Quito published her book The State of Philosophy in the Philippines in 1983. When the book was already out for fifteen years, I undertook a re-reading of its identified four clusters of reasons for the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy, and hope for development in 1999, through an article “Re-Reading Emerita Quito’s Thoughts Concerning the Underdevelopment of Filipino Philosophy.” Thirty-six years after the publication of Quito’s book, and twenty years after the publication of my re-reading, this paper looks back again on Quito’s four clusters of reasons and hope, as well as on my re-reading of such reasons and hope, with the intention of sharpening our collective diagnosis on what continue to cause the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy, as well as imagining more realistic pathways towards its more robust development. This paper, therefore, has two substantive sections: the first is an exposition of Quito’s four clusters of causes and hope, accompanied by my commentaries on such four causes and hope; and the second is my present critical reflection on Quito’s thirty-four-year-old diagnosis and hope, as well as on my twenty-year-old commentary.

The state of exception is mostly considered within the context of the modern sovereignty. Although the state of exception is thought within the modern paradigm of state governance, it carries a Christian context. The Christian context represents an eschatological way of power that comes in a miracle which cannot be interiorized by present. This divine way of governance therefore refers to a power which occurs as a threshold. The theological-political form of governance, which is also called the divine oikonomia, shows the power of governance in creating an exception which cannot be foreseen by any current contexts. That is why the power of modern sovereignty resembles its archaic model in which the divine power of God is designated as a pure potentiality which cannot be limited within any contextuality. This article aims to explore the theological source of modern sovereignty in order to understand the very meaning of governance.

I argue in this paper that infinitism is the best answer to the dialectical regress challenge. Infinitism, as a theory of rational dialectics, has not received enough attention from scholars because major proponents of the theory have focused mainly on using infinitism to answer an epistemic regress problem. Rather than construing infinitism as an answer to the epistemic regress question, I take the theory to be addressing a dialectical regress challenge and subsequently pitch it against its dialectical rivals. It emerges that dialectical infinitism addresses the regress challenge far better than its competitors if it is couched as a social contextualist thesis.

Three hypostases and their relations form the core of Plotinus’ philosophical system. We claim that contrary to some interpretations, there are no overlaps or blurred borders between hypostases, and we demonstrate that mature Plotinus philosophy presents them as clearly defined and separated. This article begins by providing an overall overview of the structure of Plotinus’ metaphysics. We then briefly characterize each of the hypostases to provide firm support for our claims. After this exposition, we discuss the relations of these hypostases and metaphysical differentiating principles, firstly providing an overview of other viewpoints then describing our proposed interpretation. The concluding remarks provide a comparison of our reading of Plotinus with the main interpretative principles of his work.

The liar paradox results from a line of reasoning that starts with the liar sentence, ‘This sentence is false’ and ends with a contradictory conclusion, ‘The liar sentence is both true and false’. There have been solutions to the paradox that preserve the standard conception of truth and the classical notion of logical validity. In this paper, I explore nonstandard solutions to it. In particular, I focus on two non-classical solutions to the liar paradox; viz., the gappy and the glutty solutions. According to the gappy solution, the liar sentence is neither true nor false, and the reasoning that leads to the paradoxical conclusion is unsound. On the other hand, according to the glutty solution, the paradoxical conclusion is correct, but any subsequent reasoning from it is invalid. I show some ways of motivating each of these solutions. Next, I show what each implies about the notions of truth and validity, and how each solves the paradox. Finally, I highlight some of the more recent problems that could be pitted against each of these solutions.

Suppose a person blushes iff what she says is false and she says: ‘I am blushing’. If she blushes, she doesn’t, and if she doesn’t, she does. This Blushing Liar (BL) is a new paradox, similar in some respects to the Pinocchio Paradox (PP): Pinocchio’s nose grows iff he says some falsity, and he says: ‘my nose is growing’. Both paradoxes involve physical properties, and both, supposedly, confirm the existence of metaphysical dialetheias (see Eldridge-Smith 2011). In the paper, we note first that while PP relies on the rather implausible scenario of a wooden puppet whose nose grows iff he is lying, so it is debunked by the objection of fictionality (raised by Beall 2012), BL is more plausible. Many people in our world blush, and it is not difficult to imagine someone whose saying is causally related to blushing in a similar way. A second question is whether blushing can be directly connected to falsity, without deliberate conscience, on the part of the speaker, of saying a false statement. So we explore the consequences of intending ‘I am blushing’ as a ‘lie’, in the strict meaning of the term, and we claim there is no substantial difference, but for the fact that the paradoxical effect is even more plausible. Third, we check whether BL and PP do really release metaphysical dialetheias, and we argue they do not: they lack the fundamental requisite of Liar-like contradictions, i.e. the stratification of properties.

The article focuses mainly on linguistic aspects, paying special attention to meanings of the word ZHEN 貞. The research is based on the text version and commentary by Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249) from Wei Dynasty, classical Ten Wings (Shi yi 十翼) commentaries from the 1st mil. BC, works by scholars from Han, Tang, Song and Qing Dynasties (2nd cent. BC until17th. cent. AD), as well as translations by Western sinologists. In the first part of the article, the semantic approach is applied, in order to trace origins and existing definitions of the term ZHEN. In the second part, a creative deconstruction approach will be used to analyze the entire text, revealing atypical meanings within various schemes: 1) in the layer of hexagram succession chain and judgments, 2) in relationships of lines, 3) in problematic and inauspicious situations where the word is mentioned.

The topic of science was one of the most significant topics in the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was not primarily a science methodologist; he could be considered a significant philosopher of science. Heidegger’s philosophy of science is often labeled supertemporal. Although Heidegger was interested in reflecting several stages of science, the present article only deals with his philosophical view of modern science. The article does not analyze how Heidegger reflects on particular sciences; it analyses how he reflects on science as a whole, specifically the individual stages of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The basic question of the research is whether his philosophy of science before the “Turn” is in any way different from his philosophy of science after the “Turn,” i.e., whether we can speak of two completely different approaches to science, or whether it is possible to find some continuity between them. Besides Heidegger’s published works, the paper also reflects on the discovery of an original, unpublished version of his text and looks critically at some interpreters of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The study concludes that despite numerous differences in his reflection on science before and after the Turn, it can be stated that there is substantial continuity between the stages of Heidegger´s philosophy of science.

The moral debate about open borders needs to go beyond focusing on the interests of the migrant versus the interests of the hosting state and its original citizens to focusing more on the interests of the countries that migrants are leaving. I hint at the long-term insufficiency of so-called economic remittances to the development of migrant-sending states when compared to domiciled skilled labor. But most importantly, I identify the irrelevance of current empirical research on brain drain to an open borders scenario. I hint at the potential scale of brain drain in such a scenario, and I raise a moral question about the propriety of proposing open borders with a focus on the wellbeing of the individual migrant if such a focus is determined to be at the expense of the wellbeing of the migrant’s home country. I add that a preamble to opening borders would be to significantly address gross global economic disparities, world poverty, and political injustices.

The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica (henceforth, ST) since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate (henceforth, Dv), there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief.

The principle of overlap of classes holds that when two entities interface, the effect is a blurring of boundaries between conceptual territories. In this paper, this question is in order: Is Folk Catholicism an instance of overlap of classes? If Folk Catholicism is not construed as such, these fallacies – using Robin George Collingwood’s perspective in his An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), may unfold: the fallacy of precarious margins, the fallacy of identified coincidents, and the fallacy of false disjunction. The first fallacy holds that the ‘Folk’ in Folk Catholicism has no contribution to how ‘Catholicism’ unfolds. The second fallacy maintains that the extensions of both ‘Folk’ and ‘Catholicism’ are clearly delineated. The third fallacy underscores that Folk and Catholicism are mutually exclusive terms. When such fallacies are accepted, this paper holds that Folk Catholicism as a construct may be a contradiction of terms on what it means to be Folk and Catholic. This is the illogical consequence given that the truth of what it means to be folk necessitates the falsity of what it means to be Catholic and vice-versa. However, when recognized from the lens of the overlap, Folk Catholicism is construed as a term that evolves and is historically conditioned.

I argue in this paper that every society has its own “libidinal drives” that may or may not paralyze the capacity of individuals towards freedom. Fromm calls this the social character. Social character is the unconscious canalization of individual libidinal drives for the attainment of social objectives instituted by the dominant figures of society. I theorize that the Freirian dyadic alliance persists because of a dominant characterology permeated by the ruling authorities. The dynamics of social character structure not only eludes the oppressed conscious awareness, but it also actually strengthens the domination and control through the institutionalization of structural policies enacted and implemented by the oppressors. Hence, what Freire laments in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed is equalized and smoothen by how the marginalized and the downtrodden cling incessantly towards the oppressors. By depending upon the dominant ruling authorities, the oppressed find fulfillment and satisfaction, upon which they fortify the dyadic-symbiotic relations. This happens because of the dynamics of their character structure that caters to the instinctual drive to survive. The social character gives rise to the inner satisfaction of oppressed libidinous desires and needs, thus equalizing their own emotional needs. Furthermore, the very nature of their submissiveness is a character trait that unknowingly recanalizes their elementary needs in life. Hence, by understanding how the Frommian social character influences social behaviors the symbiotic element that cements the Freirian dyadic relation is unlocked. Through unraveling the dynamics of social characterology, the Freirian dyadic symbiosis ungrounds itself and eventually grasps why the majority of the poor and marginalized are motivated and find fulfillment therein as a matter of survival from controlling authorities.

Morality is a normative system of guidance that figures into practical reason by telling people what to do in various situations. The problem, however, is that morality has inherent gaps that often render it inefficacious. First, it may be indeterminate due to the high level of generality in which its principles are formulated. Second, moral terms such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ may be so vague that they fail to specify the requisite behavior. And third, its subjective aspect, which is a product of personal experience, generates moral disagreement and thereby creates coordination problems that frustrate society’s collective moral aims. The objective of this article is to advance the thesis that morality must sometimes depend on law as a supplementary source of practical reason, a dependence which can be explained in terms of three essential features of law: its institutional character, its claim to authority, and its status as a second-order exclusionary reason for action. It shall then be explained how these three features enable law to make difficult decisions on behalf of individuals, define objective standards of conduct, and solve coordination problems, respectively, and in doing so, manage to fill in the gaps of morality mentioned above. Hence, it will be argued that law is also a normative system that helps people achieve their moral aims, notwithstanding the fact that it guides human behavior through a different logic and mode of operation from those of morality.

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown.

This paper aims to institute that the folk song Pamulinawen is essentially a work of art descriptive of Ilokano cultural self-understanding. Specifically, it wants to elucidate that Pamulinanen, per se, is capable of self-assertion; it can usher itself to engage in a dialogue with the Ilokano beholder, and through the mediation of a common pagsasao (language), it embodies the individual and/or Nakem, the Ilokano collective identity. More than a popular song of courtship among the Ilokanos, the song Pamulinawen then attempts to increase knowledge about Ilokano kananakem (cultural self-understanding) so that it serves not only as a piece of Ilokano cultural entertainment but as a medium to express “Ilokano-ness" (Ilokano beingness). Through the qualitative methodology, this study mainly employs maiyannatup a panagripirip, a hermeneutical approach to appropriately philosophize on the Ilokano metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. This approach consists of, among others, palpaliiw (observation) and the “Agcaoilon PAR” (“Punget-A-Ramut a balikas” or root-stem word).

Whether all the Platonic dialogues are parts of an inconsistent or consistent body is a controversial subject of philosophy. Indeed, though in form all the texts are written dialogically, in content, one might recognize methodological alterations in Platonic thought from the 1st book of The Republic to later dialogues such as The Statesman and The Laws. However, how much this methodological alteration might affect the content of Plato’s political philosophy, the relation between the rupture in the method of contemplation on the one hand and the structure of the Platonic ideal Polis is still a subject not seriously explored yet. Exploring the characteristics of the three different methods used in Plato’s different dialogues, the present study attempts to show that in the light of the methodological alteration, one might realize how Platonic understanding of the good society has changed from The Republic to The Statesman and The Laws.