Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.

The sciences and popular views generally consider matter from the bottom up, that is, as the least common denominator underlying all of its various forms and realizations. In Rahner sensibility is matter looked at from the top down, that is, with a view to the highest realization of matter in human beings, and in Christ. In Whitehead creativity is matter, not inert or static but spontaneous and active, and creativity is matter viewed in light of its highest realizations in humans and in God. So, in Rahner and in Whitehead, matter is viewed in much the same way, called sensibility in Rahner, and creativity in Whitehead, and defined in terms of its actualization in human nature.

The article discusses some parallels between Weltanschauung analysis in contemporary philosophy of science and Rahner’s criticism of the context/content approach to theological pluralism.

Mark Lloyd Taylor in God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner charges that Rahner’s understanding of the essential immutability of God renders his theology incoherent. For Taylor, Rahner’s assertion of God’s essential immutability prevents him from cartying through in a consistent manner the methodological turn to the subject which is at the heart of his theological project. An assessment of the validity of Taylor’s process-informed critique requires a careful examination of Rahner’s understanding of analogy. Analogy, for Rahner is not based on a conceptual or semantic distinction but on the ontological constitution of human transcendence. From Rahner’s perspective, Taylor’s critique is faulty because it springs from an impoverished view of Being and a diminished sense of the radical nature of human transcendence. While Taylor’s critique does not undermine Rahner’s position, it alerts one to the propensity of his position to generate substantialized interpretations and, at times, Rahner’s own tendency to dissolve too quickly dialectical tensions within his position.

This paper contends that the dispute between Avery Dulles and Karl Rahner on the prospects for the unity of the churches is not fundamentally theological. Instead, their sharply contrasting perceptions of contemporary culture lead them to construe the ecumenical imperative quite differendy. If this analysis is correct, what may be most divisive between and within the churches is not faith or doctrine at all but different readings of “the signs of the times.” If so, ecumenists will have to undertake cultural interpretation as an essential component of their work. Without careful cultural analyses, the goal of unity of the Christian churches may be held hostage to impressions stemming more from bias than reasoned judgments.

The first three sections of this study explain the debt that Karl Rahner’s metaphysics of symbol owes to the influence of Maurice Blondel and Joseph Maréchal. The concluding section suggests that a Blondel-inspired renewal of the metaphysics of symbol could challenge the restricted claim for reason offered by secular and religious post-modernity.

This paper explores the question of whether there is a conceptual distinction between romantic love and friendship and whether such a distinction would support the normative conclusion that friends should not be lovers. Laurence Thomas has argued that, given an egalitarian conception of romantic love, there is no such distinction between romantic love and friendship. This paper shows that equally egalitarian alternatives to Thomas’s conceptions of love and friendship do suggest that friends should not be lovers. Moreover, the alternative view of romantic love defended in the paper supports a link between romantic love and sexual exclusivity.

ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between his view of religious belief and his claims about how it can function, and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects.

The term “patriotism” has had different meanings, deriving from different historical circumstances. In its predominant modern sense it has been condemned as vicious, extolled as virtuous, and judged to be a quality potentially virtuous, but only in moderation. It is argued that, as most commonly understood by writers in this century, neither unrestricted patriotism, nor even moderate patriotism, is a virtue, but it is a socially pernicious vice, the more virulent for being associared with virtue.

Liberalism is no longer defensible as a strategy for coping with conflicts in a pluralistic society, but is itself one of the pluralities in conflict. Hence its strategy for coping with plurality---tolerant suspension or privatization of the deep commitments that are the roots of conflict, coupled with rational discussion to form a public consensus not connected to the plurality of commitments---can no longer serve as a common sense approach for all citizens. In this paper I explore as a solution the continuation of discussion toward shared public policy, but now discussion openly tied to underlying commitments. Truth in this context is pursued not as a matter of argument, but as fruitful consequences of action.

Certain passages in the Meditations indicate a silence of Descartes before the mystery of God. These passages underscore the inadequacy of reason to penetrate God’s attributes. Descartes underlines the incomprehensibility of God’s infinity and God’s purposes. He evokes an intuitive knowledge of God which transcends the conceptual. Relevant passages in the correspondence of Descartes indicate Descartes’s repeated concern with the limits of philosophical theology and support a deconstruction of the Medítations which privileges its recurrent theologia negativa. Such an interpretation of the religious theory in public and private Cartesian texts contests the persistent “rationalist” interpretation of Descartes, which reduces the theology of the Meditations to a series of deductive proofs.

The received view is that Gaunilo’s attempted refutation of Anselm’s ontological argument fails. But those who believe this do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay is to show that whether the attempted refutation succeeds depends crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking principle on which Anselm’s argument rests . This principle has largely been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of them, which Anselm may have held, his argument avoids Gaunilo’s criticism.

Schelling’s philosophy has been construed either as endorsing a Christian view of revelation or as setting the stage for an existentialist account of human freedom. There has been a tendency to ignore the interface of Schelling’s task, namely, as exploring the presuppositions that govern an attempt to rethink the affinity between the Divine and the human will. This paper aims to rectify the above deficiency; it shows how Schelling offers a more radical account of human freedom than can be found in either a conventional Christian or in a secular account of the frailty of the human situation. The key to this interpretation lies in showing that Schelling developed a dialectic of human freedom which establishes how the self-devisiveness of evil can arise as a corollary to the harmony of love. Through his dialectic, Schelling cultivates the insights of German idealism in a manner which clarifies rather than undermines the basic motifs of Christianity.

L’enjeu de cette analyse de la signification de l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis est double: projeter un éclairage nouveau, d’une part sur la nature des rapports entre raison et science intuitive, d’autre part sur l’articulation entre durée et éternité. Que les formules sub specie et sub quadam specie aeternitatis soient équivalentes ou non, il s’agit dans les deux cas de figure, de déterminer les raisons de la présence, puis de la disparition de l’adjectif quadam. Enfin on examine les occurrences de l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis et des deux autres variantes pour mieux cerner leur signification et leur portée.

William Sweet offers a rejoinder to Hendrik Hart’s response. He begins with terminological considerations, and argues that, despite Hart’s further clarifications regarding his use of such terms as ‘faith,’ ‘belief,’ and ‘rational,’ the concerns raised in his first critical essay (“Anti-foundationalism, Hendrik Hart, and the Nature and Function of Religious Belief,” Philosophy & Theology 8:2) still stand. He raises two substantive issues which, he argues, Hart has yet to explain fully and convincingly: the nature of faith, and how what religious believers say about their faith can be understood as meaningful or true. He concludes by suggesting that the future conversation focus on two central questions: the nature of faith, and whether Hart is arguing for an ‘alternative’ vision of meaning and truth, or simply a ‘broader’ one.

In response to the critique of his work by William Sweet, Hendrik Hart first offers some terminological clarifications. The important difference between ‘faith’ (trust in God) and ‘belief’ (our network of accepted understandings of things, expressed in concepts and propositions) is emphasized and his use of terms such as ‘religion,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘truth’ are explained. Hart then clarifies his approach to the Western philosophical tradition . He argues that Christian accommodation to philosophy and its idea of ‘reason’ as ultimate arbiter have hindered proper understanding of biblical faith. He finds support for his critique within the philosophical tradition itself, particularly in the form of feminist and postmodern thought. In the end, he offers a vision of religious truth, encapsulated in Jesus’ proclamation, “I am the truth,” that is based upon the embodiment of God’s will and intent.