John Rawls defines “primary social goods” to be the benefits of social co-operation that are valuable no matter what one’s life-plan. The benefit for international trade of talking in terms of primary goods is that such goods represent a fixed or standard rate, and thus facilitate efficient negotiation. The difficulty, however, is that such discussions appear to ignore, and thereby do violence to, significant cross-cultural value differences. I argue that an appropriate view of Rawlsian primary goods helps to facilitate inter-subjective agreement about what constitutes an advantage to the least advantaged. I illustrate this in a case study of the PT Freeport mining operations in Papua New Guinea.

In this paper I argue that large cooperative organizations, in particular cooperative banks, are better positioned than business firms to be ethically responsible, global citizens. These organizations include cooperative networks in France, the Netherlands, and Germany, provident societies in the United Kingdom, and Mouvement des caisses populaires Desjardins and credit unions in Canada. Large cooperatives are distinct from firms but compete with them and are major socio-economic actors in their respective communities. They are more predisposed to implement policies that are compatible with local expectations and simultaneously reflect fundamental macro-social principles or hypernorms. The advantage of these particular economic organizations springs from their institutional and historical background, and particularly from the cooperative values on which they are founded and which make them different from firms.

This paper proposes a model of transnational corporations that calls for a non-unitary normative approach to ground the kind of corporate social responsibility that must, maximally, be ascribed to them. This involves injecting the notion of moral obligation into the picture, a particularly strict notion with an equally rigorous set of requirements that is not normally expected to be applicable to the case of big business operating internationally. However, if we are to be honest about the prospects of establishing a viable regime of international justice in conditions of globalized economies, the litanies of half-measures, wishful thinking, and lame excuses for nottackling the responsibilities of multinationally operating economic units will obviously lead us nowhere. Neither will any lists of principles of a voluntary global compact type, nor the intuitions of business ethics writers, be of any help either. We must go back to the historical kernel of ethical systems, identify key concepts, and ascertain for which particular issues raised by the operation of transnationals each such concept best delivers the corresponding moral obligation, thus silencing the traditional realist worry that the international arena is, logically, a Hobbesian state of nature. My proposal rests on the idea that transnationals are polythetic organisms,both internally and externally, that require a corresponding multi-positioned ethical approach to cover their overlapping operating units.

This paper examines several primarily academic discourses on corruption to demarcate the assumptions embedded within each one. It begins by discussing different definitions of corruption, which leads to an identification of five prominent discourses on the subject that are examined in some detail. The paper concludes by considering some implications of this analysis.

This article studies the possibility of forming social policy, and in particular policies for social security, through the participation of domestic business. By taking on social responsibility, business can eventually, of own its own accord, offer the state and society its assistance in dealing with social problems. In Kazakhstan, a major part of business people see their responsibility as many-sided, consisting of duties to employees, consumers, business partners, the local community, and the country as a whole. They acknowledge responsibility along three dimensions: financial, ecological, and social.

The revelation of widespread corruption in the Oil-for-Food Programme (the “Programme”) and the recent scandal involving the British arms manufacturer BAE Systems threatens to unravel the fragile global consensus on combating corruption. This paper outlines the emerging global consensus and legal framework on corruption and assesses the extent to which this consensus has been undermined by the above mentioned revelations of corruption. Both incidents provide an interesting context in which to analysesome of the difficult issues presented in the regulation of transnational corruption. The regulation of transnational corruption provides a framework for analyzing the critical dimensions of the interaction between the norms in various domestic communities and the transnational context of these interactions. The paper argues that the current framework of multilateral efforts to curb transnational corruption is unable to tackle the problem effectively and concludes that the liability framework for engaging in transnational corruption has almost exclusively been the result of political expediency rather than that of empirical information. By examining the multilateral efforts by the international community to combat corruption, the paper generates questions about the status and future direction of thefight against corruption under international law.

For the most part, the primary driver for international businesses in establishing operations in other countries is the reduction of overall operating costs. Host countries, especially developing nations, welcome multinational corporations (MNCs) because of the perceived economic benefits that international businesses can bring to their local communities. Surprisingly, one of the most understudied, under-analyzed, and sometimes even completely neglected factors when international businesses consider setting up shop in other countries is the local culture of their chosen destination country. This paper substantiates the thesis that international businesses should adapt their corporate practices to the local cultures in which they operate to achieve effective and superior businessperformance. The paper goes further in identifying corporate practices that were adapted or revised by international businesses to respond to the culture of local communities in the Philippines.

I am foregoing the discussant's critical role in favor of a short examination of how one sociologist's imagination is tantalized and irritated by some of the ideas and interconnections of Professor Messick's paper. The question is, when it comes to ingroups and outgroups, why does race matter? Why does sex or gender matter? I will briefly make four points about sociobiology, favoritism toward the ingroup, hostility toward the outgroup, and finally, the conflict theorist's favorite topic - resource allocation.

In this article, I want to draw attention to one strand ofthe complex web of processes that are involved when people group others, including themselves, into social categories. I will focus on the tendency to treat members of one's own group more favorably than nonmembers, a tendency that has been called ingroup favoritism. The structure of the article has three parts. First I will offer anevolutionary argument as to why ingroup favoritism, or something very much like it, is required by theories of the evolution of altruism. I will then review some of the basic social psychological research findings dealing with social categorization generally, and ingroup favoritism specifically. Finally, I will examine two problems in business ethics from the point of view of ingroup favoritism to suggest ways in which social psychological principles and findings may be mobilized to help solve problems of racial or gender discrimination in business contexts.