Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

This paper sketches out Peirce's "theory of indeterminacy" as part of a larger "triadic" theory within the context of the semiotic. It then examines the theory of the object in his later work, emphasizing the difference between immediate and dynamical object. The role of collateral experience is discussed. Connections are drawn between Peircean indeterminacy and Kant. The relationship of the indeterminate to contradiction and excluded middle is discussed. 'Determination', 'vagueness', and 'generality' are discussed in detail in the context established in this paper.

We distinguish scanning switches, which only enumerate states, from function switches which transform input states into output states. For the latter we introduce a logical network symbolism. Our history of early computer switching begins with the suggestions of Ramon Lull and Gottfried Leibniz, surveys the evolution of mechanical scanning switches and the first mechanical function switches, and then describes the first electromechanical function switches. The main themes of the present paper are that William S. Jevons built the first substantial function switch (his logical piano), and that his work led to the design by Allan Marquand of the first substantial electromechanical function switch, as well as to Charles S. Peirce's idea for an electrical general-purpose programmable computer. These events all occurred fifty years before the first general-purpose programmable computers were constructed (in the 1940's), but they had no influence.

In empirical science, hypostatic abstraction posits an entity defined by its assumed physical relation to a known phenomenon. If the assumed relation is real, the posited entity is physically real and is not an ens rationis. The posited entity, being identified indirectly, by its relation to something else, may be the agreed-upon subject of mutually incommensurable theories, and this is a key to understanding the history of science. Natural kinds may be introduced by hypostatic abstraction, and this explains why, contrary to received doctrine, concepts of natural kinds can never be vague in the sense of being fuzzy, though they can be vague in the sense of lacking specificity. Terms defined by hypostatic abstraction are rigid designators in Kripke's sense, but show how rigid designation is consistent with the Fregean theory of reference.

There is a Wittgensteinian use of "phenomenology" which is the grammar of the apriori possibility of facts, in contradistinction to an hermeneutical conception of language in the spirit of German phenomenology. Not only does Wittgenstein refer, as early as 1929, to such a "language" as opposed to a Husserlian "doctrine" of intuiting the phenomenal apriori, but he keeps using the term in a positive manner which does not allow us to declare that from the Tractatus to the early thirties Wittgenstein shifted from a kind of ineffabilist phenomenalism to physicalism. Rather the author of the Philosophical Remarks aims at freeing "phenomenology" from the earlier assumption of an atomistic basis providing a "primary language". Yet, Wittgenstein says in the same period that there is and there is not any confrontation with the given. Two ways of speaking about the connection between language and reality according to what is to be understood by "verifying" a sentence make Wittgenstein remain the same from one conception to the other.

J.J. Gibson claims that one who is looking at Niagara Falls is seeing it directly, whereas one who is looking at a picture of Niagara Falls is seeing it indirectly or mediately. Gibson's cognitivist critics claim that all perception is mediated and that "external objects" are never seen directly. Each side takes the debate to be a scientific issue. But following Wittgenstein's "nose" for detecting philosophical intrusions into what do not appear to be philosophical debates, the author shows how such elements play a decisive role in influencing the character of the argument. When the issue is seen from this perspective it can also be seen why both sides are mistaken in their claims.

According to Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, no 'language game' or 'form of life' is inherently philosophically problematic. However real, practical moral problems undermine the objectivity of morality, which as moral beings we cannot abandon. This problem is both philosophical and 'real'. Morality therefore undermines the later Wittgenstein's whole account of philosophy, i.e. its nature, how such problems are resolved, and its relation with the rest of our lives. Perhaps that is why he virtually never mentions Ethics in his writings after 1932-3.

Many have interpreted Wittgenstein as advocating a form of behaviourism. Through an examination of Wittgenstein's own remarks about behaviourism, and further textual evidence from his notebooks, it is shown that categorizing Wittgenstein as a 'behaviourist', of whatever ilk, serves not merely to obstruct an appreciation of his thinking, but perversely to distort Wittgenstein's views by flying in the face of the central critical thrusts of his later philosophy.

The negative part of Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations is a critique of Platonic theories of meaning. The main argument, summarized in §§ 201-202 is a reductio: if Platonism were true, the difference between obeying and disobeying a linguistic rule would vanish. For Platonism requires the rule-follower to have in his mind something which will completely determine in advance all the correct applications of a descriptive word, but this is a requirement that could not be conceivably satisfied. — The analogy which Wittgenstein finds for the Platonist's "super-idealization" of the rule-follower's mental equipment — the analogy of the "machine-as-symbol" (§§ 193-194) indicates the connection between his treatment of this topic and his philosophy of mathematics.

There has recently come to light a list of manuscripts and typescripts with instructions for their disposal, which suggests a number of hypotheses concerning the composition of Wittgenstein's only printed work, the Tractatus. In this article an attempt is made at identifying these documents with the help of biographical facts of the period 1914-1918. As a result it becomes highly improbable that many of the notebooks from which the Tractatus was composed have been lost. Rather it is suggested that the various stages of the "Prototractatus" can finally be traced on the basis of the now available evidence.

Wittgenstein is usually taken to have held that the use of a term is not mentally constrained. That is utterly wrong. A use of language unconstrained by meaning is attributed by him to "meaning-blind" or "aspect-blind" creatures, not to us. We observe meaning when an aspect dawns on us; meaning is the impression {Eindruck) of a term as fitting something; hence, unhke pain, it cannot stand alone. That is a mentalistic theory of meaning: use is determined by images {Vorstellungen) that play semantic roles in virtue of their aesthetic properties. Although a term may be arbitrarily interpreted, aesthetic reasons determine which interpretation be seen as right for it.

Following a suggestion made by Wittgenstein writing is treated as a manifestation of and model for thinking. An analysis of Wittgenstein's own writing as well as that of Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche reveals it as work carried out in multiple episodes of addition, deletion, and (re-)organization. Reflective writing of this kind is, in fact, a process of equilibration between local and global ideas which in philosophical work typically generates problems of coherence and closure. Non-reflective, immediate writing is not primary in philosophy, but characteristically presupposes a process of reflective rehearsal. The classical conception of thinking as an apprehension of thoughts derives from the mistaken idea of the primacy of immediate writing.