81.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1993 >
Issue: 16
陳俊輝
Jiunn-Huei Chern
存在與語言一一對祁克果語言哲學的幾點考察
Existence and Language - Inquiries about Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Language
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Generally speaking, S. Kierkegaard is regarded as the Father of the Existentialism in the modern time. We all know that he is famous for concentrating religiously on the individual existence. But owing to this fact his talent of the linguistic insight is seldom talked about. In order to correct the ordinary prejudice, the article tries to inquiry from thle viewpoint of existence into Kierkegaard's philosophy of language. The art icle is divided into three main parts: Part I mentions about Kierkegaard's reflection and analysisof the problem of Existence, and about the emergence of the liguistic theme. Part II discusses the main reference and the inner significance of Kierkegaard's philosophy of language. Part III comments the influence of Kierkegaard's philosophy of language on the modern time and what it reveals to us.
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82.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
林正弘
林正弘
科學哲學課程內容及教材之檢討
科學哲學課程內容及教材之檢討
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83.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
郎昆如
郎昆如
愛智在宇宙問題與人生問題之張力與調適
愛智在宇宙問題與人生問題之張力與調適
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84.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
傅佩榮
傅佩榮
宗教現象的哲學反省
宗教現象的哲學反省
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85.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
關永中
關永中
神秘經驗知識論及其三大型悠
神秘經驗知識論及其三大型悠
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86.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
陳文秀
陳文秀
理則學與進識教育
理則學與進識教育
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87.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
.林照田
.林照田
略論理則學的基本重要性 一從它的涵蓋性、系統性以及應用性來看
略論理則學的基本重要性 一從它的涵蓋性、系統性以及應用性來看
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88.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1994 >
Issue: 17
陳榮華
陳榮華
從這德、知識的性格 論孟子哲學的心性和智
從這德、知識的性格 論孟子哲學的心性和智
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89.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
郎崑如
Kun-Yu Woo
民國時期的社會哲學研究
A Study on the Social Philosophy in the Period of the Republic of China
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This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and reference books.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy in the period of the Republic of China. It begins from the revolutional ideology created by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1895, through the revolution in 1911, and ended in 1949, when the republic government escaped from mainland China to Taiwan on the one hand, it propounded by scholars on the other.The second part examines the essential contents of the social principles, prohlems and praxis during this century. Finally in the third part the author attempts a critique onthe values and the limitations of this study of the social philosophy in this period.
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90.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
蔡信安
Denis Hsin-An Tasi
論洛克哲學中的失口識、觀念與確定性
On Knowledge, Idea, and Certainty in John Locke
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In his Essay, John Locke contends, “since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, ... our knowledge is only conversant about them." But it is inconsistent with his realisrn, since the object of human knowlege is the external world itself rather than the idea in the mind. Thus, how can he be sure that he has knowledge of the world?In this paper, the author deals with Locke's concept of knowledge by an investigation of the problem in ideas which is related to criteria of truth.The paper is divded into two parts. The first part deals with Locke's metaphysics. The author contends that Locke develops his theory of knowledge in order to justify his religious faith and metaphysics. Locke is a realist. He establishes his theory of knowledge by way of way of idea. But he does not trust the ability of senses. Mind cannot know the real essence of the material substance. Thus, how can he claim that he knows things, since his theory of truth is of correspondence rather than of cohence?The second part of the paper clarifies Locke's problem of certainty in terms of origin, nature and division of idea. The author contends that Locke holds a causal theory of perception, since he uses the correspondence theory of truth. But It does not help Locke to get rid of the challenge of scepticism in natural science. In mathematics and morals, Locke believes that the human knowledge can be certain.
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91.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
黃懿梅
Yih-mei Huang
論人格同一性與思想實驗
Personal Identity and Thought Experments
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In studying the problems of personal identity, we found there are many imaginary cases. Philosophers used these imaginary thought experiments to decide who we are. They used these thought experiments to find out whether the criterion of personal identity is bodily identity or is constituted by psychological factors.But when they described these thought experiments, they have presupposed some criterion of personal identity. J. Perry's story is the good example. It can be described as' body change', it also can be described as' character and personality change'. The way we describe is dependent on what we assume about the criterion of personal identity. It is circular. Therefore, we cannot use these imaginary thought experments to decide who we are and the criterion of personal identity.
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92.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
陳榮華
Wing-wah Chan
從〈孟子〉和〈中庸〉 揭露一新的詮釋模型
A New Hermeneutical Model for the Interpretation of (Mencius) and (The Doctrine of the Mean)
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This essay contains of two parts. The first is show that the hermeneutical model, referred to as "the ontology of man as subject", on which the most popular contemporary interpretations of {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} are based, is inappropriate. I further point out that this ontological assumption is incoherent with the main themes of the works under investigation. In the second part, I propose a new hermeneutical model, "the ontology of Heaven as subject," and I show that the main principles in {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} can be well interpreted in this model. Finally, the relationship of these two models is briefly analysed.
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93.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
張柯圳
Chuan Chang-Ko
黑格爾的教育概念與通識教育中的哲 學概論之無構問題
Hegel's concept of Education and the Problem of the Structure of the Course of Introduction to Philosophy in Studium Generale
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Hegel' s concept of education in its development has three aspects. In " Das Leben Jesu", Hegel tries to find in the Gospel, from Platonic and Kantian point of view, a heuristic method of education, based upon a metaphysic of morality a priori. It is in effect a synthetic interpretation of the idea of education in Greek and Hebrew culture. In "Phanomenologie des Geistes", the metaphysic of morality a priori was deepened into a theory of the immanence of "weltgeist", and the heuristic method of education was enlarged to an idea of the education of well-rounded, integrated person. In his Nurnberg period, Hegel considered some actual practices of the educational institution and conteds that the low level vocational education may not achieve such ideal of education and that we should develop the general middle school education as universalas possible. The curriculum of philosophy in middle school is indispensable to the education of the individual person in its entirety, and it is also the best way to develop philosophy.If the middle school has the curriculum of philosophy, evidently the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale should be not a course in beginning philosophy, but must be more advanced and differentiated. The theory of the immanence of "Weltgeist" implies the infinite potentiality of the rnental development of human nature, and therefore expects a complete liberation and freedom of all opportunities of education. In such situation, the form of the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale may be a minor or a second major in philosophy.
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94.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1995 >
Issue: 18
曾漢塘
Hann-tong Tzeng
「合理性」與「邏輯一致性」 ~從泰勒〈合理性〉一文談起
“Rationality and Logical Consistency" ~ Discussing from Taylor's Viewpoint
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It is unquestionable that “rationality" is one of the most important terminologies used in modern philosophy. Philosophers do usually criticize other's statements or acts as“rational" or “irrational". Owing to its tremendous influences on academic discussions and even on ordinary conversations, we are enthusiastic to know what is its meaning and what is the standard when we possess the word to judge.In most cases, people take the logical consistency as a key criterion of rationality. Charles Taylor adjusted this opinion in his paper titled "Rationality". He thought consistency is plainly a necessary condition of rationality.Though logical inconsistency may be enough to explain the most accusations of the irrationality that bandied around in western civilization, rationality involves more than avoiding inconsistency. Peter Winch also mentioned us , in his paper "Understanding a Primitive society", that standards of rationality may differ from culture to culture and we must beware of applying them crossculturally. Charles Taylor did not agree with Winch's plurality of standards of rationality. He still opens the door for transcultural judgments of rationality and insists that the concept of rationality we use is richer.I am not quite satisfied with Taylor's resolution on the problem of rationality. He did not tell us what is the standard we possess to make the judgments of rationality betweentheoretical and atheoretical societies. The only message we got from him is consistency is not enough to explain all the judgments of rationality, especially in transcultural occasions. So I try to review some more comments on rationality. Through the distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality, Max Weber tried to help people escape from the confusion of making this kind of judgment. In a book "Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness", the author, Tran Van Doan, alleged that these three words should be applied in different aspects of human life. Reason expresses the metaphysical dimension of man. Rationality reflects human technical interest of dominating nature and of deciding human fate. And reasonableness is constructed on human daily life. People become confused only when they misplace these words in improperarea. As to the standard of judgments, Tran said that acceptance or agreement could be the criterion of reasonableness.Contrasting with Taylor's arguments, this paper tries to argue that logical consistency is still the main criterion of judgments of rationality. Consistency is concerned only in itslogical formulation, and is nothing to do with a whole theoretical structure. Things interfering one's judgment are usually happened to be in the theoretical structure or in the presupposition the debater possesses. The confusion of judgments of rationality originates from the different theory people hold, not from the common logical structure they have.
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95.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
黃懿梅
Yih-mei Huang
融貫論與可靠性
Coherentism and Reliability
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In this paper I discuss whether Lehrer' s theory of justification is able to overcome the isolation problem which purpots to show the internal relations do not guarantee truth about the world. Lehrer defends his coherence theory by claiming that our acceptance system contains not only what we accept about the external world but what we accept about our relationship to that world, including what we accept about the conditions under which we are reliable or trustworthy. This is to say that complete justification involves the reliability of the acceptance system and the acceptance of that reliability. I argue that Lehrer's defense is not successful.
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96.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
林義正
Lin
論〈周易〉與孔子晚年思想的關條
On the Relation between Chou-i and Confucius' Thoughts at His Old Age
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What are Confucius' thoughts at his old age really like? This is a question which has been brought out for discussion ever since. In this paper the author has addressed himself to the relation between Chou-i and Confucius' thoughts in his later life in five chapters, that is1. Preface2. Development of Confucius' thoughts thru his whole life3. Discussion on the relation between Confucius and C'hou-i4. Speculation on Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven at his late age5. Conclusion.As the author has acquired a new understanding of the implication in chapters relative to analect (5:12) and 'Hsu-Tuan Hsi-hsiang Shuo-Kuo Wen-Yen' of Shih Chi Kung-Tze-ShihChia, the I-Chuan in silk recently unearthed and the results of academic research over the past decade have further provided him with room for even more profound thinking as to make him realize that Confucius had once reorganized, researched, addressed and written about Chou-i. In his entire life, Confucius learned Chou-i when young but delighted in it during his later days. His attitude toward Chou-i had changed from “No prognostication" to “introducing prognostication" to moral teaching. All of these have shown that Confucius' lifelong thoughts had undergone a substantial change. In a word, Confucius did develop the thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven as recorded in “Ten Wngs." Futher more, I-Chuan of today's version was not entirely a work of Confucius', however, it did have some bearing on Confucius. For this reason, the author has refuted in the paper the arguments put forward in the past which completely denied the relation between Chou-i and Confucius and considered “Ten Wings" anything but a work full of Confucius' thoughts. The author believes that we cannot help focusing on the T'uan-Chuan with the aid of "Hien-y en Chuan, Hs'i-tz'u Chuan when we discuss theConfucius' thoughts at his old age to understand Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven, order of Heaven and human nature.
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97.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
愛與真--與馬賽爾懇談
Love and Truth - A Dialogde with Gabriel Marcel
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一般人以為愛情是盲目的,聖經卻把愛等同為真知:一一〈創世紀〉稱男女愛的結合為認識對方o (Genesis 4: 1; 19:8 )一一一〈申命記〉以摩西和上帝間的往還為彼此面對面的認知o ( Deuteronomy 34: 10 )一一先知們也意識到神對人那愛的選拔為懇切的洞見o ( Jeremiah 1: 5; Amos 3: 2 )如此說來,我們可大有立場地肯定一一一愛是導向真理的不二法門!誠然,愛容許你用積極的心態去面對對方,愛叫你在正面的眼光下洞悉被愛者的心靈深處,而被愛者也會在愛的滋潤下綻放他最湛深的蘊藏o為此,眾多哲人都在見證著說:除非透過愛,否則你無從在心靈的共嗚下獲得對方完整的敢 刀可o昔日有巴斯噶( Blaise Pascal )的名句:「心有其理性,為理性所不識o ˩ (註)當代也有佛洛姆( Erich Fromm) 的證言:「知識有許多層面,唯獨藉愛而獲致的洞察不停留在表面,而直指本心o ˩ (註)謝勒( Max Scheler )更直截了當地說:「真愛開敵人的靈眼,讓我們發現被愛者的更高價值o 它容許人有洞察,而不叫人盲目o ˩ (註)上述的名盲都在提示出于端至理:一一一愛與真理相貫通,愛不異於真,愛即是真!相類似的言辭,也在馬賽爾( Gabriel Marcel )的作品中出 現。在反省愛與真理的連貫之前,先讓我們體味馬氏對真理的看 法,以及他對傳統形上學談真理的回應:
The article is divided into four sections, i.e.,Section I: Traditional Metaphysics on TruthSection II: A Response from Gabriel MarcelSection III: Truth as Seen from the Perspective of LoveSection IV: The Interconnectedness between Love and TruthThomas Aquinas, as the representative of classical metaphysicians, proposes that truth is the adequation between one's intellect and its object. From the perspective of the object known, truth has its foundation in the intelligibility of the thing itself. Whereas, from the perspective of the knower, truth is the conformity of one's knowing, (especially one's judgment), to the actual content of the known object. Moreower, from the perspective of the Ultimate Being, truth has its highest manifestation in God's Noesis Noeseos.To such a thesis, Marcel has the following responses:1. Truth is not only an adequation between the intellect and the thing known, it is also a value I cherish so that I may even give up my life in order to bear witness to truth, as inthe case of Bruno's martyrdom.2. The intelligibility of the thing known can be regarded as its process of unconcealment, as explained by Martin Heidegger.3. As to the person who knows, the process of unconcealment also includes the courage to 'face' the truth on the part of the subject, as in the case of the parents' final willing to admit that their child is abnormal.4. From the perspective of the Divine Being, Marcel would be willing 10 emphasize that man's exigence for transcendence reveals the fact of God being the Ultimate Source of Truth and Light.If we reflect on the essence of truth from the eye of love, we may come to know that the more we love a being, the deeper we may penetrate into the core of her existence. Thelove from the part of the lover makes possible the beloved to manifest herself in a possitive manner. And, the love one has enables the lover to open his heart to the beloved so that he may allow himself to receive the revelation of the beloved to the fullest possible extent. Furthermore, from the inner life of the Divine, His Noesis Noeseos is no difference from His perfect love of Himself and of His creatures, since God is Truth and Love as such.Hence, we may conclude that the names of ' truth' and 'love' are convertible to one another; and, love can be regarded as a Transcendental Attribute on the par of the One, the True, the Good , and the Beautiful.
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98.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
陳榮華
Wing-wah Chan
葛達瑪遊戲概念中的存有學
The Ontological Commitment of Gadamer's Conception of Play
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In this essay, I address a holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play. The analysis consists of three parts. The first is to point out that certain basic characteristics of play are in essence some characteristics of Being. On the basis of this observation, as I further argue, an approach to a preliminary view of Being can be figured out. Secondly, I show the relationship between Being and man in virtue of an analysis of the relation between play and man. And finally, I argue that the play of Being is in some sort of sense a language game; and Being and man are to be mediated as a phenomenological unity in a language game of this type. Details of this holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play are discussed.
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99.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
孫效智
Hsiao-chih Sun
兩種追德判斷 -- 論「迫使、善惡」與「迫使、正誤」的區分
Two Categories of Moral Judgement - On the Distinction between Moral Goodness and Rightness
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The two objects of moral judgement are man and conduct. there are accordingly two kinds of rnoral judgement. In order to distinguish these two categories some ethicist introduce the two terms “moral goodness" and “moral rightness": “moral-goodness" for the judgement of man's morality; and “moral rightness" for describing the moral quality of conduct. Such distinction can be traced back to G. E. Moore's “Principia Ethica". German scholar B. Schuller also adopted it to his study of moral theology.These two terms are widely used by modern ethicists nowadays. Nevertheless, there are few systematic discussions about them, and some ethicists still doubt about their plausibility and even their necessity. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the issue in width and depth before we use them. To this purpose this artical is divided into three parts: firstly, historical background of the distinction; secondly, detailed clarification of the definitions of “moral goodness" and “moral rightness" and their relationship: lastly, the importance of this distinction in foundamental ethics.
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100.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
羅秉祥
Ping-cheung Lo
權利為本的迫使、理論之限剎與價值
The Limit and Value of Right-based Moral Theories
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Ronald Dworkin introduces a tripartite classification into political theories, viz., duty-based, goal-based, and right-based theories. J. L. Mackie extends this classification into moral theores. He argues that in addition to duty-based moral theories (e.g. , Kant's theory) and goal-based moral theories (e.g., Utilitarianism), a right-based moral theory is both conceptually possible and morally more desirable. This paper first attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mackie's right-based nioral theory in particular, and any right-'based moral theory in general. The present author then contends that there are three major weaknesses of such theories: (1) They over-simplify the relation between duties and rights;, (2) they fail to provide adequate guidance to moral life; (3) they cannot account for the true moral significance of supererogation and virtue. Accordingly, the present author agrees that a right-based moral theory is morally truncated and impoverished. It captures only a minimalist ethics. This is because there is a two-fold fundamental error of a right based moral theory, viz., it misplaces the moral subject, and it captures the point or object of morality only partially.The rejection of a right-based moral theory does not imply a rejection of rights. On the contrary, this paper continues to argue for the importance of rights in moral life, andthe priority of rights over duties in some cases. In other words, though rights cannot furnish the sufficient basis of morality, it does provide its necessary basis.
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