The latest form of violence in the Niger Delta, i.e., hostage taking by militant male youth, reproduces the “logic of capital” that characterizes state and corporate violence. This logic of capital can be explicated in contrast to a relational account of community that can ground alternative logics of care. Nigeria’s oil policy led to drilling impacts including pollution, social costs, and corruption. The failure of organized resistance to these developments produced widespread disillusionment in the 1990s, to which male youth responded with militancy and profiteering. In contrast, women’s organized resistance practices are “logics of care” consistent with distributive, recognition, intergenerational, and restorative justice as well as effectiveness.

The way we farm, the kinds of backyards and landscapes we favor, and the way we control patterns of development are creating an invisible crisis through their affects upon soil ecology. The invisibility of soil ecosystems, the seemingly alien properties of the organisms that inhabit them, and the specialized knowledge required to understand them create obstacles to moral concern for these fountains of life. Our treatment of soils has reached the point of crisis. Obstacles to moral thinking about soils might be overcome by supplying the moral imagination with a deeper understanding of our own biological identity as ecosystems analogous in organization and functions to soil ecosystems. Not only have microbes created the conditions necessary for human life, but they have shaped our evolutionary history and helped constitute the human genome. Our biological identity encompasses communities of microbes, such that humans (and all organisms) are most properly understood as ecosystems. For this reason, moral concern for humans implies moral concern for ecosystems.

Richness theory offers an alternative to the paradigms that have dominated the short history of environmental ethics as a self-conscious field. This alternative theoretical paradigm defines intrinsic value as “richness”—a synonym for “organic unity” or “unity in diversity.” Richness theory can handily reconcile two kinds of ideas that seem to be in tension with each other:that (1) an individual human being has a greater worth than an individual organism of just about any other species; and (2) yet the world would be a better place with substantially fewer humans and/or less consumption per capita, thus leaving more resources for other species.The mutual compatibility of such ideas within the framework of richness theory can be demonstrated both verbally and through a simplified mathematical model.

Much philosophical attention has been devoted to “The Land Ethic,” especially by Anglo-American philosophers, but little has been paid to A Sand County Almanac as a whole. Read through the lens of continental philosophy, A Sand County Almanac promulgates an evolutionary-ecological world view and effects a personal self- and a species-specific Self-transformation in its audience. It’s author, Aldo Leopold, realizes these aims through descriptive reflection that has something in common with phenomenology-although Leopold was by no stretch of the imagination a phenomenologist. Consideration of human-animal intersubjectivity, thematized in A Sand County Almanac, brings to light the moral problem of hunting and killing animal subjects. Leopold does not confront that problem, but it is confronted and resolved by Jose Ortega y Gassett, Henry Beston, and Paul Shepard in terms of an appropriate human relationship with wild-animal Others. Comparison with the genuinely Other-based Leopold-Ortega-Beston-Shepard wild-animal ethic shows the purportedly Other-based humanand possibly animal ethic of Emmanuel Levinas actually to be Same-based after all.

Petroleum extraction in the Amazon rain forest has left grave human rights violations in its wake, creating myriad ethics and sustainability challenges. Framing sustainability ethics in terms of collective responsibility, there are four conceptions of responsibility: aggregated complicit individual responsibility, the responsibility of a unitary corporate person, a social connection model of shared responsibility, and universal social responsibility. Each conception of collective responsibility expands the scope of responsible actors, from selective stakeholders, to institutions, to systems, and finally to all parties. Only universal social responsibility is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all actors responsible for environmental problems such as the Amazon crisis. Moreover, its proponents take a spiritual turn that emphasizes compassion with and a sense of solidarity requisite for motivating activism. Universal social responsibility has the greatest potential to stimulate a paradigm shift that could lead to improved solutions to sustainability challenges. Ultimately, environmental activism needs to be rooted in love.

Agricultural biotechnology has long been criticized from an environmental justice perspective. However, an analysis, using golden rice as a case study, shows that golden rice is not susceptible to the main criticisms that are appropriate when directed at most products of agricultural biotechnology, and that golden rice has important humanitarian potential. For these reasons, an environmental justice evaluation of golden rice may need to be more nuanced and complex than a more traditional environmental ethics can provide. Study of the complexity of this issue may pay off in a more effective environmentalism on its own terms.

A Catholic environmental virtue ethic must include an understanding of prudence that incorporates attunement significantly. Catholic theologians are reluctant to revise notions of prudence, but there are traditions in theology that support such an approach. Catholic virtue ethical traditions point to this necessity, and, in addition, philosophical environmental virtue ethics (which are much more fully developed) simply insist on it. The comparison of a moral character (as it is understood in virtue ethics) with a bioregion’s ecosystem helps support this argument.

In an influential paper, Elliott Sober raises philosophical problems for environmentalism, and proposes a basis for being an environmentalist without discarding familiar, traditional ethical theories, a basis consisting in the aesthetic value of nature and natural entities. Two of his themes are problematic. One is his objection to arguments from the unknown value of endangered species, which he designates “the argument from ignorance,” but which should instead be understood as arguments from probability. The other concerns his attempt to avoid holistic value theories by appealing to aesthetic value. If one invokes Derek Parfit’s response to the non-identity problem, one can appeal to another tradition-related approach that Sober neglects, which can readily be employed in support of species preservation without disparaging aesthetic value or endorsing holistic theories.

There is a complexity of entities and happenings embodied within the pillars that frame the doorways in our homes and support the broad flat spaces that form supermarkets and department stores. Each pillar speaks to the mythology encircling the origins of Gothic architecture; the ideas surrounding the shift from the trunks and boughs of the sacred grove toward the columns, arches, and vaults of church and cathedral. Each pillar embodies the evolution of life and the history of the Earth. Awakening toward the relational agency at play within the “humanly derived” allows us to recognize this agency as akin to wildness and as William Cronon asserts, this kinship draws us closer to recognizing and responding to the wild in all that surrounds us. It also produces a shift in how we understand the concept of wilderness. It is not, as Cronon contends, a cultural construct, but a fluxing and complex gestalt that includes both human and more-than-human agency.

In The Ethics of Authenticity, Charles Taylor speaks of the malaises of modernity in which individualism and authenticity lose their moral force by becoming simply a type of relativism and/or soft despotism. In contrast, Taylor suggests that individualism and authenticity need to be understood as holding moral salience through the dialogical nature of human life and the external horizons of meaning necessary to the very formulation of the authentic self. Individual choice only makes sense when some choices are more socially, politically, and/or ethically valuable than others. Taylor’s discussion of the ethics of authenticity can be applied to the religious movement of contemporary Paganism and the marked hesitation on the part of Pagans to claim any expected responsibility on the part of other Pagans toward nature and/or the environment.

“Since the actions I perform as an individual only have an inconsequential effect on the threat of climate change,” a common argument goes, “it cannot be morally wrong for me to take my car to work everyday or refuse to recycle.” This argument has received a lot of scorn from philosophers over the years, but has actually been defended in some recent articles. A more systematic treatment of a central set of related issues (moral mathematics, collective action, side effects, green virtues) shows how maneuvering around these issues is no easy philosophical task. In the end, it appears, the argument from inconsequentialism indeed is correct in typical cases, but there are also important qualificatory considerations.

The relationship between society and nature has an outstanding importance in the fields of environmental philosophy and sociology. It is dominated by the opposition between realism and constructivism, i.e., between those who argue that nature is an entity independent of society and those who respond that nature is a social construction. Such conflict is usually solved by accepting that nature exists, but our knowledge of it can only be socially mediated. However, a new version of constructivism can be defended, one which pays enough attention to the material dimension of society and nature’s interaction. Society has always intervened upon nature and the final outcome of such historical process has been the transformation of nature into human environment. A realistic constructivism allows us to highlight that decisive feature of socio-natural interaction.

The discussion of environmental aesthetics as it relates to ethics has primarily been concerned with how to harmonize aesthetic judgments of nature’s beauty with ecological judgments of nature’s health. This discussion brings to our attention the need for new perceptual norms for the experience of nature. Hence, focusing exclusively on the question of whether a work of “environmental art” is good or bad for the ecological health of a system occludes the important role such works can play in formulating new perceptual norms and metaphors for nature. To illustrate this point, the work of sculptor Andy Goldsworthy presents us with a different perception of time that is ethically useful.

Environmental virtue ethics (EVE) can be applied to environmental justice. Environmental justice refers to the concern that many poor and nonwhite communities bear a disproportionate burden of risk of exposure to environmental hazards compared to white and/or economically higher-class communities. The most common applied ethical response to this concern—that is, to environmental injustice—is the call for an expanded application of human rights, such as requirements for clean air and water. The virtue-oriented approach can be made consistent with such calls, but there are broader applications as well that generate unique strategies for moral responsiveness and for expanding the role of moral philosophers in civic affairs.

In recent years, scholars studying the writing of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey have attempted to use his ethical ideas to construct a viable environmental ethics. This endeavor has found limited success and generated some intriguing debates, but has been found wanting in many areas important to environmental ethicists of the twenty-first century. In particular, the humanist motivations behind many of his ethical writings stand in the way of a philosophy that takes nonhumans seriously. However, there is much environmental philosophers can learn from Dewey, not from his ethics, but from his ontological writings. A concept of the contingency of existence, found in Dewey, in particular in Experience and Nature, can be the foundation for a robust, if dark, ecological philosophy.

Eco-minimalism is an emerging approach to building design, construction, and retrofitting. The approach is exemplified by the work of architect Howard Liddell and sustainable water management consultant Nick Grant. The fundamental tenet of this approach is an opposition to the use of inappropriate, unnecessary, and ostentatious eco-technology—or “eco-bling”—where the main emphasis is on being seen to be green. The adoption of the principles of the eco-minimalist approach offers, they argue, a significant opportunity to improve sustainability in construction. However, a critical examination of eco-minimalism as a design philosophy shows that eco-minimalism needs to be further developed within the framework of virtue ethics. The focus should be on two main themes: (1) incommensurabilities arising in relation to eco-minimalism’s goals of minimizing environmental impact and maximizing human benefit, which cannot be resolved from the principles Liddell and Grant have articulated, and (2) the practical importance of cultivating settled dispositions to act eco-minimally on the part of those who design, construct, and use buildings. A strong emphasis needs to be placed on the role of practical wisdom when navigating challenging decisions of the kind facing eco-minimalists in practice.

Biocultural homogenization involves three major drivers: (a) the physical barrier to every­day contact with biodiversity derived from the rapid growth of urban population, (b) the conceptual barrier derived from the omission in formal and non-formal education of native languages that contain a broad spectrum of traditional ecological knowledge and values, and (c) political barriers associated with the elimination or reduction of the teaching of ethics under the prevailing neoliberal economy governance since the 1960s. Biocultural ethics aims at overcoming these barriers by recovering the vital links between biological and cultural diversity, between the habits and the habitats of the inhabitants. These links are acknowledged by early Western philosophy, Amerindian traditional ecological knowledge, and contemporary ecological and evolutionary sciences, but have been lost in prevailing modern ethics. There is an overlooked diversity of forms of knowing and inhabiting regional ecosystems, each of them having diverse environmental and social consequences. A better understanding of the regionally diverse mosaics of ecosystems, languages, and cultures facilitates the distinction of specific causes and responsible agents of environmental problems, and the disclosure of sustainable practices, forms of ecological knowledge and values that offer already existing options to solve socio-ecological problems.

Non-native species are implicated in many ecological and economic problems, and the field of invasion biology has burgeoned in response to this fact. However, classification, terminology, and management of non-native species generate controversies and even calls for abolition of the field. The fact that the basis for disputes is differing worldviews rather than simply interpretation of biological observations suggests that resolving arguments about non-native species will be difficult, independently of questions about the operational tractability of proposed courses of action.

Ecological restoration has been a topic for philosophical criticism for three decades. In this essay, I present a discussion of the arguments against ecological restoration and the objections raised against my position. I have two purposes in mind: (1) to defend my views against my critics, and (2) to demonstrate that the debate over restoration reveals fundamental ideas about the meaning of nature, ideas that are necessary for the existence of any substantive environmentalism. I discuss the possibility of positive restorations, the idea that nature can restore itself, the meaning of artifacts, and the significance of the distinction between humanity and nature.