There is a tension between John Locke’s awareness of the fundamental importance of a shared public language and the manner in which his theorizing appears limited to offering a psychologistic account of the idiolects of individual speakers. I argue that a correct understanding of Locke’s central notion of signification can resolve this tension. I start by examining a long standing objection to Locke’s view, according to which his theory of meaning systematically gets the subject matter of our discourse wrong, by making our ideas the meanings of our words. By examining Locke’s definition of “truth”, I show that Lockean signification is an expression relation, rather than a descriptive or referential relation. Consequently, the sense in which our words signify our ideas is roughly that our utterances advertise our otherwise undisclosed mental lives to each other. While this resolves one aspect of the public/private tension, I close with a brief discussion of the remaining tension, and the role for normative constraints on signification to play in generating a genuinely shared public language.

The paper presents a number of empirical arguments for the perceptual view of speech comprehension. It then argues that a particular version of phenomenal dogmatism can confer immediate justification upon belief. In combination, these two views can bypass Davidsonian skepticism toward knowledge of meanings. The perceptual view alone, however, can bypass a variation on the Davidsonian argument. One reason Davidson thought meanings were not truly graspable was that he believed meanings were private (unlike behavior). But if the perceptual view of speech comprehension is correct, then meanings (or at least conveyed meanings) are public objects like other perceivable entities. Hence, there is no particular problem of language comprehension, even if meanings originate in “private” mental states.

The arbitrariness of a sign is considered a universal feature and a well-established property of the world’s languages by many linguists, which makes languages flexible and facilitates distinguishing the particular referents to words. However, there are some exceptions in the case of Chinese, a language quite different from western languages. This article analyzes Chinese’s arbitrariness mainly from the perspective of word formation and will show that Chinese characters, which were iconic originally, depart from this universal feature to a great extent. Through many transformations and changes, Chinese characters continue to display three features: iconicity, systematicity and arbitrariness.

The internalist-externalist debate about semantic and mental contents concerns whether the contents of certain claims and beliefs depend on facts external to the people having those beliefs or not. However, rather than just join up with either side, I argue for re-casting the debate so as to allow for hybrid internalist-externalist views, on the grounds that such views can help explain certain phenomena associated with slurs and pejoratives. If the debate can indeed be recast in this way and if hybrid views offer significant explanatory power, then they deserve further exploration.

An influential view about the relationship between publicity and linguistic meaning is brought into question. It has been thought that since public languages are essentially public, linguistic meaning is subject to a kind of epistemic cap so that there can be nothing more to linguistic meaning than can be determinately known on the basis of publicly available evidence (Epistemic Thesis). Given the thinness of such evidence, a well-known thesis follows to the effect that linguistic meaning is substantially indeterminate. In this paper, we consider the sort of reasons offered for the Epistemic Thesis and uncover an unexamined presupposition about the epistemic requirements of communication and the establishment of meaning conventions. We show this presupposition is undermined by independently motivated considerations about communication and convention, giving us good reason to reject the Epistemic Thesis and its corollary about indeterminacy.

As common expressions in natural language, sentences with tense and aspect play a very important role. There are many ways to encode their contributions to meaning, but I believe their function is best understood as exhibiting relations among related eventualities (events and states). Accordingly, contra other efforts to explain tense and aspect by appeal to temporal logics or interval logics, I believe the most basic and correct way to explain tense and aspect is to articulate these relations between eventualities. Building on these ideas, I will characterize a formal semantics – Event-State Semantics (ESS) – which differs from all formal semantics based on temporal logics; in particular, one with which sentences with tense and aspect can be adequately explained, including molecular sentences and those with adverbial clauses.

A context-directed theory of communicative acts is one that thinks of a communicative act as a proposal to change the context in some way. I focus on three influential examples: Robert Stalnaker’s theory of assertion, Craige Roberts’ theory of questions, and Paul Portner’s theory of directives. These theories distinguish different categories of communicative acts by distinguishing the components of context that they aim to change. I argue that the components of context they posit turn out not to be distinct after all, and that these theories therefore col­lapse the taxonomic distinctions that they set out to draw. Although it might be possible to avoid this problem by devising a more adequate theory of the nature of context, I argue that it should be taken as a reductio of context-directed theories.

This essay highlights the theoretical relations between Weber, Jaspers and Eisenstadt on the issue of the axial age and modernity. For Weber Modernity is an “axial age” but also an event in the history of Western rationalization. So we can’t say which is his idea on this topic. For Jaspers the axial revolution took place at the same time in China, India, and Greece. Modernity can’t be an “axial age” because it took place in the West and only after in these three civilizations. For Eisenstadt, on the contrary, modernity is a second “axial age”. He thinks the XX and the XXI century as an era of multiple modernities.

Husserl's phenomenological reduction is aimed at disclosing, the potentialities of a transcendental ego as absolute ground of any possible knowledge. This absolute ground is impossible to attain in the natural attitude of the naive, non-reduced lifeworld. But the reduction is exposed to a difficulty of principle, since the language of the transcendental ego cannot be other than ordinary language. However, instead of dismissing the validity of the reduction, this problem reveals how much the transcendental ego's alienation in the natural world is part of its transcendental meaning.

In this paper; having somewhat arbitrarily adopted a general line of interpretation of Wittgenstein on forms of life in which the word ’life' is taken in a biological sense, I try to work out ways of being more specific than that, which (a) are philosophically interesting, (b) are consistent with Wittgenstein's uses of the expression form of life' and with other remarks of his that seem closely connected, and (c) that take seriously both his disavowal of THESES in philosophy and his (related) belief that the job of philosophy is not to devise better theories, but to show how the problem itself arises from a particular kind of misunderstanding of language. A number of ways in which the idea of a form of life could play that sort of part are explored, for example the question how we know from which direction a sound comes, which we might initially have supposed to be answerable by reference to a calculation of the time difference in the arrival of a sound wave at one ear and then the other is rejected in favour of a supposition that the waves affect the nervous system and thereby causes us to look in the correct direction. This is an important difference. A neurologist might spend half a lifetime tracking down the nerves that calculate the direction, ana fail because no such calculation is done. Misdirected questions about identifying and locating pains, and about mastery are investigated, and finally Wittgenstein is depicted as holding that the nervous system, together with membership in a community provides all the assurance we need of the general correctness of calculations.

Richard Rorty has drawn a distinction between three ways philosophers in the 20th Century have conceived of the enterprise of philosophy. There are those who see it as the guardian of the sciences, those who treat it as a kina of poetry, and those who view philosophy as a political exercise. In this paper, I try to show that Wittgenstein, despite certain popular conceptions of his project, belongs more in the third group than in the other two. The paper focuses on Wittgenstein's notes On Certainty in order to reveal the structure of Wittgenstein's notion of epistemological privilege and how it depends on communal agreement and behaviour. The system of conventions and commitments on which our vanouis practices are grounded is not justifiable. It is a matter of forms of life.

The debate about Habermas' use of the system and lifeworld distinction has not focused on the explanation of social pathologies that he offers, but rather only on conceptual problems with the theories that he uses. Twill argue that the explanation offered by his thesis that "systems colonize the lifeworld" fits the main criterion for adequacy for macro-micro explanation: because it establishes macro-micro linkage, it is at least potentially complete. Such an analysis fits the empirical approach to traditional debates between collectivists and individualists among macrosociologists. I shall apply this approach here in three steps. First, I shall use the controversy about functionalist explanation in the social sciences to develop the criterion of completeness for macrosociological explanations (1). Second, I shall generalize the conditions of adequacy for functionalist explanations to macrosociology as a whole and show that Habermas'explanation of the colonization of the lifeworld is at least potentially complete, as an explanation sketch that lacks empirical detail (2). Third, I shall show that this approach also requires that Habermas modify his overly Weberian claims about the effects of bureaucracy, since his stronger notion of reification is based on the incompletness in his explanation of this aspect of the micromacrolinkage (3). Moreover; a more complete account has clearer practical consequences for agency in the form of collective action.

This article critically examines some of the major assumptions of structuralevolutionary theory. This examination has accepted as valid one basic implication of this approach - namely the strong tendency, among human beings, to "expansion”, and has examined the different dimensions of such expansion.But contrary to the classical evolutionary perspective, our approach has emphasized that the different dimensions of such expansions - especially the symbolic and the structural differentiation, need not always go together.Of central importance in such a reappraisal is the distinction between, on the one hand, social division of labor which contains the core of structural differtation and on the other hand what has been called the basic elite functions - those functions or activities which are oriented to the problems generated by the very constitution of social division of labor, i.e. the constants of trust, regulation of power, construction of meaning and legitimation. The social activities oriented to these problems can be defined as elite functions and which are indeed distinct from those engendered by the social division of labor.This distinction has, however, not been fully recognized in the relevant literature and it is the examination of this distinction ana its implications for sociological analysis that constitutes the starting point, or the reappraisal, of structural-evolutionary perspective which is presented in this article and which is based above all on some of the research in comparative macro-sociology which I have undertaken in the last three decades — starting with the analysis of the Political Systems of Empires.This reappraisal has accordingly emphasized that it is indeed the different combination of these dimensions that gives rise to the dynamics of societies and civilization which indicate a much greater variability than has been proposed in classical and contemporary structural-evolutionary analysis.

What social scientists study is the evolution of historical systems. Evolution refers to the trajectory of processes inherent in the structure of the system. The structure of a system cannot explain either its genesis nor what happens to it following its inevitable structural crisis. The mechanisms of the evolution of the modern worldsystem, a system structured around the primum mobile of the endless accumulation of capital, is described.

This essay analyzes the principal approaches to culture which are available in the social sciences today and places these debates within the framework of broader theoretical controversies. On the one hand, it is a critical comparison. On the other hand, it has a systematic dimension that casts these arguments in a cumulative form. While the ambition of this essay is to prepare the way for a critical synthesis, such a task will not be attempted here. Far from being aimed at concluding judgments and summary evaluations, the purpose of this essay is to open up doors. In taking up general issues only as they are raised in the readings that follow, this essay will not lose sight of its introductory function.

This essay explicates a structural theory of the historical evolution of world-systems. Rather than using societies as the unit of analysis the authors use intersocietal interaction networks (world-systems). This enables them to take theoretical account of the systemic development processes that are regional and inter-regional in scope and to formulate a more powerful theory that explains how thousands of egalitarian small-scale world-systems evolved, expanded and merged to become the hierarchical and global world-system of today.

The beliefs and philosophical assumptions that comprise the cultural outlook known as "Postmodernism" are produced by the changing distribution of power within the international system. The collapse of general theory in the arts and humanities reflects the decline of American hegemony ana the rise of a world culture based on relativism, many voices, and no logocentrism. This reflects the plural international system in the period of post hegemony.

The negative phenomena accompanying modernization are often put down to the fact that modernization is incomplete ana follows the path of economic and scientific- technological rationalization. We then expect these negative sides to modernization to be eliminated as a result of its completion via moral and/or reflexive modernization and through the moral or reflexive regulation of economic or scientific-technological development. A sober look at a number of the negative manifestations of modernity reveals, however, that moral modernization itself plays a part in them. In the course of moral modernization, "moral respect" develops as a medium of communication that has on the one hand a global range but on the other destabilizes particularistic moral communities and draws them into a moral community which is global in principle but highly unstable. In this way, moral modernization has unintended consequences which can be termed "irrational" if viewed from the standpoint of rationality in its broadest sense.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union invites re-examination of Parsons' view of democracy as an evolutionary universal. This is done here in three steps. First, it is shown that his central propositions are in line with contemporary evolutionary thought which, problems of measurement notwithstanding, can be subjected to empirical test with indirect evidence. Secondly, and mindful of his commitment to the leading role of ideas in sociocultural evolution, his main argument for democracy as an evolutionary universal is summarized. Lastly, the most pertinent evidence of quantitative work to date is used to test his proposition. Contrary to his reasoning, it is found that hitherto authoritarian regimes have proved as adaptive to internal and external social change as democratic ones.

Piaget's genetic epistemology claims to be an empirically grounded, universal theory of mental development. This claim is excessive because of Piaget's naturalistic approach. His genetic structuralism explains only a smallpart of human conduct. Communicative theories of action are a necessary completion of the genetic structuralism. If they succeed in combining specific, individual experiences of reality with a theoretical reconstruction of the universal mental development Piaget's abstract biologism can be overcome.