Although preservationists sometimes allege a right of wild areas to remain wild, their arguments do not warrant the ascription of such a right. It is hard to see how any argument to this conclusion could be persuasive, for (1) X having a right to Y requires that depriving X of Y injure X (other things being equal), and (2) the only X we have reason to think can be injured is an X which possesses consciousness. On the other hand, rights are problematic creatures, and the individualistic moral view they presuppose does not accord well with the holistic perspective of many preservationists. While it might be possible to develop this perspective into a moral theory that gives wildemess intrinsic value, there seems a greater need for clarifying the policy implications of accepted moral principles.

Although John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice does not deal specifically with the ethics of environmental concerns, it can generally be applied to give justification for the prudent and continent use of our natural resources. The argument takes two forms: one dealing with the immediate effects of environmental impact and the other, delayed effects. Immediate effects, which impact the present society, should besubject to environmental controls because they affect health and opportunity, social primary goods to be dispensed by society. Delayed environmental impacts, affecting future generations, are also subject to control because future generations have a just claim upon our natural resources-the generation to which a person belongs is an arbitrary contingency which should not exclude persons not yet born from consideration in the original contract of society.

While Eastern and Western cultures agree that life is sacred, and that morality demands its protection, they differ sharply as to how the term life is to be interpreted, and therefore what prohibitions against killing should entail. l examine some of these conflicting perspectives, explore life as an ambiguous term, and suggest are interpretation of the concept, which permits moral ruIes against killing to be applied more rationally.

One seldom-noted consequence of most recent arguments for “animal rights” or against “speciesism” is their inability to provide a justification for differential treatment on the basis of species membership, even in cases of rare or endangered species. I defend the claim that arguments about the moral status of individual animals inadequately deal with this issue, and go on, with the help of several test cases, to reject three traditional analyses of our alleged obligation to protect endangered species. I conclude (a) that these traditional analyses fail, (b) that there is an important conceptual confusion in any attempt to ascribe value to a species, and (c) that our obligation must ultimately rest on the value---often aesthetic-of individual members of certain species.

Nature is examined as a carrier of values. Despite problems of subjectivity and objectivity in value assignments, values are actualized in human relationships with nature, sometimes by (human) constructive activity depending on a natural support, sometimes by a sensitive, if an interpretive, appreciation of the characteristics of natural objects. Ten areas of values associated with nature are recognized: (1)economic value, (2) life support value, (3) recreational value, (4) scientific value, (5) aesthetic value, (6) life value, (7) diversity and unity values, (8) stability and spontaneity values, (9) dialectical value, and (10) sacramental value. Bach is analyzed and illustrated with particular reference to the objective precursors of value as these are described by natural science.

Human beings have always been preoccupied with the relationship between humanity and nature, and imaginative literature reflects that preoccupation. The group of views about humanity in nature to be found there is strikingly pluralistic, contrary to the simple “pro” and “con” set to which the environmental debate is often reduced. The richness, however, is not easy to appreciate. In this essay I argue for a new approach to understanding views about the relationship between humanity and nature, one that transcends the conventional terms for such analysis and emphasizes plurality. The approach has ethical dimensions: it aims at strengthening both our hope and our ability to find a better relationship with nature.

In his article, “The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethics,” Tom Regan says that the fitting attitude toward nature “is one of admiring respect.” What folIows is an attempt to discover what in nature should impel us to respond in this way. Ultimately I argue that the value of wild nature is found in the fact that it has emerged spontaneously, independent of human designs.

I present the foundational structure for a life-centered theory of environmental ethics. The structure consists of three interrelated components. First is the adopting of a certain ultimate moral attitude toward nature, which I call “respect for nature.” Second is a belief system that constitutes a way of conceiving of the natural world and of our place in it. This belief system underlies and supports the attitude in a way that makes it an appropriate attitude to take toward the Earth’s natural ecosystems and their life communities. Third is a system of moral rules and standards for guiding our treatment of those ecosystems and life communities, a set of normative principles which give concrete embodiment or expression to the attitude of respect for nature. The theory set forth and defended here is, I hold, structurally symmetrical with a theory of human ethics based on the principle of respect for persons.

David Ehrenfeld argues that humanism emphasizes reason at the expense of emotion, and that its narrow focus on the use of reason to serve human interests leads to a dichotomy between man and nature in which ecological factors are subordinated to the satisfaction of human wants. In response, I argue that: (1) humanists stress employment of reflective reason and reason’s interrelations with other aspectsofthe human personality, (2) humanism’s typical commitment to naturalism locates man as part of nature and does not entail an exclusive focus on human interests, and (3) humanism’s commitment to the legitimate sphere of human interests does not entail indifference to nonhuman nature, for a healthy environment is necessary for the long-term satisfaction of human interests.

Philosophers and ecologists have proposed that ecological principles such as cooperation and ecosystern stability serve as a basis for environmental ethics. Requisite to understanding whether a cooperation based environmental ethic can be taken as an unqualified good is knowledge of the role of cooperation in the context of other interactions between species (e.g., cornpetition), and the significance of such interactions to ecosystem stability. Further, since the key ecological concept of stability has been ambiguously defined, the various definitions need to be understood so that use of scientific information in philosophical discussion is accurate and consistent.

J. Baird Callicott misinterprets both the way in which pain seems important to animal liberationists and why it is thought important. Examination of Callicott’s account reveals its inadequacies and strengthens the animal liberationist’s position. It also indicates that resolution of the dispute between proponents of animal liberation and the land ethic demands consideration of the justifiability of “sentientism.”

Donald C. Lee’s “On the Marxian View of the Relationship between Man and Nature” is one of a number of recent attempts to interpret Marxian doctrine in an environmentally attractive way. I argue that Lee does not really succeed, that many of the assumptions of the Marxian theory which Lee still retains are in conflict with a satisfactory environmental ethic and with the current process of revision of theconventional ethic. The central doctrine Lee expounds, the superficially attractive Marxian thesis of unity between man and nature, is attractive only because the real basis of this “unity”-the transformation of nature into a human expression-is not spelled out. Such unity-through-transformation is incompatible with retention and respect for untransformed nature, i.e., wilderness. The Marxian position Lee expoundsis environmentally unsatisfactory in many other ways also: it continues to laud the “objectification” of nature, retains a highly homocentric view of man’s relation to nature, and encourages human hubris. Other specific elements of the position Lee presents which are in conflict with environmentalism are the doctrine of the historical necessity of the capitalist stage, with its acquiescence in the destructive technology of advanced capitalism, the chauvinistic Marxian material on animals appealed to by Lee, and the treatment of liberation as the maximization of leisure and the minimization of bread labor. To obtain an environmentally sound noncapitalist society it is necessary to discard many central elements of Marxian doctrine and to move beyond Marx.

In this paper I criticize what many economists recommend: namely, that land use regulations should simulate what markets would do were all resources fully owned and freely exchanged. I argue that this “efficiency” approach, even if balanced with equity considerations, will result in commercial sprawl, an environment that consumers pay for, but one that appalls ethical judgment and aesthetic taste. I showthat economic strategies intended to avoid this result are inadequate, and conclude that ethical and aesthetic as well as economic principles are needed to guide policies governing the use of land.

The voice of Orpheus symbolizes the everlasting importance of music and poetry in the animus of man. According to the ancient legend, Orpheus by his very gift of music tills the radical sense of enjoyment in us all and enables entire nature to dance in delight. Music resonates the most primordial and invariant mood of man in his harmony with the universe (uni-verse) from time immemorial. On the basis of the image of “roundness” derived from the auditory model of space, an “ecotopia” or a new orientation of ecological ethics is projected. By affirming man as the responsible caretaker of the Earth, it rejects both speciesism and individualism -the antitheses of social principle.

Courts and legal commentators have been notoriously unsuccessful in articulating a rule to differentiate between uncompensated police power regulations of land by govemment and situations in which the govemment can only interfere with property rights if it provides compensation to those owners who suffer losses. Noticeably absent from most discussions of this “takings” issue is any foundational underpinning in a theory of justice with respect to property holdings. Can two of the most influential contemporary theories ofjustice-that of John Rawls and Robert Nozick -provide such needed support for the analysis of the “takings” issue? By employing the vehicle of three hypothetical exampIes I investigate this question and reach some conclusions conceming the applicability of such abstract theories of justice to the real world.

In formulating the concept of a “land ethic,” Aldo Leopold suggested that true conservation would begin when we enlarged our sense of community to include other organisms besides human beings. This cannot be done, I argue, until we begin viewing other beings in nature as worthy of existence on their own terms, rather than simply as means to human ends. I use Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue,as expounded in I and Thou, to shed light on the spiritual roots of our environmental crisis and show how we can appreciate beings in nature if we encounter them as persons rather than things. Applying Buber’s concepts to the experiences of backpackers suggests that wildemess travel can help individuals develop habits of mind conducive to I-You relations, thereby enhancing our life with other people as well as with our natural environment.

If it is immoral to raise animals for the purpose of eating during a period of food scarcity because the process of changing grain protein to animal protein is wasteful, then it is surely immoral to waste animal protein which was not raised for the purpose of eating, but which could nevertheless be eaten during periods of food scarcity. Therefore, it is immoral not to eat human carrion during periods of food scarcity.

Victoria Davion in “Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited” takes biocentric individualism to task, focusing in particular on my paper, “Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue.” Davion levels a wide-range of criticisms, and concludes that we humans would be better off putting biocentric individualism aside to focus on more important issues and positions. Worries raised by Davion can be defended by elaborating on the position laid out in the original paper, including a background normative theory appealing to hypothetical virtuous ideal observers, upon which the position is drawn. Many of her criticisms appear to arise out of misreading or ignoring what is explicitly argued. When these misconstruals are corrected, it becomes clear that there is still space for a viable virtue of reverence for life.

In opposition to modernist conceptions of the “self,” some environmental philosophers argue that human identity is first and foremost wild and natural because it is a product of an ontologically independent nature. They use evolutionary theory to create and maintain a division between our wild, natural human identity and our artifactual culture. Their position is supported by a misunderstanding of both early hominid evolution and artifacts. Artifacts are not the neutral instruments of human will, but exist with us in “economies” that constantly create unintended consequences. In terms of recent work in the field of philosophical anthropology, a reexamination of the evolutionary evidence suggests that our identity is not natural but completely artifactual. This artifactual identity provides us with new ways of conceptualizing our present ecological problems.

Those residing in the Rocky Mountains enjoy both nature and culture in ways not characteristic of many inhabited landscapes. Landscapes elsewhere in the United States and in Europe involve a nature-culture synthesis. An original nature, once encountered by settlers, has been transformed by a dominating culture, and on the resulting landscape, there is little experience of primordial nature. On Rocky Mountain landscapes, the model is an ellipse with two foci. Much of the landscape is in synthesis, but there is much landscape where the principal determinant remains spontaneous nature, contrasted with the developed, rebuilt landscape in which the principal determinant is culture. Life in the Rockies permits both use and admiration of nature (fruited plains), with constant reminders (mountain majesties) that the human scale of values is rather tentatively localized in a more comprehensive environment.