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Gregory Bassham
Gracia on Divine Revelation
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422.
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Colleen McCluskey
Gracia and the Question of Religious Relativism
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423.
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Jorge J.E. Gracia
Revelation, Interpretation, and Relativism:
A Response to Some Critics of How Can We Know What God Means?
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424.
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Mark D. Jordan
Thomas as Commentator in Some Programs of Neo-Thomism:
A Reply to Kaczor
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Arguments that Aquinas’s literal commentaries on Aristotle present his own philosophy are often proxies for larger claims about the relation of philosophy to theology. While trying to secure a place for Thomas in philosophic conversation, such arguments impose modern notions of an autonomous and apodictic philosophy, with fixed genres of declarative speech. The result is neither a plausiblereading of the Thomistic corpus nor a helpful exemplar for contemporary Catholic philosophy.
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Eugene Kelly
A Postscript to Max Scheler’s “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue”
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The translator of Scheler’s essay, “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue,” presents an account of the context of this essay in Scheler’s work and of its relevance to his concept of the ordo amoris and to his critique of Kant. The translator discusses the intended audience of the essay, its moral purpose, and the method of its procedure. The postscript further reflects on the essay’s central themes of humility and reverence, suggesting avenues for a critical assessment of Scheler’s conclusions. It ends with some reflections on the contemporary value of Scheler’s contributions in this essay to a historical and philosophical understanding of the conflict between science and religion.
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Dietrich von Hildebrand
The Personality of Max Scheler
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Dietrich von Hildebrand, a close friend of Max Scheler since 1907, wrote this assessment of Scheler’s personality and philosophical style in 1928, just months after Scheler’s death. (Dietrich von Hildebrand, “Max Scheler als Persönlichkeit,” Hochland 26, no. 1 [1928/29]: 70–80.) He explores the extraordinarily rich lived contact with being out of which Scheler philosophized. At the same time he acknowledges the lack of philosophical rigor in many of Scheler’s analyses. He brings out the restlessness of Scheler’s mind and person that resulted from a one-sided passion for coming to know things; Scheler was not able to dwell with things or persons once he had come to know them. Von Hildebrand also explores the relation of Scheler’s thought to Catholicism and offers an interpretation of Scheler’s abandonment of Catholicism in his last years.
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427.
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John R. White
Exemplary Persons and Ethics:
The Significance of St. Francis for the Philosophy of Max Scheler
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For Max Scheler, St. Francis represented perhaps the highest ideal of the moral life, an ideal he felt compelled to articulate throughout his philosophical work. In this paper, I examine the significance of the person of St. Francis for Scheler’s philosophy. I begin by developing Scheler’s notion of “exemplary person,” the idea that persons act as influences on moral life and thought. I then hypothesize that St. Francis functioned as an exemplary person for Scheler. Finally, I attempt to justify that hypothesis by examining Scheler’s discussion of Francis in Sympathy and by comparing Scheler’s philosophy to elements of the thought of Bonaventure and of Scotus. I conclude with a discussion of the significance of using exemplary persons for understanding the history of philosophy.
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428.
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John F. Crosby
Person and Obligation:
Critical Reflections on the Anti-Authoritarian Strain in Scheler’s Personalism
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In the course of his polemic against Kant’s moral philosophy, Scheler was led to depreciate moral obligation and its place in the existence of persons. This depreciation is part of a larger anti-authoritarian strain in his personalism. I attempt to retrieve certain truths about moral obligation that tend to get lost in Scheler: moral obligation is not merely “medicinal” but has a place at the highest levels of moral life; the freedom of persons is lived in an incomparable way in responding to moral obligation; obligation and obedience even have an indispensable place in the existence of Christians. Drawing on the studies of Scheler by Rudolf Otto, Karol Wojtyla, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Dietrich von Hildebrand, I show how Scheler’s personalism is corrected and enhanced once we distance ourselves from his anti-authoritarian animus against obligation and restore obligation to its place in the existence of persons.
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429.
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Philip Blosser
The “Cape Horn” of Scheler’s Ethics
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I dispute Scheler’s view that good and evil cannot be willed as such; that moral value is always an inevitable and indirect by-product of willing other ends; that every act of willing yields a moral value; and that moral value attaches only to persons. I argue that moral value attaches to a variety of objects of willing (including one’s own moral worth), and that, although all acts have moral implications, not all acts are typologically moral. Those that are, I suggest, typically involve a transactional categoriality where we take another’s good or bad as our own. Those that are not may yield various values of personal willing whose positive or negative value is typologically non-moral. I also deny that obligation is diminished by value-insight or that all norms are categorially moral.
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430.
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John F. Crosby
Introduction
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431.
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American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly:
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Jonathan J. Sanford
Scheler versus Scheler:
The Case for a Better Ontology of the Person
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Scheler’s theory of the person is at the center of his philosophy and one of the most celebrated of his achievements. It is somewhat surprising, then, that a straightforward and sufficient account of the person is missing from his works, an omission felt most keenly in that work which is in large measure dedicated to forging a new personalism: The Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. In his explicit accounts of what a person is, Scheler stresses its spirituality and claims that it lives and has its being wholly in the execution of its acts. But in forging his personalism, Scheler makes a number of claims which require an account of the person that reaches deeper than its executed acts. In this essay, I focus on the accounts of the person given in the Formalism and use Scheler toimprove Scheler’s theory of the person.
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Joshua Miller
Scheler on the Twofold Source of Personal Uniqueness
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There is a latent distinction in Scheler’s middle-period philosophical anthropology between personal uniqueness as divinely determined and as self-determined. The first dimension is more explicit; the second, a logical conclusion from Scheler’s notion of person as pure spirit. In the following study I will first thematize these two aspects of personal uniqueness. Then, I will explore Scheler’sidea that one gains knowledge of these aspects of a person through love. Here Scheler’s differentiation between love as intuitive and love as participative serves to justify and further explain the above distinction in personal uniqueness. Through intuitive love one is especially able to grasp the divinely determined dimension of another, her ideal and individual value essence. Through participative love one is especially able to grasp that dimension of another’s uniqueness which she herself forms through her own freedom.
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Josef Seifert
Scheler on Repentance
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The author studies Scheler’s essay, “Repentance and Rebirth,” gathering together and interpreting all the insights of Scheler on repentance, and often reading them in the light of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s work in the philosophy of religion. The author examines Scheler’s critique of the reductionist accounts of repentance as well as Scheler’s own account. He gives particular attention to one basic problem in Scheler’s account of repentance, namely, a tendency to let forgiveness arise in the repentant person simply by the force of the act of repenting and not to give due weight to the divine initiative without which there is no forgiveness.
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434.
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Joshua Miller
The Writings of Max Scheler
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John J. Drummond
Personalism and the Metaphysical:
Comments on Max Scheler’s Acting Persons
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This article is a review of the recently published book Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, edited by Stephen Schneck. It considers some issues regarding the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological personalism and his later metaphysics by way of a discussion of the articles contained in this volume. The review explores the various and varied discussions of the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological notions of person and spirit. It suggests that Scheler’s turn from a phenomenological anthropology to metaphysics has its roots not only in this notion of spirit, which is distinguished both from Husserl’s absolute consciousness and from Heidegger’sDasein, but also in the ontology of values that is embedded in Scheler’s phenomenological axiology.
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436.
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Max Scheler
On the Rehabilitation of Virtue
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Max Scheler’s essay on virtue, first published under a pseudonym in 1913, begins with some reflection upon the decline in his era of a concern for virtue. Its central theme is a phenomenological exhibition of the Christian experience of humility, reverence, and related concepts, together with an exploration of their historical and social embodiments in Western culture. The core of humility is a spiritual readiness to serve, related to love, that produces in its possessor a liberation from the ego. The core of reverence is its sense of what surpasses our vision. It has the power to reveal to us the deeper value and being in all things. The paper contains elements of a polemic directed against scientific naturalism.
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Christopher Gilbert
Catholic Cartesian Dualism:
A Reply to Freddoso
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Alfred Freddoso has argued that Cartesian dualism cannot serve as the model for a philosophical anthropology that will be consistent with the plain sense of Church teachings. I disagree. Although the interpretation of Cartesian dualism to which Freddoso objects is not unwarranted by the Cartesian texts, a close reading of those texts suggests a diff erent interpretation. I shall defend a reading of Cartesian dualism that departs from the one which Freddoso discusses. I shall then demonstrate that this alternative reading is consonant with the teachings of the Church.
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Alan Baker
Malebranche’s Occasionalism:
A Strategic Reinterpretation
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The core thesis of Malebranche’s doctrine of occasionalism is that God is the sole true cause, where a true cause is one that has the power to initiate change and for which the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects. Malebranche gives two separate arguments for his core thesis, T, based on necessary connection and on divine power respectively. The standard view is that these two arguments are necessary to establish T. I argue for a reinterpretation of Malebranche’s strategy, according to which the Necessary Connection Argument alone is sufficient to establish T. The Divine Power Argument, which is anyway weaker, is needed not to support T but to bridge the gap between T and full-fledged occasionalism. Specifically, it is needed to rule out the existence of causal powers in nature, a scenario which is consistent with T but inconsistent with occasionalism.
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Sean J. McGrath
The Facticity of Being God-Forsaken:
The Young Heidegger and Luther’s Theology of the Cross
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The early Freiburg lectures have shown us the degree to which Heidegger is influenced by Luther. In Being and Time, Heidegger designs a philosophy that can co-exist with a radical Lutheran theology of revelation. Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity constitutes a polemic with the Scholastic idea of a natural desire for God and an accommodation of a theology of revelation. However, Heidegger’s implicit assent to the Lutheran concept of God-forsakenness is philosophically problematic. To be God-forsaken is not to be ignorant of God; it is to be abandoned by God, to have a history of dealing with God that has resulted in a decisive rupture and distance. But if this is a theological position, as Luther would be the first to argue, it can be justified only theologically.
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Jacob Howland
Storytelling and Philosophy in Plato’s Republic
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Scholarly convention holds that logos and muthos are in Plato’s mind fundamentally opposed, the former being the medium of philosophy and the latter of poetry. I argue that muthos in the broad sense of story or narrative in fact plays an indispensable philosophical role in the Republic. In particular, any account of the nature and power of justice and injustice must begin with powers of the soul that can come to light only through the telling and interpretation of stories. This is implicit in Glaucon’s Gygean tale. Read in connection with the earlier tale of Gyges in Herodotus, Glaucon’s muthos shows itself to be a story about storytelling and interpretation, knowledge of self and others, and the discovery of the roots of justice and injustice.
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