This article aims to present Cicero and Wang Chong as theorists of divination. While it has already been determined that they advanced both defenses and criticisms, I specifically intend to focus on their significant criticisms of divination, which emerged as corrective for the practice by supporting or disapproving and extending or limiting its underlying principles. I also emphasize that these thinkers have different objectives and emphases in their criticisms. Cicero’s objective is to maintain the fundamental teachings of their forefathers, prompting him to criticize anything that contradicts their teachings. Wang Chong’s objective is to make an appeal and encourage their people to be critical, and he often showed this through his criticism of the old, their classic texts, or even their tradition. In bringing them together, I show a robust and united rebuttal to the old ways of thinking about the divine and its ritualization. In conclusion, I offer an analysis that their critical attitudes, although different and may even be opposed, are complementary and both necessary.

Since Descartes, the quest for the foundation in epistemology has suffered a series of setbacks. The consequence of the opposition against an epistemic foundation is epistemic skepticism. The irony of the skeptic position is that scepticism in all its hues is self-refuting. Although the establishment of a foundation is essential for coherent epistemology, the quest for epistemic foundation has suffered some oppositions because most attempts at establishing foundational epistemology have focused on intentional signs or products – beliefs, concepts, propositions, etc. In this essay, I argue that in order to establish foundational epistemology, cognitional and intentionality analysis should take priority over conceptual analysis. Hence, instead of focusing on intentional signs or products, attention should be paid to intentional acts – experiencing, understanding and judging – of the knowing subject. In other words, I argue that paying adequate attention to human cognitional structure is vital in the defense of epistemic foundation and that the foundation is found in the structure of human knowing rather than in the products of human knowing. Focusing on cognitional analysis will help to account for both epistemic foundation and epistemic pluralism. The shift from conceptual to cognitional and intentionality analysis has implications for the articulation of the African perspective on knowledge since the human cognitional structure is the same, but contextual differences arise because of one's epistemic environment. Following the example of Bernard Lonergan, I argue that self-knowledge or self-affirmation of the knower, as he terms it, is the paradigmatic case for the establishment of epistemic foundation.

Aristotle discovered the law of contradiction more than 2000 years ago. Since then, this law has been regarded as one of the basic principles of logic. Aristotle considered this principle to be 'the most indisputable of all beliefs,' but nearly half a century ago, it began to be criticized. The voice of criticism came from a philosophical logic - paraconsistent logic. This study analyses in depth the specific properties of the positive logic plus approach, non-adjunctive approach, and relevant approach of paraconsistent logic and presents three definitions of the law of contradiction. It also shows that there are two types of the law of contradiction in C-logics and that the law of contradiction with classical negation is valid in them. Furthermore, this study proves that the law of contradiction with classical negation is also valid in a non-adjunctive approach and explains the reason this law cannot be deduced in some relevant logic systems. Based on these, we can clarify what type of the law of contradiction is questioned by paraconsistent logics and thoroughly reveal the exact meaning of 'the law of contradiction is invalid' in paraconsistent logics.

In this article, we contest the idea that evil does not exist, or that it is a mistaken grasp of reality to contend that evil exists. We analyze two versions of this argument: the 'orchestra argument' and the 'mystical argument.' In common, these arguments contend that those who affirm the existence of evil in the world have a limited view of reality. We argue that these views are either over-abstract from reality or do not offer a plausible approach to the problem of evil. We then advance a decolonial perspective on evil. According to the perspective advanced here, evil is conceptualized as a phenomenon that diminishes life. We contend this view provides a better account of how to understand evil.

The objective of this work is to explore the notion of "action" and "agency" in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of "action" and "agency" in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension, employed in the language and science of artificial intelligence. The advent of the science of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, and the technological applications of artificial intelligence in the production of agents such as driverless cars and expert systems, have raised the question of moral, ethical and/or legal responsibility in AI agents. This has re-emphasized the importance of the philosophical discourse on the notions of action and agency, which in contemporary intellectual discourse are now perceived to be phenomena within the epistemic competence of the natural sciences. This paper argues that AI systems do not and cannot possess free agency and autonomy, thus, cannot be morally and ethically responsible. Hence, it recommends a socio-political response to the question of responsibility in AI. It is then the duty of individual nations, or the global community to define and enact policies on who shoulders the responsibility of actions executed by AIs

Recent pluralist accounts of the People and popular sovereignty, defining it as either a performance or a process, are divorced from the realities of mass disempowerment. By shifting emphasis from who to what, these notions of the People, though seemingly unconcerned with the problem of positing this entity as a collective agent, have actually posited the politically active as the concrete subject of the People. Consequently, I argue that these recent theories exclude the reality of mass disempowerment within contemporary democracies by marginalizing agency, presupposing empowerment, and assuming the resonance of the various representations of the People. Simply put, they suffer from an activist-centric bias that renders the politically alienated, disempowered, and inactive as irrelevant entities, a nameless shadow lurking behind analyses of popular power. Hence, my task is to clear the ground for a more comprehensive theory of the People and Popular Sovereignty by exposing the roots, limits, and costs of this activist-centric bias.

One compelling argument challenging the tenability of physicalism, which sees reality as fundamentally comprised of physical facts, is Jackson's knowledge argument. Through a powerful thought experiment involving the case of Mary, the super neuroscientist, the argument demonstrates how knowledge of phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from knowledge of physical facts. For allegedly leaving out phenomenal facts in its account of reality, physicalism is shown to be incomplete and hence mistaken. Physicalists respond to this argument in a variety of ways, challenging, in turn, some aspects of the knowledge argument. This paper focuses on the replies of the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, which respectively try to block the two crucial moves in the knowledge argument: the establishment of an epistemic gap and the inference from the occurrence of this gap to the existence of an ontological gap. The paper critically examines how proponents of these two replies to the knowledge argument respond to some objections to maintain the viability of physicalism.

As we face an uncertain future for our country, philosophers – the so-called lovers of wisdom - are tasked to revisit our role in shaping our country's future and molding the consciousness of our people, especially the young. In this paper, I focus on the evolution of philosophy in the Philippines, what we have done as teachers and philosophers in and for the academe, and what else we need to do not only for the future of philosophy in our country but for the future of our country as well. In this last point, I stress that we need to contribute to shaping the critical consciousness of our people as our contribution to nation-building. That must be the future of philosophy in the Philippines and its critical role in the future of our beloved country

In his two articles, F. P. A. Demeterio III attempts to classify works in Filipino philosophy using a list of twelve (or sixteen) supposed discourses that prominent philosophers in the Philippines have engaged in and published over the past few years. From this list, he advises current Filipino philosophers to invest their time and effort in contributing to only five of these because of their alleged higher measure of "developmental potential" as opposed to other discourses. In this paper, we raise some fundamental issues with Demeterio's approach. We show that (i) his work's conclusions rest on questionable methodological assumptions that make (ii) the discourses which the work arrived at and the rankings in terms of "developmental potential" superficial and ungrounded. Finally, (iii) instead of fulfilling the main aim of advancing research in Filipino philosophy, the proposed approach may actually lead to its stagnation and demise. We argue that these issues, if left unanswered, make Demeterio's whole approach to Filipino philosophy unsound and may put into question the employment of such an approach.

The article intends to argue that the roots of religious freedom in the West can be found many centuries before the time of the Reformation, namely in the writings of Christian apologists who wrote in defense of the right to practice the Christian faith in the Roman Empire, in the political context of the time, which was otherwise tolerant of the religious pluralism present in its space. Moreover, we talk about Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, known as Tertullian (160-225): "the first theologian of the West" and "the first political theologian." In last, we will argue that religious freedom is a natural right according to the philosophical and political developments over the centuries.

The view is gaining currency that modern democracy is facing a crisis. This article offers a perspective on this theme. The article argues that the crisis is not about which political perspective comes to power, or which policies governments should pursue. Arising from the foundations of the democratic system, the crisis emerges from the supreme prominence given to an absolutist interpretation of freedom, which is a defining feature of the modern democratic state. This leads to a contentious pluralism, marked by the emergence of a plurality of worldviews and a spirit of relativism, that have become characteristic features of many democratic nations. The article identifies at last three causes of this crisis of worldview pluralism: the relationship between freedom and pluralism, a loss of confidence in reason, and the failure of public deliberation. After introducing the notion of a worldview, the article goes on to consider the prominence of both religious and secularist worldviews and rejects several arguments from secular liberalism for excluding religion from public life. We draw out the implications for church and state and look at how democracies must proceed in the light of the crisis and the new realities that are a consequence of pluralism.

Freedom and truth are topics that have engaged the attention of many throughout history. In different contexts, they continue to be the subject of much debate in society. Given the variety of interests and, at times, questionable references, there is a need to probe much more closely into what is involved in citing these two ideas. This article discusses the underpinnings of the notions of freedom and truth and provides relevant considerations of fundamental issues in the hope of throwing some light on their usage in discussions. It then offers suggestions on how some guiding principles may help resolve specific situations.

The paper argues that John Locke's 'Theory of government justification' (TGJ) is grounded on a consistent moral account. This is shown by reconstructing such an account through textual analysis of The Essays on the Law of Nature, The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and the Two Treatises of Government. The first two parts of the paper show that the account of morality that can be traced throughout Locke's works fulfills the desiderata of 1) normative strength and 2) motivational effectiveness by way of being at the same time both deontic and naturalistic. The third part introduces an epistemological objection that seriously compromises the success of Locke's project but argues that it is not fatal to it.

This essay discusses the right to same-sex marriages in Africa within the purview of African thought systems. The consensus among Africans appears to be that LGBT rights and lifestyles are imported ways of life from the West and are inimical to the communal cultural values of Africa. However, the West has insisted that African countries recognize LGBT rights or face sanctions. We examine this tension within the purview of the African thought system, specifically within the perspective of moderate African communitarian values, and conclude by offering a more comprehensive resolution strategy to ending the impasse.

This paper takes another look at the controversial category of expository philosophical writing in the context of Filipino philosophy. Expository philosophical writing is understood here as writing about the philosophical thoughts of a given philosopher, who is usually Wester. This paper starts with how Quito and Abulad denounced this mode of philosophical writing as inferior. With Abulad’s realization of the necessity of this mode of writing, the author took a parallel look at how he grappled with this controversial category from the late 1990s to the present. Agreeing with Abulad on the necessity of this mode of writing, this paper offers a typology of expository philosophical writing consisting of: 1) introductory/overview writing, 2) curation writing, 3) archeological writing, 4) forensic writing, 5) comparative writing, 6) polemic writing, 7) writing as a prelude to appropriation, and 8) writing in the Filipino language. This paper has two substantive sections. The first one catalogues eight typologies of expository philosophical writings together with their strengths and weaknesses. The second one sharpens further the idea of expository philosophical writing by contrasting it with related modes of philosophical writing. This paper will be useful to Filipino philosophy students, philosophy teachers, thesis advisers, and thesis panelists, as this paper attempted not only to clear away the mark of inferiority that Filipino philosophy placed on expository philosophical writing but more so to provide some guideposts on how specific types of expository philosophical writings should be pursued by Filipino researchers of philosophy.

This paper takes Rosa's theory of resonance as a viable alternative to a meaningful and purposive life. The relentless pressures of modern living have led us towards a dissonant existence. Despite the scientific advances and technological innovations, the modern world has provided, life has become too burdensome. The world becomes a silent, cold, and rigid haven where our social relationships are alienated. Alienated relations separate and disconnect us from our everyday affairs, which are supposed to be essential for growth and productivity. We are cut off and unable to use our human powers to connect with the world. Alienation detaches us and our surrounding environment, and thus, it seems that no meaningful experiences can ever be achieved. Hence, in this paper, I offer Rosa's resonance as a point of looking at the world from another angle. I argue with Rosa that only when we are touched and moved by our daily affairs do we become self-efficacious and thus empowered to improve and reclaim a sense of the world. Unlike in alienated experiences, only when we are rooted, affirmed, and validated by our society can we partake and share a segment of the world. The endless social debates that we do remain to be theories unless they touch and move us from within. This is where I think Rosa's version of critical theory emerges to be relevant in our times. What really matters, he says, is what goes on in our daily affairs. In our world of social relations, we either resonate or are alienated by the things surrounding us. As Rosa argues, if we resonate, we allow ourselves to be one with the world, creating harmony and unity, which call us to respond to the call of our times.

I argue that the underlying criterion for the list of professions that fall under the Roman legal category of Infamia was not moral, as scholars have argued, but rather aesthetic-ontological. Revisiting Greco-Roman philosophy of mimesis and consulting Edwards’s analysis of infames-elite role exchange as well as Hell’s research into Roman “judicial theatre,” I argue that infames were disqualified from legal testimony because their trades involved professional dramatic mimesis. They were thus conceived to be prone to sacrifice the specificity of events for pre-established aesthetic forms, which undermines the pursuit of truth in a court of law. However, far from excluding mimesis, the Roman court deployed what Hutcheon has called “mimesis of process,” which, despite being self-referential, encouraged the depiction of the pure, naked event—what Blanchot (following Levinas) has termed il y a — prior to being reduced to pre-established aesthetic, moral, epistemological, and even linguistic forms and ideals.

This paper covers the idea of fascism in the light of new and emerging technologies as well as the current ubiquity of its use. I draw my inspiration for this paper from the constant use of the word "fascist" to denote opposition to a group or personal stance on socio-political issues. My attempt to look at new forms of fascism is guided by the original concept of fascism espoused by Mussolini's Doctrine of Fascism. I also attempt to frame the conditions of the new forms of fascism in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This context undergirds the current propaganda model of media institutions that have shifted their operations to the Internet. I argue in this paper that current media platforms that operate under the BUMMER principle provide a potent breeding pool for new forms of fascism that are reliant on ideologies as opposed to authoritarian figures. These conditions, as I argue in this paper, force us to rethink our current entanglement with democratic systems that are entrenched in representative iterations. As a conclusion to this paper, I argue the strong need for exploring an increased degree of participation of individuals through direct forms of democracy, increased scrutiny of media institutions, and the exploration of current and existing technologies to undergird direct democratic participation.