The expression “ecological threat” refers to a dynamic of double intrusion: the intrusion of geological history in human history (the intrusion of Gaia) and the intrusion of human history in geological history (the Anthropocene). This double intrusion is founded on a series of major partitions (culture/nature; society/environment) that do not allow for the possibility of communication between the terms of these dichotomies unless it is in the form of reciprocal violation. In the article, the ontology of the flesh is used in order to think the intrusion in a different way compared to the great partitions. Within a chiasmatic logic, the terms of each dichotomy are understood as inseparable moments of the same flesh which institutes a difference – inside/outside – through an infinite movement of folding and torsion. By thinking this common element, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh enters in dialogue with Amerindian mythocosmologies of the “first Anthropocene.” In these mythocosmologies, a humanity-flesh – understood as a transformative, pre-individual, and metastable potential – gives birth, through differentiation, to the multiple points of view that populate the cosmos. This dialogue allows us to think about the socialization of Gaia and to trace the contours of a general ecology understood as a thought that operates between – or beyond – major partitions.

In recent years, the concept of the Anthropocene has summoned such an archipelago of senses that the academic debate related to this term, which initially emerged in the natural sciences, has since penetrated the fields of philosophy, economy, history, and sociology. To draw a possible cartography of the Anthropocene, we wish before anything else to emphasize the intrinsic connection between the debate on the Anthropocene and the theme of climate change, and, more generally, of the environmental crisis. We will attempt to show, also, how a Merleau-Pontyan philosophy that is constitutively dedicated to overcoming dichotomies – philosophy and non-philosophy, nature and culture, subject and object – can provide a valuable methodological and ontological support for the study of the environmental question and the ecological crisis. This philosophy belongs, in its own right, among the non-sad philosophies for thinking climate change.

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis about transcendental geology in the final phase of his work, this article examines the debate about the Anthropocene from the perspective of philosophy of history. Firstly, we follow the author through the preliminary materials for The Visible and The Invisible by situating transcendental geology within the book’s complex theoretical architecture, and by foregrounding the necessity of rethinking the notion of Earth through the reading that the French philosopher offers of Husserl’s phenomenology. We will thus focus on the theme of the overturning of the Copernican doctrine in an ethico-practical perspective, showing that Merleau-Ponty’s ecology can be considered a philosophical ecology ante litteram. Finally, drawing on the hypothesis proposed by historians Bonneuil and Fressoz, the essay will attempt to highlight the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s practical thought for the debate about the Anthropocene.

The goal of this article is to introduce a Merleau-Pontyan reading of the Four Theses of Dipesh Chakrabarty. In the first part of this article, we identify the theoretical problems that undergird Chakrabarty’s claims by connecting them to an attempt to rethink the concept of history in a non-historicist manner in light of the questions raised by the Anthropocene and by anthropogenic climate change. Our hypothesis, which we explore in the second part of the article, is that the idea of history developed by Merleau-Ponty, which finds in the concepts of “institution” and “transcendental geology” its fundamental theoretical articulations, can provide the framework for a rereading of the Four Theses. In the last section, we attempt to provide an interpretation of Chakrabarty’s proposition by reading the problem of the relationship between geological history, life history, and human history as a relationship of institution. In conclusion, we indicate some potential developments for this proposition that move in the direction of a narrower intersection between philosophy and earth system science.

In this article, I examine the debate about the Anthropocene through the lens of two images that animate this debate like presuppositions: that of the Globe and that of the Earth. After analyzing the characteristics of the former, I attempt to define the status of the concept of Earth in Merleau-Ponty’s works in relation to the concepts of Nature, life, and background. In a final section, I attempt to valorize the main theoretical objectives achieved by reading Merleau-Ponty in the direction of a new reflection on the notion of the Anthropocene, beyond the Promethean discourse on the Anthropocene (which originates in a vision of the planet as a Globe). For this, we will read together some recent works by Dipesh Chakrabarty and Jeremy Devies that focus precisely on the attempt to rethink the Anthropocene beyond the image of the Globe.

In his notes for the course entitled “The Problem of Passivity: Sleep, the Unconscious, Memory,” Merleau-Ponty describe the notion of “negative hallucination” as “a perception, but not recognized for what it is.” This essay analyses this figure as it is taken up by Merleau-Ponty in direct dialogue with Freud’s work. To begin, through the double category of the “negative” and the “perceived,” Merleau-Ponty broaches the question of the “place” of dreams by adopting an eccentric position that sheds light on an unexplored pathway of Freudian theory. Moreover, a crucial point can be found in the idea of a negative margin, that appears to implicitly configure a redefinition of the hallucinatory in the direction of chiasm. To highlight this aspect, I review in a preliminary manner some passages of Phenomenology of Perception in which the question of the “place” of negative hallucination emerges in particularly dramatic terms.

This essay aims to shed new light on Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology through the analysis of the problem of incommensurable, by taking into consideration Gaetano Chiurazzi’s work, Dynamis. Ontologia dell’incommensurabile. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression is assumed as the reading key of this comparison: it allows to connect the theme of incommensurability (considered in the first part) both to the problem of history and of intersubjective relationship (analyzed in the second part), and to the fundamental problem of perception (third part). In particular, the analysis of the concept of expression will stress the ontological value of the phenomenological description of perception, pointing out a particular affinity between the ontology of incommensurable and the phenomenological approach. Therefore, the discovery of incommensurability and the phenomenological method will be interpreted as two different starting points for one and the same path, which leads to a non-substantialist and relational conception of Being. Rather than providing a new interpretation of this definition of Being, this comparison aims to make it clearer and better understandable, by underlining some of its essential aspects. In particular, I will consider the possibility to interpret consciousness and the subject as expressive events, analyzing the philosophical consequences of this definition.

This article proposes a reflection on the meaning of the crisis event that is the war in Ukraine, based on the modes of representation through which it was constituted as an image. Starting from a short essay by Merleau-Ponty written at the end of the Second World War, in which the French philosopher reaffirms that the war took place, I intend to critically juxtapose Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to inherit the crisis as a political task and, above all, a philosophical one, with the processes of hyper-representation highlighted by Jean Baudrillard which, on the contrary, operates a subtraction of the event and the real. The proposal is therefore to analyze the non-taking place of events as the impossibility of inheriting a task and a meaning, by showing how such an impossibility manifests itself precisely in the phenomenal space of our contemporary screens.

The essay intends to revisit certain phenomenological themes present in the theoretical work of Pierre Schaeffer, based on his most important and influential book: the Traité des objets musicaux. A French engineer and composer, Schaeffer was the initiator – from the point of view of its musical practice, and its theoretical analysis – of one of the most important musical avant-gardes of the 20th century, musique concrète. The objective of the article will be to consider Schaeffer’s main reference – the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl – and suggest that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology could be a prism that helps to understand and expand the heterogeneous and incomplete research project the French composer documented extensively in his writings.

The article proposes to sketch an analogy between, on the one hand, linguistic learning and sound dialogue in humanist music therapy and, on the other hand, certain reflections of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: in particular, the centrality of corporeality in the learning, treated in the Phenomenology of Perception and in the courses on the psychology and pedagogy of the child, and the status of inter-corporeality developed through reflections on passivity and the metaphor of flesh. We will trace an analysis of the music therapy of Giulia Cremaschi Trovesi, with reference to the linguistic and musical gesture, through the Merleau-Pontian notion of praktognosia, and of the sound dialogue with reference to institution and intercorporeity. Through an interpretation of music in the terms adopted by Stéphanie Ménasé and in reference to Merleau-Pontian passivity in artistic creation, our objective is to define the musical institution of the vibrating body in music therapy in terms analogous to the institution of the subject according to Merleau-Ponty and, consequently, to find, in the sound dialogue, the intercorporeity which anticipates the individuation of the subject, by describing the communicative authenticity of the musical-therapeutic encounter.

Gianluca De Fazio’s book Avversità e margini di gioco. Studio sulla soggettività in Merleau-Ponty presents precise and original research along several nodes of great importance in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical production, such as subjectivity, expression, passivity, nature, history. By focusing on, without limiting himself to, the 1950’s period, the author declares that he aims at a denaturalization of nature and a dehistoricization of history: an overcoming of dichotomies which, though faithfully following the Merleau-Pontian path, does not fail to have a Deleuzian overtones. The issues of the book are also, and above all, political, shown in the considerations of the task of philosophy.