Since the 1990s, stakeholder theory has become a central framework within the field of business ethics, as much for academics as for practitioners. The definition of what a stakeholder is, is always attributed to Freeman in his book Stakeholder Management from 1984. It is also common to contrast Freeman’s definition to the 1963 definition from the Stanford Research Institute. However, a largely forgotten work is that by Rhenman from 1964.This paper compares the respective stakeholder conceptualisations of Rhenman and Freeman. A semantic analysis of their work reveals the differences in assumptions and implications underlying Freeman’s and Rhenman’s definitions with regard to the ontological status of a corporation, the nature of the stake and the role of management. Some explanations are formulated as to why Freeman has apparently eclipsed Rhenman.

The 25th anniversary of R. Edward Freeman’s Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach provides an opportunity to consider where stakeholder theory has been, where it is going, and how it might influence the behavior of academics conducting stakeholder-oriented research. We propose that Freeman’s early work on the stakeholder concept supports the normative claim that a stakeholder’s contribution to value creation implies a right to stakeholder voice with regard to how a corporation makes decisions. Failure to account for stakeholder voice (especially for non-shareholder stakeholders) works to the detriment of stakeholders. We further propose that business ethicists and stakeholder scholars have a role to play with regard to supporting the interests - including a right to voice - ofnon-shareholder stakeholders through advocacy, teaching, and scholarship. We use the example of industrial relations teaching and scholarship as a model for future business ethics teaching and scholarship.

Portraying the firm as a ‘black box’, as traditional conceptions of the firm tend to do, has been strongly criticised by stakeholder theorists. This article claims, however, that the ‘black box problem’ has not been satisfactorily resolved by stakeholder theory itself. The failure to bring clarity to the internal realities of the firm has led to unacceptable conceptions of the firm from a moral agency point of view. For example, stakeholder theory tends to portray the firm as an exchange system with an input-output thought model as a basis. Such a conception does not provide a credible account of moral agency and results in problematic consequences for stakeholder theory, for example when it comes to motivating the existence of corporate moral purposes and ethically acceptable foundations ofstakeholder interests.

The recent global financial crisis and worst recession since the Great Depression underscore the theoretical and practical importance of defining requirements for assessing alternative theories of capitalism. The expressed goal of Freeman and his co-authors is to replace value-allocating ‘shareholder capitalism’ with value-creating ‘stakeholder capitalism.’ Each theory combines a different value proposition and principal-agent conception. So interpreted, the value creation proposition suggests two requirements for assessing alternative theories. A proposed better theory of capitalism should demonstrate first practicality of prescriptive guidance for managers and second superiority of its embedded value proposition for sustainable long-term performance. Shareholder and stakeholder conceptions are not the only approaches to developing a theory of capitalism embedding a different value proposition and agency model. Two other conceptions suggest organisational wealth and corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories of capitalism. All four alternatives meet the relatively minimal requirement of practicality. Freeman and his co-authors argue the value creation proposition will outperform the value allocation proposition. But organisational wealth and CSR theories may also outperform shareholder capitalism. Demonstrating that stakeholder capitalism will outperform organisational wealth and CSR theories depends on which principal and value proposition one judges most important in particular conditions.

Much ink has been spilt over the last decade in discussion of the theories and practices of social enterprise - see especially Peattie and Morley for a comprehensive review of the field, including of other reviews.This brief paper is about a specific aspect of these theories and practices: the effort to establish social enterprises as distinctive from others in having at least a double bottom-line (or in some cases a triple bottom-line, or even some greater multiple of bottom-lines).The effort to establish this distinction does not fit comfortably with Freeman’s ideas about stakeholders, as exemplified in his suggestion that ‘all of those groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of the business enterprise’ should be taken into account by its managers.The main feature of the multiple bottom-line is, on the contrary, that only some interests, not all, should be taken into account in decision making.I do not claim that the multiple bottom-line is the sole distinctive characteristic of organisations defined (by themselves or other) as social enterprises, but it is the only characteristic that concerns me in relation to stakeholder theory in this paper. I also do not claim that stakeholder theory consists only of a view about who should be taken into account by managers, but this is the only element of stakeholder theory that concerns me, in this paper, in relation to social enterprises; and all other aspects of social enterprise theory and practice, and all other aspects of stakeholder theory, will have to wait until another day.

Denunciations, disclosures and reporting: why do whistleblowing procedures create an ethical dilemma in French corporations? Since July 2006, the requirement that foreign multinationals listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) implement this practice has been met with stiff resistance in many French companies. French labor unions see this controversy as a clash between the French and Anglo-Saxon models of transparency. To understand the moral reticence of French companies towards whistleblowing, we investigate five distinct perspectives: legal, economic, historical, philosophical and sociological. 1/ We first probe into the legal contradictions in French regulations and find in these paradoxes the symptoms of a national taboo. 2/ We report on an economic survey, that gathers empirical data from 82 large French corporations, and analyzes different business sectors in France and the working population covered by a whistleblowing procedure. 3/ To elicit the etiology of this taboo, we return to the historical sources of the Dreyfus Affair and the Vichy regime, whose political traumas remain imprinted on the collective French memory. The linguistic confusion between the two French terms délation and dénonciation shows why whistleblowing is perceived in France more as an act of betrayal than of heroism. 4/ The philosophical roots of whistleblowing also shed light on the organizational behavior of French companies and the transparency they are struggling to promote. 5/ Entangled in sociological ambiguities, we discuss why French companies see whistleblowing as a risk, not as a means to prevent risk.

Process theories of leadership emphasize its relational nature but lack a substantial method of analysis. We offer an account of leadership as a language-game, employing the concepts of opaque context and propositional attitudes. Using established methods of linguistic analysis, we reformulate Weber’s understanding of charismatic leadership. A by-product of this approach is to limit the epistemological role of individual psychology in leadership studies, and to increase the relevance of linguistic and semantic conventions.

Within the Configuration school the management author Henry Mintzberg contributed a strong criticism of a normative conception of strategic planning, arguing that this is too narrow. The philosopher Henri Bergson embraced the totality of life as a creative evolution which transcends the fullness of a preconceived idea. While Mintzberg attempts to rethink the concept of strategy and Bergson to renew philosophical thought, together they share a vision of a changing and unpredictable world that enables them to discover – above and beyond the systematic data they are able to assemble – another mode of knowledge formed by intuition. Intuition holds a central place in the work of both thinkers, invigorating Mintzberg’s work on strategy and Bergson’s thought on metaphysics through a grasp of the substantiality of change. In this paper, we explore the implications of the concept of intuition for their ideas, then discuss some of its limitations, before investigating its possible applications for management research.

In this paper we examine the alleged war between Kuhn and Popper, extending the discussion to incorporate two of their lesser known, but important, protagonists, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The argument presented here is that the four can fruitfully be considered together, and that it is possible to go beyond the surface tensions and clashes between them to fashion an approach which takes advantage of the insights of all. The implications of this approach for management are then considered, using the concept of co-creation in two different contexts to illustrate this.

This paper revisits some recent contributions on ‘Why Management Theory Needs Popper’ to the journal Philosophy of Management. It proposes that those discussions provided an appraisal of the relevance of Popper’s falsification schema to management theory, but that they did not thereby bring to the fore all of the issues pertinent to a balanced and well-rounded understanding of Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism. It is argued that such an understanding requires a discussion of what Popper himself declared to be the real lynchpin of his thought: fallibilism and a critical approach. It is noted that this represents a rejection of the historical problem situation of philosophy – that knowledge claims need to be positively justified as true. It is argued that this rejection implies an anti-authoritarian, non-justificational philosophy based on the use of critical reason. Its application to several different objects of criticism is demonstrated and its ethical dimensions are explored. The relevance of critical rationalism to management studies and practice is assessed and an inherent limitation on the prospects of its adoption in management practice is identified.

This paper submits that an intersubjective account of integrity is able to solve current confusion and cynicism provoked by organisations stating their integrity. First, I argue that regarding organisations as persons causes much of this confusion. Second, I assert that a useful account of integrity in an organisational context must place central importance on the notion of human interaction. With regard to this criterion I examine the meta-ethical assumptions of three accounts of integrity: objective, subjective and intersubjective. The intersubjective account of integrity is most suited for an organisational context because it recasts integrity as ‘talking the walk’ and as ‘towards integrity’.

Because resentment features prominently in work relations, supervisors should understand the nature of such emotions and how to address them. Popular wisdom’s insistence that emotions cannot be rationally assessed is mistaken. Emotions are judgments embodied in perceptions, dispositions, and “raw feels,” that reflect one’s worldview. At the core of paradigmatic resentment is the moral judgment that someone has betrayed one by unfairly rejecting one in a waythat shows ill-will. Non-paradigmatic resentment is an extension of the paradigm. This paper examines (part I) the logic of resentment and (part II) how supervisors can avoid and assist subordinates in processing resentment. Part III suggests that emotional change requires reconciling inconsistencies in a person’s worldview, which may require deep and widespread changes in outlook. Emotions are as logical or illogical as the people who have them. People are immune neither from criticism for their emotions nor from demands that their emotions be changed.

This article reflects aspects of the debate between constructivism and rationalism by suggesting that rationalist accounts of the nature of organization may be limited, and that recent events around the crisis in world financial systems demonstrate the failure of the latter to provide adequate explanatory theory. The paradigms of mythos and logos reflect the dichotomy, where the former represents meaning and sense making as opposed to the rational pragmatic scienceof logos thinking. In the context of organization theory it is proposed that people create their worlds through language and that to propose an organization possesses a type of personhood in the metaphysical sense, a trope familiar to the literary scholars but not always appreciated by management writers. However, some scholars are now attempting to link the two worlds: an example is the use of the organic metaphors favoured by the Romantic poets to understandthe nature of economic turbulence. The paper argues that such attempts to employ mythos-type thinking are a helpful counterweight to rational attempts to explain apparently non-rational organizational actions.

Over the last two decades, the Japanese notion of ba, introduced by Ikujiro Nonaka and his associates to the West, has come to play an important role in management theory. This notion, which has been roughly translated as ‘place’ or ‘topos,’ stresses the importance of processual spatial thinking for economics and management alike. As such, it echoes and amplifies recent voices in the business world, which argue that we must understand business strategy in terms ofspace, that is to say, as an expression of the dynamics of social interaction which involves such factors as connectivity, information flow, external versus tacit knowledge, etc. Despite many efforts, the barriers for fully integrating ba into the body of Western management literature will remain for as long as its underlying assumptions are defined by ontologically static categories. This article is an attempt to overcome this theoretical bottleneck, first by critiquing the sub optimal approach to processual problems generated by conventional Western business theories, which can neither recognise their hidden background assumptions about space nor transcend them, and second, by explaining, within the framework of comparative analysis, how ba leads to a new processual and dynamic account of business life. Our overall aim is to demonstrate how a new processual notion of space enables a deeper, more integrated understanding not only ofthe nature of the firm, but also of the role managers play within firms.

This paper is underpinned by an epistemological question: What are the types and ways of knowing that can be entailed in reflective leadership in its fullest sense? The question is explored through a mapping exercise which outlines a geography of reflective leadership in terms of three variables: type of knowledge, problem focus, and mode of learning (incorporating the notion of embodied learning). Particular attention is given to recognising within the terrain of reflective leadership the epistemic credentials of spiritual learning and experiential awareness of spirituality.

The folklore of Groundhog Day is an invitation to reflect on continuity, choice, and reinvention in our daily lives. Groundhog Day is an annual opportunity to imagine how the future could unfold as a straightforward extension of what we are doing today in one another’s company, or as a departure from the typical course of our joined endeavors. The joined endeavor at issue in this paper is the act of justifying inclusion of the study of managerial practice, commonly calledManagement, in the undergraduate college curriculum in the United States. Management is routinely shielded from a process of intellectual justification. There is a fruitful alternative to this de facto exemption. I argue that there is a place in the undergraduate curriculum for systematic attention to managerial practice, but that place need not be filled with a Management major per se. This new curricular place is anchored in the experience of living our everyday lives in a world managed by others. The inspiration for imagining this different place came one Groundhog Day, as I was sorting mail delivered to me by the US Postal Service.