321.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
James R. Brown
Einstein’s Principle Theory
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322.
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12
Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl
Transcendental Deductions and Universal Architectures for Inductive Inferences
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323.
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Paul C.L. Tang
On Paul Churchland’s Treatment of the Argument from Introspection and Scientific Realism
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324.
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12
Carl A. Matheson
Observational Adequacy as distinct from the Truth about Observables
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325.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
George N. Schlesinger
Degrees of Characterizations
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326.
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12
Thomas R. Grimes
Scientific Realism and the Problem of Underdetermination
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327.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
Joseph Agassi
Science Real and Ideal: Popper and the Dogmatic Scientist
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328.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
Michael Bradie
Models and Metaphors in Science:
The metaphorical Turn
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329.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
David Resnik
Scientific Rationality and Epistemic Goals
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330.
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12
Aldo Montesano
Rationality in Economics:
A General Framework
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331.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
On ProtoSociology
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332.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
Forthcoming and published Volumes
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333.
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Authors
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334.
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Impressum
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335.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
Publications within the Project ProtoSociology
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336.
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12
David Gruender
Values and the Philosophy of Science
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337.
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12
Subscription
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338.
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ProtoSociology:
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12
Electronic Publications – Special Offer!
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339.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
14
Alvin I. Goldman
Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts
abstract |
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rights & permissions
There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: (1) what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, (2) how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and (3) how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution?Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary problem is to define each of these approaches. Alternative definitions are explored, centering on which questions each approach tries to answer and how it answers them. For example, simulation theorists substantially agree on the answer to question (2) but not on the answer to question (1). The paper then turns to some serious problems facing both rationality theory and theory theory.Rationality theory is faulted for its inadequate treatment of question (1) and for its implausible answers to question (2). Theory theory is faulted for the problems it encounters in explaining first-person attribution, and for its treatment of attributed reasoning about change (the “frame problem”). Turning to simulation theory, the paper argues against Gordon’s “ascent routine” account of first-person attribution and in favor of an inner detection account. Finally, the paper addresses the question of the contents of our mental-state concepts. How do these concepts incorporate both behavioral features and inner features? A dual-representation hypothesis is advanced, and linked speculatively to mirror neurons.
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340.
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14
Philip Pettit
How the Folk Understand Folk Psychology
abstract |
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rights & permissions
Let folk psychology consist in the network of concepts, and associated beliefs, in terms of which we make sense of minded performance.This paper addresses the question of how we, the folk, come to understand those concepts: this, as distinct from the separate question as to how we come to apply them in the interpretation of particular minds, our own and those of others.The argument is that even though the network of concepts is akin to a set of theoretical, interdefined terms, still it is possible to explain how we, the folk, understand them without suggesting that we are proto-scientists. The understanding required can be based on a sort of know-how: that is, a practical, untheoretical, form of knowledge.
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