Gene therapy is the modification of the human genetic code to prevent disease or cure illness. This technology is in its infancy and remains confined to experimental clinical trials. Once the present barriers are overcome, gene therapy will confront humanity with a host of ethical challenges. Therapies targeted to the genes of germ-line cells will introduce permanent changes to the human gene pool. Furthermore, nonmedical gene modifications have the potential to introduce a new form of eugenics into our society by which some members attempt to become inherently superior to others and humanity is re-engineered to man-made specifications. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 45–50.

The purpose of the Instruction Dignitas personae, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, is not only to reaffirm the validity of the teaching laid out in Donum vitae (1987), with regard to both the principles on which it is based and the moral evaluations which it expresses, but to add needed clarification on reproductive technologies in the light of more recent developments. In addition to the reproductive technologies discussed in Dignitas personae, namely, homologous and heterologous artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection, the author also discusses other reproductive technologies, not covered by the Instruction, such as gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, tubal embryo transfer, and pronuclear-stage embryo transfer. After analyzing each of these the author offers a general ethical evaluation. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 51–59.

The author shows how, by means of adoption, spouses become parents together and as the fruit of their marital love. The account serves two purposes. First, it allows a rebuttal of two types of objections to embryo adoption: that embryo adoption fails to respect the mutuality of marital love and that it in some way “constructs” parenthood. Second, the account makes it possible to recognize a deficiency in the way Dignitas personae understands embryo adoption, a deficiency indicated by the Instruction’s discussion of embryo adoption in the context of “treatments for infertility.” The author suggests that the Instruction is guilty of a misuse of terms and possibly a misunderstanding of the nature of adoption as such. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 75–85.

Embryo adoption is an act of artificial impregnation. Artificial impregnation is analogous to artificial insemination. The conditions under which artificial impregnation is ethically acceptable may therefore be the same as the conditions under which artificial insemination is ethically acceptable. But artificial insemination is ethically acceptable only when it assists conjugal union to attain its natural purpose. If artificial impregnation is likewise ethically acceptable only insofar as it assists and does not replace conjugal union, then the presence or absence of the conjugal act itself is the fundamental moral criterion by which to judge whether to permit or exclude artificial impregnation. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 111–122.

Dignitas personae has garnered significant attention both inside and outside Roman Catholic circles, but it lacks the argumentative force not only to present the Church’s ethical judgment but also to persuade non-sympathetic readers. More direct engagement with contrary views would provide a stronger foundation for constructing arguments in public discourse. This article highlights various assertions found in Dignitas personae which call for greater explicit argumentation. Subjects treated include the ontological and moral status of human embryos, prenatal adoption, potentially abortifacient contraceptives, reproductive cloning, and alternatives to human embryonic stem cell research, such as induced pluripotent stem cells and animal–human chimeras. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 89–110.

Dignitas personae teaches that before research into certain alternative techniques for deriving human pluripotent stem cells can be licit, it is necessary to have moral certitude that no human embryo is brought into existence by those techniques. This article evaluates three such techniques—human parthenogenesis, ANT-OAR, and direct cellular reprogramming—and asks whether at present such moral certitude is achievable. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 123–142.

The question of embryo adoption remains unresolved. Dignitas personae expresses reservations about the practice, but does not reject it. A proper interpretation of Dignitas personae n. 19 shows that the Vatican does not hold that human embryo adoption is intrinsically immoral, but that the question of its morality depends on the circumstances that surround the practice. Embryo adoption as practiced today is often compromised by illicit cooperation with objectionable reproductive technologies; nonetheless, it is possible to identify a best case scenario which may lessen or even eliminate these concerns. That best case is when a Catholic couple, who have not previously utilized in vitro fertilization to overcome a problem of infertility, adopt an abandoned embryo and choose to raise that child as their own. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 329–347.