Die auf G. Frege zurückgehende logische Urteilslehre, die die universalen Aussagen im Sinne existenzfreier und die partikulären im Sinne existenzmitbehauptender Urteile deutet, hat ihren Ursprung in der nicht-mathematischen Logik des 19. Jahrhunderts. Bei J.F. Herbart findet sich die hypothetische Konzeption der Allaussage, die eine bedeutsame, Fregesche Gedankengänge antizipierende Verfeinerung durch Chr. Sigwart erfährt. Die genaue Struktur der partikulären Aussage bleibt vorerst noch im Dunkel. Erst F. Brentano gelingt es, die universalen wie die partikulären Aussagen in ihrer Eigenart herauszustellen. In dieser Entwicklung spielen die Problematik fiktiver Gegenstände und leerer Begriffe, die apriorische Gesetzlichkeit sowie der Einfachheitsbegriff eine zentrale Rolle.

Es wird versucht, einige Aspekte von Carnaps Werk Der logische Auflyau der Welt vor dem Hintergrund des Kantianismus zu betrachten, insbesondere die Strukturalismusthese, das Verhältnis von Gegebenem und Konstruiertem und den Wirklichkeitsbegriff; das Ergebnis geht dahin, daß sich mehr Gemeinsamkeiten mit der kantianischen Tradition zeigen als es von einem klassischen Werk des Neopositivismus zu erwarten wäre.

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen.

In this paper I shall attempt to perform two tasks; first, to defend James Jordan's recent self-referential arguments for the inconsistency of Protagorean relativism from the criticisms of Jack Meiland, and second, to contribute towards the cause of undermining Protagorean and conceptual relativism by criticizing Meiland's own explication of the notion of relative truth.

Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im Rahmen der Theorie von der Intentionalität des Mentalen vorgebracht werden, um uns von der Notwendigkeit der Annahme von Propositionen zu überzeugen.

Popper and Eccles present two different notions of Interactionism. Popper's arguments arise out of the traditional philosophical debate, whereas Eccles' arguments arise out of a mixture of neurophysiology and personal belief. Popper's three-world ontology is the philosophical foundation of both their positions. However, it is precisely against the background of the three Worlds that the considerable differences between their positions are apparent. Despite these defects, Interactionism is a productive notion since it does not place the Self beyond experimental investigation. Indeed, both Popper and Eccles have made implicit suggestions as to experimental procedure which might contribute to the investigation of the Self.

Die Standard-Interpretation von Carnaps Logischer Außau der Welt als unmittelbarer Nachfolger des britischen Empirismus wird anhand einer detaillierten Untersuchung des philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs, auf den Carnap selbst explizit oder implizit verweist, kritisiert. Es stellt sich heraus, daß Carnaps Unterfangen vor allem auf den Ansätzen einer "psychophysiologischen Erkenntnistheorie" fußt — einer Richtung, die vor allem im deutschsprachigen Bereich am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts einflußreich war, und die noch ungenügend erforscht worden ist.

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.

Bergman's view on the History of philosophy can be characterised as a heuristic doctrine which helps the philosophical pedagogue. Some problems arising from Bergman's religious way of thinking are revealed as underpinning the objections to it, as there are: the multiplicity of systems, the possibility of acquiring final truth, etc. In spite of these objections Bergman's ideas can be maintianed as a very efficient means for a teacher of academic philosophy.

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence.

Bergman's account of Cusanus's view of the relationship between God and the world leaves room for reservations. Bergman maintains that Cusanus is either a pantheist or a panentheist. This view, at variance with Cusanus's explicit theism, is hardly tenable in the light of a suitable interpretation of his apparently pantheistic or panentheistic formulations. Bergman's treatment of enfolding and unfolding, and especially of the arithmetical illustration of those relations, is deficient. His ascription of manifest Platonism to Cusanus's theory of enfolding is objectionable, since, for Cusanus, the enfolding entities are not universals and need not even be existents. The way in which Bergman compares Cusanus with Goethe and with Rudolf Otto is misleading. So is his account of Cusanus's principle of the coincidence of opposites.

Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare the approximationist theories of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory.

The relations between philosophy, science and religion preoccupied S.H. Bergman for many years. He wanted to corroborate, by belief, a personal God to whom, and not only about whom, one can speak. This should follow from authentic religious experience, making it independent from philosophy. Furthermore, according to Bergman, religion can do what philosophical reasoning is incapable of doing since he considers belief to be stronger than knowledge. A criticalscrutiny of these assumptions involves some interesting implications concerning toleration, freedom-of-thought and dogmatism. The final conclusion consists in that belief cannot refute philosophical knowledge but can reject it while philosophy can refute belief but cannot reject it.

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical.

Bergman's views on the relation between philosophy and religion are critically examined by following his discussions of the Neo-Kantians and, among others, of Nicolaus Cusanus, Kierkegaard, Buber and Sri Aurobindo. Thereby his thesis that philosophy and religion form a unity is criticised together with his attempt atabandoning philosophy in view of its idealistic results which deprive men of actual reality. Finally it is argued that reason has to be reestablished since despite its being insufficient there is nothing to replace or complement it.

On Thomas Reid's 18thC theory of psychology and ontology, our conception of primary qualities was original and our conception of secondary qualities was acquired. The conception of both was a response to sensations. In the Inquiry Reid insisted that our original conceptions were automatic and irresistible, while in the Essays he insisted that our conception of general attributes arises from a two step process of abstraction and generalization. These doctrines are rendered consistent by a distinction between particular attributes, which exist and are conceived by abstraction, and general attributes, which do not exist and are conceived by generalization guided by their utility in knowledge and communication.

Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment and the watering-down of extranuclear properties to surrogate nuclear counterparts was offered in response to Russell's problem of the existent round square. To avoid an infinite regress of successively watered-down factualities, Meinong stipulates that the modal moment itself cannot be watered-down. This limits free assumption, since it means that the idea of the existent-cum-modal-moment round square cannot be entertained in thought. It is possible to eliminate the modal moment and watering-down from Meinongian semantics in favor of a strict enforcement of the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. This provides a simpler, more economical Meinongian object theory, and regains unrestricted free assumption.

Motivations for systems of free logics are reviewed and systems are divided according as they are positive (asserting atomic truths with non-denoting terms) negative (denying all such sentences) or neutral. A positive theory is developed and defended. One of the major considerations in favor of the theory is that it allows (via translation) representation of the other points of view. Finally, the relation between free logic and truth theories is elaborated.