Heidegger is perhaps best known for stressing the function of time as temporality on the phenomena of life. There is a sense, however, in which the full significance of these insights can be best understood only through an exploration of the function of space as spatiality in the phenomena of life. At their juxtaposition, there is a privileged perspective on the meaning of life, and most importantly on what is the most meaningful life on the Heideggerian account, thephilosophical life. The following short exploration uncovers this standpoint through an analysis of the word “clearing” as temporally expansive space. Through this device, there is a clear view of the role of philosophy, of truth, and of the meaning of life in Heidegger’s Being and Time.

There are three conceptions of expression in Husserl: (1) expression as a physical or sensible entity (expression-token), (2) expression as a repeatable entity (expression-type), and (3) expression as an act that connects token and type to each other (act of expressing). Only when all three notions are considered canHusserl's theory of expression and its meaning be correctly interpreted. However, such an interpretation does not ensure the correctness of Husserl’s theory itself. Rather, the distinctions of the three notions reveal implausibility in the theory, because using an expression-token is nothing other than having a presentation(Vorstellung) of it. In his manuscript of 1914, Husserl attempts to overcome that implausibility but in a way that gives rise to another difficulty.

Sartre builds up his notion of Bad Faith and then develops it by borrowing the method used in psychoanalytic theory. Thus, he treats Bad Faith as the model of a mental illness and inquires into its nature, origins, symptoms, and treatment. Following this procedure, he isolates consciousness as the origin of Bad Faith and describes in his examples from Nausea (1938) to Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr (1952) a variety of symptoms of varying degrees of severity. These and other questions are extensively treated in Being and Nothingness. Some critics, however, tend to relate Sartre’s ideas of Bad Faith solely to this latter exposition. I believe this is a mistake, and that Sartre’s conception may be shown to have changed and developed in other writings.

The present paper aims to view three ways of thinking time by Emmanuel Levinas. We distinguish existential, historical, and eschatological time demonstrating how they are connected with his central notion of responsibility toward the Other. The following analysis reorders and interprets what Levinas has said in response of Martin Heidegger’s and Hegel’s position. The text does not make any other claims but aims to offer a possible reading and exegesis of Levinas’s philosophy and open a further discussion on these topics.

From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything, but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because ofphenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism etc. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. This make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy. it shall not be called as philosophy. Philosophy’starget object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.

Husserl’s phenomenology opens itself with a critique of positive sciences. Husserl problematizes the hardcore presupposition of positivism that the world is a definite sort of an existential totality of objects and thus it is exhaustible with empirical data and deductive-conceptual abstraction on the basis of causalspatio-temoprality. Criticizing the wholesome reduction of nature into a physical reality and the instrumentalizing of theoretical reason, he proposes transcendental phenomenology, as an ideal form of science. Self-entitled as the genuine science, the science of origin, the science of all sciences, etc., it concerns itself with the matter of validity. Claiming that validating objectivity as such and the meaning of scientific objectification is something of which onlyphenomenological reflection on pure consciousness is capable and that the positivistic objectivity is and must be founded on transcendental subjectivity, Husserl radically idealistically revised the whole positivistic concept of evidence and givenness of a fact and substituted it with the phenomenological notion of apriori self-evidence and originary givenness of primordial intentional consciousness. Nevertheless, it is noticed that the absolute universal validity of positivistic objectivity was never rejected or questioned; objectivity is still in and of itself an absolute criterion of scientificity in Husserl. This paper will argue that the idealistic turn toward subjectivity takes place through factualization of transcendentality and this, by bestowing apriori apodicticity with facticity, even enhances more the supreme epistemological function of positivity. It will discuss such positivistic drive, directly bequeathed from the very cultural ethos at which phenomenological criticism targeted, as an important locomotive for Husserl’s program and point out an antinomical consequence with which it is to be faced as a consequence.

In this paper I am discussing the concept of “objective world”, its hope and aim as vigorously presented in Husserl’s famous discourse of the Fifth Meditation. In this manner, the first part of my work focuses on Husserl’s intentionality as knowledge of the “I” or “my ego” as my primordial identity, in relation to “my culturalcommunity” as its primordial one, too. The thesis will then develop into “intersubjectivity” in which “the other” and his “cultural community” as primordially constituted are objective to be fully understood in terms of synthetic knowledge; namely through psychological, cultural, historical and social forms and contents. The second part of my paper takes off from where transcendental phenomenology is grounded to look into the problem of Globalization and questions of value. If the first part followed Husserlian theoretical investigations, sometimes called interpretive philosophy to hopefully acquire universal principles, the second onecan be called practical doctrine, which studies cases presented by a number of specialists who focus on praxis and consequences of Globalization – a theme for economic concerns, but inherently it affects the stability of the community of mankind. This new world order overtly and covertly critiques traditional concepts of nation and culture as it redefines democratic concept, coming home to human rights. Its challenge has been already about the doubts and contradictoriness of “values” in broadest and “reduction” sense. OBJECTIVITY as a noun, and OBJECTIVE, an adjective and noun are terminologies of extremely complicated shades of meaning in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, particularly in the fifth one where such terms are used interchangeably to fit the concept of intersubjective Nature; which I will explore and further put it in current economic and political drive to Globalization. In this regard my theme will deal simultaneously with both the critique of Husserlian thought and neo-liberalism (liberal democracy), a twist of democracy for preserving capitalism in what is called a new world order by ordinance and defense of Imperialism as well as the states that so desire to join the world market.

The thought of Edith Stein on woman brings out the fuller sense of the metaphysical notion of the being of woman. Stein’s position is that woman’s nature as biological mother affects her whole being. Woman has two essential characteristics: attraction to the personal and attraction to wholeness. It is woman’s emotions that account for these distinctly feminine traits. Woman is distinguished by her empathetic perception of persons, an intuitive grasp of a person’s being and value as “person”. Stein describes empathy as a clear awareness of another person, not simply of the content of his experience, but of his experience of that content. In empathy, one takes the place of the other without becoming strictly identical to him. One does not just understand the experiences of the other, but takes them on as one’s own. Stein reinterprets traditional readings of woman, challenging claims to the woman as the “weaker sex” and to the emotions as inferior to reason.

Edmund Husserl believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systematically applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called “bracketing” of the objects outside of our consciousness. Husserl elaborated his idea through the conception of reductions, which he divided into eidetic,transcendental and phenomenological ones. The conception has recently been carefully analyzed by Dagfinn Føllesdal, an outstanding analytical thinker. But he had do admit that Husserl was not consistent in applying his method. Definitely, the core of Husserl’s phenomenology can be studied using the analytic method. However, this does not mean that we can speak about applying a method in the case of Husserl himself. We get somewhat closer to a clearly defined method when we apply the priority argument of Merleau-Ponty for making the method of a phenomenological thinker intelligible. This helps us to clarify that what is being bracketed in phenomenology is the idea of the world embraced by traditional philosophical theory. What we are left with after the reduction is a reformedunderstanding.

Plato’s Charmides has generally been regarded as an aporetic dialogue, which attempts to define temperance (swfrosu/nh) and ends in aporia, without any positive answer. My paper aims to understand the dialogue as suggesting positive answers to the questions about the nature of temperance. I am focusing on thefollowing: at the outset of the dialogue Socrates is supposed to cure Charmides’ headache; the cure is not only a matter of bodily care, but also a matter of care for one’s soul. Quoting a Thracian doctor, he maintains the soul needs to be treated by using certain charms, which are beautiful words (tou\j lo/gouj ... tou\j kalou/j), and that from such beautiful words temperance comes into being in souls; once temperance has come into being and is present in the souls, then it is easy to bring about health both for the head and for the rest of the body (157a3-b1). This was the initial point from which the interlocutors begin to investigate whether temperance is present in Charmides, and what temperance is. Even by the end of the dialogue, however, Charmides has not been proved to have temperance; he is still in need of charms. Apparently Socrates has not given any charm he promised to Charmides. In a sense, only the argument/discussionitself can be considered as a sort of incantation, insofar as it will cure the soul of Charmides. But I suggest there is actually a hint in the dialogue: the Delphic inscription –“Know thyself!”- can be taken as beautiful words which are worth reciting with a full understanding of its implications, though it is not presented by Socrates but by Critias. This will explain the unity of the Charmides.

Thinking about abnormalization, the author views abnormalizing as one of the means of entering the space where everything is born, and evaluates the place of this means in modern society. Over the course of human history, society established norms and taboos of all kinds, and the system of norms and taboosdetermined the society itself. This is especially important in modern society, the society where, besides self-reproduction, development is also one of the main objectives, which presupposes constant creation of new norms. How are norms created? What are the requirements for this? What kind of people can create new norms? What are the threats of this process? The author answers these questions and many others in the outlines of thought. While dwelling upon abnormalization, the author involuntarily touched the borders, the limits of the human world, took a look beyond the horizon of something totally different.

Socrates is philosophy’s greatest hero, and a model for the philosophic life. Yet, why did Socrates live the way he did? How did Socrates become Socrates? How can a contemporary philosopher aspire to be like Socrates, even in ways and contexts in which there is no record of a Socratic example? This short paper explores the implications of Socrates’ encounter with Callicles in the Gorgias on the aspiring philosophic life. In this dialogue, we find Socrates’ own testimony as to why he lives the way he does, how he comes to die the way he does, and also discover how it is that we can presently pursue the philosophic life by his recipe.

Comment, Socrate, personnage historique et citoyen notoire de l’Athènes, est-il devenu une fiction littéraire dans les dialogues de Platon? Serait-il une réaction, assez étrange, au refus de socrate d’écrire? Quoi qu’il en soit, peu après la mort de Socrate, fait son apparition un nouveau genre nommé Socratikoi logoi. Outre Platon d’autres écrivains ont donné de telles compositions en dialogue: Eschine de Sphattos, Antistene, Aristipe, Bryson, Cebes, Criton, Euclide de Megara, Phaidon. Est-ce que les dialogues de jeunesse de Platon sont autre chose que les plus réussies Socratikoi logoi. La thématique de ces dialogue en manière socratique est la démonstration savoureuse que l’interlocuteur de Socrate, malgré le fait qu’il semble savoir beaucoup de choses, il ne sait, en fin de compte, rien. Presque tous les jeunes de l’entourage de Socrate avaient emprunté cette technique de Socrate et dialoguaient avec les citoyen d’Athènes, faisant de Socrate un nom notoire, tout en l’exposant aussi à la haine de ceux qu’il avait directement humilié et que ses disciples avaient humilié. Cette technique de montret au savant qu’il ne sait rien; a enchanté les disciples qui ont inventé ultérieurement Socratikoi logoi. Souvent, Platon lui-même, en choisissant des enjeux impossibles dans ses dialogues de jeunesse (la définition d’une vertu) crée des Socratikoi logoi.

In order to discover the justice and argue that it is a goodness, Socrates draws an analogy between the justice of a polis and the justice of an individual in the book II of the Republic. According to him, a polis is a large version of an individual. In Book IV, Socrates proves their congruity from two perspectives --- the polis and the soul are the same “tripartite”: Both of them have the same four virtues. He thus explains why the vulgar justice is good, and makes a preliminary definition of the nature of justice as well. In his view, the justice is doing one’s own; therefore like temperance, it runs through all the notes of the scale and brings both the polis and the soul harmony and symphony. Seen in the context of the Republic as a whole, this argument of Socrates’ is obviously not convincing. Readers are reasonable in raising the following questions: First, are a polis and an individual of the same composition? Second, are virtues of the state necessarily virtues of the soul? In other words, must a good man be a good citizen? This paper is to deal with Socrates’ argument from these two aspects. In fact, a polis cannot achieve the same harmony and symphony as an individual, nor can political virtues come to the same level as philosophical ones. Hence, a good citizen is not necessarily a good man. Rather, the justice of polis is more of temperance while the justice of soul is more of wisdom. If it is true that the genuine virtue is knowledge, therefore only philosophers are the most just and happiest in the world, then more thought needs to be given to the view that the vulgar virtuesinevitably mean happiness.

A meteor that fell in northern Greece in 467 BC was said to have been predicted by Anaxagoras. It seems rather that his theory entailed (“predicted”) the possibility of such bodies. The meteor provided a rare case of an observation confirming a theory. The subsequent recognition of the meteor shows that early philosophical theories could have testable consequences and that empirical evidence was being sought to evaluate theories at this early time.

The appellation “Western” is, in my view, inappropriate when applied to Ancient Hellas and its greatest product, the Hellenic philosophy. For, as a matter of historical fact, neither the spirit of free inquiry and bold speculation, nor the quest of perfection via autonomous virtuous activity and ethical excellence survived, in the purity of their Hellenic forms, the imposition of inflexible religious doctrines and practices on Christian Europe. The coming of Christianity, with the theocratic proclivity of the Church, especially the hierarchically organized Catholic Church, sealed the fate of Hellenic philosophy in Europe for more than a millennium. Since the Italian Renaissance, several attempts primarily by Platonists to revive the free spirit and other virtues of Hellenic philosophy have been invariably frustrated by violent reactions from religious movements, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and the bloody wars which followed their appearance in Europe. Modern science succeeded to a certain extent, after struggle with the Catholic Church, in freeing itself from the snares of medieval theocratic restrictions. Thus, it managed to reconnect with the scientific spirit of late antiquity and its great achievements, especially in the fields of cosmology, physics, mathematics, and medicine, which enabled modern science to ad-vance further. But it seems that the mainstream European philosophy has failed to follow the example of science and to liberate itself, too. As in the Middle Ages, so in modern and post-modern times the “European philosophy” has continued to play the undignified and servile role of handmaiden of something. In addition to the medieval role of “handmaiden of theology” (ancilla theologiae), since the seventeenth century philosophy in Europe assumed the role of “handmaiden of science” (ancilla scientiae) and, with the coming of the Marxist “scientific socialism,” the extra role of ‘handmaiden of ideology” (ancilla ideologiae). In this respect, the so-called “Western philosophy,” as it has been historically practiced in Christian and partially Islamized Europe, is indeed a very different kind of product from the autonomous intellectual and ethical human activity, which the Ancient Hellenes named philosophia and honored as “the queen of arts and sciences.” In this historical light, Hellenic philosophy would appear to be closer to the Asian philosophies of India, China, Japan, and Korea than to Western or “European philosophy.” So as we stand at the post-cold war era, witnessing the collapse of Soviet-style Socialism and the coming of the post-modern era; as we look at the dawn of a new millennium and dream of a new global order of freedom and democracy, the moment seemspropitious for reflection. We may stop and reflect upon our philosophical past as exemplified in the free spirit of Hellenic philosophy and its misfortunes, its great “passion” in Christian Europe in the last two millennia or so.

The subject I intend to discuss deals with a problem which is central in the debate of ancient greek philosophy: the quest for happiness as the final end, the highest good for a human being. Fixing in the achievement of a life worth living the strategic aim of actions, ancient philosophers tried to define as well what a man should desire for himself to fully develop all the capabilities which lie inside human nature. On the one side they proposed major normative models of wisdom, on the other side they gave an important practical indication: the “care of the self”, as a self-control discipline that aims to build a virtuous form of subjectivity, that is able to design and deserve the eudaimonia. In this context, my analysis will focus on the issue of pleasure. The hedone surely represents the critical point of all happiness models of Socratic origin, centred in different ways on the practice of the “care of the self”. While this practical proposal appears to be a complex and demanding alternative in the search for a life worth living, the hedonistic way seems to be much easier and simpler, as far as pleasure is intended as an unequivocal sign of goodness and wellness, immediately recognisable in the experience of happiness. The hedonism of the many appears to the philosophers as a serious menace to society and to the individual, because it conveys unlimited desires and interior disharmony, though, on the other hand, it not possible to deny the value of pleasure without making philosophical happiness unattractive. In the field of the important contemporary re-evaluation of bios models of ancient philosophers (Hadot, Foucault, Nussbaum, Annas) to test their strength and operative capabilities in human subject’s condition in the present days, I would like to outline a comparison between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the dilemmas set by pleasure in the enterprise of self-construction: their positions appear, as usual, close and at the same time opposite in the well-known “gigantomachy”.