Many articles and books on Buddhism have been published in recent years, but publications dealing with Buddhist educational views are rarely available. In this paper, I wish to expound on Zen Buddhist perspectives on modern education. The history of Buddhist education is long and complex. In early centuries (400 BCE- 800 CE), Buddhist monasteries in India and China functioned as educational centers where vinaya, sutras and other subjects were taught. Many men and women were refugees from social injustice and the sangha provided them with education, security and dignity. Spirituality and pedantry were always combined in Buddhist education. But from a Zen perspective, modern education has become an occupational training program to promote financial interest. Capitalism, science and technology have formed a new world view; to wit, occupational training has become more essential to one's way of living than the spiritual quest. Today, most students are concerned with finding financial stability and material gain. Against this trend, Zen education encourages students to seek spiritual stability. Because of Buddha nature, this is a natural human inclination, while not everyone is talented to become a computer specialist or an investment banker. Zen education guides students to grasp the "twist and turn" of the samsaric world, teaching them to be compassionate, understanding, patient listeners and well-balanced individuals.

I examine Nagarjuna’s averting an opponent’s argument (Verse 29 of Averting the Arguments), Paul Sagal’s general interpretation of Nagarjuna and especially Sagal’s conception of "averting" an argument. Following Matilal, a distinction is drawn between locutionary negation and illocationary negation in order to avoid errant interpretations of verse 29 ("If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error. But I do not make a proposition; therefore, I am not in error.") The argument is treated as representing an ampliative or inductive inference rather than a deductive one. As Nagarjuna says in verse 30: "That [denial] of mine [in verse 29] is a non-apprehension of non-things" and non-apprehension is the averting of arguments or "the relinquishing of all views." "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P (where P is some opposing view) and, as Sagal argues, not meaning a global linguistic silence (where P stands for any proposition whatsoever). Such an interpretation would lead to attributing wholesale irrationalism to Nagarjuna-something I wish to avoid.

In this paper I ask the question of how change is effected in the li practices of a fundamentally conservative society. I begin with a description of how li functions in society ideally and actually, arguing that they play a crucial role in society as the medium through which the Confucian objectives (the perfection of the self, the establishment of order within one’s family, and the restoration and preservation of social order) are realized. The character of li suggests that li practices be evaluated in terms of their efficacy in realizing the Confucian objectives, for which participation in li is both necessary and sufficient. Yet, these objectives transcend li practices, allowing individuals to evaluate li practices in terms of their efficacy in realizing Confucian objectives in the face of changing concerns and circumstances, and thereby affect the relevant changes in li practices. It is an adequate understanding of what the Confucian objectives entail and the structure of the situations one finds oneself in that inform evaluation of existing li practices. However, changes in li practices take place vis-a-vis a conservative attitude towards inherited social conventions, and it is this conservative attitude that provides stability and continuity despite flux. Changes in li practices are therefore gradual, and do not disrupt social order.

Efficiency is a highly considered virtue, especially in our contemporary technological society. It appears to be opposed to the sense of ludus (playfulness) that is greatly valued in Brazilian culture. Is this conflict real? Is it a definite impediment to modernization? This paper deals with this apparent conflict of values, trying to find a way toward a harmonious integration of them. Efficiency is shown as the virtue of a culture turned toward modernity. It is therefore highly prized in contemporary business administration theories. It is also shown that the whole of modern society is oriented toward technological advance and it consequently tends to value efficiency above all other values. Considering other values found in different cultures, there needs to be a better knowledge of them. This study establishes ludus as a typical value of Brazilian culture. An analogy is drawn between the sense of playfulness described and praised by Brazilian authors, and the sense of detachment from technology proposed by Jacques Ellus as a condition for creating a real civilization with technological progress.

In Nueva refutación del tiempo, Borges explicitly interprets both Berkeley and Hume as genuine exponents and "apologists" of idealism. We may not owe Berkeley the discovery of a doctrine which according to Borges is practically as "ancient" and "popular" as metaphysics itself. However, his arguments connote a unique philosophical achievement. Borges himself adheres to these arguments and goes beyond them. He makes Berkeley's doctrine flow into Hume's which in turn flows into the uniform ocean of pantheistic idealism as envisioned by Schopenhauer and by Oriental philosophy. A close reading of the story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" shows how the epistemology inherent in the language descriptions of this planet leads its metaphysicians to move from the underlying Berkeleian-Humean principles to the acceptance of pantheistic idealism. This story is not only a subtle, imaginative fantasy; it is also a work of intellectual elegance reading deep into the problem of knowledge of the external world. Berkeley and Hume devoted their whole attention to this issue and developed views that could adequately address the problem. Borges avoids arguing whether their doctrine falls under the denomination of "immaterialism," "phenomenalism" or "idealism." He seems either to deliberately ignore this scholarly dispute or to go beyond it in an effort to let the texts speak for themselves. Thus, Berkeley's Principles, and Hume's Treatise and first Enquiry show a common fact: the world is mind-dependent.

Son analizadas en el presente trabajo las tres propuestas metodologicas hechas por pensadores latinoamericanos, para el estudio de la filosofía en la America Latina. Esas propuestas son: (1) de la originalidad total; (2) de la ausencia de originalidad; (3) de la originalidad relativa. La primera es defendida por autores como el brasileño R. Gomes or el peruano A. Palacios, para quienes habria la posibilidad de un pensamiento latinoamericano ciento por ciento original. La segunda es defendida por pensadores como el brasileño C. Bevilacqua, para quien a los latinoamericanos solo les resta repetir el pensamiento filosofico europeo, porque no estan dotados de la capacidad para hacer filosofia original. La tercera propuesta, que es la sustentada por el autor del trabajo, ha sido formulada por los brasileños M. Reale y A. Paim, y consiste en reconocer que, aunque inspirados en fuentes filosoficas europeas, los latinoamericanos han realizado una meditacion propia, al reflexionar con las categorias filosoficas aprendidas de la tradicion occidental, sobre una realidad que es absolutamente original en su historicidad. Surge de ahi una meditacion dotada de la originalidad de la problematica humana a la cual se refiere la meditacion filosofica. El concepto de originalidad es relativo, pero garantiza una filosofia latinoamericana en sentido proprio.

I reflect on the incidence and character of the certainties that comprise the basis of our ethical behavior. We do not speak of the propositions due to evidence or to the result of conclusions to which our reasoning leads us. Rather, we treat that which is taken for granted when we justify any behavior. These certainties are not the consequence of theoretical teaching but of action itself, defined here as coinciding action between individuals. While coincidence gives ethical certainties meaning, the training we receive from childhood with respect to these certainties cannot be overestimated. However, ethical teaching as we commonly know it can be articulated in relation with these certainties. Finally, I reflect on the difficulties and problems posed by the different certainties in the background of the behavior of distinct groups and individuals. In my opinion, this does not lead to ethical relativism because some way of continuity must be given in terms of the common human condition. Persuasion can drive individuals sharing a common ethical image of the world to participate in another because some of the certainties are surely shared.

In this paper I wish to examine the position of Camus regarding social change, namely his concepts of rebellion and revolution. I in no way question his well-deserved status as a major twentieth-century French writer, nor do I wish to suggest that he may have been someone caught in a Sartrean notion of 'bad faith.' I am concerned with what one might call his theory of social action. I do wish to assert that Camus was a good man who seriously wrestled with the events of his time. Yet his claims on behalf of suffering humanity, while honest, are not sufficient when faced with complex social issues. That his move toward the right that today might well be taken for a supposed liberalism was undoubtedly bound up with his continued misunderstanding of the dialectic of history.

The discussion of Heidegger's “destructive retrieve” of Aristotle has been intensified in recent years by the publication of Heidegger's courses in the years surrounding his magnum opus. Heidegger's explicit commentary on Aristotle in these courses permits one to read Being and Time with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics. My paper analyzes a network of differences between the two thinkers, focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis. From Aristotle to Heidegger, there is: (1) a shift from the priority of actuality to the priority of possibility. This shift, I argue, is itself the metaphysical ground of: (2) a shift from the priority of theory to the priority of praxis. This shift is seen most clearly in the way in which (3) Heidegger's notion of Theorie is a modification of his poíesis. The temporal ground of the reversal is seen in (4) Heidegger's notion of transcendence towards the world, and not towards an eternal being.

In what follows, I analyze the nature of work as human action. From there I discuss the triple dimension of human perfectibility through man's operative powers: the intellect, will and affections or emotions. After that, I focus on human work as the basis for the integration of ethics and practice: the root of human and cultural development of the individual and society.

In this paper I attempt to give an account of the moral criticizability of motive by appeal to some insights in semantic theory. I maintain that the actions for which we hold persons responsible cannot strictly be understood as expressive of semantic meaning. However, I argue that morally responsible actions can be understood on analogy with a basic Gricean distinction between speaker's and sentence meaning. The analogy suggests that morally responsible actions require a competent moral agent to operate from within the confines of an interpretive moral framework of action assessment, a framework analogous to the framework required for sentence meaning.

In Davidson's example of causal deviancy, a climber knows that he can save himself from plummeting to his death by letting go of a rope connecting him to a companion who has lost his footing, but the thought of the contemplated act so upsets him that he lets go unintentionally. Causation of behavior by intentional states that rationalize it is not enough for it to count as acting. Therefore, the behavior must be caused in 'the right way' or by the Right Kind of Cause (RKC). The immediate cause in Davidson's and other examples of causal immediacy is the agent's awareness or contemplation of what he or she is intending or thinking of doing, which is either caused by, or implicit in the agent's awareness of, his or her intentions or beliefs and desires. I argue that RKC can only be a mechanism-the Will-whose operation we are not directly aware of, but only indirectly once the action is underway.

Spohn's decision model, an advancement of Fishburn's theory, is valuable for making explicit the principle used also by other thinkers that 'any adequate quantitative decision model must not explicitly or implicitly contain any subjective probabilities for acts.' This principle is not used in the decision theories of Jeffrey or of Luce and Krantz. According to Spohn, this principle is important because it has effects on the term of action, on Newcomb's problem, and on the theory of causality and the freedom of the will. On the one hand, I will argue against Spohn with Jeffrey that the principle has to be given up. On the other, I will try to argue against Jeffrey that the decision-maker ascribes subjective probabilities to actions on the condition of the given decision situation.

The theory of agency, it has been claimed, seems to involve two strange notions: on the one hand, that of a self who is not merely an event, but a substance; and that of causation, according to which an agent, who is a substance, can nevertheless be the cause of an event. The understanding of the conscious subject as constituted by the operations of experience, understanding, judgment and decision, proposed by the Canadian philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan, might resolve the puzzle, and provide the basis for an understanding of human freedom that is the affirmation of neither determinism nor arbitrariness. Perhaps one of the strongest arguments in the proposal's favor is that any attempt to refute it in theory would entail its adoption in practice.

There are two distinctions of orientation or of intention of a subject toward any phenomenon: "to" or "from" it, attraction or repulsion, acceptance or rejection. The +/- acceptability or pleasantness/unpleasantness of a phenomenon to a subject is the term indicating his or her +/- orientation to the perceived phenomenon. There are six components of the stream of human consciousness: contact senses (smell, taste, tactile senses), distant senses (auditory, visual) and emotions. Only four of them (the three contact senses and emotions) possess their own acceptability or pleasantness. Pleasantness of Condition of a Subject (PCS) is a sum or an integral of acceptabilities of these four components. "Happiness" is the upper limit of the maximization of PCS; a subject is constantly striving to maximize PCS or to reach for happiness. An attitude of a subject to a phenomenon in the center of his or her attention is determined by the synchronous PCS. Belief/disbelief is a verbalized positive/negative attitude. Desire of a phenomenon x is a change of PCS (ΔPCSx) created by the act of perceiving/imagining the phenomenon; the strength of desire is the magnitude of this change |ΔPCSx|. Desire of a phenomenon characterizes power of the PCS maximization possessed by this phenomenon. Need is a periodic desire; the desire correspondent to need is a concrete form of existence of this need. Choice is determined by comparative strength of the desirabilities of the competing elements of choice; it includes choice of the phenomena to perceive or attend. The attention of a subject toward a perceived phenomenon x is proportional to the strength of its desirability: ATTx=k|ΔPCSx| = k|DESIREx|. The distribution of attention is a function of the desirabilities of (n) phenomena perceived at the time (t): ATTtotalt=k|DES1t|+k|DES2t|+…+|DESnt|. Will is an ability of the subject to influence the balance of desirabilities of elements of the subject's choice in the predetermined way. The nature of the will's effort is a self-inducement of suitable emotions through activation of memories by the concentration of the subject's attention to them.

In light of interpreting a paradox of irrationality, vaguely expressed by Donald Davidson in the context of explaining weakness of will, I attempt to show that it contains a significant thesis regarding the cognitive as well as motivational basis of our normative practice. First, an irrational act must involve both a rational element and a non-rational element at its core. Second, irrationality entails free and intentional violation of fundamental norms which the agent deems right or necessary. Third, "normative interpretation" is only possible for objects that are both natural events and capable of mental operations which presuppose some freedom of will as well as constructive representation of the surrounding reality. Fourth, there is always a question of whether we strike the best balance between fitting individual mental items consistently with the overall behavior pattern and keeping our critical ability in following certain normative principles which constitute our rational background. Fifth, the paradox of irrationality reflects and polarizes a deep-seated tension in the normative human practice under the ultimate constraints of nature. Finally, the ultimate issue is how we can find the best lines on which our normative rational standards are based-"best" in the sense that they are close enough to limits of human practical potentialities and are not too high as to render our normative standards idle or even disastrous.

Given that any society is endowed not only with a set of institutions but also with the particular pattern of self-reflection and self-description, postmodernity should be viewed as an epoch representing the climax of modernity and its self-refutation. Parting with traditional society, modernity represents the triumph of power-knowledge, the divorce between spheres of culture, the global social relations, the new institutions, the change in the understanding of space-time relations, the cult of the new, and the modernization process. While preserving the institutional set of modernity, the postmodern period casts into doubt the basic thought foundations of classical modernity. The horizons of the emerging cultural future should be viewed in the light of a positive synthesis of the postmodern reflexive pattern with the legacy of modernity.

A general problem of philosophical interests concerns the possibility of objective knowledge of other cultures and a past culture, as well as the adequacy of their reconstruction. The problem of cultural development is also crucial. By the criterion I develop, a culture which has expanded its potentialities in various independent forms is an open culture able to enter into dialogue with any other culture.

Traditionally, attempts to verify communications between individuals and cultures appeal to 'public' objects, essential structures of experience, or universal reason. Contemporary continental philosophy demonstrates that not only such appeals, but fortuitously also the very conception of isolated individuals and cultures whose communication such appeals were designed to insure, are problematic. Indeed we encounter and understand ourselves, and are also originally constituted, in relation to others. In view of this the traditional problem of communication is inverted and becomes that of how we are sufficiently differentiated from one another such that communication might appear problematic.

Andrew Bowie's recent Schelling and Modern European Philosophy claims that Schelling idealism is a critique of 'reflective reason' that can be brought to bear on the avatars of French postmodernism. Bower is careful not to intricate Schelling's Naturphilosophie and Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, in which both nature and freedom are fused into a single, unconscious series of natural drives or 'vortex of forces.' To take Schelling at word would turn the Naturphilosophie and Inquiries into a materialist physics of mental states, the basis of which are inaccessible to reflective consciousness. Best represented by philosophers such as Paul Churchland, however, why does Bowie avoid playing up this materialist Schelling when dealing with French 'Irrationalism?' Inadvertently, Bowie rekindles the Kantian critique in order to separate two aspects of recent French philosophy: the materialist (with which Paul Churchland notes that his eliminative, connectionist neuromaterialism has much in common) and the reflective (as inherited from the German Idealism Schelling represents, and mediated via Bergson and Heidegger). While French philosophy's recent adoptions in the Anglo world have been of this latter complexion, Bowie's anxious prophylaxia exposes a materialist current in French thought that has remained more or less beyond the range of Anglophone hearing.