Education, an action, is a process, a development of the imperfect human being intentionally directed at achieving the ideal of human plenitude in the best possible manner. This is a description of the educational process based on the human being who travels toward plenitude, a point of arrival; the human being who achieves his or her own perfection in the best possible manner; and a method: intentional guidance towards plenitude in the harmonious formation of humanity. It is not enough to say what education is or what it is like. It is necessary to clarify what education is for. The harmonious development of essential, integral and vocational abilities makes the student more perfect and causes his or her cosmic and social circumstance to be more perfect. In this integral philosophy of education, I offer a new "Paideia." It is necessary to seek the student's point of balance between the sciences of empirical verification and humanistic duties. Otherwise, we will march toward the disintegration of the human being, to the anti-knowledge of a very powerful technocracy. Integral personal and community education is education which promotes the person in a changing society susceptible to progress. That student perfectibility which is anxious to satisfy demands can only be fulfilled with love. The contemporary world has not rehearsed on a large scale an education for love. If we do not found education on love, the world will not be inhabited by humans.

From its first appearance in western culture, philosophy has been considered able to build up reality, to educate people, and to disclose truth. Plato proposed philosophers as governors in life-long pursuit of philosophical learning. Socrates was the ideal paradigm of an educating philosopher: he tried to wake up human minds so that they could be aware of themselves and of the world, criticizing tradition and prejudices in a logically consistent perspective. A critical and dialogic approach—not by mere chance defined as "Socratic"—to problems has been considered until now the most profitable method of teaching. Socrates is a pioneer in discussing the question of a philosophical (paideia), as he defined his method "maieutic." He was not an authoritarian teacher, but a sparring partner in the process of self-education. Moreover, he considered himself as the most learned and, at the same time, the wisest in Greece, just because he was conscious of his ignorance. Therefore, he understood for the first time in our cultural tradition that knowledge is an endless process rather than a product, within marked bounds.

For the sake of humanity, outward compulsion must change into inward check. This is possible with the help of "paideia." I use "paideia" instead of the equivocal German word "Bildung," which comprises the meanings of "education," "formation," and "cultivation." The core of my recently developed concept of "paideia" is that the educating individual does what has to be done in a certain situation. He or she works alone or together with the other. In doing a work the educated individual tries to avoid any disadvantage for the other. The finished work represents the realization of both, the individual as well as the other in a step toward self-realization. This philosophy of education integrates into one single concept the two main traces of theories of education in European countries, namely the theories of "self-being" and those of "selflessness." The concept of "paideia" is a possible answer to actual problems such as the gap between the rich and the poor, the increase of violence, existing political radicalism, exploitation of natural resources and so on. According to this situation, not all people are educated very well. I claim that the expounded philosophy of education is able to contribute to the education of humanity. The combination of "self-being" and "selflessness" guarantees the optimal realization of sense in a given situation. This ensures that the common work of the individual and the other can develop very well, so that both are intertwined in the result.

Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality (to some degree), Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason (empirical coherence, for Brightman), and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus was on moral education. My interest, however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism.

Despite the historical recognition of the importance of the development of individual human potentialities for the group, gifted individuals have not been treated equally. Three reasons are analyzed: (a) the primacy given to institutions over the individual, except those particular cases in which the individual is identified with the institution itself, or invested with the power of one institution; (b) the lack of recognition of the particular needs of gifted individuals; and (c) the assumption of egalitarian ideals inside specific societies. Despite arguments to the contrary, gifted education will be defended. Gifted individuals have special needs. I assume that Hope and Good Will provide enough justification for this public human task.

I justify the humanities by sketching four views of knowledge in which the idea of an academy or an integration of disciplines might be understood. I assume that every system of higher education inevitably appeals to concepts of knowledge. Such concepts cannot be isolated from political and civic dimensions of life as well as from personal cultivation and character. Nonetheless, older views based on these aspects are open to serious criticism. The four views considered are Aristotelian-Thomistic, Cartesian-positivist, Kantian, and "traditionalist" (in a liberal and hermeneutic sense). The paper describes key elements in each of these views and notes several objections, with a marked preference for Kantian and "traditionalist" views. Kant provides for rehabilitation of the humanities, especially ethics and literature (the moral and aesthetic), within a framework in which modern science displaces ancient teleological nature. "Tradition" is justified on practical grounds--by the need to appropriate for oneself the knowledge and experience of past generations (without which human life loses continuity and meaning). Further, the humanities save the great texts from oblivion to which "progress" would otherwise consign them. The humanities counteract the tendency of science to undermine the conditions of its own possibility, as well as the discipline, knowledge, and virtue required for its own origin.

Vico's concept of the Heroic Mind forms the pedagogical basis for his view of the liberal arts in university education. It is also the key to understanding his humanist critique of Cartesian epistemology. This essay studies Vico's Heroic Mind concept as revealed in his 1732 De mente heroica Oration, discusses the nature of Vico's challenge to Descartes' view of the human person and of knowledge, and points out the development of Vico's ideas on mind, education, and knowledge from his earlier works. Vico's writings not only offer a portrait of eighteenth century European intellectual and cultural thought, but also prophesy the change, disruption, and dehumanization that result from the exaggerated emphases on rationality as the end of all knowledge divorced from other physical, emotional, natural, or historical contingencies and from a neglect of the de mente heroica concept at the foundation of the humanistic world view. His understanding of the state of learning, wisdom, and culture in his own age as well as his exposure to the aversion of the Cartesian mathematical paradigm which discounted the Heroic Mind issues forth in an understanding of the forces driving modern technological society and the problems plaguing contemporary consciousness and life. He has influenced and inspired much modern thinking in sociology, politics, anthropology, language, pedagogy, literature, psychology, and even science. It is the concept of the historical and cultural evolution of the Heroic Mind which Vico passionately pursued in his monumentally creative The New Science.

I argue that the contemporary crisis in education — that nothing appears valid as a discipline unless it has a utilitarian value — may be challenged from the perspective of the Platonist tradition. The ascent through philosophy to the vision of Beauty in itself in Plato's Symposium affirms the perception of beauty or nobility as the ultimate end and value of all knowledge. Marsilio Ficino's adaption of Plato in the Renaissance articulates a more metaphysical ascent which broadens the objects of knowledge in order to include the cosmos and the arts as well as philosophy. Together, these two accounts provide a foundation for understanding the ordering of all knowledge toward the end of the perception of beauty or nobility. There is no dichotomy between the sciences and the humanities: there is only a hierarchy of disciplines according to a scale of metaphysical nobility. The sciences, the arts, history, and philosophy are the steps toward knowledge of Beauty in itself. They constitute a vision of liberal education that is not utilitarian, but whose value must be understood precisely through the moral concept of nobility that is the end of such an education. In embracing the concept of beauty or nobility, liberal education affirms the value of life itself.

I am concerned to accomplish five things. First, I attempt to say something about the nature and purpose of education both in and through spirituality. Second, I contend that spiritual discourse and practice have become so fragmented that they are virtually meaningless; therefore, spirituality is an area ripe for, even if neglected by, philosophical inquiry. My argument here is similar in structure to MacIntyre's historical thesis in relation to morality. Additionally, I argue, following Hadot, that spiritual exercises were once the province of philosophy but, after Suarez, spiritual matters were assigned solely to religion and theology. Third, I begin to discuss the primary importance to philosophy of such matters; I do so by way of a brief analysis of the competing meanings attached to pneuma and psyche, and the ways in which these relate to an account of a human telos. Fourth, I suggest that, by rediscovering the kinds of spiritual exercises favoured by the four philosophical schools of Antiquity, it is possible to say something meaningful about human teleology, which I take to be essentially Aristotelian in that it is to do with cultivating the virtues of both mind and character. Finally, I mention the authoritarian and uncritical approaches to spiritual and moral matters adopted in education in the U.K.

Philosophy is a special way of signifying the world. If philosophy is the place where the question is radical, then the task of the philosophy of education is to turn education into a problem through the practice of criticism. With this in mind we ask, Is teaching possible? What can really be transmitted? If man, as psychoanalysis indicates, is constituted as a desirous being, learning is possible only if desire is present. This interweaving of philosophy and psychoanalysis leads us to consider the impossibility of education in terms of three questions. (1) Is it possible or desirable to transmit the culture in its entirety? (2) Is learning possible without desire? (3) Could any pedagogical syllabus cover for lack in the other?

Kant's argument that autonomy is the basis of human dignity complements the experiential truth that students have the ultimate agency with regard to their learning. Students must see themselves as objects with workable content objectively subject to evaluation — "objects being events-with-meanings" (Dewey), that can be more appreciated personally, socially, and intellectually. To do so sustains and broadens the conditions in which paideia can flourish for its own sake as well as for human ends.

In this essay, I sketch five complementary arenas of concern are set forth as candidates for a cogent contemporary theory of paideia. First, a searching, goal setting form of reflection is central to paideia today even as it was in Hellenistic times. A second contributor to paideia is critical reflection. But, third, reasoning is also connected to embodied activity through feeling. Thus, sensitivity to existential meaning helps people determine what they really want and believe, and it also joins them to the persons, things, and events that matter most to them. Fourth, use of the moral point of view safeguards individuals against wallowing in mere self-indulgence heedless of the welfare of others or of the world as a whole. Finally, only by being open to the complex challenges of the world can a person be receptive to the mysterious dimension of life and discern ultimate priorities. I claim that persons guiding themselves by the five-leveled notion of paideia articulated here will again experience the power of philosophy to confer well-being upon themselves and the world.

An international conference that takes Philosophy Educating Humanity as its theme does well to revisit the liberal arts tradition. Although the liberal arts are most often assimilated to studies brought together as the Humanities, the old usage included the arts which employed artificial languages in mathematics, music, and astronomy, as well as the literature and letters of the various natural languages. The current conflation of liberal education with the humanities does violence to the historical tradition in education, reducing it to fluff in the eyes of tough-minded scientists who know that only numbers deliver objectivity. The liberal arts of the traditional undergraduate curriculum provided the skills to liberate the student's linguistic powers so that he or she could read, speak, and understand natural language in all its functions. To educate human persons to master language is to encourage students to take possession of their natural powers so that they can express themselves, understand what others say, and reason together. The arts of natural language lead to mastery of the mathematical arts which use a language that is no one's mother tongue. Together, the seven arts rid students of the worst enemies of humankind: ignorance and prejudice.

The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell's philosophy, though this is not yet generally recognized in the literature on critical thinking. For Russell, the ideal is embedded in the fabric of philosophy, science, liberalism and rationality, and this paper reconstructs Russell's account, which is scattered throughout numerous papers and books. It appears that he has developed a rich conception, involving a complex set of skills, dispositions and attitudes, which together delineate a virtue which has both intellectual and moral aspects. It is a view which is rooted in Russell's epistemological conviction that knowledge is difficult but not impossible to attain, and in his ethical conviction that freedom and independence in inquiry are vital. Russell's account anticipates many of the insights to be found in the recent critical thinking literature, and his views on critical thinking are of enormous importance in understanding the nature of educational aims. Moreover, it is argued that Russell manages to avoid many of the objections which have been raised against recent accounts. With respect to impartiality, thinking for oneself, the importance of feelings and relational skills, the connection with action, and the problem of generalizability, Russell shows a deep understanding of problems and issues which have been at the forefront of recent debate.

In an age of radical pluralism it is increasingly difficult to affirm and sustain the educational aspirations of Greek paideia (Latin humanitas). The most challenging attacks on these aspirations come from standpoints which share a postmodern attitude of opposition towards inherited cultural ideals, especially those which claim universality. This paper first examines optimistic and pessimistic prospects for the educational heritage of humanitas, concluding that, in the face of cultural disparateness which is increasingly evident in post-Enlightenment cultures, the pessimistic case seems to be more convincing. Recognizing that this gives added impetus to postmodernist standpoints, the second section examines some key features of these, taking as its examples arguments of Lyotard, Foucault and Rorty. I show that the prejudices of the postmodernist arguments are as invidious as the discriminatory assumptions and the neglect of the quality of educational practice in the Western cultural inheritance. Recalling some insights which can be gleaned from the educational practices of Socrates, the last section joins these with findings of contemporary philosophers on the pre-judgements and partiality which are inescapable features of human understanding. This is a reclamation and elucidation of a practical and promising humanitas which does justice to the claims of diversity and universality.

The basic conception of Confucius' philosophy is ren, i.e., humanity, while humanity is at the same time the leitmotiv of our epoch. This accounts for why the Confucian idea is close to contemporary readers and why his teaching principles and methods has maintained vitality throughout history. Confucius explained humanity as 'to love the people,' or 'to love the masses extensively.' This led him to provide equal opportunities education and to carry out teaching activities in dialogue with his disciples. The overall development of everyone's potential ability constitutes the most important part of Confucius' notion of humanity. He practiced moral education, intellectual education, physical education and aesthetic education through his 'six artcrafts': 'The wise have no perplexities, the humanists have no worries, the courageous have no fears.' His philosophy originated from his political practice and teaching activity. Based on experience, its principles and methods are pragmatic rather than speculative. Confucius has been honored as a paragon of virtue and learning by Chinese people for thousands of years. The main documents of Confucian philosophy consists in recorded dialogues and discourses with his disciples: The Analects. Thus it may seen that his lectures sent forth an amiable intimacy, and his philosophic discourses were characterized distinctively by an element of feeling.

The term "teaching" is usually used in the Academy without a clear sense of what is meant, resulting in imprecise and ineffective teaching. The standard lines-that teaching is a matter of applying approved methods, that teaching is mostly a matter of teaching skills-as-means to some career or whatever-are reflective of failure in the Academy, measured in its "defect rate" of around 30 percent. The definition of teaching I sketch-skills adopted from a theoretical foundation, in turn based on a critique-is well founded in the scholarly tradition. Such a definition is, however, challenging to an Academy at the end of an ancien régime.

The regulative ideal of being educated is construed through features associated with the conduct and aspirations of faculty in higher education. These features include autonomy of mind and its presuppositions in self-knowledge and ability to inquire. These features as well cover having the identity of an educated person, implying evaluation of the products of the mind in logic and language, motivation to maintain an education, and the deep convictions and attitudes characteristic of the academic, humanist, and scientist. Finally, these features encompass knowing how to apply professional methods in reading and evaluating professional literature, identifying what is potentially educative, seeking a deepening of values through value inquiry, and the application of values in a constructive manner. However, the most promising motivation is commitment to oneself. Other motivators, such as love of learning and curiosity, will be transitory. Commitment can be to prescriptions based on the features associated with the regulative ideal. These prescriptions would in turn comprise a rudimentary ethics for being educated.

We argue that there are three basic views of paideia in ancient Greece. After briefly discussing them, we turn our attention to the contemporary situation. We try to show that the dialogical or Socratic view of paideia can contribute toward a deeper understanding of the contemporary problem of multiculturalism.

The paper discloses changes in Russian education from a prospective which focuses on the culturology of education (Krylova 1994, 1995, 1996), a new trend in theories of education that is being constructed upon the established turf of philosophy of education. The culturology of education includes inquiry concerning both cultural values and pedagogical methodologies. It attempts to explain the whole complex of cultural, sociocultural, and multicultural problems in education with reference to principles drawn from both educational theory, and cultural anthropology and philosophy. I argue that the solution to many educational problems will become possible when the educator or researcher utilizes the culturological approach in effective ways.