The present article aims to analyze the relation between the finitude of the soul and the perception of the infinite in Malebranche’s philosophy. We will initially address the relationship that Malebranche establishes between the spirit and God through the simple vue proof of the existence of God, and the subsequent infinitesimal perception that follows from this immediate apprehension of the infinite. We will then turn specifically to the function that the idea of the infinite plays for Malebranchean theory of perception. On the basis of this analysis, it will become clear how the infinite is not only perceived by the spirit, but also how it becomes, after the introduction of the notion of intelligible extension, a structuring part of perception.

Supposing that addicts choose to act as they do, rather than being compelled to behave in particular ways, what explains the choices that they make? Hannah Pickard has recently pointed out that we can go a long way to answering this question if we can make sense of why addicts value the ends they pursue. She argues that addiction is a social identity that gives purpose and structure to life and that the choices that addicts make are valuable to them as ways of sustaining this social identity. But if addicts freely make choices towards ends that they perceive as valuable in terms of a social identity to which they contribute, and therefore if addiction involves the deployment of quite considerable agential apparatus, how are we to hold on to the natural assumption that addictions are disempowering? In this paper I present an answer to this question. Drawing on the resources of the phenomenological tradition, I argue that some social identities give purpose and structure to life in a way that inhibits, rather than enables, the exercise of a capacity that is central to our form of life. I elaborate the hypothesis that paradigmatic cases of addiction involve this sort of disempowering social identity.

Since the publication of Hume’s Treatise, scholars have been divided on how to interpret the ontology of Humean relations. In particular, is Hume’s theory of relations consistent with positivism, (skeptical) realism, or anti-realism? In this essay, I propose a novel distinction separating impressions and ideas from relations such that relations are construed as forming a distinct category equal to impressions and ideas. In so doing, I interpret Hume as fundamentally agnostic toward the ontology of relations.

It is a puzzling fact that the Greek term for Nature ‘physis’ could be used to refer to (inter alia) i) reality as a whole, ii) the nature (essence) of something, iii) to individual material beings or materiality and iv) all things that are self-generating. In order to understand and tie together this wide array of possible meanings, I will consider the thesis that ‘physis’ was in fact used as a concept of being, a term naming the fundamental property of all of reality in the early pre-Socratics, poets and scientists before 500 BCE. Investigating ‘physis’ in this way can give us a way of thinking about Nature as a dynamic and creative but material process that goes far beyond the classical understanding of Nature as the sum of things that self-generate or the modern mathematical understanding of Nature born with Galileo, dominant to this day.

In the Lectures on the Method of Academic Study in 1802, F.W.J. Schelling warned his listeners against the annihilation of nature. The annihilation he had in mind was not ecological in the usual sense of the word, but an annihilation caused by a certain way of looking at nature – a philosophical annihilation. The issue Schelling had in mind was that of understanding nature as mechanical, or as merely a domain of things, and of understanding humans as somehow more than natural. This paper is set to describe and argue for a Schellingian alternative to the “annihilation” of nature, to demonstrate why, on such an understanding of nature, the only thing which could undermine it is abstraction and to see how a philosophy should approach abstract thinking in order to deal with this apparent problem. For that, different ways to apply the “knife” of abstraction will be then discussed – some murderous, some surgical.

This paper will compare the concept of nature as it appears in the philosophies of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Chinese text known as the Zhuangzi, with an aim towards mapping out a heuristic program which might be used to correct various interpretive difficulties in reading each figure. I shall argue that Dewey and Zhuangzi both held more complex and comprehensive philosophies of nature than for which either is typically credited. Such a view of nature turns on the notion of continuity, particularly that between an experiencing organism [Dewey’s “live creature”] and the conditioning environment [Zhuangzi’s “crooked tree”]. Where Dewey’s and Zhuangzi’s ideas about nature converge, one finds similarities in prescriptions made for human action, and in the few places where they differ, one finds mutually complementary insights.

This paper aims to highlight how the philosophy of chemistry could be of help for rethinking Nature today. To do so, we will point out: (1) the co-definition of chemical relations (transformations) and chemical relata (bodies) within chemical activities; (2) the constitutive role of the modes of intervention in the definition, always open and provisional, of “active” chemical bodies; and (3) the mutual dependence of the levels of organization in chemistry. We will insist on the way chemists tailor networks of interdependencies within which chemical bodies and properties are context-sensitive and mutually determined by means of particular chemical operations or transformations. To conclude, we will show how the specific action of bodies upon the Earth at different scales of space and time, and how the relational definition of a chemical body, pave the way for a new understanding of Nature.

In this article, two different claims about nature are discussed. On the one hand, environmental philosophy has forced us to reflect on our position within nature. We are not the masters of nature as was claimed before. On the other hand there are the recent developments within synthetic biology. It claims that, now at last, we can be the masters of nature we have never been before. The question is then raised how these two claims must be related to one another. Rather than stating that they are completely irreconcilable, I will argue for a dialogue aimed to discuss the differences and similarities. The claim is that we should not see it as two successive temporal phases of our relation to nature, but two tendencies that can coexist.

A complex global nonlinear physics, eurhythmic physics, promotes not only the epistemic unification of the known branches of physics but also establishes a deep interconnection with complex human sciences.

This paper offers a discussion of Conway’s account of omnipresence, as found in her only published work, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690). It is argued that Conway proposes a radical approach to understanding the nature of the divine presence in the world. After delineating different approaches to the question of omnipresence that can be found in the philosophical and theological tradition, it is argued that Conway offers a significant and original account that contrasts with the more traditional notions of divine presence based on God’s location, knowledge, power, and creative activity. This account is informed by an exploration of Conway’s underlying Platonist commitments and her arguments regarding the need for a mediating principle, “Christ” or “Adam Kadmon,” between God and creation. Following this, it is argued that there is a notion of omnipresence to be found in Conway’s philosophy centred on a Platonist-inspired “participation-presence,” which offers a dynamic sense of the growing presence of God in the world. The paper then concludes with some more general reflections upon the manner in which Conway’s account of omnipresence fits into the wider intellectual climate of the time, including radical reimaginings of both the nature of God and his presence in the world.

In this paper, I argue that Kant gives a philosophically plausible derivation of the general duty of benevolence and that this derivation can be used to show how to derive other general duties of commission with the universalizability tests.The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain Kant’s notion of a general duty. In the second, I introduce the universalizability tests. In the third, I examine and argue against an account in the secondary literature of how to derive general duties from these tests. In the fourth, I look at Kant’s derivation of the duty of benevolence in the Metaphysics of Morals, and I suggest how this reasoning can be extended to other duties.

The debate in Metaphysics of Science concerning the interaction between metaphysics and science has been mainly approached from the perspective of the scientificdiscipline of physics. In this paper, I address this debate from a different framework, namely that of biology. I pay attention to the recent characterization of Metaphysics of Biology and the different forms in which philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual biological problems. In doing so, I argue that two main lessons can be obtained that can serve to enrich the debate in Metaphysics of Science: i) that the interaction between metaphysics and science seems to be more complex than generally considered; and ii) that the type of metaphysics that is interacting with science when characterizing the ontological status of the world is neither the a priori nor the naturalized one, but a different form of metaphysics that will be labelled here as applied metaphysics.