One of the common targets that contemporary feminists are critical of concerning the problem of the body is Rene Descartes' mind and body relation. Feminist scholars can identify at least three lines of investigation of the body in contemporary thought that may be regarded as legacies of the Cartesian view, which treat the body as primarily an object for: 1) the natural sciences, particularly for the life sciences, biology, and medicine; 2) as an instrument or a machine at the disposal of consciousness or allocating an animating, willful subjectivity; and 3) as a vehicle of expression of private thoughts and feelings; that is, as fundamentally passive and transparent. Recently, feminist scholars are seriously thinking of a new conceptual model that can displace Cartesian dualism and that can emancipate notions of the body from Cartesian dominant mechanistic models and metaphors. In this light, this paper turns to a Confucian theory of the body for revelation and the case of Mencius is introduced, in which the mind is regarded as the major component of the body and a coherent model is adopted. Can we then conclude to ask in what ways the reclaiming of the body in the Contemporary Western discussion may learn from the Confucian ideas of the body...?

In this paper I examine the relevance of Maurice Merleau- Ponty's criticism of what he labels "objective thinking", in the light of contemporary political discussions. I compare his critique of the mutually exclusive categories of objective thinking, with Edward W. Said's analysis of Orientalism and its dichotomies between Orient and Occident as constitutive of highly material relationships of power. Especially after the 9.11 events, reasoning in terms of dichotomies between East and West, islam and civilization/freedom and so on has been prevalent in the discourse of politicians, journalists as well as intellectuals. Is there something that Merleau- Ponty's philosophy can teach us here? I claim that his view of the interdependency of language on the one hand, understanding and thinking on the other, is of highest importance here, since it shows that we have to undermine the established discourse from the inside, working out the complex differences of reality at the same time as forgin out new less rigid categories.

Perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein offers, is not another methodology, but it consists in seeing the connections. The Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation is therapeutic. The method he suggests for philosophy is the same method he suggests for social sciences. In both of these cases, he tries to get us to see the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing and theorizing. In both of these disciplines he warns us not to advance explanatory, metaphysical theories. In this paper, I connect Wittgenstein's this concern with his critique of Frazer. In criticizing Frazer Wittgenstein adopts the important part of Spengler's view. Nonetheless, there are differences between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Spengler; this paper aims to show similarities as well as these differences. The first part of the paper briefly summarizes Frazer's views. The second part focusses on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding science. The third part gives an account of his critique concerning method of social sciences and philosophy. The last part concentrates on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding the tolerance towards alternative forms of life.

In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the 17th century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science.

In this paper, I will try to show Bergson's resolution of the paradox of the human condition: the tension existing between 'living in the world' and 'perceiving the world'. His resolution centers around his concept "displacement of attention." According to him, when the direction of reasoning changes from 'intellect to intuition' to 'intuition to intellect', one will be able to experience the seemingly distinct two realms as a "succession without distinction". This experience is possible only by means of intuition in duration. In order to explain this kind of experience, Bergson uses the analogy of an artist creating a work of art. The artist and the philosopher both share the act of perceiving for the sake of perceiving; they both create in duration and as such they are able to perceive the moving world of phenomena without stopping it and breaking it into pieces. It is only through carrying this experience that we live in art or when we listen to a melody or again when we experience our self from within into the realm of philosophy that one is able to do true philosophy.

The value and importance accorded to personal autonomy within liberalism would seem to suggest that cultural practices that severely constrain the choices of individuals through heavyhanded role socialization and restriction ought to be strongly discouraged in liberal societies. In this paper, I explore this claim in connection with the custom of arranged marriage, which has recently come under fire in some liberal democratic states, notably Britain. My aim is to try to complicate the liberal understanding of the relationship between cultural traditions and personal autonomy. In the course of this discussion, I analyze and offer some criticisms of autonomy as a substantive ideal and requirement for flourishing. In revisiting and evaluating arguments in favor of a thick or substantive ideal of autonomy criticisms, I hope to show that a substantive ideal of autonomy as independence is culturally bounded in ways that are often overlooked by liberal philosophers.

In this paper, I would like to explore Nietzsche's philosophy of value, its influence on contemporary thought and culture and what it means for us today, that is, what we can appropriate from it in order to shed light on some of the problems of our age and to overcome them. These problems are in the areas of conflict, globalization and chronic injustices. I will approach the question of value in three parts: 1) Nietzsche's explicit writings on value starting with the second half of his works (The Gay Science and after). Here I will explore his value-related thoughts such as transvaluation, value-positing as legislation or law-giving, language and value, the locus of value-creation and the unconscious -psychic and somatic, for instance- aspects of valuation. What search and research has been done in these areas in the 2 0 t n century will also be surveyed here. 2) The value of individuality and 'unity' or belonging in Nietzsche's thought, that is, the individual and his or her 'environment.' In this part, I will reexamine his notion of individuality within the context of culture. 3) What Nietzsche sees as value in culture or "interpretation of existence". In this part, I will examine "forces of culture" such as ecstasy, creativity, language, body, soul, wisdom, knowledge, character-formation and education and how these different values form a meaningful constellation. In conclusion, I will try to bring these three parts together as I, at the same time, discuss philosophers who have been influenced by Nietzsche's ideas.

Philosophy should not be understood as a Eurocentric project of Greco-Judaic origin, but as a critical and fundamentally reflective intellectual practice which occurs worldwide, in many different forms. If this is so, anthropology has a crucial role to play in the project of reshaping philosophy's self-conception, to include the multiplicity of regional intellectual histories that have been neglected, and thus acknowledge and take seriously philosophical reflections from around the world. Through empirical observation, documentation, and comparative analysis, an anthropology of philosophy can help philosophy reach a better self-understanding, particularly in times of rising awareness of globally operating interdependencies and suspicions that philosophy is a smoke-screen for Eurocentric power interests. Anthropological investigation, if performed carefully and in combination with philosophical expertise, can provide concrete details, accounts and assessments of philosophical practice around the world, different from those that a sociology of philosophies (Collins 1998) or a history of philosophy can offer. It can integrate understanding of local languages and sensitivity for relevant social contexts, and need not be philosophically naive. Philosophy is linked to knowledge, the quest for knowledge, the critique of knowledge, and to the various perspectives from which forms of knowledge can be described and conceptualised. An anthropology of philosophy can be developed in relation to an anthropology of knowledge (Lambek 1993), where various locally relevant forms of knowledge are identified, observed, described and discussed, in relation to social practice. Making the case for an anthropology of philosophy, my paper refers to arguments of African philosophers, and the debate on African philosophy, while also drawing from my own fieldwork experience on philosophical discourse in a Swahili context.

Globalisation seems to be especially the Westernisation of the World. One of the crucial elements of (Western) European cultural identity is the reference to its scientific and philosophical inheritance. European culture is held to be rooted in ancient Greece, where a unique, historically inevitable and irreversible transition from myth to reason is thought to have taken place. I shall try to re-examine this still predominant view to clarify the elements of Western thought by comparing it with its historical predecessors in ancient Greek mythology in order to discuss its Euro-centric elements. For this purpose, two questions have to be asked: What is so special about ancient Greek philosophy? And how and why did it come into being? The arguments given to solve the first question are hardly convincing. If we might not be able to give a satisfying answer, the search for the reasons to come up with something like Western philosophy are becoming more important.

Among the fragments published in Zettel, one finds one of Wittgenstein's most enigmatic comments. In entry 455, he states that "the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher". The apparent incongruity between this entry and the thrust of Wittgenstein's later works initially draws one's attention, but the passage sustains interest because it is situated at the nexus of issues addressed in current philosophical debate regarding cultural pluralism. This paper attempts to make sense of the Zettel fragment in the contexts of both Wittgenstein's own analysis and such debate. It argues that the post-Enlightenment philosopher's role entails a cosmopolitan point of view with promotes both the recognition of citizens' embeddedness in a cultural tradition and the need for a critical distancing from that tradition, occasioned by an awareness of cultural pluralism.

In this paper I outline some ways in which philosophy can contribute to the study of culture and pluralism, and how such a study may lead to a better understanding of philosophical enquiry. Building on earlier work (Sweet, 2002), I focus on four areas in which these contributions might be made. The first concerns the methodological, ideological, and historical presuppositions of culture and multiculturalism. The second area considers how philosophical discourse affects a culture's "self-understanding". The third area focuses on how (and how far) philosophy may enable a culture to allow diversity and pluralism within the larger community. The fourth area deals with philosophy's dialectical relation with culture -how far philosophy is a product of culture, and whether that affects philosophy's participation in culture. An exploration of these areas will show both what role philosophy has to play in the analysis of culture, and why it is important for philosophers -especially in the English-speaking world- to engage in the "philosophy of culture".

I argue here that, due to the influence of Greek philosophical ideas (such as the depreciation of time and change, and the glorification of independence and unqualified omnipotence), Christianity and Islam developed in directions foreign to the religious vision of their founders, leading ultimately to the present antagonisms between them. A 'philosophy of organism' - which sees time as cumulative, relations rather than substance as basic - can, however, help to reinterpret the insights of Jesus and Mohammed, and show that humanity's primary responsibility is to care for the creatures which the Eternal One has called into being.

The logical problem of evil centers on the apparent inconsistency of the following two propositions: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, and (2) There is evil in the world. This is the problem that Alvin Plantinga takes to task in his celebrated response to the problem of evil. Plantinga denies that (1) and (2) are inconsistent, arguing that J.L. Mackie's principle - that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do - is false. We challenge Plantinga, and defend Mackie's view.

William James and John Dewey hold the view that all knowledge and experience are experimental. Within this common pragmatic context, James's theism and Dewey's atheism offer contrasting - indeed, contradictory - interpretations of the object of religious experience. This essay explores the intertwining of their common pragmatic context and differing objects of religious belief to show the way in which this intertwining gives rise to a unique position which can appeal to theists and atheists alike.

Since the Enlightenment, a common assumption in much of Western philosophy has been that religious belief would decline. Yet this has not occurred. Religion's tenacity can be partly explained by considering it as a story. The fact that stories play a central role in human experience may help to explain why religion continues to appeal to so many in a supposedly technologically-advanced, secular age.

While many have claimed that there is a conflict between science and religion, it is not often noted that they share a number of assumptions. Here, I work toward identifying and clarifying some of these shared assumptions. I focus on some of the common commitments to metaphysical, epistemological and moral priorities which are necessary for human life in a democratic society. While this will not eliminate all conflict between science and religion, it will remind the disputants of their common goals and even common enemies.

Philosophers of religion debate what is meant by the word 'God,' in the conclusion of proofs of God's existence. If'God' is a proper name, there seems to be no good proof that a non-empirical entity has this name. If it is a common name, it seems that it must mean what classical theists mean by 'God' - and the existence of such a being is hard to prove. I defend a third possibility: that 'God' names a common name that is the least prescriptive possible, while being sufficient to signify one kind of thing different from all others.

In this paper, I argue that, while Kierkegaard distinguishes between an event 'contrary to the order of nature' and an event 'above the order of nature,' and while he recognises a strong order of nature and a strong bond of natural laws, the idea of miracle (i.e., expressed explicitly in terms of violation of laws of nature or of the order of nature) is not important to him. The unavoidable doubtfulness of all historical knowledge and the 'non-immediate' character of personal experience are the most important reasons for what is, at best, a tangential interest in miracles.