641.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
David L. Hildebrand
Comment on Tapley's "What is Wrong with Being a Pervert"
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642.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Mark Painter
Co-Constitutionality and Craft:
A Commentary on Robyn Gaier's "On the Continuation of the Craft Analogy in Republic II"
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643.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Joseph Bien
Sartre on Freedom, Fatalism, and the Other
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644.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Mark Painter
Nationality and Homelessness:
A Commentary on Kuhlken's "Heidegger's Political Philosophy: The Distinction Between Nationality and Patriotic Orientation"
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645.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Stephen Minister
The Optics of Responsibility
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646.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Eva M. Dadlez
Comments on Deborah K. Heikes' "Let's Be Reasonable:
Feminism and Rationality"
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647.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Alastair Norcross
Moral Intuitions and fMRI Research
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648.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
J. K. Swindler
Piper on Respect for Personal Autonomy and Prudential Value
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649.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Michael P. Wolf
Could I Just Be a Very Epistemically Responsible Zombie?
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650.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
25 >
Issue: 2
Sarah Tyson
Comments on "Failing to Do Things with Words"
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651.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Zachary J. Goldberg
Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom
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652.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Maurice Hamington
Hull House:
Urban Epistemology and Social Action
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653.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Jason Wyckoff
The Inseparability Thesis:
Why Political Legitimacy Entails Political Obligations
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Several noted political theorists have argued that a state can be legitimate even if it does not generate in its citizens an obligation to obey the law. I argue that this claim is false. All plausible analyses of political legitimacy either build in the concept of political obligation, or else incorporate claims that require some account of political obligation. In either case, political legitimacy is possible only when a state successfully generates in its citizens an obligation to obey the law.
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654.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Elizabeth J. Jelinek
The Philosopher-Ruler:
From Theory to Action
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655.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Richard Cole
Nature, Value, and Duty
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656.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Hoke Robinson
Kant on Empirical Concept- and Intuition-Formation:
A Discussion with Hannah Ginsborg
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657.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Kenneth Henley
Hume’s Deflationary Theory of Allegiance
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658.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Robert B. Talisse
Why I am Not a Pluralist (Presidential Address)
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659.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
C.D. Meyers
Nature, Virtue, and the Nature of Virtue:
An Outline for an Environmental Virtue Ethics
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Most of the philosophical work written on environmental issues focuses on notions such as rights, consequences, duties, etc. And most of the theoretical philosophy done in environmental ethics focuses on questions of whether animals, plants, or ecosystems have inherent value or moral standing independently of their usefulness to humans. A character-based approach has been largely neglected (despite a few important works). In this paper, I consider what a plausible environmental virtue ethics would look like. Specifically, I argue (pace Sandler) that it would not require any distinct eco-virtue but would involve merely widening the scope of traditional virtues to include the non-human world. I further argue that a successful environmental virtue ethics would have to be pluralistic (involving more than one virtue) and would require the formulation of prima facie (rather than absolute) v-rules. Finally, borrowing from Naess, I suggest a way that eco-friendly character could be acquired.
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660.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 1
Eva Dadlez
Kames on Ideal Presence:
Revisiting the Problem of Fiction and Emotion
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The problem of fiction and emotion is the problem of how we can be moved by the contemplation of fi ctional events and the plight of fictional characters when we know that the former have not occurred and the latter do not exist. I will give a general sketch of the philosophical treatment of the issue in the present day, and then turn to the eighteenth century for a solution as effective as the best that are presently on offer. The solution is to be found in the account of ideal presence given by Henry Home, Lord Kames.
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