Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view

The reism adopted by Brentano in the later stages of his philosophy led him to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. George Bealer, in his book Quality and Concept, charges that Brentano's theory, and indeed all non-propositional theories of judgment are not adequate to certain "intuitively valid" arguments in the realm of intensional logic. I show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments, and I challenge the intuitive validity of the third. I conclude, therefore, that Bealer's arguments against Brentano do not succeed.

Relativists try to reduce the realistic notion of truth or make do without it. Rorty, e.g., regards 'true' as an indexical, or as a commendatory term; both construals result in contradictions. Dummett replaces truth by assertability, but that results in a vicious regress, making it impossible, first, to state the theory, and second, that nonomniscients know anything. Quine, rejecting meaning and reference altogether, ends with a picture of language that is a mere pattern of (e.g., vocal) interactions; by its own light, that theory is incomprehensible and unjustifiable. Truth as correspondence to reality is therefore an irreducible notion.

In his essay, "Über Gegenstandstheorie", Meinong presents a clear formulation of his somewhat paradoxical Ontology. I have attempted to construct an explicit differentiation between Meinong's objects which are indifferent to being, and objects upon which a type of being is predicated. I argue that once a clear distinction between Meinongian objects and objects of a higher order is effected, not only do paradoxical inconsistencies fade, but also the Ontology itself gains intuitive appeal.

Wittgenstein's Über Gewißheit shows his de facto commitment to the Three Condition Theory, according to which a knowledge-attribution implies belief, justification and truth, i.e., one can't be said to know that p unless (a) he believes that p; (b) he is in a position to justify p; and (c) 'p' is true. However, when it comes to tackling the puzzling infinite regress of justifications Wittgenstein's argument becomes entangled in an epistemological circle. It seems to oscillate between an unwelcome absolutism and a self-refuting relativism as far as epistemological matters are concerned.

This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of St. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God

Conceptual relativism is characterized and elucitated in such a way that its force can be appreciated. It is argued that the usual attempts to dismiss it as a conceptual confusion fail. Then two attempts to articulate a conception of rationality adequate to show how conceptual relativism rests on a mistake are examined and shown to be at the best only partially successful. The upshot is, that, counter-intuitive as it is, the problem of conceptual relativism is still very much with us.

The Fregean distinction between Sinn ("sense") and Bedeutung ("reference") can be applied also to pictures. As to pictorial representation, one may distinguish between what a picture refers to and the properties of the picture that make it possible to tell what it refers to. It is tempting to try to define or elucidate notions like depiction in terms of the Sinn of pictures. But to avoid certain obvious objections to such an approach, the properties of the picture must be construed broadly; they should not only include patches of colors and light, but also complex relational properties. This paper tries to pave the way for such an analysis of pictorial representation in terms of certain combinations of intentions, seeing as, and traditions of representation. An attempt is also made to explore the relations between pictorial representation and structural similarity, and to outline distinctions between some relevant senses of "see-as". Applications to different kinds of art are briefly discussed.

Critical discussion of Quine's concepts of purely referential occurrence/position. It is argued from the perspective of a Russellian view of truth that existential generalization and substitutivity of identity are non-equivalent tests for referential occurrence/position, and that the former rather than the latter is the appropriate test.

The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.

Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. The main counter-argument is that the doctrine has implications which are morally unacceptable.

The problems that I address concern the morality and rationality of decisions with respect to the application and practice of science. Formally, the situation is a standard decision theoretic one in which one has a set of alternatives and a set of outcomes. The standard solution is to maximize expected utility. This formal simplicity conceals considerable philosophical complexity. The most obvious is — whose expected utility should we maximize? The second is — are there any moral constraints on what utility assignments we shall allow? The principle of rationality I am assuming is that a rational decision should be based on the total information available. Failure to cooperate in effecting such an amalgamation is subversive with respect to this overriding principle of rationality. It is a fundamental principle of truth seeking. Given the prima facie moral obligation to seek truth, failure to cooperate is prima facie immoral as well.

The Humanism of the new era grew in a renaissance of hellenistic culture with the new trends in science and art coming into conflict with clerical dogmatism. Its decay has been caused by external factors (creation of national states and institutions) and by the internal development of science and philosophy; particularly the principle of objectivism separated science from ethics. The revival of humanism occured in defense of the principles of equality, freedom and universality against the militancy and dogmatism of totalitarian parties. The danger of a total nuclear and ecological disaster has given to humanism the highest principle: the preservation of life. Humanism today is endowed by the mission to create the common basis for world-accord and -unity.