourse. Taking the treatise of 1927 and the Zollikon Seminars as a reference, we would like to ask if the Freudian psychoanalysis – as a science of psychic phenomenon – is able to think the human existence as outside of the enclosure of the modern subjectivity and objectivity. In other words: if the freudian meta-psychology breaks with or adjusts to the imperatives of the metaphysics of subjectivity.Contra a absolutização do modo de pensar que reduz o homem a uma mente que representa e o mundo a uma estrutura fisico-matemática disponível apenas pela via da objetificação, Heidegger convoca a filosofi a retomar a questão do ser, fazendo-a tarefa do pensamento. No caminho desta tarefa, constrói a possibilidade de um pensar sobre homem irredutível ao discurso objetifi cante. Tomando como referência o tratado de 1927 e os Seminarios de Zollikon, visamos perguntar se a psicanálise freudiana – enquanto ciência dos fenômenos psíquicos – dá conta de pensar o existir humano fora da clausura da subjetividade e objetividade modernas. Em outros termos: se a metapsicologia freudiana rompe ou afi na-se, com os imperativos da metafísica da subjetividade.

Phobia constitutes an anguishing fear, unrestrained by the presence of an object, a situation or a person that do not have an objectively dangerous character. Rather than interpreting the choice of something as a phobic-like object as psychoanalysis does, phenomenology sets aside all theories and tries to reach the structure of the ego so as to point out the dimension of existence there. Anguish permeates existence and exposes it to a threat that alters the relationship with the world, i.e., a world that one believes potentially hostile, does not let one live in a banal way, and leads one to the lack of mundane aspect.

The aim of the present article is to show that it is possible to perceive that certain discussions suggested by D. W. Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory instigate and clear inquiries that are still pending in Heidegger’s Existential Analysis, such as the question of natality, of the physicality of the Dasein, and of the reaching of the potentiality-for-being of the Dasein. Consequently, it can be said that some Winnicottian ideas on being and going-on-being touch the essential theme of Heidegger’s theory found in Being and Time, i.e.: human existence is, fundamentally, a timely and finite experience.Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar que é possível perceber que certas discussões avançadas pela teoria psicanalítica de D. W. Winnicott instigam e aclaram indagações ainda pendentes na analítica do ser-o-aí (Dasein) de Heidegger, tais como a questão da nascencialidade, da corporeidade do ser-o-ai e do chegar ao poder-ser do ser-o-aí. Por conseqüência, poder-se-á indicar que algumas idéias winnicottianas sobre ser e continuara-ser tocam o tema essencial da teoria heideggeriana presente em Ser e Tempo, a saber: o existir humano é, no seu fundamento, um acontecer temporal e finito.