“Analytical construct. The Culture as construct and the constitution of the social – fallowing Max Weber”. The key of this paper is the chalange to determinate theplace of the cultural sociology in the context of the general sociology and of the other cultural sciences, like cultural anthropology and ethnology. For doing that it is necessary to analize Max Weber’s concept: Gedankenbild.

'What is the sufficient reason for the inalienable dignity of man?' If man has an inalienable dignity, there has to be an ontologically sufficient reason for the inalienable dignity of man. We find this ontologically sufficient reason for the inalienable dignity of man in the ontological being and essence of man, according to our thesis. We argue that the human being is a 'person in a body.' To be a person is an objective inestimable value, it is the objective value par excellence. We are persons from the beginning (conception), because it is not possible to become 'someone.' We argue that the intrinsic preciousness of being a person is the ontologically sufficient reason for the inalienable dignity of man. We do not want to separate values from beings; the inalienable dignity of the human person is the heart of his being and essence. Therefore we should speak more often of man, insofar as he is inestimably precious.

This paper brings in discussion some key moments in semiotic field in the process of modern reconstruction of logic and of philosophy of language. We arefollowing the construction of logical semiotic (from Frege to Carnap and 'semantic of the possible worlds') and the central position of the concept 'possible worlds' in the interpretation process, which creates a meta-semantic. This concept is essential to understand 'the worlds from the poetic space'.

Expulsion of senses. Acustic spaces: call and listening in interpretive sociology. Following the 'mental constructs' that are illustrative for Max Weber's Idealtypologie, the 'acustic spaces' in the cultural concept of education are developed. The study is an analysis of the organization of command and obedience in Weber's sociology of domination. His interpretive sociology is taken from Martin Heidegger. Another subject of the paper is an excursion into the sociology of music of Weber and Adorno. In the acoustic sounds of music, especially in the organ and piano works, we find the process of rationalization of the Western culture.

The paper tries first to show that P. Strawson’s and J. Searle’s proposal of explicating the illocutionary meaning of speech-acts (or corresponding explicit sentences) in terms of the conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction (with regard to the underlying intentional states of mind) is unsatisfactory. It provides no full understanding of the meaning of speech-acts, at least not of non-constative acts, as e.g. orders, requests, demands, confessions, promisses, etc.; for, through its quasi-verificationist horizon, it provides no unterstanding of the illocutionary force in terms of the conditions of accepting the validity-claims that are connected with the performance of the act. Thus far the paper complies with Habermas’ approach. There remains however an ambiguity with regard to the good reasons for accepting a speech-act, since on the level of life-world communication and interaction not only validity-claims and pertinent arguments but also threats and offers are functioning as socially binding illocutionary forces (thus e.g. not only in coercions like "hands up" but in all kinds of negotiations and bargainings). How is it possible to show by a cogent argument that openly strategical acts as offers and threats cannot fulfill the role of providing good reasons for accepting speech-acts in the sense of unrestricted Verständigung (i.e. communicative understanding and coming to agreement) but are parasitic upon non-strategical ways of consensual communication by understanding and accepting validity-claims?The paper argues that this suggestive contention cannot be proved, i.e. grounded by a descriptive analysis of the normal function of communicative actions in the life-world but only - indeed - by transcendental pragmatic reflection on the normative conditions of argumentative discourse which cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction.

This paper takes up again Grice’s Basic Model (GBM) for analysing communicative acts. We draw attention to a ’new’ fault in GBM, i.e. a fault not yet noticed in the literature: Grice’s deflniens for CA (= communicative attempt) is not only too weak (as it is not satisfying the reflexivity-condition according to which any CA implies the speaker’s intention of CA’s being understood by the hearer); it is also too strong - and just for the same reason.

The domain of pragmatics is to arrange in the architectonic of competences. Competences are to discriminate on the base of distinction between rule-following behaviour and action-rules. This can be understood as a critic of L. Wittgensteins conception of following a rule. The Frankfurter version of speechacttheory has argued - following partial K Bühler - that three fundamental properties (functions) of language can be identified: the representation of state of affaires, the generation of interpersonal relationship and the expression of intentional make happen someone (Erlebnisse). Further dimensions and explications for concerning this properties shall be elaborated. Steps to constructive pragmatics can be gone.

How operates communication with pictures? S. Kjörup has elaborated - follow up the analysis of pictorial symbolization in N. Goodman’s "languages of art" - a speechacttheory of picturing The problem of this approach is that Kjörup has no answer of pictorial fiction.

The relationship between reflection and language has become of main interest, not only in the area of philosophy. How is reflection by means of language on language possible?Firstly I want to discuss the possibility of linguistic reflexivity within the late philosophy of L. Wittgenstein.The next step will be a critical analysis of G. Frey's "linguistic theory of reflection". This will be followed by an outline of the importance of reflection in context of the speechacttheory (J.L. Austin, J.R. Searle).Finally I will analyse the problems around linguistic reflexivity within a discourse theoretical framework (J. Habermas, K-O. Apel).It will be questioned if the "discourse" would have to be understood as the linguistic equivalent to "reflection" . Then I will be looking at the relationship between discourse and metacommunication. The analysis will end in the attempt of a typology of discoursive-reflexive predicats.

Semantic implicatures are features for understanding the use of sentences. The status of this implementations of meaning is a quasi-logical relation as a "weak implication". They are determinated through types of lexical units and expressions in grammatical positions. But both are only necessary conditions for semantic implicatures. Further assumption for meaningful use of sentences are presupposed e.g. existence presuppositions, evidences, customs etc. So, the delimination to pragmatic (presuppositions) is indicated.

In their book 'Foundation of illocutionary logic' the authors attempt to formalize the theory of speech acts. In set theoretical terms they describe their basic notions of illocutionary forces and points, define new ’illocutionary' symbols and operations and formulate some axioms and postulates, which should explicitly describe their theory, but their creativity of introducing new functional symbols and connectives conjoint with an unsystematic representation opposes this purpose.