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Peter Dalton
Hume’s Third Cause
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It is widely believed that Hume recognizes only two types of causality-one equivalent to a constant conjunction between two "objects," the other involving somesort of necessary connection between them. I will refer to these types, respectively, as "conjunction" and "necessity." I believe that Hume relies on a third type of causality-a process by which a constant conjunction of perceptions causes someone to acquire a mental habit. To remain close to Hume's terminology, I will refer to the process as "repetition." The main thesis of this paper is that this process, though causal, cannot be equated with either conjunction or necessity. Repetition is no small matter. It is the key to the correctness of Hume's overall account of causality and causal belief since it explains why humans have causal beliefs,why the causes they believe in need only be revealed in conjoined perceptions, and yet also why humans believe that a cause involves a necessary connection with its effect even though this belief is unverifiable.
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342.
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Sami Pihlström
On the Concept of Philosophical Anthropology
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343.
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Professor Andrew Botterell
The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism
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344.
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Curtis Bowman
A Deduction of Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good
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This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich.s interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causation between happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promisedin my title.
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345.
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Abe Witonsky
A Defense of Michael Lockwood’s Anti-Physicalist Argument
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346.
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Kenneth Dorter
Free Will, Luck, and Happiness in the Myth of Er
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According to the Myth of Er we are responsible for our character because we chose it before birth. But any choice is determined by our present character, sothere is an indefinite regress and we cannot be entirely responsible for our character. The Myth of Er can be seen as the first formulation of the problem of free will, which Aristotle demythologizes in Nicomachean Ethics III.5. Plato's solution is that freedom is compatible with causal determinism because it does not mean indeterminism but rationality. The myth links the individual lives to the harmony of the spheres, so our lives are determined not by blind necessity, but by rational necessity that follows from the nature of the universe. Even so, the limitations of determinism prevent rationality from being a sufficient cause of happiness (although the opposite view is usually attributed to Plato), but it remains a necessary one.
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347.
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Mark Huston
Is Koethe’s Wittgenstein a Linguistic Idealist?
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348.
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Jason Baehr
Necessity and Rational Insight:
BonJour and Audi on A Priori Justification
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349.
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Panagiotis Thanassas
From Circular Facticity to Hermeneutic Tidings:
On Heidegger’s Contribution to Hermeneutics
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350.
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Dan McArthur
Deflationary Metaphysics, Social Constructivism, and the Natural Ontological Attitude
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351.
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Tara Smith
Morality Without the Wink:
A Defense of Moral Perfection
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352.
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Hamid Vahid
Doubts About Epistemic Supervenience
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353.
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Donald N. Blakeley
The Mysticism of Plotinus and Deep Ecology
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354.
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Karen Wendling
Habits of Inequality:
A Radical View of Institutions and Inequality
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355.
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William Vaughan
Beinger than Being is Being Itself:
A Beiträge Primer
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356.
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Kevin Cahill
The Tractatus, Ethics, and Authenticity
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357.
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H. Scott Hestevold
Pity
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358.
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Andrei A. Buckareff
Acceptance and Deciding to Believe
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359.
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Jeremy Randel Koons
Disenchanting the World:
McDowell, Sellars, and Rational Constraint by Perception
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360.
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Yitzhak Benbaji
Using Others’ Words
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