Although recent work in philosophical aesthetics has brought welcome attention to the beauty of nature, the aesthetic appreciation of animals remains rarely discussed. The existence of this gap in aesthetic theory can be traced to certain ethical difficulties with aesthetically appreciating animals. These difficulties can be avoided by focusing on the aesthetic quality of “looking fit for function.” This approach to animal beauty can be defended against the view that “looking fit” is a non-aesthetic quality and against Edmund Burke’s famous critique of the connection between fitness and the beauty of animals.

Unconsidered visual acts carry with them embedded presuppositions that arise with the speed of thought. The mind’s virtually instantaneous labeling of objects perceived forces subconscious (though learned) categorization that infects the results obtained from acts seeing acts. Chief among these biased results is a presumed divide between self and other that is both ecologically false and philosophicallydangerous.

A popular if controversial claim, and troublesome for environmental philosophy, ethics, and related disciplines, is that “there is no such thing as nature.” The social constructionist version of this claim makes it difficult to draw a distinction between human and nonhuman nature. In response, first, the concept of landscape can be helpful in drawing this distinction. Second, taking this approach is consistent with at least one interpretation of Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Constructionism can be divided into two forms: moderate and radical. Moderate constructionism allows the landscape/nature distinction; radical constructionism excludes it. Rorty’s claim that independent reality is “the world well lost” apparently marks him as a radical constructionist. Nevertheless, the core doctrines of his neopragmatism constitute a moderate constructionism, allowing the nature/landscape distinction. The real problem is Rorty’s anthropocentric instrumentalist characterization of pragmatic justification. Left in place, it rendersneopragmatism a form of radical social constructionism. Redescribing the terms of justification in less anthropocentric instrumentalist terms is consistent with the anti-Platonist core of neopragmatism. Thus redescribed, neopragmatism is fully consistent with the landscape/nature distinction. Anthropocentric instrumentalism, not social constructionism per se, is the problem.

Kevin Elliott has argued that I defend two “conceptions” of adaptive management processes in my book, Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management, calling the conceptions “political” and “metaphysical,” respectively. Elliott claims that I must choose between them. Elliott has not sufficiently explained how he proceeds from the claim that I provide two separable arguments for my adaptive management process to his conclusion that I have two conceptions of this process. Once this confusion is clarified, it becomes clear that adapting a pragmatist grounding for the process (which Elliott refers to as my “metaphysical” conception) is compatible with an open and inclusionary process. Pragmatism, in other words, does not exclude those who adopt ideological approaches to value from the adaptive process; it merely urges them, once in the process, to propose testable hypotheses rather than resort to ideological rhetoric.

In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren defends a comprehensive theory of the moral status of various entities. Under this theory, she argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans, who have rights in the fullest, strongest sense. Subsequently, Warren believes that our duties to animals are far weaker than our duties to other humans. This weakness is especially evident from the fact that Warren believes that it is frequently permissible for humans to kill animals for food. Warren’s argument for her view consists primarily in the belief that we have inevitable practical conflicts with animals that make it impossible to grant them equal rights without sacrificing basic human interests. However, her arguments fail to justify her conclusions. In particular, Warren fails to justify her beliefs that animals do not have an equal right to life and that it is permissible for humans to kill animals for food.

The epistemological and ontological claims of social/ist ecofeminist thought (a combination of social and socialist ecofeminism) are moving away from the dichotomy between idealism and materialism (both forms of colonial thinking about humans and the rest of the natural world). The social/ist ecofeminists have constructed a postfoundational “eco-ontology” of nature-cultures (Haraway) in which the ideal and the material are co-agents in the continuing process of creation. Given that contemporary public discourse in the United States on the topic of “environmental issues” is still heavily shaped by Christian theology and metaphors, changing or challenging this discourse must also mean speaking theologically. Based upon an understanding of social/ist ecofeminist “eco-ontology,” a new understanding of God (ideal) and Creation (material) can be constructed which suggests that God is a human horizon that helps reconnect (religion/religare) Christian humans with the rest of the natural world and with the manyhuman “others” of different religious traditions. In this construction, Carolyn Merchant’s understanding of humans as “partners” with nature and Catherine Keller’s postcolonial critique of the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing are the most helpful.

Philosophical naturalists deny the existence of anything supernatural, such as God, souls, demons, ghosts, angels, witchcraft, miracles, etc. They believe that human beings are animals whose existence is entirely governed by the same laws which govern the rest of the natural world. However, some environmentalists value nature intrinsically and aesthetically, and in doing so conceive of nature as that which is distinguished from the products of human culture. Some philosophical naturalists have claimed that any attempt to distinguish nature from the products of human culture in this way stems from a pre-Darwinian world view in which humans are conceived as being separate from and superior to the natural world. They suggest that this distinction involves an implicit denial of philosophical naturalism. Furthermore, J. Baird Callicott and others have argued that it contributes to environmental destruction by espousing human superiority over the natural world. To the contrary, the nature/culture distinction is not the cause of either of these offenses. It is consistent with philosophical naturalism, fundamental to our ordinary conception of nature, and useful in promoting environmental protection.

Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can be legitimately used for human purposes and which should be left alone. What needs to be justified are not attempts to preserve nature but rather any human interventions which infringe on the autonomy of nature.

As the last great philosopher of the will, Albert Schweitzer rejected the radical individualism of Nietzsche and the pessimistic-mystical detachment of Schopenhauer, and instead sought to create a true social ethic. Schweitzer’s particular contribution was to move further than Nietzsche to reconcile philosophy with natural science while simultaneously preserving and transforming the sense of mysticism and higher world-order principles from Schopenhauer. He joined this new cosmology to the virtue ethics of Aristotle, and recovered one key element of his ontology of becoming to transcend the Humean “is/ought” gap for ethics.The result is a philosophy that is as much biographical of Schweitzer himself as it is systematic. This result is both the strength and greatest weakness of hisreverence-for-life ethic. It is tailor-made for contemporary environmental ethics: it has applications in many strands of environmental thought, including deepecology, ecofeminism, and ecotheology, and may attract considerable interest from environmental movements that seek to cultivate deep personal conviction.

Despite widespread agreement that we have moral responsibilities to future generations, many are reluctant to frame the issues in terms of justice and rights.There are indeed philosophical challenges here, particularly concerning nonoverlapping generations. They can, however, be met. For example, talk of justiceand rights for future generations in connection with climate change is both appropriate and important, although it requires revising some common theoreticalassumptions about the nature of justice and rights. We can, in fact, be bound by the rights of future people, despite the “non-identity problem,” and the force of these rights cannot be diluted by “discounting” future costs. Moreover, a rights-based approach provides an effective answer to political arguments against taking mandatory measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions when these are unpopular with a democratic populace.

The Earth Charter is largely a wholesome embodiment of a commendable and globally applicable ecological ethic. But it fails to treat responsibilities towardfuture generations with sufficient clarity, presenting these generations as comparable to present and past generations, whose members are identifiable, whenin fact most future people are of unknown identity, and when the very existence of most of them depends on current actions. It can be claimed that we still haveobligations with regard to whoever there will be whom we could affect, and in addition, all the possible people of the future whom we could affect have moralstanding, as well as corresponding members of other species. These obligations clash with the person-affecting principle, which considerably restricts suchobligations and the scope of moral standing at the same time. Finally, there are implications for sustainability, at least with regard to sustainable levels ofpopulation and with regard to global warming, and thus a need for further clarification of the content of responsibilities toward future generations.

Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions of the precautionary principle, and insofar as the precautionary principle rests on this distinction, it diverges from direct consequentialist approaches to risk management.There are two ways in which such reliance on the doing/allowing distinction may be defended: by appeal to indirect consequentialist considerations, and by appeal to deontological considerations. Neither approach is unproblematic; however, retention of a distinction between doing and allowing in environmentalpolicy is consistent with the widespread intuition that there is something prima facie valuable about the world as we find it.

How do we weigh the claims of current and future people when current exercise of rights to property conflict with sustainability? Are property rights over theseresources more limited due to the claims of posterity? Lockean property rights allow no right to degrade resources when doing so threatens the basic needs offuture generations. A stewardship conception of property rights can be developed, providing a justification for sustainable management legislation even whensuch law conflicts with the rights an owner would have, were the resource under more full-blown ownership. A protection indicator can be developed that is sensitive to a range of empirical factors such as scarcity, renewability, importance of the resource, and seriousness and reversibility of potential harm. The stewardship conception of rights over environmental resources can be applied in policy settings, for example, in decisions over emissions limits and land-use patterns. Such harnessing of Lockean intuitions to argue for environmental protection is in sharp contrast to Locke’s usual employment by those keen to show that such protection violates owners’ rights.

Donald Lee’s account in “The Marxian View” is inaccurate in asserting the centrality of an abstract conception of alienation based on a speculattve understanding of human nature. This was precisely the view rejected by Marx in 1845. The development of Marx’s materialist conception of human nature is traced in order to show the importance to his analysis of the forces and relations of production. Somespecific difficulties in Lee’s account are discussed, and the broad implications of Marxist theory regarding environmental problems and the mastery of nature are presented.

Although the participants in the initial situation of justice in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice choose principles of justice only, their choices have implications for other moral concerns. The only check on the self-interest of the participants is that there be unanimous acceptance of the principles. But, since animals are not participants, it is possible that principles will be adopted which confiict with what Rawls calls“duties of compassion and humanity” toward animals. This is a consequence of the initial situation’s assumption that principles of justice can be determined independently of other moral considerations. We question this assumption, and show that satisfactory modifications of Rawls’ initial situation undermine its contractarian basis and require the rejection of exclusively self-interested participants.

Donald Lee has claimed that of three ethical values, freedom, justice, and security-survival, involved in the effects of population growth on the future and the survival of all human beings, security-survival is the most fundamental. As such, it should have priority over freedom and justice. Based on this hierarchy, Lee draws the conclusion that one does not have the right to unlimited procreation, and that ultimately it is the duty of government to impose limits on population growth. I accept Lee’s argument that personal rights must be balanced by personal responsibility, but I argue that justice is the fundamental ethical principle in this discussion. This is not a trivial distinction, for it leads to two significant conclusions. First, by focusing proper attention on justice, the threat to survival of the race from overpopulation is reduced to reasonable and realistic proportions. Second, and particulady important with regard to Lee’s position, the recognition of the need for justice brings to light the fact that the primary responsibility of government is to address itself to redressing injustice in society, injustice which does pose a very real threat to the survival of mankind. In this context, I argue that under no circumstances should government have the right or the responsibility to enforce limits on procreation.

I argue that Islam provides very efficient ethical principles for dealing with the present ecological crisis, a crisis rooted in moral deprivation. I reject the maximization of benefits from natural resources without giving due consideration to the adverse environmental impact of such actions, and argue that this practice is based on injustices generated by factors like greed, extravagance, and ignorance, among others. So far, Western solutions of such problems have generally been based purely on materialistic approaches which place emphasis on secular technological models without any linkage with metaphysical doctrines. Islam recognizes that man by virtue of his creation is a superior being, one for the service of whom the Earth was created; but at the same time man has been made responsible for any departure inhis behavior from the ways laid down by Almighty Allah. Man’s activities, according to Islam, must be based on the idea that this world is a transitory abode, and that man has to gain God’s favor in order to be able to find a better place in the other world. Hence, man's actions, as manifestations of his faith, must be properly and effectively administered, requiring justice, Taqwa (piety), and appropriate knowledge and understanding of environmental problems.

Our erises of energy and of social values are eausally interrelated. Our energy problems have contributed substantially to our contemporary value problems, as evident, for example, by the institution of the private automobile, whieh has begun to erode the very values it initially served. That our energy erisis has resulted from problems of value is illustrated by setting up a simple model of producer-consumerinteraetion, with egoism and hedonism as dominant prineiples of duty and of good respeetively, and by showing that an energy crisis like the one we are currently experieneing is practically inevitable. These discussions lead to an assessment of the possible roles moral philosophy might play in confronting these two crises.

A conception of an environmental ethic is set forth which involves postulating that nonconscious natural objects can have value in their own right, independently of human interests. Two kinds of objection are considered: (1) those that deny the possibility (the intelligibility) of developing an ethic ofthe environment that accepts this postulate, and (2) those.that deny the necessity of constructing such an ethic. Both types of objection are found wanting. The essay condudes with some tentative remarks regarding the notion of inherent value.

Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”