A valid logical form is exhibited which underlies many arguments for logical, precognitive, and causal fatalism. The tools of modal and metrical tense logic (Prior's) are employed. And the logic of subjunctive conditionals is employed to display for the first time the valid variant of this form which underlies the most plausible causal fatalisms. Eleven arguments from ancient, medieval, and modern authors are shown to have variants of this valid form.The truth of the premises is examined, especially the premise that the past is necessary. This is made precise and defended as Ockham and Montague suggest, and this defence's implicit logic of the interrelations of time, modality, and counterfactual dependence is explored, A novel argument is given to refute the ancient view that unchangeable truth of a tensed sentence is proof of its necessity. Logical fatalism is shown to be not falsifiable independently of the falsity of causal fatalism.

The writings of the Italian philosophers Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) and Mario Calderoni (1879-1914), sometimes called logical pragmatists, are not well-known in the English-speaking countries. A recent revival of interest is due in part to the reflection in the works of these men of later developments in analytic and pragmatic philosophy. This bibliography has three parts; In Part I are listed English and French translations of some of Vailati's writings, and commentaries in English and French on his work. Part II indicates the extent of Vailati's correspondence with scholars of his time, and lists reviews by Vailati of the works of his contemporaries. Part III is a list of his major writings in Italian, with English translations of the titles.

This paper contrasts the morally suspect elements in Marx's comments on relations between men and women in the 1844 Manuscripts with the more sensible and liberal tone of Marx's (and Engels') remarks on the same topic in post-1844 writings. The contrast is used to illustrate the claim that an important moral shift occurs in Marx's thought around 1844, a shift away from the early concern to overcome bourgeois egoism and with it the antagonism between state and civil society, and toward the mature concern to eliminate what are perceived to be unfair inequalities of power among economic agents in a capitalist economy.The concept of alienation articulated in the Manuscripts attempts to combine these disparate concerns, and in consequence Marx's discussion there founders interestingly.

The view that animals are thoughtless brutes was the subject of considerable controversy during the seventeenth century. Locke clearly perceived his own position to differ substantially from that of Descartes. Historians usually credit Locke with an anti-Cartesian view of the nature of animals and with setting the vogue in France for a concept of soul that differentiated people and animals only in degree. According to Bayle, for example, "Locke has declared himself against those who will not attribute reason to beasts." In this paper I show that Locke does not attribute reason to beasts, that his ontological position does not differ in great detail from Descartes' and does not differ in its social consequences for animals. I argue that the major differences between Descartes and Locke on the question of animal consciousness are for the most part linguistic.

Paternalism is generally construed to entail two claims about persons toward whom it is directed: (1) that their liberty is impeded, and (2) that their good or interests are promoted or intended. Two recent arguments on the subject are based on the writings of John Stuart Mill: one* by Gerald Dworkin, maintains that paternalism is sometimes justified; the other, by Tom Beauchamp, claims that paternalism is never justified. My critique of both positions is based on a concept of human life as developmental. In that context I argue that Mill's views themselves entail paternalism, Dworkin's position collapses into Beauchamp's, and Beauchamp neglects the crucial role of liberty in his critique of Mill. My conclusion suggests that a parental model be substituted for that of the pater, so that the individual's capacity for freedom be fully respected.

In Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley speaks of the sensible qualities of an apple (its colour, taste, smell, etc.) as being its parts. The paper argues that our words for sense-qualities play a role so unlike that of part-words (stem, core, skin) that verbal atrocities would result from treating qualities as parts. Berkeley lends a surface plausibility to this move by focusing on a narrow selection of the normal linguistic accompaniment of the noun 'apple'. He puts out of mind the language of 'doing things with apples'— peeling, dicing, and so on— which when recalled shows how strikingly far apart are the two categories he tries to mingle.

This bibliography of Ludwig Wittgenstein is limited to the doctoral dissertations submitted in North American Universities. It covers almost all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought. Compared with K.T. Fann's "Wittgenstein Bibliography", published in the International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 7 1967 pp. 311-339, where there are only seventeen references to Ph.D. dissertations, this present list cites more than one hundred and twenty five. Further, the dissertations which have been published are indicated.

Professor Harry Frankfurt has made a distinction between what he calls first-order desires, such as a desire for a Porsche, and second-order desires, such as a desire to desire (or a desire not to desire) a Porsche. He claims that this analysis of the structure of the will can provide an account of free human action. I argue against Frankfurt as follows: First, his account does not really free our wills, but only binds our wills at successively higher levels of desire; second, there is no good reason to think that desires of any level higher than second exist; and third, critical review of one's desires necessarily involves the idea of an ought, and is thus not really a second-order desire at all. Rightly understood, all "higher-order" critical review of one's desires occurs at a single "level" of review, contrary to what Frankfurt believes, and this fact makes room for the theory of agency.

Traditional interpretations of the Euthydemus find little of value in its sophistical sections. Where value is found at all it is in those aspects of the sophistic display which point to (but do not adequately analyze) serious issues in other dialogues. This paper argues that there is methodological value intrinsic to the sophistic sections, that taken together these displays make a coherent and valuable contribution to an understanding of sophistic argumentation, and of the foundations of correct reasoning. Each of the sections deals in some way with the principle of contradiction; it is the manipulation of this principle which produces the sophistic tricks, and the principle itself which reveals and organizes around itself the many sides of the sophistic display. The first display offers an apparent refutation of this principle, one based only on verbal ambiguity. In the second display the principle is denied from Parmenidean and Heraclitean perspectives, and the implications of such are analyzed. In the third display the brothers misapply this principle to relational predicates so as to work their tricks. Plato reveals here the necessity and limits of the principle of contradiction, and how its denial and misuse stand at the basis of various sophistical arguments.

Popper’s three world doctrine, it has been argued by Peyerahend and Krige, is a rejection of the type of critical dualism of facts and norms articulated in The Open Society. Peyerabend argues further that world 3 acts as a methodological prison designed to restrict the free decision of the individual theoretical scientist. It is my position that Popper's concept of world 3 is not a rejection of critical dualism but rather an attempt to allow for the existence of free normative decisions within the context of a binding tradition. The key to understanding this move is the notion of an objective norm. Specifically I argue that Popper's pluralistic epistemology is based on a traditional many-levelled semantics developed originally to combat psychologism and used now to place the issue of the choice of methodological norms within the framework of a theory of tradition.

"Possibilism" is the view that among the things that there are, or which have being»are included individual objects which do not exist, although they conceivably could have existed, and would have existed if certain possible-but-unrealized states of affairs had obtained. In this paper I try to develop a plausible ontological context from which the possibilist thesis could be deduced. Among the assumptions that are required for the argument is the idea that a state of affairs is a complex entity individuated by its constituents and their arrangement in that state of affairs. This is contrasted with Chisholm's strategy for individuating states of affairs. If one also assumes that possible states of affairs have their status as possibilities as a matter of logical necessity, then it is shown how a possibilist could argue that non-existent objects would have being as constituents of possible-but- non-obtaining states of affairs. In particular, possibilism could be seen as the view that the being of non-existent objects is required as an ontological ground of the possiblity of there having existed objects other than those things that do actually exist.

In Part I of this essay I distinguish perception from sensation and sensory processing, and I argue that propositional perceiving is an act, intentional, cognitive, and can go amiss. In Part II I show that perceiving must be committive to go amiss, and since a committive, cognitive, intentional act is assentive, I conclude that propositional perceiving is assentive. In Part III of the essay I argue that nonpropositional perceiving is an act, intentional, cognitive, and capable of going amiss, and hence committive. In the course of showing that nonpropositional perceiving is cognitive, I examine Bertrand Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance and argue that such knowledge is logically propositional. Since nonpropositional perceiving is a committive, cognitive, intentional act, I conclude that it too is assentive. Thus, the conclusion I reach in this work is that the propositional attitude in perception, whether propositional or nonpropositional, is one of assent.

Comparing E.M. Curley's Descartes Against the Skeptics and Margaret Dauler Wilson's Descartes, I point out a seeming incompatibility between the central theses of the two books and an unclarity in the development of the central thesis in each book. More particularly, I examine and criticize two of Professor Curley's "reconstructions” of arguments in the Meditations : the argument from dreaming in Meditation I and the ontological proof in Meditation V. In Professor Wilson's book, I raise questions about her interpretation of the passages about the wax in Meditation II and the Attribution to Descartes of a "non-Platonic" theory of mathematics on the basis of passages in Meditations V and VI.

In this paper a view of self-deception is given which eliminates the paradox usually associated with self-deception (i.e., the self deceived believes both p and not-p at the same time).Self-deception is distinguished from ignorance, false belief, wishful thinking, and reluctance to believe. Through an analysis of ordinary language, the role of knowing and believing in self-deception is examined as well as the notion of the self-deceived person "persuading himself to believe." The role of intention and the function of "self" in "self-deception" is analyzed through a discussion of evidence and interpretation.It is shown that the self-deceived person does not know or even believe p, but is, nevertheless, properly characterized as "self-deceived." It is argued that the self-deceived person believes not-p and does not know, or even believe, p. The paradox turns out to be more apparent than real.

In the second Meditation Descartes claims to establish beyond a doubt that he exists. In the third Meditation, however, he seems to question this claim. There he maintains that until he has proven that there is a nondeceiving God, he cannot remove the demon hypothesis and, hence, cannot "be certain of anything," In his "Descartes Self-Doubt" Donald Sievert proposes a reading of the text which would allow Descartes to make both claims without contradiction. According to Sievert, Descartes advances two distinct claims for self-knowledge—that is, Descartes claims self-knowledge of an occurrent self and self- knowledge of a substantial self. While the latter is subject to doubt until the demon is dismissed, the former is never doubted. I find Sievert's interpretation enticing but incorrect. The distinction which he sees clearly in the Meditations is one which, I believe, Descartes was working toward, but one which he did not have clearly in mind.

This paper attempts to undermine Michael McKinsey’s Important objections to Kripke’s attempts to refute cluster versions of description theories of name reference. McKinsey argues that Kripke Ignores descriptions to which a clustser theorist might appeal In constructing his counterexamples, but that these same descriptions are what guide our intuitions In evaluating the examples. I argue that the descriptions McKinsey offers are question-begging, and thus of no help to a cluster theorist. In a second brief section, I offer an argument designed to show that even If McKinsey*s descriptions were legitimate, the views Kripke endorses in "Naming and Necessity" would be supported rather than vitiated.

The C. I. Lewis Collection at Special Collections, Stanford University, contains papers and letters which update or expand upon topics discussed by C. I. Lewis during his professional career. This edition of Lewis' reflections on topics related to empirical knowledge and phenomenology is intended to make those materials readily available to scholars and philosophers interested in the philosophy of C. I. Lewis or in those topics represented here. (Also included are two significant references to and revisions of his early works.)

The paper assumes the usefulness of juxtaposing the major philosophical, religious, and literary components of the milieu of Newman's notion of knowledge. Rooted in classical philosophies of mind, his view draws both upon the idealisms of Kant and others and upon the variety of romanticisms of Coleridge and of the Oxford Movement. His Apologia Pro Vita Sua holds in uneasy reconciliation his insistence at once upon the necessity of rational grounds for belief and upon the psyche's need for transcendence of rational processes. The resulting empiricism, most clearly stated in his Grammar of Assent, exhibits some of the theoretical problems common to that modern school of philosophy.

In this essay I argue: (1) that Sartre's account of freedom falls back into the Cartesian problems it is explicitly designed to escape (specifically the Cartesian problem of how a disembodied will can move the physical body in freedom); that Sartre simply pushes the old Cartesian problem of how a spontaneity can act on an object back to the level of pre-reflective original freedom, without solving it; (2) that Merleau-Ponty's account does indeed move us beyond the Cartesian dilemmas by rooting freedom in its pre-reflective ground of meaning, which, in essence, is the body's pre-reflective relationality to the world; (3) and that Sartre's account of freedom rests only on the obstacle/task dialectic while Merleau-Ponty's account seems to rest on the richer dialectics of both obstacle/task and giving/receiving.

This paper criticises rationalist ideas of intellectual honesty, arguing that the ethics of belief reduces to an ethics of inquiry, and that the ethics of inquiry should be based not on the dubious concept of 'sufficiency' of evidence but on economic considerations, such as the availability of time, resources and opportunities. Thus an inquiry may be sufficient for one person and not for another - which makes intellectual honesty difficult to assess. Scientific inquiry is also concerned with belief (to be worth constructing a theory must be at least 'potentially credible'), and the same ethical and economic considerations apply, e.g. to choice between research programs. They apply also to discussion and teaching, e.g. in judging whether participants in discussion are as open-minded as they should be, or whether a teacher is giving due credit to a student whose opinions he disagrees with, or whether he exercises improper censorship.