Embryo adoption is an act of artificial impregnation. Artificial impregnation is analogous to artificial insemination. The conditions under which artificial impregnation is ethically acceptable may therefore be the same as the conditions under which artificial insemination is ethically acceptable. But artificial insemination is ethically acceptable only when it assists conjugal union to attain its natural purpose. If artificial impregnation is likewise ethically acceptable only insofar as it assists and does not replace conjugal union, then the presence or absence of the conjugal act itself is the fundamental moral criterion by which to judge whether to permit or exclude artificial impregnation. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 111–122.

Dignitas personae has garnered significant attention both inside and outside Roman Catholic circles, but it lacks the argumentative force not only to present the Church’s ethical judgment but also to persuade non-sympathetic readers. More direct engagement with contrary views would provide a stronger foundation for constructing arguments in public discourse. This article highlights various assertions found in Dignitas personae which call for greater explicit argumentation. Subjects treated include the ontological and moral status of human embryos, prenatal adoption, potentially abortifacient contraceptives, reproductive cloning, and alternatives to human embryonic stem cell research, such as induced pluripotent stem cells and animal–human chimeras. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 89–110.

Dignitas personae teaches that before research into certain alternative techniques for deriving human pluripotent stem cells can be licit, it is necessary to have moral certitude that no human embryo is brought into existence by those techniques. This article evaluates three such techniques—human parthenogenesis, ANT-OAR, and direct cellular reprogramming—and asks whether at present such moral certitude is achievable. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 123–142.

The question of embryo adoption remains unresolved. Dignitas personae expresses reservations about the practice, but does not reject it. A proper interpretation of Dignitas personae n. 19 shows that the Vatican does not hold that human embryo adoption is intrinsically immoral, but that the question of its morality depends on the circumstances that surround the practice. Embryo adoption as practiced today is often compromised by illicit cooperation with objectionable reproductive technologies; nonetheless, it is possible to identify a best case scenario which may lessen or even eliminate these concerns. That best case is when a Catholic couple, who have not previously utilized in vitro fertilization to overcome a problem of infertility, adopt an abandoned embryo and choose to raise that child as their own. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 329–347.

The recent Instruction Dignitas personae from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith formally addresses the issue of the use of biological material of illicit origin. We now face the challenge of applying the principles it sets forth to daily realities. While the issue of vaccines that use such illicit cell lines has been addressed, other scenarios involving the everyday scientist or researcher in the laboratory or clinic will have to be confronted. It is a critical time for the cell line issue, and much work is needed by the scientific community to find ethical solutions. This article hopes to encourage positive steps in that direction. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 273–280.

The author argues that an action is morally wrong if any of its steps serves no purpose apart from preventing the existence of a human being. This principle entails that contraception and some proposed techniques for altered nuclear transfer are morally wrong, but it does not preclude producing stem cells through parthenogenesis. His argument depends on the premise that human life always is a good, including human life produced through immoral actions. The immoral action, not the life caused by the action, is the evil that should be prevented. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 257–264.

This article provides a detailed overview and critical commentary on the Instruction Dignitas personae from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, a document that updates Donum vitae. First, it situates the Instruction in the context of modern society’s reliance on biotechnology to overcome infertility, while also examining technology’s wider impact on human persons—for example, on their relationship with God. It then examines the teaching of the document while at the same time offering critical comments on it, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses in, for example, its treatment of the issue of human embryo adoption. It concludes with some general comments on how the Instruction will influence Catholic bioethics in both theory and practice. Throughout the article, it is often noted how Dignitas personae compares with its predecessor, Donum vitae. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 283–305.

The Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith’s Dignitas personae does not offer a definitive rejection of the practice of human embryo adoption as intrinsically evil, but neither does it simply leave the matter an “open question.” The document does indeed oppose the practice, but its reasons for doing so are not clearly stated and seem to be in tension with its own affirmations of the personal dignity of embryos and the goodness of adoption. The Congregation’s opposition is therefore best read as a prudential judgment that embryo adoption cannot be justified in the present circumstances due to the potential for scandal and the cooperation with the fertility industry which it involves. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 307–328.