From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything, but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because ofphenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism etc. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. This make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy, it shall not be called as philosophy. Philosophy’starget object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.

Husserl’s phenomenology opens itself with a critique of positive sciences. Husserl problematizes the hardcore presupposition of positivism that the world is a definite sort of an existential totality of objects and thus it is exhaustible with empirical data and deductive-conceptual abstraction on the basis of causalspatio-temoprality. Criticizing the wholesome reduction of nature into a physical reality and the instrumentalizing of theoretical reason, he proposes transcendental phenomenology, as an ideal form of science. Self-entitled as the genuine science, the science of origin, the science of all sciences, etc., it concerns itself with the matter of validity. Claiming that validating objectivity as such and the meaning of scientific objectification is something of which onlyphenomenological reflection on pure consciousness is capable and that the positivistic objectivity is and must be founded on transcendental subjectivity, Husserl radically idealistically revised the whole positivistic concept of evidence and givenness of a fact and substituted it with the phenomenological notion of apriori self-evidence and originary givenness of primordial intentional consciousness. Nevertheless, it is noticed that the absolute universal validity of positivistic objectivity was never rejected or questioned; objectivity is still in and of itself an absolute criterion of scientificity in Husserl. This paper will argue that the idealistic turn toward subjectivity takes place through factualization of transcendentality and this, by bestowing apriori apodicticity with facticity, even enhances more the supreme epistemological function of positivity. It will discuss such positivistic drive, directly bequeathed from the very cultural ethos at which phenomenological criticism targeted, as an important locomotive for Husserl’s program and point out an antinomical consequence with which it is to be faced as a consequence.

In this paper I am discussing the concept of “objective world”, its hope and aim as vigorously presented in Husserl’s famous discourse of the Fifth Meditation. In this manner, the first part of my work focuses on Husserl’s intentionality as knowledge of the “I” or “my ego” as my primordial identity, in relation to “my culturalcommunity” as its primordial one, too. The thesis will then develop into “intersubjectivity” in which “the other” and his “cultural community” as primordially constituted are objective to be fully understood in terms of synthetic knowledge; namely through psychological, cultural, historical and social forms and contents. The second part of my paper takes off from where transcendental phenomenology is grounded to look into the problem of Globalization and questions of value. If the first part followed Husserlian theoretical investigations, sometimes called interpretive philosophy to hopefully acquire universal principles, the second onecan be called practical doctrine, which studies cases presented by a number of specialists who focus on praxis and consequences of Globalization – a theme for economic concerns, but inherently it affects the stability of the community of mankind. This new world order overtly and covertly critiques traditional concepts of nation and culture as it redefines democratic concept, coming home to human rights. Its challenge has been already about the doubts and contradictoriness of “values” in broadest and “reduction” sense. OBJECTIVITY as a noun, and OBJECTIVE, an adjective and noun are terminologies of extremely complicated shades of meaning in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, particularly in the fifth one where such terms are used interchangeably to fit the concept of intersubjective Nature; which I will explore and further put it in current economic and political drive to Globalization. In this regard my theme will deal simultaneously with both the critique of Husserlian thought and neo-liberalism (liberal democracy), a twist of democracy for preserving capitalism in what is called a new world order by ordinance and defense of Imperialism as well as the states that so desire to join the world market.

The thought of Edith Stein on woman brings out the fuller sense of the metaphysical notion of the being of woman. Stein’s position is that woman’s nature as biological mother affects her whole being. Woman has two essential characteristics: attraction to the personal and attraction to wholeness. It is woman’s emotions that account for these distinctly feminine traits. Woman is distinguished by her empathetic perception of persons, an intuitive grasp of a person’s being and value as “person”. Stein describes empathy as a clear awareness of another person, not simply of the content of his experience, but of his experience of that content. In empathy, one takes the place of the other without becoming strictly identical to him. One does not just understand the experiences of the other, but takes them on as one’s own. Stein reinterprets traditional readings of woman, challenging claims to the woman as the “weaker sex” and to the emotions as inferior to reason.

Edmund Husserl believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systematically applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called “bracketing” of the objects outside of our consciousness. Husserl elaborated his idea through the conception of reductions, which he divided into eidetic,transcendental and phenomenological ones. The conception has recently been carefully analyzed by Dagfinn Føllesdal, an outstanding analytical thinker. But he had do admit that Husserl was not consistent in applying his method. Definitely, the core of Husserl’s phenomenology can be studied using the analytic method. However, this does not mean that we can speak about applying a method in the case of Husserl himself. We get somewhat closer to a clearly defined method when we apply the priority argument of Merleau-Ponty for making the method of a phenomenological thinker intelligible. This helps us to clarify that what is being bracketed in phenomenology is the idea of the world embraced by traditional philosophical theory. What we are left with after the reduction is a reformedunderstanding.

Plato’s Charmides has generally been regarded as an aporetic dialogue, which attempts to define temperance (swfrosu/nh) and ends in aporia, without any positive answer. My paper aims to understand the dialogue as suggesting positive answers to the questions about the nature of temperance. I am focusing on thefollowing: at the outset of the dialogue Socrates is supposed to cure Charmides’ headache; the cure is not only a matter of bodily care, but also a matter of care for one’s soul. Quoting a Thracian doctor, he maintains the soul needs to be treated by using certain charms, which are beautiful words (tou\j lo/gouj ... tou\j kalou/j), and that from such beautiful words temperance comes into being in souls; once temperance has come into being and is present in the souls, then it is easy to bring about health both for the head and for the rest of the body (157a3-b1). This was the initial point from which the interlocutors begin to investigate whether temperance is present in Charmides, and what temperance is. Even by the end of the dialogue, however, Charmides has not been proved to have temperance; he is still in need of charms. Apparently Socrates has not given any charm he promised to Charmides. In a sense, only the argument/discussionitself can be considered as a sort of incantation, insofar as it will cure the soul of Charmides. But I suggest there is actually a hint in the dialogue: the Delphic inscription –“Know thyself!”- can be taken as beautiful words which are worth reciting with a full understanding of its implications, though it is not presented by Socrates but by Critias. This will explain the unity of the Charmides.

Already in antiquity the Aristotelian Philosophy was under attack by its philosophical opponents. The Stoics can surely be counted to the most important ones. Furthermore they can be regarded as one of the most influential philosophy schools of the Hellenistic time and in the early Roman Empire and their influenceeven on modern thinkers must not be neglected. It is well known that the Stoics not only advocated a physical monism but can also be described as determinists or, from a modern point of view, even as compatibilists because they were the first who tried to harmonize moral responsibility with the thesis of a causal determinism. Therefore, the stoic concept of causality is of vast importance. In one of Seneca’s books a discussion of the Aristotelian theory of causality has come down to us. Although it is a quite short passage it proves itself to be very illuminating. This paper wants to shed light on the differences between the Aristotelian and the Stoic theory of causality and therefore help to clarify the historical background of the modern concept of causality which is of intense importance for the actual discussion about free will and determinism.

Thinking about abnormalization, the author views abnormalizing as one of the means of entering the space where everything is born, and evaluates the place of this means in modern society. Over the course of human history, society established norms and taboos of all kinds, and the system of norms and taboosdetermined the society itself. This is especially important in modern society, the society where, besides self-reproduction, development is also one of the main objectives, which presupposes constant creation of new norms. How are norms created? What are the requirements for this? What kind of people can create new norms? What are the threats of this process? The author answers these questions and many others in the outlines of thought. While dwelling upon abnormalization, the author involuntarily touched the borders, the limits of the human world, took a look beyond the horizon of something totally different.

Socrates is philosophy’s greatest hero, and a model for the philosophic life. Yet, why did Socrates live the way he did? How did Socrates become Socrates? How can a contemporary philosopher aspire to be like Socrates, even in ways and contexts in which there is no record of a Socratic example? This short paper explores the implications of Socrates’ encounter with Callicles in the Gorgias on the aspiring philosophic life. In this dialogue, we find Socrates’ own testimony as to why he lives the way he does, how he comes to die the way he does, and also discover how it is that we can presently pursue the philosophic life by his recipe.

Comment, Socrate, personnage historique et citoyen notoire de l’Athènes, est-il devenu une fiction littéraire dans les dialogues de Platon? Serait-il une réaction, assez étrange, au refus de socrate d’écrire? Quoi qu’il en soit, peu après la mort de Socrate, fait son apparition un nouveau genre nommé Socratikoi logoi. Outre Platon d’autres écrivains ont donné de telles compositions en dialogue: Eschine de Sphattos, Antistene, Aristipe, Bryson, Cebes, Criton, Euclide de Megara, Phaidon. Est-ce que les dialogues de jeunesse de Platon sont autre chose que les plus réussies Socratikoi logoi. La thématique de ces dialogue en manière socratique est la démonstration savoureuse que l’interlocuteur de Socrate, malgré le fait qu’il semble savoir beaucoup de choses, il ne sait, en fin de compte, rien. Presque tous les jeunes de l’entourage de Socrate avaient emprunté cette technique de Socrate et dialoguaient avec les citoyen d’Athènes, faisant de Socrate un nom notoire, tout en l’exposant aussi à la haine de ceux qu’il avait directement humilié et que ses disciples avaient humilié. Cette technique de montret au savant qu’il ne sait rien; a enchanté les disciples qui ont inventé ultérieurement Socratikoi logoi. Souvent, Platon lui-même, en choisissant des enjeux impossibles dans ses dialogues de jeunesse (la définition d’une vertu) crée des Socratikoi logoi.

What is philosophy ,what is the natrue and the task of philosophy and what is the function of philosophy? These basic knowledge of philosophy is the topic which is always argued and confered by the field of philosophy. After researching Metaphysics, the author think that Aristotle had already answered these questions. Philosophy is a knowledge which regards bing and its interdependence as obiect, regards the reason and nature as its target ,and why practice as its purpose. The nature of philosophy is wisdom. The task of philosophy is that the knowlege which is about four reasons and three primal thing and principle is aquired.Philosophy has three functions: First, philosophy provide basic frame and demonstration method for knowledge and science. Second, philosophy put the common sense thinking into logic thinking. Third, philosophy provide choices for people practice.

In order to discover the justice and argue that it is a goodness, Socrates draws an analogy between the justice of a polis and the justice of an individual in the book II of the Republic. According to him, a polis is a large version of an individual. In Book IV, Socrates proves their congruity from two perspectives --- the polis and the soul are the same “tripartite”: Both of them have the same four virtues. He thus explains why the vulgar justice is good, and makes a preliminary definition of the nature of justice as well. In his view, the justice is doing one’s own; therefore like temperance, it runs through all the notes of the scale and brings both the polis and the soul harmony and symphony. Seen in the context of the Republic as a whole, this argument of Socrates’ is obviously not convincing. Readers are reasonable in raising the following questions: First, are a polis and an individual of the same composition? Second, are virtues of the state necessarily virtues of the soul? In other words, must a good man be a good citizen? This paper is to deal with Socrates’ argument from these two aspects. In fact, a polis cannot achieve the same harmony and symphony as an individual, nor can political virtues come to the same level as philosophical ones. Hence, a good citizen is not necessarily a good man. Rather, the justice of polis is more of temperance while the justice of soul is more of wisdom. If it is true that the genuine virtue is knowledge, therefore only philosophers are the most just and happiest in the world, then more thought needs to be given to the view that the vulgar virtuesinevitably mean happiness.

A meteor that fell in northern Greece in 467 BC was said to have been predicted by Anaxagoras. It seems rather that his theory entailed (“predicted”) the possibility of such bodies. The meteor provided a rare case of an observation confirming a theory. The subsequent recognition of the meteor shows that early philosophical theories could have testable consequences and that empirical evidence was being sought to evaluate theories at this early time.

1, this article chooses three famous sayings, discusses the laozi philosophy the dialectical thought and its modern significance. And the suggestion, the philosophy needs to make the contribution for the world peace 2, the atomic bomb and the violence, threaten humanity's life, is this century characteristic. The science is developed, the humanity has not obtained the perfect happiness, on the contrary actually is the threat which the world trend perishes. Take this fact as the example, has proven the Laozi "为学日益,为道日 损." Dialectical thought. 3, "民不畏死,奈何以死惧之" Laozi speech, its meaning is, regarding the death, feared with did not fear, is relative, may transform. Resolves the contradiction with the military force, died threatens others, if others do not fear death, you do not have themeans. Explained person's will, it cannot use the military force to conquer. Must solve the various countries dispute, is impossible with the military force. 4, the Laozi thought what the world is weakest is the water, it may have the flood tremendous strength, is because has an invariable intention. Always unceasingly flows, achieved the horizontal position, or the condition is tranquil, only then stops. But the humanity similarly has one forever invariable intention, is requests the equality, request peace. Therefore people's intention, is the invincible tremendous strength. This is a truth.

1, Kong Zi and Laozi believed that a philosophy, the thing transformation, under certain must the condition, can complete. If does not have this kind of condition, you insist to do, is impossible to succeed. They thought that the human society the highest ideal is: Everybody can be the social work selflessly, has the common rich life. But must be, society's productive forces may meet all person's need, moreover also has unnecessary. But, Kong Zi's society, the productive forces is very low, therefore Kong Zi sighs, he has the ideal, but is unable to achieve. laozi believed that broad ideal, if does not meet the time requirement, is unable to achieve. Therefore lives in seclusion. 2, the sakya-muni spirit, is higher than Kong Zi and Laozi. It saw that lives of the people in sea of bitterness. It wants the universal salvation people, is separated from sea of bitterness, arrives at the happy other shore. Therefore, it gives up king's life, enters sea of bitterness, with the misery common people, lives together, struggles together.

The appellation “Western” is, in my view, inappropriate when applied to Ancient Hellas and its greatest product, the Hellenic philosophy. For, as a matter of historical fact, neither the spirit of free inquiry and bold speculation, nor the quest of perfection via autonomous virtuous activity and ethical excellence survived, in the purity of their Hellenic forms, the imposition of inflexible religious doctrines and practices on Christian Europe. The coming of Christianity, with the theocratic proclivity of the Church, especially the hierarchically organized Catholic Church, sealed the fate of Hellenic philosophy in Europe for more than a millennium. Since the Italian Renaissance, several attempts primarily by Platonists to revive the free spirit and other virtues of Hellenic philosophy have been invariably frustrated by violent reactions from religious movements, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and the bloody wars which followed their appearance in Europe. Modern science succeeded to a certain extent, after struggle with the Catholic Church, in freeing itself from the snares of medieval theocratic restrictions. Thus, it managed to reconnect with the scientific spirit of late antiquity and its great achievements, especially in the fields of cosmology, physics, mathematics, and medicine, which enabled modern science to ad-vance further. But it seems that the mainstream European philosophy has failed to follow the example of science and to liberate itself, too. As in the Middle Ages, so in modern and post-modern times the “European philosophy” has continued to play the undignified and servile role of handmaiden of something. In addition to the medieval role of “handmaiden of theology” (ancilla theologiae), since the seventeenth century philosophy in Europe assumed the role of “handmaiden of science” (ancilla scientiae) and, with the coming of the Marxist “scientific socialism,” the extra role of ‘handmaiden of ideology” (ancilla ideologiae). In this respect, the so-called “Western philosophy,” as it has been historically practiced in Christian and partially Islamized Europe, is indeed a very different kind of product from the autonomous intellectual and ethical human activity, which the Ancient Hellenes named philosophia and honored as “the queen of arts and sciences.” In this historical light, Hellenic philosophy would appear to be closer to the Asian philosophies of India, China, Japan, and Korea than to Western or “European philosophy.” So as we stand at the post-cold war era, witnessing the collapse of Soviet-style Socialism and the coming of the post-modern era; as we look at the dawn of a new millennium and dream of a new global order of freedom and democracy, the moment seemspropitious for reflection. We may stop and reflect upon our philosophical past as exemplified in the free spirit of Hellenic philosophy and its misfortunes, its great “passion” in Christian Europe in the last two millennia or so.

The subject I intend to discuss deals with a problem which is central in the debate of ancient greek philosophy: the quest for happiness as the final end, the highest good for a human being. Fixing in the achievement of a life worth living the strategic aim of actions, ancient philosophers tried to define as well what a man should desire for himself to fully develop all the capabilities which lie inside human nature. On the one side they proposed major normative models of wisdom, on the other side they gave an important practical indication: the “care of the self”, as a self-control discipline that aims to build a virtuous form of subjectivity, that is able to design and deserve the eudaimonia. In this context, my analysis will focus on the issue of pleasure. The hedone surely represents the critical point of all happiness models of Socratic origin, centred in different ways on the practice of the “care of the self”. While this practical proposal appears to be a complex and demanding alternative in the search for a life worth living, the hedonistic way seems to be much easier and simpler, as far as pleasure is intended as an unequivocal sign of goodness and wellness, immediately recognisable in the experience of happiness. The hedonism of the many appears to the philosophers as a serious menace to society and to the individual, because it conveys unlimited desires and interior disharmony, though, on the other hand, it not possible to deny the value of pleasure without making philosophical happiness unattractive. In the field of the important contemporary re-evaluation of bios models of ancient philosophers (Hadot, Foucault, Nussbaum, Annas) to test their strength and operative capabilities in human subject’s condition in the present days, I would like to outline a comparison between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the dilemmas set by pleasure in the enterprise of self-construction: their positions appear, as usual, close and at the same time opposite in the well-known “gigantomachy”.

There is a hitherto not recognized possibility effectively to use computer-based scientific investigating, teaching and learning strategies and resources in history of philosophy. This is especially interesting for comparative scientific investigations in history of philosophy, for distance learning and teaching it. Effectively to apply modern computer technologies one has to have an adequate mathematical simulation of the sphere of application. Therefore the paper starts with submitting a mathematical simulation of metaphysics (in general). Then this mathematical machinery is applied to a representative concrete example, namely, to the metaphysical system of Parmenides of Elea. By means of the method submitted in this paper (and by virtue of computer) a user himself can create (construct) an adequate digital simulation of some computable aspect of any specific philosophical system. Here the digital method of investigating the history of philosophy is exemplified by applying it to the metaphysical system of Parmenides. According to the hypothesis underlying the mentioned method, metaphysics is formal axiology. Hence algebra of metaphysics is algebra of formal axiology. Therefore metaphysics of Parmenides is represented below as a system of equations of the formal-axiology algebra. This system of equations could be computer-generated and investigated by any user autonomously.

This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides 132a1-b2. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number ofinterpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false. Besides, in this article I will point out that in putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, his device of the Third Man Argument in Parmenides 132a1-b2 should be considered as a warning against the materialistic interpretation of the relation between Forms and particulars: if we interpret the conception of“participation” in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the Largeness Regress.