In the dialogue, Crito, Socrates justified his decision to accept his death penalty. His decision was praised as principled and just. However, such a view was one of the greatest myths in the history of philosophy. Contrary to the accepted ideas, I wish to show that Socrates’ argument was erroneous, the crucial error being his failure to distinguish between substantial and procedural justice. In fact, the whole of the Crito refers to some deeper problems of the philosophy of law and morality.

A perennial problem in the philosophy of love has centered around what it is to love persons qua persons. Plato has usually been interpreted as believing that when we love we are attaching ourselves to qualities that inhere in the objects of our love and that these qualities transcend the objects. Vlastos has argued, along with Nussbaum, Price and many others that such an account tells against a true love of persons as unique and irreplaceable individuals. I argue that Plato’s account of love as present in the Lysis and Symposium is not so easily rejected. My concern is to show both that Plato can meet the objections and that his theory can still offer helpful insights into the understanding of love in our lives. In particular, I will identify two manners of loving persons; one which is context and individual specific, and another which might be termed metaphysical, thereby preserving aspects of the Platonic ascent of love. I will further argue that the two aspects are often noncontroversially linked, and that such linking helps explain something of the mysterious nature of love.

Antisthenes of Athens was an older student of Socrates who had previously studied under the Sophists. His philosophical legacy also influenced Cynic and early Stoic thought. Consequently, he has left us an interesting theory of paideia (reading, writing, and the arts) followed by an even more brief one in divine paideia, the latter consisting of learning how to grasp the tenets of reason in order to complete virtue. Once properly grasped, the pupil will never lose it since it is embedded in the heart with true belief. However, there is a danger of being confused by human learning, which may delay or obviate completing divine paideia. Nonetheless, with the help of a teacher who gives a personal example, like Socrates or the mythical Centaur Chiron, the pupil has a chance of reaching his or her goal. Through a series of myths, Antisthenes gives us the foundations of his logical and ethical theory together. Reasoning is both a way to grasp virtue and also to fortify it. Although he would have chaffed under a modern university educational system, we may learn from him to value concise philosophical studies as a necessary adjunct to basic lessons in liberal arts.

This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.

‘Paideia’ connotes the handing down and preservation of tradition and culture, even civilization, through education. Plato’s education of philosophers in the Academy is inimical to such an essentially conservative notion. His dialectical method is inherently dynamic and open-ended: not only are such conclusions as are reached in the dialogues subject to further criticism, so are the assumptions on which those conclusions are based. In these and other ways explored in this paper, Plato demonstrates that paideia has no harbor within philosophy.

In ancient Greek theories of health, it was the equal balance or mixing of the humors or elements (i.e., the isonomic mean) that comprised the ideal healthy state. In the Aristotelian Problema XXX.1, however, there is a description of a form of melancholic constitution that is both 1) itself characterized as a mean, and 2) thought to lead to intellectual outstandingness. This is theoretically problematic since the melancholic constitution was by definition a constitution in which there was a natural preponderance of black bile. Thus, there appear to be two incompatible means that are descriptive of the ideal in ancient Greek medicine: the isonomic mean that underlies the ideal healthy state, and the melancholic mean that describes the melancholic who is capable of greatness. This paper attempts to understand the melancholic mean as described in Problema XXX.1 by considering the two different but related models of this mean that are suggested in the text. A reconciliation of the two somatic ideals is argued for on the basis of what else is said in the Problema, as well as ideas found in the Hippocratic work Airs, Waters, Places and other Aristotelian Problemata.

In this paper, I will show the deep roots of dialogue in Plato’s thought, in order to examine the validity of the so-called ‘esoteric Plato’. The confrontation between dialogicity and unwritten doctrines is the main theme of this article. These two views — Hermeneutics and Tübingen School — are not far away on concrete contents, with more or less variations. But it must be noticed that both conceptions of Platonic thinking are contradictory and that is reflected in their explanations of Plato’s own philosophical project.

Who is the Plotinian spoudaios and what is his function in the Enneads? This question turns out to be fundamental, especially when trying to make out an ethical dimension in Plotinus. Treatise I 4 [46] offers, concerning that question, not only the longest sustained discussion of the spoudaios, but also shows how highly problematic it is to figure out more precisely his characteristics. This is due to the terminological ambiguity with the term sophos, which is also the reason why the two terms are often considered synonymous by translators. It appears in I 4 that this ambiguity is closely related to the question of aisthesis. And this is also perhaps the main problematic point concerning the spoudaios: he is instituted by Plotinus as the paradigm of the ‘living man,’ but is still described as someone who has detached himself from the bounds of the sensible world. So this leads to several conclusions concerning the Plotinian conception of ethical implication.

Socrates' great educational innovation was in ascribing moral worth to the intellectual activity reflectively directed at one's own life. His concept of eudaimonia was so different from the ordinary that talking about it took on sometimes a paradoxical air, as in Apology 30b3. For him, reason is not a tool for attaining goals independently thought worthwhile; rather, rationality itself, expressed in the giving of reasons and the avoidance of contradictions, confers value to goals and opinions. Persons are reasonable, but obviously not the empirical human being. But education is aimed at the empirical man or woman and inevitably employs psychological means. How then is it possible that the result of education should grow out of the depths of each individual and be nevertheless valid for all individuals? In the Symposium, Plato gives Aristophanes the crucial move. Each of us is only half the whole person and we are moved by our desire for what we lack. In this context, to claim that the soul is immortal is to claim-at least-that the soul has a non-empirical dimension, that its real objects are not the objects of desire as such, and that a person's sensible life is not the true basis for the evaluation of his or her eudaimonia. However, in the soul which is not free from contradictions there is no advantage to right but unexamined options. There is in the life of the naïve just an insecurity which is not merely pragmatic. Even if a person never falters to the end of life, this is no more than moral luck. One is still guilty on the level of the logos, and liable to blame and punishment not for what one does, but for what one could have done.

The structure of the Euthydemus, together with other more subtle hints, shows that Plato's purpose in the dialogue is to contrast two educational methods: eristic, as represented by the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and dialectic, as represented by Socrates. Plato has made the educational failure of eristic so evident in the dialogue that the question arises why he should have thought it worth attacking at such length. The reply is suggested that it was the sophists' claim to teach virtue that was particularly galling to Plato. He wishes to show further, that the character of their eristic tricks is to deny the possibility of teaching at all, since the either/or basis of their arguments amounts to a denial of becoming. Plato brings these matters to a head less than half-way through the dialogue, at 286E, when he has Socrates ask his 'stupid question' as to what the sophists teach, if they really believe that there is no false speaking, no refutation, and no ignorance. The paper concludes by agreeing with Holger Thesleff that the Euthydemus is 'pedimental' in construction, although disagreeing with him as to where the central peripateia occurs. To place the turning point, as I would do, at 286E, is to show that the theme of the dialogue is paideia.

I show that Aristotle’s ethics is determined by his notion of communities which are in turn determined by hundreds of themes in his Topics-sameness and difference, part and whole, better than, etc. These are tools for all dialectical investigations into being and action (viz. Top. I.11 104b2) for they secure definitions and get at essences of things or their aspects. Reflecting structures of being and good, they allow Aristotle to arrive at objective reality and good. Being tools for all investigations into being and values, we are not free to reject them, nor can we have any discourse or claim to reality or good. I show how permutating the combination of these topics allows for subsequent ‘sub-communities’ which are common to some. I offer an Aristotelian explanation for the origin of these topics and conclude that ethics is determined by communities, which in turn are determined by education.

This paper argues that the assertion of Nicomachean Ethics I.ii that the art that treats of ethics is politics is to be understood properly not in the sense of politics qua nomothetike but just as politike, i.e., direct, participatory politics as was enjoyed in the Athenian polis and as the formed background to Aristotle’s philosophizing on the nature of ethics. The ethical import of politics can be retrieved from Aristotle’s Ethics (in both versions) and Politics by dwelling on the connection of eudaimonia and humanity’s function as such. Aristotle does not construe this function as contemplation but rather as the practical application of reason-reason leading to action. This, however, is the subject of politics. This specific human function, the function that makes us homo sapiens, can not be displayed in rule-be-ruled institutions such as the oikos (household) since such institutions and their collateral behaviors are predetermined based on rank or role. But achieving the distinctively human telos requires that such rule-be-ruled relations and behaviors be transcended since those relations and behaviors exclude the free exercise of deliberative intelligence.

One vigorous line of thought in contemporary moral philosophy, which I shall call ‘Neo-Aristotelianism,’ centers on three things: (1) a rejection of traditional enlightenment moral theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism; (2) a claim that another look at the ethical concerns and projects of ancient Greek thought might help us past the impasse into which enlightenment moral theories have left us; (3) more particularly, an attempt to reinterpret Aristotle’s ethical work for the late twentieth-century so as to transcend this impasse.

This article shows that Aristotle created the first notion of a zero in the history of human thought. Since this notion stood in evident contradiction to the basic principles of his metaphysics and logic, he rejected it.

Whenever we meet an unknown person, our first judgment, even unwillingly and often subconsciously, starts from his or her external appearance. Since character can be properly recognized only from words and deeds observed over some time, at first sight we have to rely on what we immediately can see. This physiognomical first approach to each other is as old as humankind, and, though it has never been able to be proved a proper science, in everyday life we all believe in and use physioculture. The earliest extant written work on the subject is the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Physiognomonica. The author of its first part, in discussing the methodology of the art, refers to Aristotle, who develops the logical foundation of physiognomical inference: as an enthymeme, a syllogism from signs. Yet, concentrating solely on the formal logical analysis, Aristotle does not touch the central point of physiognomics; it C. S. Peirce’s discovery of the triadic relation of the sign that was able to shed new light on this central problem and to see physiognomics as a process of semiosis. Thus, Aristotle founded the formal logical basis, from which modern semiotics developed new approaches to physiognomics, taking them in account in several strands of their research.

I argue that Plato's psychological theories are motivated by concerns he had about moral theory. In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake.

Historical research was one of Jean-Paul Sartre's major concerns. Sartre's biographical studies and thought indicate that history is not only a field in which you gather facts, events, and processes, but it is a worthy challenge which includes a grave personal responsibility: my responsibility to the dead lives that preceded me. Sartre's writings suggest that accepting this responsibility can be a source of wisdom. Few historians, however, view history as transcending the orderly presenting and elucidating of facts, events, and processes. I contend that Sartre's writings suggest a personally enhancing commitment. A lucid and honest response to the challenges and demands of history and the dead lives that preceded my own existence is an engagement that requires courage, wisdom, and thought. The consequences of this commitment for teaching history is discussed.

In Vico’s New Science wisdom is understood in a double sense. On the one hand, wisdom means the poetic wisdom that provides intelligibility for the peoples of the nations during their early stages of development. On the other hand, wisdom means the noetic knowledge gained by the Vichian scientist who contemplates concrete historicity in the light of the New Science. By means of an examination of three principle aspects of Vico’s science, and by looking to his conception of the origin of the most rudimentary institutions of humanity, primordial piety— fear of the mythic other— is shown to be the origin of poetic wisdom. And, by focusing on the necessity of surmounting the conceit of scholars and the conceit of nations for a science of universal history, philosophical piety— openness to the wholly Other— is revealed as the ground of philosophical wisdom. This paper sets out to show how Vico’s science of the principles of humanity is, at the same time, a science of the unity of piety and wisdom.

In his essay "The Politics of Interpretation: Spinoza's Modernist Turn," Berel Lang attributes to Spinoza the view that interpretation presupposes or implies a political framework-in effect, that interpretation is itself a politics. The thrust of Spinoza's argument is against "interpretation from authority," i.e., against the view that the meaning of a text can be determined by an external authority. Understanding cannot be coerced, according to Spinoza. In my paper I attempt to make the relationship between reader and text even more direct and "free" than it is in Spinoza. I argue that any approach (such as Derrida's) which posits an interpretation between reader and text places constraints on the notion of a democracy of free readers. I argue that in a truly literate democracy readers have the right to claim that they have understood or grasped their texts without having any kind of intermediary placed between themselves and their texts, regardless of whether this intermediary takes the form of an external authority (in Spinoza's sense) or an interpretation (in Derrida's sense). In the course of the paper I draw upon Michael Dummett's philosophy of language in order to critique the "humpty-dymptyism" of the interpretationist school. I place myself firmly on the side of Alice in Through the Looking Glass, and spend some time discussing the significance of the difficulties which she experiences with the nonsense poem, "Jabberwocky."

Two fundamental criticisms made by traditional hermeneutics against philosophical hermeneutics are that the latter deny the possibility of objectively true interpretation, as well as assert that all interpretations are possible on the basis that they cannot be measured. In my paper, I argue that the first criticism is well-founded, while the second is not. I contend that interpretations can be decided according to two relational criteria: (i) which interpretation has a more comprehensive horizon; and (ii) which one is derivable from the other.