The transition from 'classical' to 'modern' culture has meant the disappearance of any normative, universal, and absolute culture in which all humanity is to be educated. But that, in itself, does not mean that there is now nothing 'transcending' culture that philosophy can teach humanity. I argue that Bernard Lonergan's analysis of the rational, self-conscious subject, as constituted by the conscious operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, provides a 'fixed base, an invariant pattern' as the condition for the possibility of educating humanity.

If the educator is characterized by a willingness to stand for something and simultaneously willing to care for someone, then the philosophy of authenticity should help the educator out of the problems that the Enlightenment project and some of its critics have created. While our integrative authenticity should rescue us from despair, it should also correct the possible immobilism occasioned by the interpretation of some postmodernist authors. Here, what we take as somehow fulfilling us, to a certain extent also conceived in a naturalistic way, binds us to the ways of structuring our concerns so that others can participate in a common framework. But such a philosophical perspective is confronted with two objections. First, one asks whether it is still ethics given the importance it gives to the empirical level. Second, it is questioned whether there really is a place for the other, whether it in fact transcends subjectivism. This paper deals with some of Nietzsche's central ideas and argues that the reproach of extreme relativism and scepticism is not justified. It concludes that one may find on the contrary an interesting way of dealing with the necessarily individualistic nature of education as well for the educator as for the educandus.

In what follows, I focus on the partiality and fallibility of each of us as individuals, and explore what that means for us as epistemic agents. When we examine the tradition of Western European thought, we note that most epistemological theories assume individuals can know the answer, and are able to critique what is passed down to others as socially constructed knowledge. Many have made the argument that while humanity can be deceived, one individual can know, and therefore teach the others about their deceptions and false beliefs. I argue that because we are embedded and embodied social beings who do not have transcendental, objective, "God's eye views" of the world in which we live, we need each other to help us be potential knowers able to make knowledge claims. Others help us become aware of our own situatedness and help us develop enlarged views. Rather than thinking that individual philosophers, credentialed experts in their field of study, know more and therefore have knowledge they can teach humanity, I argue that all of us, as members of humanity, have much that we can teach each other. My position is that it is only with the help of others that we are able to know anything.

What follows considers the problem of technical improvement as one of the main problems in the philosophy of education. I consider technology in connection with transferring from substantial comprehension to comprehension of the process itself. The creation of educational technologies is the expansion of educational freedom, from freedom inside action to freedom inside reflection. The connection between education and technology ensures creating and modifying a particular, non-formal, and humane pedagogy.

In pre-democratic South Africa, people never learned to listen to the stories of their fellow human beings because that was seen as a threat rather than a challenge. With the long-awaited political and constitutional changes taking place, a different societal structure is being established and a new democratic value system formally and officially being embraced. It would, however, be naive to imagine that policy changes would transform deeply-rooted attitudes, practices and existing structures overnight. The change into a democratic society does not mean, unfortunately, that a political, social and educational utopia is being created instantly. All learners will have to develop the skills, knowledge competence and attitudes to function effectively in a culturally diverse society. It will require a major paradigm shift from most educators, philosophers of education, and teacher trainers, as well as parents. I will argue for a pluralistic, problem-centered approach to teacher education and training that would be helpful in educating students to respect others and diversity.

This paper discusses certain aspects of the philosophy of education developed by the second century Christian writer Clement of Alexandria. Special attention is given to the place of his philosophy in the context of both pagan and Christian philosophical and theological movements as they relate to the Neopythagorean tradition that was revived in the first century.

Le droit, considéré comme un ensemble de régles-normes ayant force ogligatoire et contraignante, régit les rappoerts entre les hommes dans une société donnée. En même temps, il est porteur à la fois de l'image d'organisation des rapports sociaux familiaux, économiques et politiques (structure de base de la societé), et des valeurs. A ce titre, le droit constitue un type-idéal qui, inscrit dans les textes (droit positif-objectif) et enraciné dans la conscience des individus, remplit les fonctions générales de la régulation sociale, de la résolution des conflits, de l'intégration sociale et de la reproduction des structures sociales. En suivant l'enseignement d'Aristotle, le droit en tant que véhicule de valeurs peut et doit contenir la valeur suprême de la vertu qui est au principe du bonheur humain. L'État est, donc, tâché d'enseigner moyennant la loi (droit positif) la vertu tant intellectuelle qu'éthique. Ainsi, le droit devient un moyen d'éducation et remplit, outre ses fonctions générales, les fonctions pédagogique et axiologique en contribuant de cette manière à la réalisation du bonheur des citoyens, La vertu, incorporée dans le droit, s'avère la condition sine qua non de l'actualisation de toutes les valeurs contenues dans le droit, telles que démocratie, liberté, justice sociale, respect de la personne et ainsi de suite.

This paper has a two-fold task. First, I show that there are three types of individuals associated with the Thrasymachean view of society: (a) the many, i.e., the ruled or those exploited individuals who are just and obey the laws of the society; (b) the tyrant or ruler who sets down laws in the society in order to exploit the many for personal advantage; (c) the "stronger" individual (kreittoon) or member of the society who is detached from the many and aspires to become the tyrant. Second, I argue that if Thrasymachus’s account of the perfectly unjust life of the tyrant is to be more than a theoretical ideal, then the stronger individual who aspires to the tyrant’s position would do well to lead a double life—namely, pursuing private injustice while maintaining the public ‘appearance’ of justice. My interpretation accords with that of Glaucon, noted at the beginning of Republic II. I want to extend Glaucon’s interpretation to include the stronger individual as well. I argue that the standpoint of the stronger individual, as distinct from the standpoints of the tyrant and the many, shows Thrasymachus’s three statements regarding justice to be consistent with one another.

Ancient Greek education featured the pedagogical exercise of dialectic, in which a student defended a thesis against rigorous questioning by an instructor. Aristophanes’ Clouds, as well as Plato and Aristotle, criticize the practice for promoting intellectual skepticism, moral cynicism, and an eristic spirit - the desire to win in argument rather than seek the truth. I suggest Aristotle’s logic is meant to reform the practice of dialectic. In the first part of my paper, I defend the thesis that Aristotle’s syllogistic is an art of substantive reasoning against the contemporary view that it is a science of abstract argument forms. First, I show that Aristotle’s exclusive distinction between art and science makes syllogistic a techne for the higher forms of knowledge, science and practical wisdom. Then I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms provides rigorous standards for reasoning in science and public debate. In particular I discuss a) the requirement that a demonstration use verifiable premises whose middle term points out a cause for the predicate applying to the conclusion; b) how his analysis of valid syllogisms with a "wholly or partly false" universal premise applies to dialectical syllogisms.

Plato’s best-known distinction between knowledge and opinion occurs in the Meno. The distinction rests on an analogy that compares the acquisition and retention of knowledge to the acquisition and retention of valuable material goods. But Plato saw the limitations of the analogy and took pains to warn against learning the wrong lessons from it. In this paper, I will revisit this familiar analogy with a view to seeing how Plato both uses and distances himself from it.

The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works (in which the notions of pneuma and 'vital heat' play a crucial role) and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' (as it always has) but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire (orexis), which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'

In his philosophy Plato gives a prominent place to the idea of justice. Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was ultimately responsible for Socrates's death. The amateur meddlesomeness and excessive individualism became main targets of Plato's attack. This attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal society in which justice reigned supreme, since Plato believed justice to be the remedy for curing these evils. After criticizing the conventional theories of justice presented differently by Cephalus, Polymarchus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, Plato gives us his own theory of justice according to which, individually, justice is a 'human virtue' that makes a person self-consistent and good; socially, justice is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good. According to Plato, justice is a sort of specialization.

Though Plato never wrote a dialogue that explicitly asks, "What is education?", few argue that he is uninterested in the subject; after all, Plato, like Socrates, was a teacher. In his magnum opus, the Republic, Plato deals with education repeatedly. The eduction of the guardian class and the allegory of the cave present two landmark pedagogical passages. Yet to catch a glimpse of Socratic pedagogy, we must first sift through the intricacies of dialogue. In addition to the complexity inherent in dramatic context, it seems clear that Socrates’ remarks are often steeped in irony. Thus, we stumble upon a problem: how should we read these passages on education? Does Plato mean for us to read them genuinely or ironically? I will argue that Plato uses the dramatic context of the Republic to suggest that Socrates presents the education of the guardians ironically, while reserving the allegory of the cave for a glimpse of Socrates’ genuine pedagogy.

In this paper I examine the text of the Symposium to illustrate two non-philosophical responses to Socrates’ pedagogical provocation. While Apollodorus and Aristodemus, two Socratic disciples, demonstrate their erotic commitment to Socrates, they do not practice philosophy. They manifest their non-philosophical behavior in two ways. First, they idolize and imitate Socrates. Second, they constantly tell stories about Socrates. In the first section I analyze Aristodemus’ and Apollodorus’ emotional attachment to Socrates. While both disciples are genuinely protective of Socrates, their behavior often precludes the practice of philosophy. In the second section, I examine the nuances of the narrative frame of the Symposium. Apollodorus and Aristodemus both express their commitment to Socrates by telling stories about him. While their stories do preserve knowledge about Socrates, they are unpersuasive spokespersons for the philosophical life. They remain mired in their personal love for Socrates. In the third section, I interpret Plato’s rhetorical use of anonymity as a strategy designed to mitigate against the dangers of discipleship.

I evaluate the position of philosophy within Philo’s theory of education as well as its relation to encyclical studies and to the highest forms of knowledge. According to Philo, true knowledge is knowledge of the law of God. Such is the role of philosophy. There exists a strong relation among the various fields of study reflecting the order that exists in all spheres of reality. Order and harmony are the same in an individual, in a state, and in the cosmos. Order and harmony reflects the law set down by God, who is both creator and foundation of such an order. The study of higher truth and the attempt to reach wisdom enlightens secular knowledge and behavior as well. The question is not merely one of maintaining political order; it is, rather, one of adhering to the order established by God. Such order is not open to discussion or alteration.

I examine one aspect of the central role which mathematics plays in Proclus's ontology and epistemology, with particular reference to his Elements of Theology. I focus on his peculiar views about the ontological status of mathematical objects and the special faculties of the soul that are involved in understanding them. If they are merely abstract objects that are "stripped away" from sensible things, then they are unlikely to reorient the mind towards the intelligible realm, as envisioned by Plato in the Republic. Thus, in order to defend the function of mathematics as a prodaideutic to dialectic, Proclus rejects Aristotelian abstractionism in favor of an elaborate account in terms of Nous projecting images of its Forms through the medium of the imagination. In metaphorical terms, he replaces the Aristotelian image of the soul as a blank tablet with that of a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself, while also being written on by Nous. The mediating function of mathematics for understanding the higher realities is grounded in the fact that its central principles of Limit and Unlimited have a universal provenance in Proclus's whole system of reality.

The ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (= De Interpretatione) give us important elements to understand more clearly some difficult passages of this treatise. In the case of the indefinite names and verbs (i.e. 'not-man', and 'does not recover', respectively), these commentaries reveal a doctrine which explains not only the nature of the indefinites, but also why Aristotle introduces these kinds of term in Peri Hermeneias. The coherence and explanatory capacity of this doctrine is entirely absent in modern exegesis of Peri Hermeneias. This fact has important implications: it can make us to think whether there will be another topics in which the ancient commentators are still indispensable to understand Aristotle. It can also make us to think to what extent a profounder reflection of the ancient commentators can modify our idea of Aristotle and the ancient world.

The passage in question begins with a breakdown in the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras because of disagreement about what its ground rules will be and concludes with the discussion’s restoration. Though formally a mere hiatus from the main line of argument, this passage in fact contains a parable about politics, addressing the question, "How can people of differing abilities and preferences come together to form a community?" Since the passage appears in the middle of a dialogue explicitly concerned with education, the parable extends to education as well. The passage thus provides a springboard for insight into some essential interconnections between and among philosophy, education, and politics. On the one hand, a genuine practitioner of any of the three is ipso facto a engaged in the other two at the same time. And on the other hand, the three share an internal structure which is reflexive and transitive at the same time.

Humanity requires for its satisfaction Beauty and Good, that is, love, wisdom, and courage. Put differently, the necessity of order, equilibrium, and harmony. These values ground one of the most elevated planes of the spiritual life: music. Its moral force in the education of the mind, soul, and behavior of the human person has been emphasized by the ancient Greek philosophers. This important message exists as a pattern crossing the centuries. I will try to reveal the unity ‘ethics’/ethike - ‘music’/melos by using the semiotic organon.

Aristotle says that we learn which acts are virtuous, choose virtuous acts for their own sake, and acquire virtuous habits by performing virtuous acts. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks this works successfully because virtuous acts are pleasant. The learner’s virtuous choices and passions are positively reinforced. I argue that Burnyeat’s interpretation fails because virtuous acts are not typically pleasant for learners or, perhaps surprisingly, even for virtuous people. Instead, I maintain that according to Aristotle moral progress is motivated by different sorts of pain associated with vicious acts. I find a series of stages in Aristotle. First, the many come to choose virtuous acts for their own sake by internalizing punishment and becoming generous-minded. Second, motivated by shame, they gain knowledge of which acts are virtuous, becoming incontinent. Third, learners gain habits of virtuous action by regretting their vicious acts and thus become continent. Fourth, they gain habits of virtuous passions by regretting their vicious passions and become well-brought-up. Finally, they are fully virtuous by being taught why virtuous acts are virtuous.