Building on Gilles Deleuze’s famous declaration that “the brain is the screen”, wholly emblematic of his thinking on cinema, this essay interrogates the place of the body within this thought in relation to Merleau-Pontyan-inspired critiques. My aim is to determine whether Deleuze offers a theory of the perceiving body in relation to spectatorial experience, despite the risk that it possibly imply a logical contradiction in the construction of the diptych on cinema. Indeed, the insistence of the body in this experience, as can be seen from Deleuze’s two works, could deny the very possibility of this “objective and diffuse” perception to which the movement-image would give us access according to the philosopher.

The time of the confrontation between psychoanalysis and philosophy seems to belong in the past, and even to be outdated. A new path, however, is available to us today. We must concern ourselves less with the benefits of philosophy for psychoanalysis (claiming, for example, that it could illuminate that which it looks for differently) and more with the shockwaves that psychoanalysis has generated within philosophy. Philosophy, and phenomenology in particular, has reached its “limits.” These limits are not the limits of a discipline, but those of thought itself. “Can we think the unthinkable?” – such is the question that psychoanalysis asks phenomenology. By retracing Freud’s trajectory, and in particular his passage from the first to the second topical, which was caused by phenomena leading him to radicalize his thought (First World War, death of his daughter Sophie, cancer), this essay attempts to make visible how phenomenology, too, must now deepen its project. The expression « Ça n’a rien à voir » (in which Ça refers to the Freudian id) will say, strictly speaking, that the “Ça” in the second topic cannot be seen because it can neither be seen nor aimed at, and yet it always stays there. This obscure point of thought is also that which phenomenology today must attempt. It is on this basis, and on this basis only, that the confrontation between psychoanalysis “and” philosophy will find its impetus and be renewed.

The Russian invasion of 2022 was based on an organized process of influence on the Ukrainian population, aimed at obtaining their support or neutralizing their possible resistance, in concert with the state apparatus. We find, in the backdrop of this process, the memorial conflict between these two countries and their neighbours, concerning World War II and the Soviet Union. This war of influence, or political warfare, which falls within new forms of contemporary hybrid warfare, profoundly has to do with images, especially moving images. The cinematic images, the debauchery of their propaganda during the Second World War and throughout the existence of the USSR, still weighs on the bodies and minds; the new media has in many ways inherented them and their way of reenacting or extending propaganda on an individual or group scale. We will then question the place of images, and in particular those in motion, in the war between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 to describe the way in which they have served or still serve the military-memorial device deployed by the Russian invader.

In this article, I highlight the following points. In 2022, the publication of the two volumes Inédits I (1946-1947) and Inédits II (1947-1949) was a great surprise. Among the many discoveries I made, I will focus here on the reading notes Merleau-Ponty had prepared on Hegel’s Aesthetics. I suggest that the motives of his reading of Hegel’s Aesthetics must be understood according to two aspects, intimately linked: they are first due to the fact that he himself was trying to formulate his own theory of art and aesthetics; and second that he had in mind Sartre’s work What is Literature? I show that, indeed, in his reading of the Aesthetics, Merleau-Ponty very clearly focuses on the distinction between the different genres of art and on their historical divisions. This is a point that leads me to raise the following question: What are the distinctions between artistic genres in Merleau-Ponty? Here, for me it is above all a question of taking into account Merleau-Ponty’s reservations, exposed in his later essay “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” concerning the Sartrean conception of literature which distinguishes poetry from prose. Ultimately, I defend the idea that Merleau-Ponty proposes an experience of art that is inter-genre and inter-media, which opens an indefinite horizon from the historical limitation of art. Based on his theory of language and art, he thus recognized the historicity of language and art, while considering the possibility of transforming this historicity into something open.

This text is based on a reflection on the context and meaning of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s visit to Mexico in February-March 1949 and the lectures he gave at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). I rely on the information, analysis and notes of Merleau-Ponty that Michel Dalissier offers us in his book Inédits I-II. I devote myself particularly to commenting on the cultural experience that this trip represented for Merleau-Ponty – his relationship with the Mexican philosophy of the Hiperión group – as well as his conception of culture and the relationship between cultures that he exhibits at the time and in the general construction of his own work and philosophy. I support the thesis that the question of a plurality of cultures and interculturality can only be thought in a rigorous way – without falling into cultural relativism or an abstract universalism – through a phenomenological-existential reformulation of the « universal, » as Merleau-Ponty outlines it in the Mexico Conferences.

This article aims at understanding the North-American reception of Foucault’s Folie et déraison. After showing how American conceptions of social control facilitated the integration of Foucauldian thinking in North-American academia, I examine the ways by which the advocates of anti-psychiatry and the historians of psychiatry read Folie et déraison, which became emblematic for French Theory. I then present various Anglo-American critiques of Folie et déraison and defend the persistence of a “Foucauldian spirit” against the sci-entifization of psychiatry. All this allows for an assessment of the legacy of Folie et déraison in the North American debates.

A growing body of work approaches the current environmental devastation from the perspective of a “crisis of sensitivity”: our inability to care for the living around us is said to be a failure of perception and feeling. The article explores several versions of the narrative of modern insensitivity through a study of Günther Anders and Jane Bennett, highlighting the limitations of such approaches. I suggest the notion of a desensitization apparatus to specify and politicize the diagnosis of a “crisis of sensitivity”.

After a period of relative exhaustion, French phenomenology has experienced a powerful revival in the last ten years, with the emer-gence of a “cosmological” paradigm in phenomenology. While this situation is obviously to be welcomed, it also presents contemporary phenomenologists with the challenge of acquiring a compass that will enable them to find their bearings in this rapidly reconfiguring philosophical landscape, and according to principles that still partly elude those who are committed to them. In so doing, the aim of this study is twofold: firstly, to put forward a series of hypotheses as to the way in which it is being structured - and thus to elaborate a typology of contemporary French phenomenologies; and secondly, to attempt to determine the stakes and also the presuppositions of this new philosophical “deal” which, perhaps, remains transitory and, as such, rich in a future that, for the time being, it is only possible to presage.

Hannah Arendt is famous for her influential and innovative analysis of totalitarianism. However, her thinking on political systems and ideologies is far from limited to this theorization. Arendt also criti-cizes modern liberalism and its ideological framework. Indeed, Arendt’s thought reveals many of the political consequences of world-lessness, the loss of the world in contemporary times, particularly in terms of a sense of disempowerment and the advent of a technical vision of politics. This article looks at the political effects of world-lessness, exploring the emerging opposition between liberal post-politics and conservative hyper-politics. This critique of Arendt’s thought can help us better understand the issues and questions raised by liberalism.