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141. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Cyril-Mary Pius Olatunji Beneath the Rots in Post-Colonial Africa: A Reply to Henry Kam Kah and Okori Uneke
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This paper attempts a response to two suggestions regarding the roots of and solutions to Africa’s social, economic and political concerns. Rather than trying to provide answers to the question “who should be blamed for the quagmires of Africa?”, the paper tries to provide further explanations of the problems using a specific case study of two pan-African scholars, Henry Kam Kah and Okori Uneke. Although their suggestions about the situation of Africa have received popular acceptance among scholars, this paper disputes the viability of their assumptions and conclusions. Even if it is true (as the scholars have argued) that Africa is an innocent victim of colonial or post-colonial causes, their arguments fall short of providing a foundation for future, positive development. Instead, this paper attempts to go beneath superficial first layer investigations to identify a more meaning way forward for the people of post-colonial Africa.
142. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Peter H. Denton The End of Democracy
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Democracy in the 21st century is exhibiting some radical discontinuities in terms of its forms and institutions and needs to be rethought, if we wish to have a sustainable future. Democracy increasingly will be shaped by three realities: the demise of the nation state; the failure of representational liberal democracy; and the radical impacts of resource insufficiency and climate change. Yet if no government, however tyrannical, survives for long except by consent of the people, then that consent can serve as the starting point for rethinking what is meant by “democracy.” Three terms are offered as functional categories that allow for an assessment of democratic forms and institutions: subsistence, operational and systemic. Each describes how and why the population acquiesces to governance and under what conditions.
143. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Krista Karbowski Thomason Essays in Philosophy: Moral Psychology and War
144. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
MaryCatherine McDonald Haunted by a Different Ghost: Re-thinking Moral Injury
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Coined by Jonathan Shay, a clinician who works with combat veterans, the term ‘moral injury’ refers to an injury that occurs when one’s moral beliefs are betrayed. Shay developed the term to capture the shame and guilt of veterans he saw in his clinical practice. Since then, debates about moral injury have centered around the ‘what’ (what kinds of actions count as morally injurious and why?) and the ‘who’ of moral injury (should moral injuries be restricted to the guilt and shame that I feel for what I do? Or is it possible to be morally injured by what I witness?). Clinicians universally acknowledge the challenge of treating moral injuries. I will argue that this is in part because there is an essential piece of the theoretical construct that has been left behind. Namely, when veterans are morally injured, they are not only haunted by what they have done (or failed to do) but also by the specter of a world without morals.
145. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Suzanne Dovi Despairing about War: The Democratic Limits of Pessimism
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The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I identify ways pessimism cannot only undercut the types of political action needed to end war but also conflict with central democratic norms, e.g. equality and political autonomy. Contrary to the growing literature on pessimism, which stresses its resources for negotiating the moral chaos and disenchantment of modernity, I highlight the democratic costs of relying on pessimism to stop war. To do this, I clarify the meaning of despair, identify two sources of hope, and distinguish three different types of despair.
146. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
James Rocha Oppositional Courage: The Martial Courage of Refusing to Fight
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In a nearly paradoxical manner, the virtue of martial courage is best understood through violent acts that are typically vicious, such as killing, maiming, and bombing. To ameliorate this worry, I make a new distinction that is dependent on whether the agent acts in accord with social norms (social courage) or against them (oppositional courage). We usually understand martial courage through social courage, where soldiers are courageous through performing violent acts that society determines are necessary. While this understanding is accurate for a just war, violence cannot be virtuous when fighting for an unjust cause. The oppositional form of martial courage involves acting contrary to social norms by refusing to fight on behalf of an unjust cause or in unjust ways. As a virtue, martial courage should include bravely renouncing and resisting unjust wars. In this way, oppositional courage provides a non-violent grounding for martial courage: while martial courage often requires violence, it also requires a vigilant readiness to refuse to be violent when justice requires oppositional courage.
147. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Andrew Fiala Moral Injury, Jus Ad Bellum, and Conscientious Refusal
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Although jus in bello violations create transgressive acts that cause moral injury, the primary consideration in thinking about moral injury should be jus ad bellum. If one is fighting in an ad bellum just war, then transgressive acts can be rationalized in a way that allows for consolation. But for morally sensitive combatants engaged in an ad bellum unjust war, consolation is more difficult since there is no way to justify or rationalize morally problematic deeds committed in defense of an unjust cause. Morally serious combatants should consider the question of jus ad bellum as they struggle to deal with moral injury, along with other values such as obedience and loyalty. Such an inquiry can produce further trauma when the justness of the war is called into question. The paper examines moral injury and justice in war, grounding the discussion in concrete examples: the Second World War, the Vietnam War, and the U.S. war in Iraq. It concludes that in a democracy, ordinary citizens should demonstrate solidarity with combatants suffering moral injury, since those combatants serve in wars—even unjust wars—authorized by us and fought in our names.
148. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Nolen Gertz Military Professionalism and PTSD: On the Need for “Soldier-Artists”
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In part one of this paper I discuss how issues of combatant misconduct and illegality have led military academies to become more focused on professionalism rather than on the tensions between military ethics and military training. In order to interrogate the relationships between training and ethics, between becoming a military professional and being a military professional, between military professionals and society, I turn to the work of Martin Cook, Anthony Hartle, and J. Glenn Gray. In part two I focus on Cook’s analysis of the conflict between the self-understanding and the expected behavior of military professionals. In part three I focus on Hartle’s analysis of how the experience of alienation by military professionals can help to create the culture of military professionals. In part four I introduce a new theory of professionalism based on the existential and phenomenological philosophy of J. Glenn Gray, which can help us to better understand the philosophical and psychological stakes of what it means to become a military professional. I conclude in part five by suggesting that the most pressing issue in the military is not a lack of professionalism, but a lack of trust.
149. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Shannon Fyfe, Amy McKiernan Objective and Subjective Blame after War
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When soldiers come home from war, some experience lingering emotional effects from the choices they were forced to make, and the outcomes of these choices. In this article, we consider the gap between objective assessments of blame and subjective assessments of self-blame, guilt, and shame after war, and we suggest a way of understanding how soldiers can understand their moral responsibility from both of these vantage points. We examine arguments from just war theory regarding the objective moral responsibility of combatants and consider the role moral luck plays in our assessment of moral responsibility. We then use P.F. Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes to demonstrate the limitations of focusing excessively on the objective stance to determine the blameworthiness of soldiers. We argue that we should think about blame alongside moral emotions like guilt and shame, which will allow us to better understand subjective blame and the experiences of soldiers who blame themselves after war. We claim that objective determinations of heroism or responsibility do not adequately capture the complexity of moral emotions for soldiers returning home after war. As part of a shared moral community, civilians owe veterans more than automated responses based on the civilian experience.
150. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Ramona Ilea Introduction
151. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Eric Thomas Weber The Pragmatist’s Call to Democratic Activism in Higher Education
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This essay defends the Pragmatist’s call to activism in higher education, understanding it as a necessary development of good democratic inquiry. Some criticisms of activism have merit, but I distinguish crass or uncritical activism from judicious activism. I then argue that judicious activism in higher education and in philosophy is not only defensible, but both called for implicitly in the task of democratic education as well as an aspect of what John Dewey has articulated as the supreme intellectual obligation, namely to ensure that inquiry is put to use for the benefit of life.
152. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Julinna C. Oxley How to Be a (Good) Philosopher-Activist
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Can philosophers be good activists? This essay defines activism for the philosopher and then provides a normative conception of a good philosopher-activist that is grounded in rational integrity and sound rational deliberation. I argue that because philosophers have been trained in reasoning and argumentation, they can contribute these skills to an activist movement. An activist with rational integrity exhibits five skills or virtues: they are honest, rational, logical, deliberative, and respectful. Conversely, bad philosopher-activists display five vices: they are dishonest, manipulative, obfuscating, thoughtless, and insulting. Next, I argue that rhetorical and reasoning skills are only part of what define good activism, and describe the soft skills needed for effective activism. Philosophical training sometimes works against the development of these soft skills, but they are critical to the success of the philosopher-activist. I conclude by describing activism within the context of academic life and argue that philosophers who engage in activism can do so in an intellectually responsible way.
153. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Susan C. C. Hawthorne, Ramona C. Ilea, Monica “Mo” Janzen Engaged Philosophy: Showcasing Philosophers-Activists Working with the Media, Community Groups, Political Groups, Prisons, and Students
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By drawing on a selection of interviews from the website Engaged Philosophy, this paper highlights the work of philosopher-activists within their classrooms and communities. These philosophers have stepped out of the ivory towers and work directly with media, community and political groups, people in prison; or they encourage their students to engage in activist projects. The variety of approaches presented here shows the many ways philosophically inspired activism can give voice to those who are marginalized, shine a light on injustices, expose the root of social problems, and empower others to seek solutions. This work shows the relevance of philosophy to practical problems and the powerful effects it can have in the world.
154. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
R. A. Main Making Room for Activist Voices in a Philosophically Sound Theory of Disability: The Solidarity Thesis Versus the Welfarist Approach
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Against the medical and social models of disability are two newer proposals. Elizabeth Barnes’ Minority Body proposes that it is the bodies which are advocated for and included in the disability rights movement which are rightfully called “disabled.” Savulescu and Kahane’s Welfarist approach proposes that disability is intrinsically tied to the effects of bodily states on welfare. They put the need for a consistent and relatively simple normative theory above accounting for standard case judgements about who is and is not disabled or looking at all to membership of the disabled community. I argue that Barnes’ theory offers the best response to issues with the dominant models of disability. Further, I argue that the Welfarist theory operates in a space removed from the wishes and lived experiences of disabled people – separating ‘disability’ from activism entirely – to its detriment. Doing so compromises its explanatory power, over-generalizes the concept and prevents the insertion of meaningful boundaries. Barnes’ ‘solidarity thesis’ soundly conceptualizes disability whilst making room for activist voices. The centering of activist projects makes it stronger.
155. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Kyle York The Philosopher as Moral Activist: A Call for Ethical Caution in Publication
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It is normal to think that philosophers’ first dedication is to the truth. Publishers and writers consider ideas and papers according to criteria such as originality, eloquence, interestingness, soundness, and plausibility. I suggest that moral consequence should play a greater role in our choices to publish when serious harm is at stake. One’s credence in a particular idea should be weighed against the potential consequences of the publication of one’s ideas both if one turns out to be right and if one turns out to be wrong. This activist approach to philosophical writing combines moral concern with epistemic humility.
156. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1/2
Amy McKiernan Ethics Across Campus and the Curriculum: An Overview of Work in Progress
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In this essay, I offer an overview of the “Ethics Across Campus and the Curriculum Program” developed at Dickinson College over the past two years as part of a broader initiative to promote civic education and engagement. The essay proceeds in three parts. First, I explain the decision to adopt the language of “ethical reasoning” in our program and how I understand this work as supporting student activism. Second, I describe the faculty study group developed to incorporate ethical reasoning into already existing courses across the college. Third, I focus on how our college has incorporated ethical reasoning into new student orientation and first year student leadership retreats. Finally, I conclude with work on the horizon and a surprising result that has emerged from doing this work.
157. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1/2
Hil Malatino, Amy McKiernan, Sarah Clark Miller Introduction
158. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1/2
Katharine Wolfe Relational Deprivation and Resilience Across Borders: On the Precious Freedom and the Genuine Need to Care for Those One Loves
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Following a pattern of racially-motivated social violence enacted during the time of slavery and critiqued by many Black feminist thinkers, this paper argues that numerous U.S. immigration policies today inflict unjust and deeply damaging forms of relational deprivation on immigrant workers and their care communities. One form this relational deprivation takes is that of impinging on the ability to directly provide care to, or otherwise express care for, those whom one loves. When we recognize that caring for those that one loves is both a precious form of freedom and a genuine need, we establish the foundation for understanding how the shackling of this cherished ability can result in egregious injustice and harm. In highlighting this form of relational deprivation and others, the paper thus makes a case for why immigration policies must change.
159. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1/2
Zena Sharman Imagining More Care-Full Futures: Care Work as Prefigurative Praxis
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This essay explores care ethics and possibilities for caring otherwise through the lens of prefigurative praxis. It draws on the conceptualizations and critiques of care, care practices, and care futurism of writers, theorists, activists, and organizers from Black, Indigenous, and people of colour (BIPOC), disabled, and/or LGBTQIA+ communities, particularly those whose work is underpinned by disability justice and prison industrial complex abolition. It understands disability justice and abolition as integral to our ability to collectively respond to care crises in ways that think beyond austerity, carcerality, and institutional forms of care.
160. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1/2
Riikka Prattes Colonial Care: Care in the Service of Whiteness
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This article adds to critiques of discourses and practices of care that are enmeshed with coloniality. It does so via examining the prominent model of helping marginalized people through giving them the opportunity to care for themselves and their own by being recruited into paid (care) work, thus, becoming “useful” participants in society. This usefulness is read as a colonial project of subordinate inclusion into neoliberal racial capitalism. A perverse ideology of care is mobilized to extract surplus value from marginalized workers “integrated” into the lower echelons of social reproduction. Using historic and contemporary examples, the argument is developed in three steps: First, I discuss how care workers are included via subordination. Second, I analyze how an inversion of care receiver and caregiver transforms marginalized care workers into recipients of integration measures, rendering their care work invisible. Third, I show how racial usefulness, the interpellation that racialized workers be/come “useful,” is undergirded by productivism within neoliberal racial capitalism.