Anyone with more than casual interest in Aristotle's Categories knows the convention that "predicated of" ["κατηγορεἳται"] marks a general relation of predication while "said of" ["λέγεται"] is reserved for essential predication. By "convention" I simply mean to underscore that the view in question ranks as the conventional or received interpretation. Ackrill, for example, follows the received view in holding that only items within the same category (not arbitrarily, of course) can stand in the being-said-of relation and, thus, that only secondary substances can be said of primary substances. Despite its long received status the convention has never received a fully comprehensive examination and defense. In fact such an account is needed because, while enjoying considerable textual support, certain passages of the Categories appear to clash with the convention. My aim in this paper is, first, to develop and defend the standard interpretation, as I shall call it. Since the standard interpretation has lately been challenged in a closely argued article by Russell Dancy, my defense will proceed partly with an eye to his criticisms. Having met these, I go on to raise some difficulties with the rather unorthodox reading Dancy gives the Categories. The crucial point here turns out to be what Aristotle understands by a paronym.

It might appear that apologists for legal systems should have a more difficult time justifying particular acts of civil disobedience than do anarchist critics of legal systems. But while this might be so for law breaking simpliciter, I argue that it is not so for civilly disobedient law breaking. The logic of morally justifying civil disobedience is remarkably similar for both legal apologists and anarchists, and diverges only on the question of accepting punishment for one's acts. But even here what it is obligatory upon either to do is remarkably similar. Where differences in how civil disobedience is justified begin to arise is on the question of accepting punishment for breaking the law. For readily discernible reasons this is a strict obligation for legal apologists; for anarchists, however, it is but a contingent obligation. Nonetheless, in practice anarchists who engage in civil disobedience will find themselves under an obligation to suffer punishment. Essentially this is because doing so is necessary in order that the act of civil disobedience be an effective one, and like everyone else, anarchists have an obligation to try to be effective in the actions they undertake to remedy injustice. The paper concludes with offering two reasons why even anarchists ought to risk submitting to punishment by illegitimate authority by engaging in civil disobedience.

Philosophers have both produced as well as replied to a number of alleged "counter-examples" to the rule of substitution. Recently, Cartwright has urged that the standard reply to at least one of them is inadequate. The counter-example he singles out is:1) . Giorgioni is so-called because of his size.2) . Giorgiori = Barbarelli :3) . Barbarelli is so-called because of his size.Cartwright argues that since 1) and 2) are true while 3) false, substitution has failed. It is argued in reply that, contrary to Cartwright's claim, substitution does not even occur in the above argument. Rather, the meaning of the predicate "is so-called because of his size" changes from 1) to 3), rendering the invalidity the result of equivocation, not the failure of substitution.

The subject of this paper is the distinction between (actively) bringing about and (passively) letting-happen, and the implications of the distinction in the ethics of decision-making, especially in cases of withdrawal of therapy in critical care. First, the no-difference arguments of Rachels and Tooley are outlined. Some counter-arguments to the no-difference thesis are brought forward, and it is concluded that all the no-difference arguments show is that in some cases the active-passive factor is relatively insignificant compared to other ethical factors. Yet the counterarguments make clear that in some cases, the active-passive factor is ethically critical. Therefore, as a general principle, the no-difference thesis must fail. Finally, it is argued that the no-difference thesis tends to misidentify action with bodily movement. Some discussion of how the active-passive distinction might be analysed is included.

To establish a frame of reference for addressing the right to die question, I use Rawls's theory of justice to derive principles for the just distribution of health care —a primary good with distinctive attributes requiring distribution according to need, with lesser needs having priority. Where resources run out, or where care no longer functions as a primary good, the right to health care ends. This scheme of health care rights allows us to define three senses in which a patient may be said to have a right to die: he may lack the moral right to treatment necessary to life; he may have that right but choose not to exercise it; or he may have a moral right to treatment which shortens life.

This index gives the location of each reference in Spinoza's Ethics to every axiom, definition, corollary, scholium, and proposition in that work.

Robert Nozick has attempted to demonstrate that a state can emerge from anarchy which will be legitimate, in that it acquires power in morally permissible (i.e., non rights violating) ways. Its monopoly on force and apparent redistribution of holdings are, according to Nozick, justified by the steps required to prevent risky behavior by the dominant agency. These steps, I argue, contravene Nozick's own entitlement principles and so, his dominant agency is not warranted in taking them. This leaves Nozick "stranded" within his own state of nature, the dominant agency unable to legitimately transform itself into a night watchman state.

This essay is a defense of Platonic eudalmonism. Plato identified human excellence with mental health, mental health with psychic harmony, psychic harmony with the rule of reason, and he conceived reason to he the synergetic union of the power to know and the power to love. Plato believed that virtue is a constitutent of eudaimonia, that, therefore, it is its own reward. Plato was right on all these counts but one. He misunderstood the nature of the love that is a constituent of reason. That love is not the eras of the Symposium. It is what I call'undemanding love'. In this essay I describe the structure of undemanding love and I explain its connections with reason, mental health, and the moral excellence that is characteristic of a rational being.

I argue that looking for functions that explain the survival value of various language forms (e.g., words, surface syntactic structures) taken with their characteristic cooperative hearer responses, while looking also for functions that explain the survival value of the mental or neural equipments that learn to produce and to react to these language forms, is a reasonable and promising approach to the study of language and the philosophy of mind. The approach promises to help to unify the philosophy of language, showing clearly how the semantic or representational side of language and the performance or "doing" side of language are integrated. The approach leads us, among other places, to a naturalistic theory of representations (e.g., sentences, beliefs, intentions) that is a distant yet genuine relative of current "causal" and "historical" theories of knowledge and of reference.

The philosopher Averroes (1126-1198), known to the West as the Commentator on Aristotle, was also a physician. This suggests the question: Were medicine and philosophy two different and parallel interests in Averroes' intellectual life or were they in some way related within a single context of wisdom? By investigating Averroes' main, but often-neglected medical work, the Colliget, together with other relevant texts, this article showsthat Averroes sees medicine as based on principles of natural philosophy and parallel to moral philosophy. In both medical and philosophical contexts the principle of equilibrium is stressed.

This paper attempts a defense of John Stuart Mill’s absolute ban against paternalistic restrictions on liberty. Mill’s principle looks more credible once we recognize that some instances of what are thought to be justified instances of paternalism are not instances of paternalism at all—e.g. anti-duelling laws. An interpretation of Mill’s argument is advanced which stresses his commitment to autonomy and his suggestion that exactly the same reasons which favor absolute freedom of speech also favor an absolute prohibition of paternalism. Alternative expositions and appraisals of Mill by Gerald Dworkin and Joel Feiriberg are criticized. Finally, consideration is given to two arguments that render Mill’s principle trivial via the denial that there are any significant self-regarding actions.

A democrat who finds himself in the minority on some political issue is compelled to judge that the policy favored by the majority ought to be implemented even though he believes that same policy ought not to be implemented because it does not represent the best social policy. I argue that this paradox does not reduce to a mere conflict of prima facie judgments (Rawls); that to view the paradox as a conflict of desires rather than of principles (Barry) makes it impossible for the democrat to decide what policy is best; that the paradox does not rest on the mistaken assumption that the policy favored by the majority is the best (Haksar) and that it is only by understanding the seemingly incompatible judgments in a way that allows them both to be true that the paradox can be resolved.

When analyzing 'justified factual knowledge that h', we must speak of justified belief in h and also of h ' s being a justified proposition. Gettier-type problems can be dealt with by requiring that the belief in h be justified through its connection with a 'justification-explaining chain' related to h. The social aspects of knowledge can be encompassed by analyzing what it is for h to be a justified proposition in terms of h's relation to the rationality of an 'epistemic community'.The discussion explains these analyses, and shows how to concept of a justification-explaining chain is related to Ernest Sosa's concept of a 'tree of knowledge'. The present account of justification is seen to be preferable.A rationale for appealing to justification-explaining chains emerges from Popper's concern with another type of knowledge, namely, sets of propositions embedded in systems used by epistemic communities in pursuit of epistemic goals.In conclusion, the present approach is related to a number of examples found in the literature concerning the social aspects of knowledge.

In his Eros and Civilization Marcuse seeks assurance in Freud of the possibility of a non-repressive society. He finds such assurance, this paper argues, only by misinterpreting the Freudian concepts of "reality" and "repression." By reducing reality simply to the perversity of nature and the consequent need to work, Marcuse ignores the essential social aspect of Freud's "reality," and the primarily sexual and interpersonal repression resulting from it. Marcuse sees such repression as unnecessary, mainly because he sees as its only source the unnatural organization of necessary repression, i.e., that unpleasure resulting from the need to work. The social organization necessitated by the exercise of sexual prerogative, which Freud emphasizes, Marcuse ignores. Given Marcuse's non-Freudian emphasis on nature, a non-repressive society seems possible, but at the same time history, that total, cultural milieu of man permeated by unnatural, "surplus" repression, becomes completely contingent and unintelligible.

This paper attempts to explore the position that A. N. Whitehead's ultimate principle of creativity may be identified explicitly as an eternal object. Such an interpretation seems to lend greater coherence to the categoreal scheme in Process and Reality and establish Whitehead's metaphysics as more of a rationalistic enterprise than most commentators are willing to admit. It would be rationalistic to the extent that its ultimate principle illustrates one of the categories of existence. That is, creativity may be viewed as an eternal object rather than a surd element which falls outside the categoreal scheme. As eternal object, creativity would serve as the very foundation of rationality in Whitehead's metaphysical system.

There is a question over whether or not Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), contended that the rich devise structures of authority (especially civil government) to protect their wealth. At issue is whether significant, private wealth can exist prior to forms of authority. Smith seems to me not to have thought so. It is true that he asserts that, "antecedent to any civil institutions", superiority of fortune can "give some men superiority over the greater part of their brethren" (p.670). However, I argue that there is strong reason not to take the word "antecedent" here in a temporal sense. In numerous and important examples Smith depicts the relationship between wealth and authority as non-empirical (or at least not simply empirical). This connection flows naturally from Smith's epoch-making redefinition of wealth as the productive capacity which a society can command within its given social and political framework. Appreciating this point leads one to see Smith as developing an early form of historical materialism.

This is a selected bibliography of Kant's third Critique.

I show that what Quine calls 'pressing from above' is an argument for indeterminacy of translation that is generated by assuming the partial interpretation view of scientific theories. Furthermore, I argue that Quine's thesis should be understood as a reductio ad absurdum of partial interpretation and/or the view that the meaning of a term determines a unique extension for the term.

What is considered in this paper is the Hobbesian contention that there is no morality without government and consequently that there can be no moral criticism of government. It is argued that there are vital shifts in the way Hobbes thinks of rights, duties, and justice, without which outright contradictions result. Thus the Hobbesian claim that, in a state of nature, everyone has a right to everything, is equivalent to the claim that, in a state of nature, no one has a right to anything. But on Hobbes’ own account there must be rights as well as duties in a state of nature, hence also justice and injustice. It is argued that confusion about duties and justice as well as rights results from failing to distinguish rights from liberties and from power.

The theme of the human person and immortality has currently and forcefully become an issue in the face of modern materialism and dehumanization. The purpose of this paper is to investigate some philosophical issues involved in this theme with reference to Ibo (African) mataphysics as a contribution in this area. The approach is partly interpretive and partly analytical of some cultural ideas of the Ibos. The Ibos are not total materialists in their fundamental views of reality, especially with regard to the human person of which they have high regard. An analysis of some of their primitive notions and traditions shows the transcendental or metaphysical aspect of the human person. By analyzing human presence metaphysically, it is shown that personhood (Thou) is a manifestation through the body. The person or Thou survives the decay of the body. The Ibo notion of death as a "passage," the cult of ancestors, belief in reincarnation and an analysis of some dreams indicate the native sense of personal immortality. In conclusion, a warning is given against imported materialism which poses a threat to the Ibo holistic view of man since the problem today is how to integrate modern scientific and technological achievements with the traditional values without losing sight of the vital transcendence of the human person.