661.
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Jenn Neilson
Freedom of Expression, Obscenity and the Community Standards Test
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662.
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Memorial Notices
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663.
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Scott Forschler
Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing:
What Kant’s Supreme Principle of Ethics Should Have Been
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664.
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Robyn R. Gaier
Hey, You, What’s so Special about the Second-Person Perspective?
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665.
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Mark Piper
Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice
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666.
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Sarah E. Worth
Fact, Fiction, or Fraud; Faked Memoirs from Frey to Wilkomirski
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667.
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Tim Mosteller
Platonism and Recent Correspondence Theories of Truth
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668.
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Todd Lekan
Friendship as an Impersonal Value
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This paper defends a broadly Aristotelean account of character friendship that maintains that the impersonal value of acquiring a virtuous character is the ultimate basis for our reasons for caring about friends. This view of friendship appears to conflict with the entrenched intuition that viewing our connections to particular friends as merely contingent occasions for the cultivation of virtue is alienating and undesirable. I argue that far from being an alienating feature of character friendships, a focused appreciation of the contingent nature of friendships represents a morally sound attitude of honest self-acceptance. On my account, honest selfacceptance is an impersonal value—an ideal that anyone has a reason to cultivate. Although the ideal is impersonal, its content specifi es that we appreciatively acknowledge the particular contributions that friends make to the development of virtue.
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Samuel A. Stoner
Critical Philosophy as Artistic Endeavor:
On the Form of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and its Implications
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670.
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Eric Thompson
Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism
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Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by SK are actually false. We’ll then see that by combining PI and SK, the effect will be to place extremelyhigh demands upon evidence for ~SK. It will finally be observed that, while we may have good evidence for ~SK, we do not have extremely strong evidence sufficient for establishing ~SK. This supports my conclusion that any standard version of Pragmatic Invariantism ultimately entails external world skepticism. If successful, my conclusion will critically undermine the current view that Pragmatic Invariantism is actually a skeptically resistant position.
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671.
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Kendy M. Hess
The Modern Corporation as Moral Agent:
The Capacity for “Thought” and a “First-Person Perspective”
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672.
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Iain Morrisson
Nietzsche, Economy and Morality
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673.
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William Grove-Fanning
Biodiversity Loss, the Motivational Gap, and the Failure of Conservation Education
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While the precipitous decline of biodiversity threatens life-sustaining processes and vast segments of the human population, concern about its loss remains extremely shallow. Nearly all motivational campaigns falsely assume that upon appreciating the relevant information, people will be sufficiently motivated to do something. But rational argumentation is doomed to fail, for there exists a motivational gap between a comprehension of the crisis and action taken based upon such knowledge. The origin of the gap lies neither in the quantity and quality of information on the crisis, nor in the putative confl ict between self-interest and morality. Instead, it lies in “remoteness conditions” which dissociate decision-makers from ecological damage and enfeeble incentive to correct it. The centralremoteness conditions are spatial, temporal, and consequential. They can be eliminated by concretizing and particularizing earth others. While direct-experience, place-based educational programs satisfy the criteria, they are uncommon. There is also little opportunity for working adultsto engage in these sorts of activities. As such, the outlook for endangered species and humans in the developing world remains dire.
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Mary Stewart Butterfield
Moral Considerations in Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy
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675.
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Amanda Roth
Ethical Progress and the Goldilocks Problem:
Objectivity and the Radical Revision of Values
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I argue that a number of non-utopian accounts of ethical progress—specifically, those offered by Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty—face a trade-off between objectivity and the radical revision of values. I suggest that each of these views is unsatisfactory because they face the Goldilocks problem—none of the views is able to get the trade-off between objectivity and radical revision of values “just right.” Moody-Adams and Wiggins offer accounts which are too conservative with regard to ethical progress in not allowing radical revision of values, while Rorty’s account is too liberal in not maintaining enough objectivity. Despite thisdifficulty, however, I conclude on an optimistic note about the potential of non-utopian accounts of progress. I sketch out a Dewey-inspired view of progress which I believe can overcome the Goldilocks problem.
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676.
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Todd R. Long
Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality
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677.
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J.K. Swindler
Autonomy and Accountability
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678.
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Mark Bauer
Multiple Realizability as Compatible with the Mental Constraint Thesis
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679.
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William Roche
Coherentism and Inconsistency
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680.
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David L. Hildebrand
Pragmatic Objectivity in History, Journalism and Philosophy (Presidential Address)
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