1.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
都昆如
先蘇格拉底期的「太初」問題探討
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2.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
劉福增
論證與推演
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3.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
林正弘
R. M. Martin 著Truth and Denotation 商榷
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4.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
本期作者簡介
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5.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
哲學界簡訊
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6.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
.郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
魏晉社會哲學之研究
A Study on the Social Philosophy in the Wei-chin Period
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This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and bibliography.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy created by the philosophers in the Wei-Chin Period: (220-420A. D.) from the Taoists Ho-Yen (191-249 A. D.), and Wang-bi (226-249 A. D.) through the Confucianists Fu-Hsuen (217-278 A. D.) and Pei-Twei (267-:300 A. D.) to the Confucio-Taoists Gho-Hung (253-333 A. D.) and Tao-Siam (365-427 A.D.). This historcial process reveals the ascension of Taoism and the descension of Confucianism though some philosophers tried to make amalgamation of those two main Streams in that period.The second part is concerned in the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Wei-Chin period. It shows a strong value-changing from the Confucian moral approach to the Taoist mystical one. The search for the Corporeal longevity was the main stream for the Scholars by negligence of the spiritual lifestyIe. The social principle was declined because of lacking interpersonal relation. The confucianists felt in that time without power.Finally, in the third part, we attempt a critique on the values and the limitations of the sosial philosophy in the Wei-Chin period, from the historical of view or the essential significance we maintain that , the Taoism may strenghten the personal individuum, but it neglects the interpersonal relation in the social affair, which may be more important for social philosophy.The philosophical contribution in Wei-Chin period was rare.
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7.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
金忠烈
Choong-Yiol Kim
秦代哲學思想研究 一一試補中國哲學史上之一漏洞
Thoughts of Philosophy in the Ch'in Period Research fo the Lüshih Ch'iu Ch'inu
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I. This paper which is summarizing thoughts of philosophy in the Ch'in Period from 256 B..C. to 206 B.C. was written for writers already dealing with the history of Chinese Philosophy so that they might suipplement the gap in this time. II. Even if the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu is one of the most representative materials of philosoply in this period, many thinkers including Hu Shih have neglected and regarded it as miscellaneous thought because of not bieng creative motivation on it. But according to the result of my study, this would rather more synthetical than miscellaneous and the ideology as well as the new political world for coming unification must have been projected. In other words, we should not ignore this product of period which is containing not only purpose but intention, especially in the field of history of philosophy.III. After unification having selected all these conceptions, which was suggested by the Lüshih Ch'un Chiu concerning moralism in Confucianism, the whole-ch'i-ism in the In Yang school and revivalism in Taoism instead of power politics in late stage of the Legalist school for ruling people, the Ch'in would have been the owner of land undoubtedly and made the most utopian era in the political history of China.IV. The important philosophical concepts dealt in this paperis epitomizing the Calendar of Twelve Months (Shih Er Chi) regaeded as the main gist in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu to the political schedule or agriculturallife schedule for common people. Furthermore, the emphasis in this paper is saying that politics and survival should go with the order of universal operation itself so to mean the returning to naturalism and individualism which have ever been enjoyed for primitive agricultural period out of supreme nationalism in the Legalist School. The thought in Unification of the world desired by the Lüshih Ch'uTI, Ch'iu is involving that in opening of the world at the same time to restore everything in its original position and function. So, the main ideal in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu asks for the significance of life and self-importance as a point of view in life. All the beings or behaviors must be exist for the whole life and. virtue of individual life, that is , individual life be the center of all. So to speak, the conversion of value which means that the lifeis self-reliable body and purpose itself was evolved from the individual life being also used to means for whoever had been lord in that period.V. Finally, the political thoughts in the Lüshih Ch'uTl, Ch'iu were not discussed in details. These are going to be dealt with the next.
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8.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
將信苦海
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
論孟子道德抉擇
On Menicus's Choice
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Menicus has been taken as a great metaphysician. He developes a metaphysics of morality. His theory of mind as being originating from the Heaven, "Ti'en" is an essential part of the metaphysics and ethics. The problems of ethics can be solved from the metaphysics of mind. Hence, the students of Menicus mistakenly believe that the problem of moral choice wiIl be dissolved, if one has a cultivation of the mind. The main topics of this paper are:1. The main concern of the author of Menicus is praxis rather than an establishent of meaphysics of mind.2. The Menicusian theory of mind is a foundation for the universality of moral principles and moral worth of moral actions.3. Menicus‘s theory ef moral decision is founded upon the moral principles rather than that of mind or the conception of "Ti'en".4. Menicus does not derive the principles of moral decision from the metaphysics of mind rather from the practical rules that were estabIised from the "moral genuis" such as the ancient great kings, Yoa and Hsiung.5. Menicusian ethics is not a deontological ethics but a consequential one sinc.e he emphasizes the principle of the greatest utility.6. The way of re-vitalizing the philosophy of Menicus is consisted in a development of a theory of moral decision rather than the Neo-Confucian interpretations of the metaphysics of morals.
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9.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
球縈莘
Wing-wah Chan
海德格〈存有與時間〉的世界性概念
The Concept of Worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time
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This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the "presence" of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is "letting-be" of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, which is usualIy treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein's disclosedness. Therefore, I-Ieidegger adopts the second approach.
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10.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
美的形上學一一文心雕龍原道篇
The Metaphysics of Beauty-Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung's "Yuan Tao"
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The first chapter, "Yuan Tao" (原道), of We-Hsin-Del -Lung (文心雕龍) by Liu Hsieh (劉碩) is a classical composition which is highly metaphysical. It maintains that the concept of Tao may be derived through one's experience of beauty. From one's perception of beauty in nature, in fine art, in love, and even in human virtues, one may transcend the boundary of concrete particular beautiful things to the source of all beauty--Tao. Tao, as the ontological foundation of all finite ontic beauty, is understood as the Origin of all things, the Ultimate Oneness, the Infinite Being, the Absolute Spirit. Beauty, in turn, can be understood as the attribute of Tao itself. The Tao of Wen-HsinDel-Lung conforms to that of the Book of Changes.This article is di vided into three sections:I. The Discovery of Tao through One's Awareness of BeautyII. The Three Levels of Beauty: A.. Ontic Beauty: Finite ObJects are Beautiful B. Perceptive Beauty: the Human Subject has the Ability of Appreciating Beauty. C. Ontological Beauty: Tao .is the Source of All BeautyIII. The Meaning of the Concept of Tao: A. In the Book of Changes B. In Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung
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11.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
林義正
Yih-jing Lin
孔子論人之研究
A Study on Man in Confucius' Thought
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What is man? This is a perennial question in philosophy. The author has been interested in Confucius' view concerning this question.. The present paper is an attempt to explicate Confucius theory of man. It is divided into six sections: (1) human. intellect (2) human nature (3) human mind (4) human person (5) historical personalities (6) human virtues. Confucius approach to the problem of man is philosophical, rather than scientific or religious. His basic view is that there is no fixed, unchanging essence of man, and that man's essence is formed by his activities and deeds. In one word, man is what he does.
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12.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
哲學系簡訊
哲學系簡訊
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13.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
現象學方法一一從知識論到本體論
Phenomenological Method-from Epistemology to Ontology
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Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of contemporary western thought. Its founder was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Its main purpose was oriented towards a methodological research. In his phenomenological method Husserl tried to find an absolute scientific standpoint for philosophy without any presupposition.This study refers to my two previous articles, namely "The Concept Epoche by Edmund Husserl" (Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taivvan University, No. 21,Taipei, June 1972, pp. 203-307) and "A Comparative Study of Laotzu and Husserl--A Methodological Approach" (Analecta Husserliana, Ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka, Vol. XVII, D.Reider Publ. Co. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984, pp. 6573) to show the husserlian essential way of researching from the epistemological investigation to the ontological sphere.In the problem of on the methological repistemology, there would be raised the following questions. Namely: What is the thinking subject? What would be the object of thisthinking subject? Furthermore, in the phenomenological study, the instrument method, and process used by the subject become also centres of problems. The relation between subject and object is therefore to be discussed in this article.In the discussion the relation between subject and object Husserl then used his epoché (bracketing) to transcend all the sensible world in the first step, in the second step however he refers the cartesian meditations, in which the cogito seemed to be the genuine and absolute standpoint for the beginning of all sciences. The cartesian ego, cogito, is therefore the transcendental subjectivity for Husserl and his followers to guarantee his methodological beginning.But phenomenology would not satisfy with this subjectivity. Contrarily, it would like to extend its influence on the objective world. That is the method of the husserlianWesensschau through which all the external world would be constituted by the subjective intentional Bewuβtseinsstrom (consciousness-stream).The place in which Husserl overcomes Descartes lies on the refinding of the objective world. Descartes said "cogito, ergo sun", Husserl can even added "cogito, ergo die Welt ist".Phenomenology demonstrates indeed a way from epistemology to ontology.
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14.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
劉福增
Fu-Tseng Liu
鄧南倫之前之後 一一語言哲學的J 個例示
Before and After Donnellan--An Example of A Philosophical Study of Language
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The topic might indicate what kind of theme will be considered in this paper. I would like to do three things. First, to brief a historical development of the problem of definite descriptions, beginning from 1905, Russell's paper, through 1950, Strawson's rejection of Russell's theory, and 1966, Donnellan's theory of referential use and attributive use,to 1977, Kripke's criticism of Donnellan's theory. Secondly, to do some critical study of Donnellan's theory. And finally, taking the above account as an example to show that aphilosophical study of language is an important method of philosophy as well as one main philosophy in the modern time.
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15.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
郭博文
Po-Wen Kuo
杜威的經驗自然主義
John Dewey's Empirical Naturalism
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This paper is an attempt to expound and clarify the main points of Deweys naturalistic metaphysics. Section one deals with Dewey's definition of metaphysics as a study of the generic traits of existence and takes issue with Hook's and Rorty's negative view concerning Dewey's enterprise. Section two deals with Dewey's empirical method, in which such key concepts as "primary experience" and "selective emphasis" are examined. Section three deals with Deweys substantive metaphysical theories, using his treatment of the mind-body problem as a typical example. Section four deals with four generic traits of nature found or implied in Dewey's metaphysical works: change, quality, interaction and continuity. Section five defends Dewey's position against some criticisms raised by Santayana, Cohen and others, while at the same time points out that Deweys concept of "primary experience" is ambiguous and that his purely functional approach to natural existences is one-sided.
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16.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
楊樹同
Shu-Tung Yang
論道德推理
Moral Reasoning: A Discussion with John Searle Concerning "Is" and "Ought"
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After a brief historical survey of the Is-Ought question, this paper takes issue with John Searle's important 1964 article 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is".' Searle tries to derive"ought" from "is" through an analysis of speech act of making a promise. Searle claims that a promise is a fact (what he calls an institutional fact), but in making a promise, a person is committed to carrying out what is promised, that is to say, he is also making an evaluation. Searle's point is that through this speech act analysis, he is able to derive an "ought" conclusion from premises which are purely factual statements. The present paper argues that whether one has to carry out what one promises depends on the content of the promise. However, in order to decide whether one should keep the promise, one has to appeal to one's own moral principles. In other words, there are evaluative elements hidden in Searle's so-called factual premises. Searle's attempt to derive "ought" from "is" is thus shown to be unsuccessful.
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17.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
林正弘
Cheng-Hung Lin
酒蓋律模式之檢討
Covering Law Theory Revisited
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Hempel's covering law theory of scientific explanation is discussed and criticized. According to Hempel, an adequate deductive-nomological explanation must satisfy the following three requirements: (i) the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; (ii) the explanans must contain general laws; and (iii) the sentences constituting the explanans must be true or well-confirmed. The present article argues that there could hardly be any explanation which satisfies all of the three requirements, and that either (i) or (iii) has to be abandoned.
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18.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
球文秀
Wen-Shiow Chen
同一
Identity
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The present paper first suggests that Quine's theory of river stage can be used in order to clarify Heraclitus' concept of the same river. However, in order for Quine's theory tobe useful, it is necessary to have a proper understanding of the principle of individuation. The author then attempts to offer an interpretation of the principle of individuation bymeans of the principle of abstraction. Finally, Leibniz's law is discussed through an analysis of the logical behavior of identity.
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19.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
傅佩采
Pel-Jung Fu
宗教語言的意義問題
On the Meaning of Religious Language
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Religious language is what we use to express religious experience which can be found in various places and times. But, has religious language any meaning, or more properly, can it be understood by those who never have or never want to admit such experience? If the answer to this question is positive, then what kind of meaning is this? The present article aims to tackling this problem. It begins with defining "religious language" , then ponders the discussion of some analytic philosophers like A. J. Ayer, A. Flew, I. Ramsey and others. Following this is an exposition of four ways in using religious language; they are: the negative way, the dubious way, the analogical way, and the qualification way. The conclusion shows that the meaning of religious language is based on a more comprehensive understanding of reality and an adequate definition of existence.
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20.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
恭信安
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
論維和:斯坦的哲學方法
On Wittgenstein's Method of Philosophy
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A method of philosophy is not independent from a conception of philosophy. The way of understanding Wittgenstein's method of philosophy is in his Philosophical Investigations. He says, "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (Sec.255). And, "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always know. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (Sec. 109). That is to say, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is that philosophy is not a doctrine of reality, but a treatment of illness which is arised from human life. The, treatment is out of his theories of language. This paper deaIs with his two different prescriptions in two books, i. e., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. The author contends that it is one method, that is, "by means of language", and one aim, "die Loesung des Problems des Lebens."
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