In the present article I wish to discuss the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence “as it is.” In this regard, I will be drawing especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche and Philosophy remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche’s thought. In the secondpart of the paper, however, I will argue that the “higher morality” generated by this position is essentially “otherless.” While this critique is not in itself devastating,I will go on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche’s thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed.

Although Michael Kelly, in his article, “On the Mind’s Pronouncement of Time” (Proceedings of the ACPA 78 [2005]: 247–62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, I argue that the similarity does not lie where he thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl’s early period. Instead I locate the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which I find expressed at Parmenides 151e–152e. This essay shows how the Neoplatonic conception of time, which I claim inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experimentfrom 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine. It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as “trapped” in the present. The point is a significant one if, as I conclude, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completedsuccession of nows, eternally fixed.

In the present article I wish to discuss the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence “as it is.” In this regard, I will be drawing especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche and Philosophy remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche’s thought. In the secondpart of the paper, however, I will argue that the “higher morality” generated by this position is essentially “otherless.” While this critique is not in itself devastating,I will go on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche’s thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed.

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self.

Like Husserl and Heidegger, Ricoeur offers a powerful and original account of what the “world” is and how it conditions our thinking. But it is difficult to recognize Ricoeur’s contributions unless we view them in relation to another aspect of his work: his post-Hegelian Kantianism. Ricoeur tries to steer a middle course between Kant’s and Hegel’s views on this topic. He thinks the idea of the world plays a crucial role in regulating experience, but he tries to understand this idea in a way that is concrete without being totalizing. Ricoeur’s theory of narrative does exactly this. It describes how narratives open up worlds for their readers:sets of specific existential possibilities that may be incorporated into readers’ lives. When Ricoeur’s account of narrative is viewed in relation to Kant and Hegel, itsheds valuable new light on many aspects of his work.

Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity, which maintain that psychology is irrelevant to our persistence, andneo-Lockean accounts, which deny that humans are animals. This paper provides a Thomistic account that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones. This account does not have to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity which matters in survival, or countenance the puzzles of spatially coincident entities that plague the neo-Lockean. The key is to understand the human being as only contingently an animal. This approach to our animality is one that Catholics have additional reason to hold given certain views about purgatory, our uniqueness as free and rational creatures, and our having once existed as zygotes.

This paper seeks to explain why the debate over the personhood of the embryo goes nowhere and is more likely to generate confusion than conviction. The paper presents two arguments. The first aims to establish that the question of the personhood of the embryo cannot be resolved by turning to science, althoughthe debate about the embryo has largely been a debate about the scientific facts. It is claimed that the rough facts on which the parties to the debate agree admit ofmultiple more refined accounts, among which science is powerless to adjudicate. So what happens is that the arguments go round and round, neither party convincing the other, both infuriating each another. The second argument concerns the implications of this claim for the many controversies involving the embryo. Here the question is how people who do not know what to make of the embryo might go about deciding how it should be treated.

Ghazālī’s The Incoherence of the Philosophers is an unusual philosophical work for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the author’s explicit disavowalof any of the conclusions contained within it. The present essay examines some of the hermeneutical challenges that face readers of the work and offers anexegetical account of the much-neglected Third Discussion, which examines a key point of Neoplatonic metaphysics. The paper argues that Ghazālī’s maintaining of the incompatibility of metaphysical creationism and Neoplatonic emanationism should not be viewed as simply a rhetorical or dialectical argument, but rather is best understood, to use Ghazālī’s words, as a philosophical “proof.” Essential to this proof in the solution to the argument of the Third Discussion is an implicit theory of metaphorical predication that can be pieced together from several of Ghazālī’s remarks as well as a reductio ad absurdum argument about the very possibility of ethical discourse.

This paper develops the question of Heidegger’s stance toward evolutionary theory. It shows that evolutionary theory harbors its own set of presuppositions,which in turn can be explicated through Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy of “formal indication.” The paper concludes that Heidegger’s account of animal lifediverges from that of evolutionary theory, not simply due to the naturalistic claims of the latter, but rather because the former places the openness of inquiry aheadof any theoretical concerns. As a result, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology stakes out a unique territory which stands apart from either a traditionally religious or secular viewpoint, each of which risks falling into the trap of dogmatism.

Although some philosophers accept an atomistic view of sense impressions, most acknowledge that we are aware not merely of isolated disparate sense data, but of concrete sensible wholes. One of many philosophical problems faced by these philosophers, however, is to explain how these distinct simultaneously presented sensible aspects are subjectively and objectively cognized as belonging to the same particular object. The traditional Thomistic solution is the sensus communis. Recently, however, the validity of that response has been called into question. As a result, the purpose of this paper is to sketch the positions involved in the debate, present St. Thomas’s account of the sensus communis, and argue that both the commentary tradition and a recent critic have overlooked an important aspect of that account.

The virtue of higher discernment (gnome) is able to discern when a particular rule must be set aside for some higher principle. Aquinas compares the failure of a particular principle to the production of monsters or defective animals. Most of those who treat of the exceptions to rules ignore this analogy, yet it provides important insights into the virtue of gnome and exceptions to rules. A defective animal is a monster only in relation to the particular cause of the power of reproduction; in relation to a higher cause it is proper and well ordered. Similarly, an exception to a general rule is a kind of monster in relation to that rule, but inrelation to a higher principle it is a well-ordered act.

Contrary to Michael Miller, I maintain that Descartes’s language test adequately distinguishes humans from non-human animals, and that the bonobosKanzi and Panbanisha have not passed it. Miller accepts Descartes’s language test as a good test for true language usage, but denies that it is an adequate test for the presence or absence of reason. I argue that it is a good test for reason, for normal rational beings eventually recognize the desirableness of knowledge of the world for its own sake as well as the fact that such knowledge can be increased by conversing with others. I also argue that the tests administered to the bonobos in question are inadequate for determining true language usage, as they could be passed by animals merely capable of associative learning.

What one takes to be a body is identified initially as what is available to sensing. Sensing and reflecting are not so available. How one conceives of theirrelation admits of at least six possibilities exhibited in the history of philosophy: Hobbesian materialism, Berkleyan idealism, Platonic dualism of soul and body,Aristotelian hylomorphism, Cartesian dualism of thought and extension, and a Leibnizian-Whiteheadian view of psycho-physical co-implication. The latter viewredraws the conceptual map in a way most in keeping with experience as a whole and with neural physiology in particular.

Although the fifteenth century showed some signs of traditionalism and disintegration, there were also highly original new solutions to long-debated problemsin scholastic and humanistic discourse. As for the relation between faith and reason, Nicholas of Cusa, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Savonarola foundnew ways to integrate these poles, around which theological and philosophical thought was organized. As a common pattern, one can discern a striving beyond the established systems of humanism and scholasticism, mingling elements of both traditions with those from the movements of spiritual reform in the later Middle Ages. This “striving beyond” was possible due to a performative turn in the fifteenth century: thinking and acting were connected by the narrator or the author in a manner that produced theoretical concepts and acts in social reality by writing, thinking, and actively developing the self.

This article seeks to defend the possibility of a metaphysical approach to philosophical theology. Challenging the claim that there can be nothing in commonbetween God (with whom theology or even a form of phenomenology such as Jean-Luc Marion’s deals) and being (as expounded for example in the metaphysical approach of Thomas Aquinas), the article develops a critique of Marion’s views with close reference to his interpretations of Aquinas.

While highlighting the inherent tension between the quest for universalization and the unavoidable particularity in philosophical hermeneutics, this essay argues against what it regards as the uncritical characterization of Leopold Sedar Senghor’s concept of “negritude” in terms of ethnophilosophy, a derogatoryterm employed in contemporary African philosophy to describe philosophy that is communal, and which can be sieved out from such genres as proverbs, wise sayings, and myths. It reviews the background and the contents of negritude, including its metaphysics and its epistemology of emotion. It calls attention to Senghor’s ideas about communalism and his universalism seen in his theory of the civilization of the universal, and concludes that Senghor’s negritude is the outcome of a particular and personal interpretation of his experience of the African condition, and is therefore eminently hermeneutical.

For all its subtle differences, Husserl scholarship on time-consciousness has reached a consensus that Husserl’s theory underwent a significant interpretiveimprovement starting around 1908 / 1909. On this advance, which concerned the intentional structure and directedness of absolute consciousness, I have cautioned against reading Augustine’s theory of time as a philosophical predecessor to Husserl’s. In a recent “confrontation” with my efforts, Roger Wasserman tried to defend a reading of Augustine’s influence on Husserl’s theory of time by criticizing my reading of Augustine and Husserl. This reply to Wasserman’s challenge (i) reestablishes my reservations about attempts to claim a relation between Augustine and Husserl on time-consciousness, (ii) defends the standard interpretation of the development of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, and (iii) raises several critical questions about Wasserman’s Neoplatonic or Augustinian reading of Husserl on time-consciousness.

The relationship between being and goodness is one of the most engaging philosophical questions, particularly in light of the new science, which pointsto the interconnectedness of the physical world. The relationship between being and goodness is examined here in the thought of Bonaventure, who maintainsa primacy of the good. Bonaventure’s integration of philosophy and theology provides an understanding of being as goodness and hence an understandingof being as relational and generative. Because being is good, created reality is intrinsically good and bears within it an inner dynamic toward the pleroma oflove. The implications of Bonaventure’s metaphysics of the good for ecology and epistemology are explored.

In this paper I challenge the received view of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Heidegger and explore the relationship between phenomenology and theology. Against the received view—the familiar claim that Heidegger “secularizes” Kierkegaard—I argue that both philosophers attempt to uncover the existential conditions for the possibility of an authentic existence and take the passionate religious life to be one form of such an existence. Therefore, Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness does not represent a secularized break with but rather aphenomenological development of Kierkegaard’s concept of inwardness; and both concepts represent a mode of existence that is the condition for the possibility of genuine Christian faith. This grounding relationship between resoluteness and faith, I argue, is representative of Heidegger’s view of the relationship between phenomenological and theological concepts in general. Thus, my argument not only sheds light onHeidegger’s development of Kierkegaard but it also clarifies some important features of the relationship between phenomenology and theology.

Karl Jaspers celebrates the “Axial Age” as marking a fundamental advance in humanity’s self-understanding, but rejects Christianity as “fettering” this new enlightenment to a notion of Jesus as the sole incarnation of the divine. Here I try to show that, relative to Jaspers’ own account of Existenz and especially of existential “foundering,” Jesus becomes distinctive in a way that Socrates, Buddha, and Confucius are not (even on Jaspers’ own accounts of these four “paradigmatic individuals”). I go on to show how, on Karl Rahner’s inclusivist account of theincarnation, Jaspers’ objections to Christianity mostly dissolve. Finally, I suggest the need to recognize two Axial Age traditions: one rejecting sacrificial forms in favor of ethical prescriptions, the other finding new ethical meaning in these older forms.