In a number of places over the last few years Hayden White has attacked a view of history which I shall call the common-sense position and which runs as follows. Although moral and aesthetic assessments play some role in the writing of history, historians are to a large extent concerned with making true statements about the past and with giving correct explanations pf past events, and these central activities can and ought to be assessed by empirical standards, which on the whole are not dissimilar to those employed in the sciences. For White, historical accounts are more like literary fictions than like scientific accounts. They are to be assessed ultimately by appeal to pragmatic, moral, and aesthetic considerations rather than to empirical ones. My aim in this paper is mainly critical. I shall examine a number of claims and arguments which White puts forward in opposition to the common-sense position and argue that they do nothing to undermine it. I shall concentrate mainly on his article "The Historical Text as a Literary Artifact" (in Clio, Vol. Ill, No. 3, June, 1974), although I shall be making some reference to his book Metahistory (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973).

The paper considers the general question of whether unconscious practical inference is possible. It undertakes an investigation of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, in order to determine whether his theory can meet the requirements of the practical inference model, and thus make room for unconscious practical inference. The paper argues that it cannot: although Freud's theory appears to meet certain conditions necessary for practical inference, i.e., minimal agent rationality and the postulation of desires, it leaves out one element which is essential for the identification of an unconscious practical inference—namely, unconscious belief.

Robert Pargetter has recently argued that, even if the theist cannot produce plausible explanations for the evil we experience, the atheologian has no justifiable basis for claiming that evil can in any sense count as strong evidence against God's existence. His strategy is to challenge as question-begging (1) the atheologian's assumption that a prima facie conflict between God and evil exists and (2) the atheologian's claim that God's nonexistence is a more plausible explanation for unresolved (unexplained) evil than a number of theistic options. I argue that Pargetter is unsuccessful, mainly because he (1) fails to understand clearly the conditions under which a prima facie moral conflict exists and (2) fails to distinguish clearly between 'plausibility' and 'possibility' as these terms are applicable to explanatory hypotheses.

Some charge W.V. Quine with being a behaviorist. Others attempt to clear him of the charge. In replying to Harman in Words and Objections, Quine himself says he is as behavioristic as anyone in his right mind could be, but nowhere does he give us a satisfactory account of how behavioristic that is. It is worthwhile trying to clear up this confusing situation. Two kinds of behaviorism are often distinguished, logical behaviorism and the thesis about the science of psychology known as methodological behaviorism. A careful definition of logical behaviorism, together with a description of relevant aspects of Quine's philosophy, enable us to conclude that Quine is no logical behaviorist. Rather, various moves Quine makes justify ascribing to him a doctrine we call "methodological behaviorism in linguistics." Our definition of this doctrine is based on an extended analysis of methodological behaviorism in psychology.

Sartre says that no Husserlian transcendental ego can exist because it would have to be simultaneously both a principle of unification and a concrete, individual moment in the stream of consciousness. If the former, it could not be experienced phenomenologically and would become a hypothetical and purely theoretical construction, nor would it be congruent with the phenomenological idea of consciousness as experience. If the latter, it could not unify all moments of consciousness because it would exist merely as one of the moments to be unified. Against Sartre’s argument, we submit (on what we feel are essentially Husserlian grounds) that the ego can be and is both these things simultaneously, owing to the directional character of consciousness which Husserl describes in his lectures on time consciousness.

The aim of the paper is to present an exposition of Henry Sidgwick's view of the relationship between philosophy and common sense. Sidgwick's views on such traditional philosophical issues as the existence of God, the free will controversy, and the nature of mind and matter are presented. It is argued that Sidgwick has a very positive attitude toward the beliefs of the educated plain man and that he accepts a philosophical outlook which might warrant us in classifying him, with some qualification, as a common sense realist.

An attempt to argue that the introduction of the category of the absurd into Kierkegaard's discussion of truth as subjectivity in the Postscript is an altogether rigorous and logical move.

Modern Western liberalism is a further development of certain philosophical trends which were emerging in the 19th century. It reflects a particular confluence of utilitarian and natural law doctrines, and of ideological expressions of capitalism and socialism. The writings of J.S. Mill stand as among the earliest and most persuasive efforts to reconcile the often conflicting demands these trends have placed upon their interpreters. This study of Mill’s philosophy explores the "incompatibility" of these conflicts as he strives to deal with them in the articulation of his democratic liberalism. Despite the increasing value that socialism held for him, I argue that Mill never really abandons his liberalist philosophy. His lifelong commitment to individualism and utilitarianism, coupled with his rejection of key socialist principles, is sufficient evidence for my conclusion that Mill's philosophy could never reach true socialism insofar as it retains the fundamental concepts of democratic liberalism.

The essay is an exposition and critical analysis of Peter Unger's book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford, 1975). In the introductory chapter my main object, in addition to defining terms, is to distinguish the two forms of scepticism Unger defends in Ignorance, which he calls, respectively, scepticism about knowledge and scepticism about rationality. Chapter II is devoted to an exposition, analysis, and evaluation of the latter and Chapter III of the former. In Chapter IV I consider a second-order argument that informs Unger's case throughout the book, his "ancestor language" hypothesis. In the final chapter I assess his scepticism as a whole and attempt to develop some of its implications concerning both the possibility and actuality of knowledge.

Wittgenstein's remarks in his Tractatus on mathematics are quite obscure. Benacerraf and Putnam wrote, "In his Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein maintained, following Russell and Frege, that mathematics was reducible to logic." On the other hand, Max Black claims, "Wittgenstein does not regard mathematics as reducible to logic, in the manner of Whitehead and Russell." I offer a detailed commentary upon Wittgenstein's remarks, concluding that his views most likely do not follow those of Frege and Russell. I reject a criticism of Wittgenstein presented by Black but find severe shortcomings in the view I take Wittgenstein to be presenting.

The passage which occurs in Plato's Philebus 25C8-E2 examines the relation between three of four classes of Being which are introduced at 23C. Problems with the text and explication of the passage are considered. Ibis paper attempts to illuminate two central issues of the later dialogues on which the interpretation of this passage rests, the significance of πέρς or the limiting class of Being, and the overall operation of συναγωγή or collection, characterizing the method of diairesis, the foundation of the later dialectic.This paper argues for the need to emend the text to read συμμισγομένων (or even συγγιγνομένων) since this is the significance required by the context; to take the referrent of έϗείνη to be πέρατος γέννα; and to understand άπείρου γέννα and πέρατος γέννα as the referrents of τούτων άμκροτέων.

The passage in the Phaedo where Plato argues that all learning is, in some sense, recovery of knowledge which we already possess has been as much discussed as any in Plato's dialogues. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, there are many questions about the passage which have not yet been satisfactorily answered. Answers are offered here to some of the most pressing of these questions taking special account of some useful recent discussion of the passage.

Five purposive relations are investigated: endeavoring, endeavoring for a certain purpose, bringing something about in a certain endeavor, bringing something about for a certain purpose, and bringing something about intentionally. No satisfactory analysis of these terms has yet been proposed, either in mentalistic -- belief, desire, intending -- or in action terms. While bringing something about for a certain purpose may seem too obscure to be taken as a primitive, there are at least two arguments in favor of it. First, no analyses in terms of other primitives has worked; second, the rather natural definitions of the other notions which it makes possible take us some way toward understanding the structure of intentional action.

This paper is a critical discussion of Robert T. Hall's recent attempt to construct a "minimal" definition of 'civil disobedience.' It is shown that the analysis, if applied consistently, results in a definition which is too minimal in including far too much under the rubric of 'civil disobedience.’ Furthermore, it is argued that Hall himself is not consistent in his treatment, the result being a definition which is too restrictive insofar as it excludes certain clear cases of civilly disobedient action. It is shown that the inadequacies in Hall's minimal definition stem from an underlying confusion in his understanding of civil disobedience, the nature of which is indicated by examining his treatment of one of the features commonly held to be essential to acts of civil disobedience, namely, the publicity attending their performance. Finally, my argument is intended to demonstrate that any proposed definition of 'civil disobedience' which does not include reference to a publicity condition is bound to fail to do the job required of it.

In this paper I examine Pierre Duhem's position on the problem of crucial experiments and the falsification of hypotheses. Duhem maintained that conclusive falsification of an isolated hypothesis is impossible; he maintained further that crucial experiments are impossible. But, I argue, this does not imply, as Adolf Grunbaum and others have taken Duhem to imply, that one could always save any hypothesis by making adjustments elsewhere in the system. By analyzing the logic of falsification, by examining the text of Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, and by surveying the recent articles about Duhem I show the correct interpretation of Duhem, the primary reason for the misinterpretations of him, and the value of Duhem's position.

As it is appropriate to regard mental events as properties of their subject rather than as entities, so it is appropriate to treat actions as properties of the agent rather than as particulars. It is argued that the property approach to action should not be rejected because of the implausibility of the theories of Goldman and Kim; for properties need not and should not be individuated in their way. It is also argued that the question of treating actions as particulars or properties is to be settled on pragnatic grounds: it has no clear metaphysical significance. Finally it is argued that the logical form of action sentences, which Davidson endeavours to display by treating acts as particulars, can be shown with greater simplicity and plausibility on a property approach.

The sentential calculus SC of Kalish and Montague is extended to modal sentences. Rules of inference and a derivation procedure are added. The resultant natural deduction system SMC is like a system for S4 due to Fitch, but SMC is for S5 and the restriction on necessity derivation concerns .terminations of such derivations whereas the restriction on strict subordinate proof in Fitch's system concerns the line-by-line development of such proofs. An axiomatic system AxMC for S5 founded on SC is presented and it is shown that SMC and AxMC are equivalent : what ever is derivable in one system is derivable in the other.

One widely recognized difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in the ability of the former versus the inability of the latter to support certain sorts of related subjunctive conditionals. Nelson Goodman's theory of projectibility is here evaluated on the basis of its implications for the relative acceptability of conflicting subjunctive conditionals or counterfactuals. It is argued that the theory's extensionalistic character precludes its dealing adequately with cases of a certain type in which the difference between two counterfactuals, one acceptable and the other unacceptable, is clearly related to a difference in nomological status between their indicative counterparts.

This paper provides an account of the development of the logos concept in Heidegger’s writings on language and examines the implications of logos for a philosophy of language. In Being and Time/ Heidegger described logos as prelanguage, a preliminary perception of the world which often finds expression in verbal communication. This view is made clear by Heidegger's account of the act of speaking in which formless prior understanding (logos) is shaped into verbal expression. Heidegger's analysis of the communicative act in Being and Time viewed logos as one of the ways in which man can experience his world. In his later writings, however, logos is the path to Being. Language precedes man and is the "house of Being." By this Heidegger means that man lives in language which is the major force in the creation of his world. Heidegger's view of language, then, is a protest against the modern tendency to view language as a mere tool, thereby stripping it of its value and connotative dimensions.

The longest remarks in the section of the Tractatus devoted to science (6.3 ff.) introduce the net metaphor in a discussion of Newtonian mechanics. These sections of the Tractatus are generally believed to be inconsistent with the rest of the book. After a brief description of these difficulties and some relevant historical background I suggest a re-interpretation of the net metaphor in terms of contemporary debates about mechanics. This interpretation shows that the account of science in the Tractatus is an application of the picture theory and eliminates a long standing inconsistency in the reading of Wittgenstein.