One of the most difficult philosophical works ever written is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In the "Introduction" to this work, Hegel attempts to aid his readers by describing the project that he carries out. But like so many things written by Hegel, the "Introduction" itself is formidable and very difficult to understand. In this paper, I attempt to "make sense" of the "Introduction" and, thus, contribute to the understanding of the Phenomenology. To achieve this end, I take the great liberty of comparing philosophers with blind men and Reality with an elephant. I take a series of claims made by Hegel in the "Introduction" and show how they make sense of his project once they are seen in the context of John Godfred Saxe’s poem, "The Blind Men and the Elephant." In doing so, I explain the similarity of problems presented in the poem and the Phenomenology. Further, I show how the nature of both problems places the same kind of restrictions on anyone trying to overcome either. While Saxe’s poem urges an acceptance of the fact that total truth is always beyond your grasp, Hegel’s goal is to achieve such a truth. What you will see is that all the characteristics that would have stopped most philosophers and Saxe, become the means by which Hegel thinks he can ultimately achieve knowledge of the Elephant.

This paper examines the nature of freedom in Hang-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It focuses on the last section of Wahrheit und Methode advancing the hypothesis that Gadamer’s model of understanding is derived from his particular appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful which poses a passive interpretative posture toward the object of understanding and deprives the activity of interpretation the essential creative quality of freedom. I argue that to the extent that the object of understanding presents itself as immediate revelation of truth, the interpreting subject is reduced to a mere acknowledger of truth as opposed to a creative producer.

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: (i) that it conflates meaning and significance; and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.

According to Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation there are no facts of matter which could determine the choice between two or more incompatible translation schemes which are in accordance with all behavioral evidence. Donald Davidson agrees with Quine that an important degree of indeterminacy will remain after all the behavioral evidence is in, but he believes that this indeterminacy of meaning (IM) should not be seen as either mysterious or threatening. In this paper I argue that IM is not as innocuous as Davidson believes it to be and has consequences which do not sit easily with some core elements of the Davidsonian project. I argue that IM leads to the nontrivial thesis of the indeterminacy of language ascription which is not captured by the mundane examples of indeterminacy of measurement that Davidson frequently cites. Davidson makes a liberal use of the principle of charity in order to lessen the effect of IM. In recent years he has broadened the scope of the principle of charity by arguing that a radical interpreter, at least in some basic cases, should identify the object of a belief with the cause of that belief. Davidson agrees with Quine and Putnam that the concept of causality is applied to the world according to human interests. For Quine and Putnam, however, the interest-relativity of causal relations has relativistic consequences. Given Davidson. s long-standing opposition to all types of relativism this conclusion should not be welcome to him. Relativism may be avoided by imposing a great deal of social and biological homogeneity on all language-users which is an equally unwelcome view.

The article presents a proposal to use the notion of information and a model of its transmission for analysis of the structure and basic functions of a sign. This is to point to the relation between information and the basic function of a sign, that is, a 'representation.' A sign is understood, in accordance with Peirce's theory, as a triadic relation of representation. One of the consequences of this theory is limitation of representation to the area of internal objects of a sign, that is, to ideal intentional objects. The relationship between a sign and the external world remains unexplained, which allows one to perceive a sign as a barrier in comprehension of the external world. A more complete justification is also required for both the relationship between object and meaning of the sign and the very arising of representation as a unity of three elements. The article analyzes the triadic relation of representation on the basis of the notion of information close to the one proposed by C.F. von Weizsacker. It is shown that representation can be understood as a specific, complex information flow. Processes of information flow determine the structure of representation as well as the relationships between the world of signs and the world beyond signs. Such approach allows one to give a more complete justification to the ability of sign systems to represent the external world.

Raymond Bradley has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the model dimension that is implicit therein. Among other theses, Bradley maintains that tractarian names can be interpreted as Kripkean rigid designators; this idea enables him to approach the Tractus from the perspective of possible worlds semantics. I reassess Bradley's thesis by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, and consider whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible. I also discuss similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning.

In what follows, I give (following Burton Dreben) a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgenstein's objections to Russell in 1913. I argue that Wittgenstein must be read as advocating no particular theory or doctrine — that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this insistence is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be applied to one's own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there any definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speaking? Such a question undercuts the easy assumption that what we are doing may be expressed in a body of meaningful statements. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein does not advocate any particular theory of language. A common reading of Wittgenstein is that he aims to prevent us from misusing language. This view assumes that, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a correct, acceptable or meaningful use of language may be taken for granted. In my view, Wittgenstein does not take the notions of use of language and grammar and its misuse for granted. For Wittgenstein grammar underdetermines what it is to use or misuse language. I argue that an ethical critique is implicit in Wittgenstein's objections to any attempt to speak a priori about language and thought.

The central topic of this paper is the analysis of the dialectical interdependency of internal and external in the theory of language as a symbolic system. Referring to and analyzing the philosophic legacy of W. von Humboldt, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, F. de Saussure and G. Spet, the author concludes that the dialectics of internal and external is not an accidental and episodic phenomenon of language. It rather is an intrinsic, ontological trait apart from which an adequate cognition of the essence of language is impossible. Taking the internal form as a logical structure, it is possible to view it as something "higher and fundamental" in language, something that is attainable more by intuition than by research. The internal intellectual base of this grammatical stability lies in the sphere of purely logical forms. If internal word formulations are related to and governed by the spirit, then the external forms in fact conceal an inner grammatical and syntactic edifice. The laws of external speech functioning are manifested, for example, in bilingualism, which may be viewed either as a social phenomenon related to individual thinking and classificatory abilities or as an evidence of the existence of common verbal structures in human consciousness. The author proposes to transfer such linguistic terms as "bilingualism" and "contamination" into a different context as a way of seeking new topical domains within the linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of language. The empiricism of specific language functioning in the form of bilingual language contamination brings us back to the assumption of the existence of uniform internal metalanguage structures of verbal thinking.

A popular explanation of the success of theories of science is that of scientific realism. It maintains, besides that the theories of a mature science are typically approximately true, that observational terms and theoretical terms refer to or denote entities. Therefore it is part of the realistic claim that "reference" explains "success." But if the realist is not able to clarify "reference" and a fortiori the reference on theoretical objects, the realist comes to a vicious circle, for there is no further criterion as the success of the theory to show that the term is referential. So it is necessary to clarify the notion "reference." Needless to say, "reference" is a relational term; but it easily becomes a problem that we are not only habituated to imagine the elation but we are convinced that a relation is just a relation between entities in a strict (viz., Quinian) sense. There are different kinds of references. For example, one is usually called "intentionality." If we, considering the traditional separation between reference and meaning, analyze meaning, we will find at least one referential component (intentional object). Such a referential process is not a meaningless aspect of linguistic reference, but now and then is the subject of the kind of relation called "denotation." The notion of meaning and the concept of reference are nonsubstantial constructions of interpretation. Nevertheless, I argue for a reference-theoretical approach.

I show that the latter Wittgenstein's treatment of language and the mind results in a conception of the human subject that goes against the exclusive emphasis on the cognitive that characterizes our modern conception of knowledge and the self. For Wittgenstein, our identification with the cognitive ego is tantamount to a blindness to our own nature — blindness that is entrenched in our present culture. The task of philosophy is thus transformed into a form of cultural therapy that seeks to awaken in us a sensitivity to different modes of awareness than the merely intellectual. Its substance of reflection becomes not only the field of conscious rational thought, but the tension in our nature between reason and vital feeling, that is, between culture and life.

Theoreticians of names are currently split into two camps: Fregean and Millian. Fregean theorists hold that names have referent-determining senses that account for such facts as the change of content with the substitution of co-referential names and the meaningfulness of names without bearers. Their enduring problem has been to state these senses. Millian theorists deny that names have senses and take courage from Kripke's arguments that names are rigid designators. If names had senses, it seems that their referents should vary among possible worlds. However, the Millians have the enduring problem of explaining the apparent cognitive content of names. I argue that Mill's original theory, when purged of confusion, provides word-reflexive senses for names. Frege failed to notice senses of this particular sort. Moreover, it is these senses that account for names' rigid designation. When the views of Mill and Frege are understood as complementary, the problems that have faced the divided theorists of names vanish.

I try to clarify the ways in which one would seek to hold that language and/or thought are public. For each of these theses, I distinguish four forms in which they can be framed, and two ways of establishing them. The first will try to make the publicity of thought follow from that of language; the second will try to make the publicity of language follow from that of thought. I show that none of these strategies can do without the thesis that language and thought are interdependent, and that even while admitting this thesis, the second strategy presents more difficulties than the first.

Indeterminacy theories, such as Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy principle on rules and language and Quine's indeterminacy of radical translation, raise some fundamental questions on our knowledge and understanding. In this paper we try to outline and interpret Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy, and then compare it to some other related theories on indeterminacy of human thinking, such as raised by Hume, Quine, and Goodman.

Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the place of constitutive rules in practices.

The linguistic theory of Chomsky has changed the long, traditional way of studying language. The nature of knowledge, which is closely tied to human knowledge in general, makes it a logical step for Chomsky to generalize his theory to the study of the relation between language and the world-in particular, the study of truth and reference. But his theory has been controversial and his proposal of "innate ideas" has been resisted by some empiricists who characterize him as rationalist. In our view, these empiricists make a mistake. In the present paper we attend to his position regarding linguistics as a science of mind/brain, which we believe is an important aspect of his theory that has not been paid enough attention or understood by his opponents. In turn, this will help to clarify some of the confusions around his theory. Finally we will discuss some of the debatable issues based on the outlines we draw.

John Gibbons tries to show that the notion of similarities and differences between different cases of events reveals the relevance of relational properties, which are of causal relevance. Based on such considerations, Gibbons' main claim is that the truth value somebody assigns to his or her beliefs has causal power. This means that the deflationary theory of truth becomes false. The questions therefore are: (1) What are the similarities and differences between different cases? (2) What kind of properties are relational properties? (3) What is the causal relevance of such relational properties, and why should the truth value be of causal relevance? (4) Why can Gibbons not show that the truth value has the relevant causal power?

The concept of deconstruction was firstr used by Derrida in transforming Heideggerian "destruction." The deconstruction of Derrida is a textintern, intertextual, in-textual activity. He plays a double game inside of philosophy, emphasizing that our thinking is embedded in metaphysics, while at the same moment he questions metaphysics. Wittgenstein's deconstruction, however, involves a new kind of reading, a Zerzettelung of the traditionally argumentative and linear thinking modes. The game plays an important role in both philosophers' texts. I would like to investigate this role and function under the two following viewpoints. First, I think that the game has a strategic role. Second, both philosophers stress that their game is not a founded game but is bounded to knowledge and forms of knowledge.

Anti-realists about the past claim that no one has yet manifested a knowledge of the truth of tensed instances of the realist schema '‡ (s is true · there is no evidence for s),' instances such as '‡ ('Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is true · there is no evidence for 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'). It is true that we cannot decide specific instances of the realist schema and that, consequently, neither our understanding of these instances, nor our knowledge of their truth may be constituted by the recognitional and executive capacities which, according to Michael Dummett's antirealism, constitute grasp of meaning. Although we cannot decide these issues, we can meet Dummett's anti-realist's manifestability challenge by arguing for them from contingency. While no recognitional and decisional skills may constitute our knowledge that their truth-conditions are satisfied, we can, without begging the question, derive that knowledge from our folk and scientific theories of the workings of nature. The evidence we have in favor of the fact that evidential relations between us and past facts are naturally contingent allows us to infer tensed instances of the fundamental realist modal claim. The joint possibility of truth and undecideability pro tempora is a natural possibility and, thereby, a logical and metaphysical possibility.

Do the special features of 'I' have epistemological and metaphysical implications? Many philosophers have thought so. Here I investigate the relation between the first person singular pronoun 'I' and the first person perspective, construed as the perspective of consciousness. First, I discuss the semantics of 'I' as a lexeme of a natural language. The fact that semantic reference and speaker reference always coincide in the case of 'I' is shown to have important consequences: it explains the 'referential guarantees' and the impossibility of 'misidentification' which have seemed so mysterious. Secondly, it is shown that these special features accrue only to actual uses. Consequently, the relation between 'I' and the first person perspective must be explicated within the context of linguistic action. It is then argued that the functioning of 'I' is not to be equated with that of a name, a description or an identifying singular term. Instead, I propose that a use of 'I' indexes a linguistic act with respect to the responsible agent. Thus construed, the use of 'I' in an utterance does more than express the first person perspective, since the first person perspective can be expressed by unmarked, impersonal or zero-pronominalization linguistic forms. I conclude by illustrating this claim with examples from the Wiener Kreis.

A crucial phase in the child's development comes with its acquisition of language, but before we can engage in any pedagogical efforts to further infant development or to aid atypical cases, we need to understand methodologically what occurs during language learning. Jerome Bruner, in a methodological adaptation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's middle and later work in an extension of Noam Chomsky's LAD, has put forth one influential proposal (Bruner 1983). Ludwig Wittgenstein's own remarks on the topic also furnish an interesting story independent of Bruner's selective use of his corpus, especially insofar as his approach results in an irreducible riddle and a hypothesis by his own account (Wittgenstein 1953 and 1958). The two views are explored, contrasted and critiqued. In the end, neither will do to resolve problems in our methodological understanding of language acquisition, for which the most important reasons are given.